

CRTP Research Series, No. 1/2021/01

MAPPING OF REGIONAL FAITH AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS' PEACE STRUCTURES

Democratic Republic of Congo

Ethiopia

Kenya

South Sudan

Elias Opongo, SJ (Editor)

with **Michelle Nyandong, Michelle Gikonyo, and Jean Philippe Mugangu.**



**Centre for Research, Training
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Executive Summary

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan are countries that have experienced chronic conflict due to internal and external influences. The dynamics of conflicts in these countries have evolved and brought about more complexity and diversification in the approaches used to resolve conflict. These countries are prone to chronic internal inter-ethnic clashes and border disputes that have claimed lives and displaced many people in the region. This study aimed to identify and analyse the approaches to peacebuilding used by diverse peace structures in these regions with a descriptive research design applied to enable the researchers to meet the objectives of the study. Consequently, this study targeted Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs), Community Based Organizations (CBOs), and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working in these countries. Quantitative and qualitative data analysis techniques were used for data collection primarily through open-ended questionnaires and interviews with the representatives of targeted peace organizations in the four countries. The research findings revealed that the theory of change used by the organizations varied according to their thematic focuses and are often revisited during the implementation phase of the project undertaken by the organizations. The study also revealed that religious leaders played an influential role in peacebuilding activities as they benefit from a high level of confidence from the local population. Finally, the study revealed that a lack of collaboration and coordination among peace structures was mainly fuelled by a conflict of interests and differences of ideology. Therefore, this study recommends that FBOs, CBOs as well as other peace structures must develop new alliances to operate in synergy towards the achievement of peace and security through their advocacy actions for positive socio-political change in the communities they are involved with.




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


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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EOTC	Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahindo Church
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
FBO	Faith-Based Organisation
FDLR	Forces Democratique de Liberation du Rwanda
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
HIPSIR	Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICNL	International Centre for Not for profit Law
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NAP	National Action Plan
NCKK	National Council of Churches in Kenya
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RNC	Rwanda National Congress
RPP	Regional Peace Partners
SNNP	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples'
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
UMHK	Union Minière du Haut-Katanga
WFDD	World Faith Development Dialogue
WPS	Women, Peace and Security



INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

The chronic nature of conflicts in the Eastern, Central, and Horn of Africa regions has been a menace for many decades. Conflicts in these regions have claimed the lives of millions and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. The protractive nature of these conflicts has also slowed down the long-term development of most countries in the region as a result of failed politics and inter-ethnic clashes. To this effect, the Regional Peace Partners (RPP) expressed a desire to learn more about Theories of Change (TOC) employed by different organisations towards resolving conflicts. The Regional Peace Partners are structured within a nested partnership of six organisations which include: the African Council of Religious Leaders – Religions for Peace (ACRL-RfP), All Africa Conference of Churches, Arigatou International, the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA), Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations, International Centre for Peace and Human Rights and Development in Africa.

The mapping of the Regional Faith and Civil Society Organisations' structures was geared towards learning more about what brings a sustainable change in the lives of communities as well as to understand the theory of change applied in social interventions. There is a need for a constant and reliable update and assessment of the socio-political contexts to make these interventions contextually relevant. Collectively, these organisations have substantial capacity in terms of expertise, resources, and influence that affect change in the regions within which they operate. Over the past two years, the Regional Peace Partners (RPP) team and its partners have been exploring the underlying TOC in projects and programmes. Discussions on TOC among international development circles are gaining momentum particularly because the range of actors involved in the peace and conflict interventions is both broad and diverse.

The research, therefore, set out to:

- Capture the various theories of change used, by drawing experiences from organizations addressing peace and conflict issues in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. This involved: identifying and researching the different faith and CSO peace structures existing in the region, how they interacted with other similar organizations, the strategies that they applied, and informed their work specifically in identifying and evaluating organizational theories of change.
- Analyse the different approaches to change in the region by assessing the role of religious leaders and strategies they used in addressing conflicts as well as gender roles and the extent of women's participation in peacebuilding activities.

Significance of the Research

The outcomes of this research will be used by Regional Peace Program (RPP) members, peacebuilders, civil society groups, and governments to inform their peacebuilding activities as related to the countries under the study.

Secondly, this inter-country study seeks to serve as an effective tool for networking in the diverse peace structures and organizations nationally and internationally through carefully coordinated and collaborative action. It creates a platform for which organisations can learn from one another and adjust their methods and approaches to peaceful conflict resolution, potentially enhancing collaboration among peace structures regionally. Thirdly, this study is

also a crucial platform for scholars who may want to conduct further research on the mapping of regional Faith and Civil Society Organisations' Peace Structures.

Assumptions of the Research

This research represents a modest overview of Regional Faith and CSO structures in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. It is by no means exhaustive and many co-related complex topics have received a cursory mention. Also, minimum attention has been paid to issues of funding and donor support because the focus of the research was reiterated in the majority of the interviews conducted. Throughout the paper, some Faith-Based and Civil Society Organisations have been mentioned to demonstrate specific points, but these references do not purport to completely characterize the situation in question.

Objectives of the Study

The study was guided by four objectives as stated below:

- Identify intervention methods and strategies employed by Faith and CSO Peace Structures
- Explore gender roles and the extent of women's participation in peacebuilding activities
- Identify and describe the role of religious leaders in addressing conflicts
- Highlight advocacy initiatives aligned with social change and policy implementation

Challenges to the Research

There were several challenges encountered while this research was being conducted. In several countries, gender parity could not be attained as most of the respondents were men. Additionally, due to the restrictions imposed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the time frame was limited, and physically reaching several organizations was challenging, therefore online surveys were administered. However, building trust online with some organizations was challenging as these organizations were sceptical of what we intended to do with the information they would provide. This limited the number of respondents. For example, in several countries, such as South Sudan, out of the 100 questionnaires sent, less than 30% were completed in addition to having respondents ask for remuneration to participate. Lastly, the translations of some questionnaires from French to English also proved challenging as some respondents used acronyms in their responses that could not be accurately translated.

While the internet search led only to a few specific sources of information and a large number of passing references to theories of change, it was found that many organisations and individuals were exploring theories of change internally. Almost every interview opened up a new line of inquiry, some of which there was not adequate time to explore. This is therefore not a complete representation of people's perceptions about and/or the use of theories of change, but an opportunity to capture some of the different perspectives on the use of those theories.



COUNTRY DESCRIPTIONS

COUNTRY DESCRIPTIONS

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a country located in the central Africa region. Its capital city, Kinshasa, is the largest in central Africa. It is the second-largest country on the continent after Algeria with a total area of 2,345,410 km². It shares national borders with 9 countries namely: The Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola.¹

The country has a large population estimated at 89,561,403 with a 3.19% growth rate as of July 2020.² The official language is French accompanied by 4 national languages (Tshiluba, Swahili, Lingala, and Kikongo) and more than 200 languages spoken by the different ethnic groups in the country.³

The DRC is endowed with vast natural resources which could potentially make it one of the richest countries on the planet.⁴ It hosts a large part of the equatorial forest and has the largest reserves of Coltan used in the manufacture of phones, computers, and other electronics. It also has large deposits of other precious minerals such as gold, diamond, cobalt, and copper. Agriculture in DRC could potentially provide food for the whole continent considering the large areas of untapped farmland.⁵ However, since the country gained independence from Belgium in 1960, the lack of political and economic stability coupled with the constant state of insecurity in many provinces has slowed down its development. Consequently, the country hosts one of the largest humanitarian crises in the continent with millions of people internally displaced in addition to a large influx of refugees from neighbouring countries. The DRC is also one of the poorest countries on the planet and ranks 179th out of 185 countries in the 2019 Human Development Index at 0.459.⁶ The Covid-19 pandemic outbreak exacerbated existing economic challenges causing a projected economic recession of -2.2% in 2020.⁷ Apart from the recurrent conflicts, the Covid-19 pandemic also affected Eastern Congo which had been previously struck by an Ebola outbreak in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri provinces since 2014, with 3,453 cases and over 2,200 deaths.⁸

Figure 1: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo



(Source: World Atlas)

¹ World Data. 2020. *Democratic Republic of the Congo*. September 17. Accessed September 12, 2020. <https://www.worlddata.info/africa/congo-kinshasa/index.php#:~:text=The%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%20Congo%20is%20a,is%20approximately%20337%25%20of%20the%20area%20of%20Texas;>

² World Population Review. 2020. DR Congo population 2020 (Live). September 16. Accessed September 12, 2020. <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/dr-congo-population/>;

³ Britannica. 2020. Democratic Republic of the Congo. September 11. Accessed September 13, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo>;;

⁴ BBC. 2013. DR Congo: Cursed by its natural wealth. October 9. Accessed September 16, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24396390>;;

⁵ Council on Foreign Relations. n.d. The Eastern Congo. Accessed September 14, 2020. <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/eastern-congo#!/#map>;;

⁶ United Nations Development Programme. 2019. "Human Development Report 2019." Accessed September 14, 2020. <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf>;

⁷ World Bank. 2020. The World Bank in DRC. May 4. Accessed September 16, 2020. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview>;;

⁸ Ibid.;

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2020), the overall security situation in Eastern DRC is intricately bound to the relationships between the major countries of the Great Lakes Region, a region that has been the battle ground of many armed conflicts. The deteriorating nature of the relationships between Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda stem from decades of which each country has accused the other of supporting rebel groups that are hostile to their respective governments based in Eastern DRC.⁹ For instance, in November 2019, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, in a speech insinuated that Uganda and Burundi were sponsoring armed strikes against his country. This came as a reaction to the October 4th 2019 attack on Kinigi village. This attack was attributed to the Forces Democratique de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) in coalition with the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) rebel groups both located in Eastern DRC. Similarly, Burundi and Uganda have accused Rwanda of sponsoring Burundian and Ugandan rebels located in eastern DRC.¹⁰ The newly elected president of DRC, Felix Tshisekedi suggested that a joint military response from DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda could conduct operations on Congolese soil to deal with the threat represented by these armed forces.¹¹ This action has been deemed risky especially considering that it could be used to finance proxy wars by the different parties in the region and further deteriorate the security status in eastern DRC which has historically been the area where regional competitions have been played out.¹²

Contextual Analysis

This section provides an account of the diverse conflict dynamics in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It will also illuminate the ongoing and evolving conflicts in the different regions. The section analyses the socio-political, economic, religious, and Gender-Based Violence (GBV) aspects of conflict in the country.

Socio-political

The political climate in DRC since its independence has been unstable and characterized by long authoritarian regimes. The longest and most noticeable was the dictatorial rule of Mobutu Sese Seko who ruled the country for nearly 30 years after a coup in 1965. His tenure was characterized by a large network of clientelism founded by his privatization of foreign companies from which he amassed a huge fortune.¹³ He was removed from power by Laurent Desire Kabila, a revolutionary leader who marched from the east of the country to Kinshasa with the support of Rwandan and Ugandan troops in 1997.¹⁴ Desire Kabila later decided to send these foreign troops back to their countries but they instead established themselves in the east of the country like Rwanda and Uganda his former allies decided to back a new rebellion in eastern Congo, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). Laurent Desire Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and replaced by his son Joseph Kabila who ruled the country for nearly 18 years. Joseph Kabila's tenure faced several challenges especially regarding the armed groups that committed significant human rights violations against the population in the east of the country. The Sun City accord signed in 2002 put an end to the conflict that had been raging in the eastern part of the country for 4 years. However, a failure to put in place effective mechanisms for the unification of the army and the demobilization of some armed groups has negatively impacted the security status of east Congo.

According to the 2020 Freedom House report, the DRC has been categorized as “not free” with

⁹ Crisis Group. 2020. Averting Proxy Wars in the Eastern DR Congo and Great Lakes. January 23. Accessed September 16, 2020. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/b150-averting-proxy-wars-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes>. par 1-4;

¹⁰ Ibid par 6-9;

¹¹ Ibid 11-12;

¹² Ibid;

¹³ Haskin, Jeanne M. 2005. The tragic state of the Congo: from decolonization to dictatorship. New York: Algora Publishing. P 6-7;

¹⁴ Ibid, p 7;

an aggregate score of 18/100 in terms of political and civil rights.¹⁵ Joseph Kabila's second presidential term ended officially in 2016. However, elections were postponed for 2 years, a period during which several protests in the capital Kinshasa and other major cities ended in bloodbaths leaving many dead or gravely injured. Felix Antoine Tshisekedi was declared winner of the controversial 2018 presidential elections although the results were highly contested. There were reported cases of abuse against opposition parties especially as security forces at times used extreme violence against opposition public political rallies. Furthermore, the 2018 electoral processes in the senate and national assembly witnessed high levels of irregularities. Kabila's coalition held 341 seats of the 500 in the national assembly and 91 of the 101 seats in the senate, granting Kabila significant influence over the legislative body of government in DRC as the leader of the majority and holder of a lifetime senate seat as prescribed by the constitution.¹⁶

Economy

The economy of the Democratic Republic of Congo has mostly relied on the extraction of minerals since the country got its independence in 1960.¹⁷ Shortly after the 1965 coup, Mobutu nationalized foreign companies such as the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK).¹⁸ Mobutu appropriated many of the new state enterprises from which he accumulated a colossal fortune.¹⁹ Apart from the extractive industry, agriculture plays a significant role in the economy of the country as it is among the main sources of food and revenues for the population. This sector has not developed to its full potential because of the deterioration of transportation infrastructures. The country produces significant amounts of coffee and palm oil but hardly benefits from it as most of it is illegally exported to other countries.²⁰

Eastern DRC hosts a large variety of natural resources. However, many mines from which these resources are extracted are often in the control of the armed groups that profit from the illegal trade of these resources to fund their activities in the region. These armed groups terrorize and exploit local populations to work in the mines in addition to physically and psychologically abusing women and children whom they use as sex slaves.²¹ Conflicts for the control of natural resources in eastern DRC have claimed millions of lives and occasioned the mass displacement of people in the region.²² To break the connection between war minerals and international markets, the United States included restrictions and verification mechanisms on the origin of raw natural resources in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010. Section 1502 of the act requires companies under US jurisdiction to ensure that the minerals they use in the manufacturing of their products especially when it comes to electronics such as phones and computers are not tied to the conflict in the DRC.²³

¹⁵ Freedom House. 2020. Democratic Republic of the Congo. Accessed September 18, 2020. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/democratic-republic-congo/free-dom-world/2020;>

¹⁶ Ibid;

¹⁷ Britannica. 2020. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Economy. September 11. Accessed September 20, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo/Economy>, par 1-3;

¹⁸ Turner, Thomas. 2007. *The Congo wars: conflict, myth and reality*. London: Zed Books Ltd. Accessed September 18, 2020. 35;

¹⁹ Britannica. 2020. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Economy. September 11. Accessed September 20, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo/Economy> par 4-6;

²⁰ Britannica. 2020. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Economy. September 11. Accessed September 20, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo/Economy> par 9;

²¹ Amnesty International. n.d. Democratic Republic of Congo. Accessed September 15, 2020. [https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo.](https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo;) ;

²² Ibid;

²³ Ibid;

Religion

The constitution of the DRC endorses freedom of religion or belief to all even during a state of emergency or siege.²⁴ The constitution also includes provisions for the registration of religious groups to conduct their operations on Congolese soil.²⁵ Religion plays an important role in society as religious groups and organizations are greatly involved in the delivery of crucial social services such as education and health care in addition to playing an important role of advocacy on some pressing political issues in the country.²⁶

The 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom estimates that 95.8% of the population in DRC is Christian which is among the highest on the continent. The report also suggests an amelioration of the relationships between the government and the church since the inauguration of the newly elected president Felix Tshisekedi.²⁷ In Upper and Lower Uele Provinces in the North of the country, there have been reported clashes between the nomadic Muslim Mbororo herder population and the local Christian population. However, the economic and political ramifications of this conflict exclude it from being solely considered a conflict based on religion.²⁸ Beyond this, there have been instances of targeted assaults on several churches and their members in North Kivu and Ituri province. For example, the kidnapping of Father Luc Adelar Alecho, a priest and the administrator of the Catholic parish of Marie Reine de Jiba, in Ituri Province's Welendu Ptisi Sector. He was kidnapped because he strongly advocated against armed militias in his homilies.²⁹

Gender-based Violence

The DRC has a track record of gender-based violence. Women have few rights, they “live under the dual cloak of politically-imposed silence as well as silence due to their gender and bear the responsibility of maintaining their families in a context of diminishing resources and increased sexual violence, especially in conflict zones.”³⁰ Discrimination against women is structural—they lack education, are discriminated against, and are economically disempowered in terms of land and inheritance rights as well as access to economic opportunities. Amidst the structural inequality, poverty, and violence, “women are the poorest of the poor.”³¹

The presence of multiple armed groups in eastern DRC has devastating effects on the lives of women and children in the region. According to Human Rights Watch (2020), there have been at least 170 reported cases of abduction in the area of Virunga Park between April 2017 and March 2020. The victims of these abductions were mostly women and underage girls who were tortured, starved, and raped on multiple occasions before being released on ransom or being executed for failure to pay enough money.³² This situation has forced many families to sell their land and other income-generating assets leaving them in complete financial insecurity. Furthermore, victims and their families are often not in a position to afford the permanent medical care required in addition to being constantly subjected to stigma and rejection from their community members.³³

²⁴ 2006. “Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” February. Accessed September 15, 2020. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011.pdf?lang=en. art 61;

²⁵ US Department of State. 2019. “2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Accessed September 17, 2020. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>;

²⁶ US State Department. 2018. Report on International Religious Freedom: Democratic Republic of the Congo. Accessed September 16, 2020. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>;

²⁷ US Department of State. 2019. “2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Accessed September 17, 2020. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>;

²⁸ Ibid;

²⁹ Ibid;

³⁰ Global Fund for Women. n.d. Women's groups in the DRC are demanding justice. Accessed September 17, 2020. <https://www.globalfundforwomen.org/womens-groups-in-drc-demand-justice/>. par 4;

³¹ Ibid. Par 5.;

³² Human Rights Watch. 2020. “DR Congo: Gangs Kidnap, Rape in National Park.” July 31. Accessed September 15, 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/30/dr-congo-gangs-kidnap-rape-national-park>;

³³ Ibid.;

Ethiopia

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (hereafter known as Ethiopia) is a landlocked country following Eritrea's independence in 1993.³⁴ The Eastern African country is nestled in the volatile Horn of Africa region and bordered by Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Ethiopia has one of the oldest Christian civilisations and served as a beacon of hope for African independence during the colonial period as it was never colonised. The government is a federal parliamentary republic with two city administrations Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa with Addis Ababa as the capital city.³⁵ During the period the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front took office, the country acceded to the ethnic federalism model³⁶ comprising nine regions including Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Somali, and Harari, regions which are of different sizes and levels of development.

Following a Consociationalism model,³⁷ the Prime Minister holds a very influential position as the head of the government and the Chief of the Armed Forces while the Chief of State is the president.³⁸ The current president, Sahle-Work Zewde is the first female president of the country, and the Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed is a Nobel Laureate for his attempts to attain peace and international cooperation as a result of the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.³⁹ The country's rapidly growing population of 114,981,813⁴⁰ has assisted it to demonstrate itself as a regional heavyweight in Eastern Africa. It is the second most populous African nation with 83 different languages and about 200 different dialects spoken.⁴¹ The 83 languages are generally categorised into four main ethnolinguistic groupings, specifically, Semitic, Cushitic, Omotic, and Nilo-Saharan.⁴² The Amharic, Oromo, Tigrinya, and Somali are the largest ethnic groups.⁴³ Concerning religion, Orthodox Christians and Muslims are the two major religious groups in the country.⁴⁴ Below is the map of Ethiopia.

Figure 2: Map of Ethiopia



(Source: Geographic Guide)

³⁴ Anderson, Ewan. *Global Geopolitical Flashpoints: an Atlas of Conflict*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2016, 109;

³⁵ Ross, Anthony and Uta Ruppert. *Reconfiguring Transregionalisation in the Global South: African-Asian Encounters*. Springer, 2020, 50;

³⁶ Woldeeslassie, Zerihun Abebe. "Ethnicity, Belonging and Identity among the Eastern Gurage of Ethiopia." *Ethnicities* 17, no. 3 2017, 418; Adimassu, Yonas Girma. *Federalism Vis a Vis the Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence: Critical Analysis of the Law and the Practice in Ethiopian Perspective*. Anchor Academic Publishing, 2015, 25;

³⁷ Kefale, Asnake. *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Regional Study*. Routledge, 2013, 9;

³⁸ Gish, Steven, Winnie Thay, Zawiah Abdul Latif, and Debbie Nevins. *Ethiopia*. New York: Cavendish Square, 2016, 37;

³⁹ Freedom House "Freedom in the World 2020: Ethiopia." 2020, 382 <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-world/2020>;

⁴⁰ World Meters. "Ethiopia Population (LIVE)." Worldometer, July 15, 2020. <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/>;

⁴¹ Austgulen, Johannes Isdahl. *Ethiopia: Experiences and Challenges*. Stockholm: BoD - Books on Demand, 2018, 8;

⁴² Asmerom, Haile K., and Elisa Pereira. *Reis. Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality*. Basingstoke: Springer, 2016, 173;

⁴³ Semela, Tesfaye. "Intergroup Relations among the Ethiopian Youth." *Journal of Developing Societies* 28, no. 3, 2012, 323. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796x12453782>;

⁴⁴ McIntosh, Ian, Nour Farra Haddad, and Dane Munro. *Peace Journeys: a New Direction in Religious Tourism and Pilgrimage Research*. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020, 83;

Contextual Analysis

The section provides an account of the diverse conflict dynamics in Ethiopia. It will also illuminate the ongoing and evolving conflicts in the different regions. The section is structured as follows: political system; ethno-political conflicts; internally displaced persons and gender-based violence.

Politics

The political situation in Ethiopia is very volatile. Exclusivist and dictatorial governmental institutions ever since the imperial (1930–1974) and military (1974–1991) periods have played a part in the springing up and ripening of competing nationalisms in the nation.⁴⁵ Centralised but federated political institutions during the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) epoch have additionally muddled the nationalist landscape by generating several lines of ethno-nationalist wrangles in Ethiopia.⁴⁶

In the past, the country experienced extensive protests because of extrajudicial killings, repressive government policies, human rights violations, and brutality from security forces. Since Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018, Ethiopia has witnessed both fast political liberalisation and a spike in violent conflicts.⁴⁷ The upsurge in violence is mainly due to an escalation in militant, opposing ethnic nationalism within the setting of supposed state fragility and party establishments.⁴⁸ The two agencies have recurrently had an impact on each other for decades. Although the prime minister in 2018 made some progressive steps by releasing political prisoners such as journalists who had been unlawfully detained or imprisoned on politically motivated charges,⁴⁹ this act came after the federal government of Ethiopia ordered a state of emergency that sanctioned draconian limitations on the rights to freedom of expression. The government also lifted the ban on access to diaspora-based media organisations such as Oromia Media Network and Ethiopian Satellite Television and websites which were accused of inciting violence through their criticism of the government. Also, it assured its people that it would revise the controversial 2008 mass media law, which confers extensive powers to the government to take legal action for defamation. However, this is yet to be approved and despite these steps of progress, the government has been accused of killing protesters and torturing those detained.⁵⁰

For instance, in 2020, the government was seen to revert to its former ways with the politically motivated killing of Oromo musician Haacaaluu Hundeessaa who many considered a cultural icon and whose music highlighted the community's grievances of marginalisation, economic and political exclusion amidst years of government repression. This therefore intensified ethnic tensions and widespread protests by the Oromo and the killing of over 239 protesters in July 2020.⁵¹ The government also reinforced an internet ban,⁵² similar to the previous government which was known for restricting internet access. According to the federal government, social media has been used as a tool for inflaming ethnic extremism and undermining the system of governance. Therefore, limiting internet access is a tool that has been used by Abiy's government each time there have been protests or some unrest.

⁴⁵ Green, Christian M, T. Jeremy Gunn, and Mark Hill. *Religion, Law and Security in Africa*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Conference-RAP, 2018, 207.;

⁴⁶ Praeg, Bertus. *Ethiopia and Political Renaissance in Africa*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006, 219.;

⁴⁷ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World 2020: Ethiopia*. 2020, 382 <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-world/2020.>;

⁴⁸ International Crisis Group. "Defusing Ethiopia's Latest Perilous Crisis," par 2. Crisis Group, July 3, 2020 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/defusing-ethiopia-latest-perilous-crisis>;

⁴⁹ Amnesty International. "Everything You Need to Know about Human Rights in Ethiopia" par 2 Accessed July 18, 2020. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/ethiopia/report-ethiopia/>;

⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch. "World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Ethiopia." Human Rights Watch, January 14, 2020, par 3. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/ethiopia>.;

⁵¹ Al Jazeera. "Death Toll in Ethiopia Violence over Singer's Killing Hits 239." News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, July 8, 2020. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/death-toll-ethiopia-violence-singer-killing-hits-239-200708075014258.html>;

⁵² Freedom House/"Freedom in the World 2020: Ethiopia." 2020, 381. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-world/2020.>;

In April 2019, the government disseminated the draft of a hate speech law which renders the intentional publication, distribution, and possession of false information illegal. Although *prima facie* it seems plausible for such a law to be put in place, it is vague and could open the door for exploitation by the authorities to limit freedom of expression.⁵³ Further civil rights concerning access to social media platforms have been barred intermittently.⁵⁴ This is a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR gives provision for the restriction of specific types of speech under article 20 such as national, racial, or religious hatred.⁵⁵ While article 19(3) provides a balance accessing legality, necessity, and proportionality of restrictions on speech,⁵⁶ in the case of Ethiopia their restrictions are elevated. The Federal Government also closed the Makaelawi detention centre which was infamously known for torture and abuse of political prisoners, rape, and denial of access to medical and legal assistance.⁵⁷ Some of these issues remained unaffected by the reform attempts, explaining Freedom House's analyses of political and civil rights in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Freedom in DRC

Index or Indicator	Score (2020)
Freedom House Political Rights	10/40 = not free
Freedom House Civil Rights	14/60 = not free
Corruption Perception Index, Ethiopia	96/190
Population (World Bank, 2020/2019)	109.2 million

Ethno-Political Conflicts

In Ethiopia, ethnic conflicts are mostly linked to resources and politics. These two factors have shaped macro and micro political and social dynamics among ethnic groups.⁵⁸ Ethiopia's political domain is awash with the conflicting demands of different ethnic parties and other interest groups. Since 1991, political parties in Ethiopia have predominantly been centred on ethnicity.⁵⁹ The country's most important ethnic parties have been affiliated with the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition represented by the Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayan, and southern groups.⁶⁰ Years of authoritarian rule, forced displacement, and the alleged dominance of Tigrayans within the EPRDF coalition led to extensive discontent that triggered a series of protests in 2015 including large-scale displacements, murders, and the destruction of property. The clashes were not restricted to a particular region but were spread out throughout the nation. In most instances, they had ethnic nuances or involved ethnic groups. Semir (2019) argues that the high stakes involved in ethnic conflicts are motivated by security dilemmas. Though Ethiopia is not new to ethnic-based conflicts, their intensity and magnitude in the short time since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali rose to power has been disturbing.⁶¹ The prime minister sought to address this with the change of EPRDF in 2019 where he merged ethnic-based regional parties into the Prosperity Party, a nationwide platform under the direction of Prime Minister Abiy. This advancement raised the profile of ruling-party structures in Ethiopia's peripheral regions such as those represented by the Somali,

⁵³ Ibid;

⁵⁴ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World 2020: Ethiopia." 2020, par 11. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-world/2020>;

⁵⁵ ICCPR, supra note 65;

⁵⁶ Ibid;

⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch. "Such a Brutal Crackdown' Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia's Oromo Protests," January 2, 2019, par 1- 2. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/15/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopia-s-oromo-protests>;

⁵⁸ Woldeselassie, Zerihun Abebe. "Ethnicity, Belonging and Identity among the Eastern Gurage of Ethiopia." *Ethnicities* 17, no. 3 (2017), 8;

⁵⁹ Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University. "Ethiopia Conflict Insight." *Peace and Security Report 1* (May 2020), 4; Asmerom, Haile K., and Elisa Pereira. *Reis. Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality*. Basingstoke: Springer, 2016, 179;

⁶⁰ Abebe, Semahagn Gashu. *The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation: Ethnicity, Ideology and Democracy in Ethiopia*. London: Routledge, 2020, 126;

⁶¹ Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University. "Ethiopia Conflict Insight." *Peace and Security Report 1* (May 2020), 1;

Benishangul Gumuz, Afar, and Gambella who were not only conspicuously underrepresented in national politics but had previously been denied full membership in the EPRDF. The merger also confirmed old fears of smaller regions that feared being controlled by the more populated ethnic groups.⁶²

In the Northern part of Ethiopia, that is the Tigray region, conflict broke out in November 2020, whose origins can be tracked to the pre-2018 political happenings and their implications. For example, the historical conflicts among the Amhara, Oromo, Qemant, Tigrayan, and Gumuz have led to cyclical ethnic regroupings and counter-regroupings particularly in the regions occupied by the Qemant community and the Oromo Special Zone of the Amhara Killil which has been prone to cross-border disputes.⁶³ More recently, the conflict in the region has been between the Amhara and Tigray factions over a bitter land dispute.⁶⁴ In the Southern part of Ethiopia, the Gedeo-Guji conflict in Oromia is rooted in competing ethnic mobilisations and political ideologies.⁶⁵

The armed confrontation in the Amhara Regional State has escalated due to the competing expectations of the Qemant and Amhara leaders. The bitter past involves the reluctance of the government to acknowledge the Qemant as a distinct ethnic group rather than a subset of the Amhara community. On the other hand, in the Oromia, the conflict between the Amhara and Oromo escalates and de-escalates depending on various political dispensations. Although the Oromo felt an impending suppression by the Amhara, the Amhara on the other hand felt it was necessary to constrain the danger of soaring Oromo nationalism in their homeland and to defend their Amhara minorities within the Oromo minority. This conflict quickly escalated to a point of violence where the Amhara Special Forces and leaders of both groups were involved.⁶⁶

The ethnopolitical experience in Ethiopia today calls for the adoption of democracy and the acknowledgment of individual and group identities. It demands more intercultural tolerance and respect for people with diverse racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds as well as those with divergent political positions.

Internal Displacements

In 2018, Ethiopia topped the list of countries with the highest number of conflict-related internal displacements globally with over three million displaced,⁶⁷ which is quadruple the figure in 2017.⁶⁸ It is also the first country in the IGAD region to have the highest number of IDPs because of intercommunal conflicts.⁶⁹ According to the Institute of Security Studies, the key hotspots include the borderlands between the Oromia and Somali regional states; Afar-Somali border; Benshangul-Gumuze regional state; southern and central Oromia such as West Wellega and West Guji zones; eastern and north-eastern parts of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region including the Basketo zones; West and Central Gonder among other regions.⁷⁰ The instability in the Oromia region – inhabited by the majority Oromo ethnic group is based on long-standing economic, cultural, and political marginalisation. In the Benishangul-Gumuz region, tensions have been on the rise between the Oromos, who were displaced from the

⁶² Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2019: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2020, 382.

⁶³ Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University. "Ethiopia Conflict Insight." *Peace and Security Report 1* (May 2020), 11; International Crisis Group. "Defusing Ethiopia's Latest Perilous Crisis." *Crisis Group*, July 3, 2020, 5. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/defusing-ethiopia-latest-perilous-crisis>;

⁶⁴ International Crisis Group. "Defusing Ethiopia's Latest Perilous Crisis." *Crisis Group*, July 3, 2020, par 1. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/defusing-ethiopia-latest-perilous-crisis>;

⁶⁵ Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University. "Ethiopia Conflict Insight." *Peace and Security Report 1* (May 2020), 20-21.;

⁶⁶ Semir, Yusuf. "What Is Driving Ethiopia's Ethnic Conflicts?" *ISS Africa*. Institute of Security Studies, November 25, 2019, 13 <https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/what-is-driving-ethiopia-ethnic-conflicts>;

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 3.;

⁶⁸ Yigzaw, Sewenet Gedifew, and Belay Endalsasa Abitew. "Causes and Impacts of Internal Displacement in Ethiopia." *African Journal of Social Work* 9, no. 2 (2019), 33.;

⁶⁹ Semir, Yusuf. "What Is Driving Ethiopia's Ethnic Conflicts?" *ISS Africa*. Institute of Security Studies, November 25, 2019, 13, 35 <https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/what-is-driving-ethiopia-ethnic-conflicts>;

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 4.;

region, the Amhara and Behishangul.⁷¹ All these ongoing conflicts have greatly contributed to the total number of IDPs mentioned.

The Ethiopian government policy of resettlement and relocation has also greatly contributed to the number of people being displaced owing to urban development and relocation projects planned to urbanise regions. Many of the people forced out of these regions have not been relocated while others have refused to move from their ancestral lands to make way for development and infrastructure projects. For instance, in Bahir Dar families were displaced in masses to pave the way for the construction of urban industries and Bahir Dar Hulageb Stadium.⁷² The government has been faulted for its lack of sustainable efforts to address the mass internal displacements of its people⁷³ and the negative effects that come with it such as the vulnerability of IDPs to physical and psychological violence, poverty, famine, and infectious diseases due to poor living conditions.

Analysis of the Gender Situation

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) is a type of gender injustice that is experienced by millions of girls and women and is deeply grounded in social gender norms and practices.⁷⁴ Practices such as female genital mutilation and child marriage have caused the deaths and trauma of women of all ages. In Ethiopia, the Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) frequency differs considerably among ethnic groups. FGM/C infringes the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa popularly referred to as the Maputo Protocol. The government of Ethiopia has taken progressive steps towards the reduction of the practice by putting in place different legal instruments such as revising family law and the constitution in addition to developing strategies and policies although it is estimated that 74 percent of the female population have gone through FGM/C.⁷⁵ The government in a bid to eliminate FGM and early child marriage by 2025 has increased its budget to ensure accountability and facilitation of coordination mechanisms.

Religion

Historically, Orthodox Christians and Muslims have had a nonviolent and tolerant relationship which was considered the hallmark of Ethiopian culture.⁷⁶ They were able to live with some level of peace even with the brief history of separation between church and state in addition to constitutionally protected religious equality and freedom of consciousness. Nonetheless, cases of religious conflict have transpired in unprecedented numbers across Ethiopia over the past few years due to the politicisation of religious identities.⁷⁷ According to Antigegegn, the rise of Islamist and Christian extremist factions is a result of the intentional manipulation of politics under the pretext of religion to appropriate justification thereby invoking hatred, anger, and violence.⁷⁸

⁷¹ Ibid, 19-20;

⁷² Yizgaw, Sewenet Gedifew, and Belay Endalsasa Abitew. "Causes and Impacts of Internal Displacement in Ethiopia." *African Journal of Social Work* 9, no. 2 (2019), 37.;

⁷³ Human Rights Watch, "Such a Brutal Crackdown' Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia's Oromo Protests." Human Rights Watch, January 2, 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/15/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protests>;

⁷⁴ Gebreyosus, Yonas. *Women in African Refugee Camps: Gender Based Violence Against Female Refugees: The Case of Mai Ayni Refugee Camp, Northern Ethiopia*. Anchor Academic Publishing, 2014, 13.;

⁷⁵ Kandala, Ngianga-Bakwin, and Paul Nzinga Komba. *Female Genital Mutilation around the World: Analysis of Medical Aspects, Law and Practice*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018, 122.;

⁷⁶ Antigegegn, Getahun Kumie. "An Assessment of Religion, Peace and Conflict in the Post 1991 of Ethiopia." *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations* 19, no. 4 (2019): 608-9.;

⁷⁷ Østebø, Terje. *Localizing Salafism: Religious Change Among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia*. Brill, 2011, 41.;

⁷⁸ Antigegegn, Getahun Kumie. "An Assessment of Religion, Peace and Conflict in the Post 1991 of Ethiopia." *Vestnik RUDN. International Relations* 19, no. 4 (2019): 608-9.;

In Ethiopia, certain regions have a dominant religion and this sometimes causes conflicts and mass displacement of people. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewaido Church has the most adherents in the northern regions of Tigray and Amhara, whereas Islam is widespread in the Afar, Oromia, and Somali Regions. Established Protestant churches have the most followers in the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples and Gambella Regions and sections of Oromia Region. Groupings that collectively comprise less than 5 percent of the inhabitants are Eastern Rite and Roman Catholics, adherents of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews, and practitioners of indigenous religions. The Rastafarian community although not as large as the other denominations numbers roughly 1,000, and its members mostly live in Addis Ababa and Shashemene, a town in Oromia Region.⁷⁹

In the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) Region of the Sidaama zone violence continuously erupts due to persistent demands for regional statehood. In an incident that took place on July 18, 2019, media associated with the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church (EOTC) reported that attackers murdered a priest and two congregants of the Church, incinerated three churches to ashes, and partly damaged four churches. In the Amhara region, some young congregants of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Mekane Yesus burned mosques and damaged Muslim-owned companies.⁸⁰ During such conflicts, Ethiopian religious leaders and institutions have engaged in religious peacebuilding together with the view of diminishing the tensions among their followers.⁸¹

Kenya

Divided by the equator, Kenya is a coastal country located in the East Africa region. It is bordered by Ethiopia (North), Somalia (East), Tanzania (South), Uganda (West), and Sudan (Northwest). The Indian Ocean is located on Kenya's southeast border.⁸² The country has a large population estimated at 54,110,887 with an annual growth rate of 2.28%.⁸³ The population of Kenya is estimated to reach and potentially surpass 100 million by the end of the century although the actual growth rate is predicted to slightly decrease.⁸⁴ The two official languages are Kiswahili and English, while various local languages are spoken by the numerous ethnic groups in other areas of the country.⁸⁵

Many of the MDGs are yet to be met by Kenya. However, the country has made progress in reducing child mortality, compulsory primary education, and reducing gender inequalities in education as a result of increased spending on health and education. In recent years, all public health agencies have targeted devolved healthcare and free maternal healthcare to improve health care outcomes and create a more equitable healthcare system.⁸⁶ Kenya has the potential of being a success story in Africa from its youthful population, vibrant business sector, qualified employees, strengthened infrastructure, modern constitution, and crucial position in East Africa.⁸⁷

However, since 1991 when Kenya became a multi-party state,⁸⁸ the country has experienced election violence during most of its general elections. The election violence is largely characterized by ethnic tensions which are manipulated by political elites to gain political

⁷⁹ U.S. Department of State. "2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ethiopia." Office of International Religious Freedom, June 10, 2020, 2. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ethiopia/>;

⁸⁰ Ibid, 1;

⁸¹ Repstad Pål. *Political Religion, Everyday Religion: Sociological Trends*. Leiden: Brill, 2019, 87.;

⁸² Britannica. (n.d.). *Kenya: Land*. Retrieved October 6, 2020, from <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kenya>;

⁸³ World Population Review. (n.d.). *Kenya Population 2020 (live)*. Retrieved October 4, 2020, from <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kenya-population>;

⁸⁴ Ibid;

⁸⁵ Britannica. (n.d.). *Kenya: Land*. Retrieved October 6, 2020, from <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kenya> par3;

⁸⁶ World Bank Group. (2020, July 31). *The World Bank in Kenya*. Retrieved October 05, 2020, from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/overview#1> par 3;

⁸⁷ Ibid;

⁸⁸ Materu, S. F. (2015). *The Post-Election Violence in Kenya: Domestic and International Legal Responses*. International Criminal Justice Series 2, volume 2, p. 26.; Retrieved October 9, 2020, from <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-6265-041-1>;

leverage. Much of these conflicts are caused by land issues. The country has hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons- as a result of conflicts related to land or politically instigated displacement such as those resulting from the general elections of 1992, 1997, and 2007/2008. For instance, in 2007, 650, 000 people were displaced during the post-election violence.⁸⁹

Figure 3: Map of Kenya



(Source: World Atlas)

Contextual Analysis

Social-Gender Equality and Women's Rights

The 2010 constitution championed women's rights as human rights. It grants women the right to education, housing, and healthcare. The constitution puts forth the principles of human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-discrimination, and the protection of marginalized groups. Women today, for the first time since independence, have the right to give citizenship to their children born outside of Kenya with non-Kenyan men, and also to their foreign spouses. Women are considered equal to men and possess the right to equal opportunities in the political, economic, cultural, and social spheres. According to the constitution, women must occupy at least a third of all seats in parliament and a third of all appointed political positions. Despite these advancements made in the constitution, women are still politically underrepresented. As of 2018, only 76 out of 349 parliamentarians were women. This is a far cry from the 117 seats required for women by the constitution. In the House of Senate, only 21 women own seats (the law demands 23 seats for women).⁹⁰ Within the East African community, Kenya is in the last place in terms of women's representation in government: Rwanda leads with 61%, followed by Tanzania at 36%, Burundi at 36%, Uganda at 34%, and South Sudan at 28.5%. Rwanda is the only one of these countries that has met the

⁸⁹ Refugee Consortium of Kenya, (n.d) internally displaced persons. Retrieved October 05, 2020, from Internally Displaced Persons – Refugee Consortium of Kenya (rckkenya.org);

⁹⁰ "Political Participation for Kenya's Women Still a Far Cry from Its Constitutional Provision," Women Deliver, February 28, 2018, <https://womendeliver.org/2018/political-participation-kenyas-women-still-far-cry-constitutional-provision/>;

African Union standard of 50/50 representation of women in leadership positions.⁹¹ Despite this bleak picture within civil society, feminist and women's groups are considered to be amongst the most active especially when it comes to influencing policy.

Politics

Kenya enjoys a unique reputation in Africa. Since independence, Kenya has been considered one of the few African countries that can lay claim to being truly free and democratic.⁹² This is despite Kenya's political space being characterized by high levels of corruption, ethnic politics, and abuse of power. Kenya has also never been under military rule-unlike many African countries like Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, and many others. Its leadership has been mostly authoritarian accompanied by the decay of government institutions, sharp economic decline, lack of access to basic services, and the erosion of trust in the government.

With the adoption of a new 2010 Constitution introducing the Bicameral House of Parliament, Devolved County Government, independent judiciary, and electoral body, Kenya has adopted a new form of political and economic governance.⁹³ This new constitution expanded the Bill of Rights to include social, economic, and cultural rights while placing focus on the needs of women and children. It also reduced the President's powers, catered to the separation of powers between the three arms of government, restricted the power of security agencies, devolved power to regions, and initiated changes to the budget process. It also addressed gender equality and women's rights by instituting affirmative action requiring women to be included in decision-making processes-a number of slots are set aside in political institutions to be occupied by women. Public institutions and agencies are also urged to avoid discriminating against women and girls. Despite these positive changes, the new constitution fails to clearly outline how past human rights violations should be addressed, it is restrictive when it comes to sexual and reproductive rights and it allows for the implementation of religious laws in the areas of marriage, divorce, and inheritance for those that profess Islam.

Kenya is a country plagued by post-election violence. It began in 1991 when multiparty democracy was introduced. Since then, every election (apart from the 2002 election) has been accompanied by violence. The worst incidences taking place after the 2007 elections were in two months, 1000 people were killed and 500,000 people were internally displaced. Viewed as "a bastion of economic and political stability in a volatile region,"⁹⁴ Kenya is plagued by structural violence that has to do with unresolved land grievances and government failure. Problems related to elections are merely a trigger for long-standing simmering tensions. On September 1, 2017, the Supreme Court annulled the results of the Presidential elections of 8 August 2017 as they were highly contested due to claims of electoral irregularities. On October 26, 2017, there was a second round of Presidential election. The president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, was sworn in on 28 November 2017 for a second and last five-year term.⁹⁵

Economy

Kenya has undergone major changes in the past decade, both institutional, systemic, and fiscal, leading primarily to viable economic growth, social transformation, and political gains. Yet poverty, wealth distribution, climate change, continued weaknesses in investment in the private sector, and economic vulnerability to internal and external shocks remain key challenges for

⁹¹ UN Women. (2019, June). Facts and figures: leadership and political participation. Retrieved September 28, 2020, from <https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures> par 4.

⁹² David Gitari, "Church and Politics in Kenya," *Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies* 8, no. 3 (1991): pp. 7-17, <https://doi.org/10.1177/026537889100800307>.

⁹³ (World Bank Group, 2020);

⁹⁴ "Ballots to Bullets," Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, May 15, 2018), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/16/ballots-bullets/organized-political-violence-and-kenyas-crisis-governance>.

⁹⁵ World Bank Group. (2020, July 31). *The World Bank in Kenya*. Retrieved October 05, 2020, from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/overview#1> par 2;

development. In 2019, economic growth in Kenya averaged 5.7% and put Kenya among Sub-Saharan Africa's fastest-growing economies. This was attributed to a stable macroeconomic climate favourable for positive consumer trust and a robust services market.⁹⁶

In 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the depressed economy that began in early 2020 has affected many parts of Kenya, especially the northeast. This has harmed the country's food security and agricultural production. Consequently, gross domestic product (GDP) is projected to decelerate from 5.7 percent (2015-2019) to 1.5 percent annually in 2020.⁹⁷

Considering the COVID-19 pandemic has taken longer than expected to resolve, the challenges include a prolonged global slowdown that has weakened exports, tourism, and remittance inflows to Kenya, worsening COVID-19 health policies that have disrupted national economic activities, fiscal slips, and weather conditions.⁹⁸

In 2012, Kenya discovered oil in Turkana County. This discovery could lead to great potential for the Kenyan economy. In particular, it bodes well for the people of Turkana who have been marginalized for many decades-this newfound wealth could be used to develop Turkana County. While Kenya has improved economically and has become wealthier, this wealth has not been evenly distributed. Society is grossly unequal in terms of income, gender, and geographical location. Rapid population growth and high rates of unemployment are major concerns, especially among the youth. Such a scenario can be demoralizing leading Kenya's youth towards radicalization or a life of crime. This is of extreme concern given that more than 70 percent of Kenya's population is under 30 years of age.⁹⁹

Religion

Religion in Kenya plays a central role in the lives of its citizens. About 97 percent of the population subscribes to a religion.¹⁰⁰ This may come as a surprise to people who are used to the separation of church and state. Religion pervades all aspects of Kenyan society with Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and other religious organizations owning many of Kenya's schools and hospitals. Because of the central role played by religious organizations across the country, faith-based organizations hold considerable sway among the public. They have grassroots access to many people providing them with social services hence tackling social ills within society. As such, faith-based organizations' reach goes beyond health and education encompassing almost all development sectors.

South Sudan

The Republic of South Sudan is the youngest and newest nation in Africa¹⁰¹ with a geographical area of 619,000 square kilometres¹⁰² and a population of 11,193,725.¹⁰³ The landlocked South Sudan whose capital is Juba borders the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Uganda.¹⁰⁴ The chief of state and head of government in South Sudan is the president. The small country is richly diverse having over sixty ethnic groups. The largest ethnic groups are the Dinka and Nuer. South Sudan broke away from Sudan on July 9 2011 as a result of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which ended decades

⁹⁶ Ibid Par 3;

⁹⁷ Ibid;

⁹⁸ Ibid;

⁹⁹ "Empowerment of Women and Girls." Interactions. Accessed July 15, 2020. <http://interactions.eldis.org/unpaid-care-work/country-profiles/kenya/social-econom-ic-and-political-context-kenya;>

¹⁰⁰ Peace and World Affairs at Georgetown University Berkley Center for Religion, "The Ubiquity of Religion in Kenya," The Ubiquity of Religion in Kenya (Georgetown University, December 15, 2014), <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/the-ubiquity-of-religion-in-kenya;>

¹⁰¹ Flores & Nooruddin (2016), Elections in Hard Times: Building Stronger Democracies in the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 106.;

¹⁰² LeRiche, M &, Matthew, A (2013), South Sudan: from Revolution to Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 3.;

¹⁰³ WorldMeters. "South Sudan Population (LIVE)." Worldometer, July 23, 2020. <https://www.worldometers.info/worldpopulation/south-sudan-population/> ;

¹⁰⁴ LeRiche, M &, Matthew, A (2013), South Sudan: from Revolution to Independence. New York: Oxford University Press,3-4;

of civil war between the government of Sudan and rebel forces.^{105 106} The South Sudanese population had high hopes of the success of their nation given their fight for civil liberties and democracy. Unfortunately, independence did not put an end to the conflict in South Sudan and civil war broke out again in 2013 following a disagreement between President Salva Kiir and his vice president Riek Machar. In 2015 a transitional government was established after a peace and power-sharing agreement between the two protagonists.¹⁰⁷ This did not broker peace as in August 2016, clashes between Salva Kiir's Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Riek Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Movement -Internal Opposition in Juba quickly spread to other parts of the country. Riek Machar fled South Sudan to South Africa where he was detained. General Taban Deng Gai later substituted him as the Prime Minister.¹⁰⁸ As a result, South Sudan's economy plummeted and its humanitarian crisis worsened.¹⁰⁹ New armed groups mushroomed while existing groups split up into further factions giving rise to further fragmentation and deterioration of the conflict.

In August 2018, a power-sharing agreement was signed by the conflicting parties with the view of putting an end to the five-year civil war which displaced four million people.^{110 111} According to this agreement, Salva Kiir maintained his position as president while Riek Machar the first vice president.^{112 113 114} In Feb 2020, South Sudan's Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) was formed with five vice presidents – including a cabinet comprising 550 members of parliament, 10 governors to accommodate the different warring parties.¹¹⁵¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁵ Munyi, Elijah Nygaga, David Mwambari, and Aleksy Ylönen. *Beyond History: African Agency in Development, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution*. London ; New York, New York: Rowman and Littlefield , 2020, p. 151; ¹⁰⁶ Rudnicová, Kateřina. "African Solution to African Problems: AU and the Conflict Resolution in South Sudan." *Politeja* 15, no. 56 (2019), 170;

¹⁰⁷ Rudnicová, Kateřina. "African Solution to African Problems: AU and the Conflict Resolution in South Sudan." *Politeja* 15, no. 56 (2019), 180.;

¹⁰⁸ Council on Foreign Relations. "Civil War in South Sudan | Global Conflict Tracker." Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed July 23, 2020. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan/>;

¹⁰⁹ Rudnicová, Kateřina. "African Solution to African Problems: AU and the Conflict Resolution in South Sudan." *Politeja* 15, no. 56 (2019), 180.;

¹¹⁰ (Rudnicová, 2018, 180.). Rudnicová, Kateřina. "African Solution to African Problems: AU and the Conflict Resolution in South Sudan." *Politeja* 15, no. 56 (2019): 169–91.; ¹¹¹ Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Factbook: South Sudan." Central Intelligence Agency, February 1, 2018, par 5. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html>;

¹¹² United Nations Office of the Coordination of the Humanitarian Affairs. "New Research Finds 1.5 Million Internally Displaced Persons in South Sudan." United Nations Office of the Coordination of the Humanitarian Affairs, October 10, 2019, par 2. <https://www.unocha.org/story/new-research-finds-15-million-internally-displaced-persons-south-sudan> ; ¹¹³ Human Right Watch, 2019, par 1; ¹¹⁴ South Sudan Nation. "Detail Copy of the Khartoum 'Agreement on Outstanding Issues of Governance' Yet to Be Signed by Kiir & Opposition." SouthSudanNation.com, July 22, 2018, par 8 <http://www.southsudannation.com/detail-copy-of-the-khartoum-agreement-on-outstanding-issues-of-governance-yet-to-be-signed-by-kiir-opposition/>;

¹¹⁵ Paaue, 2020, par 1-2; Paaue, Juliette. "All Forgiven? South Sudan's Transitional Government and the Recurring Risk of Atrocities." Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2020. <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/all-forgiven-south-sudans-transitional-government-and-the-recurring-risk-of-atrocities/> ; ¹¹⁶ Mutambo & Koga, 2020, par 4-5. Mutambo, Auggrey, and Vallerie Koga. "Kiir, Machar to Form Unity Government on Saturday." The East African, July 5, 2020. <https://www.theeastaf-rican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kiir-machar-to-form-unity-government-on-saturday-1437236>;

The country’s economy has gravely suffered due to decades of war and political tension. The country’s lack of sea access has also constrained its economic potentials due to the accompanying high charge for imports and exports. Additionally, its transport network throughout Central and East Africa are deplorable. However, these logistical challenges are worsened by instability and violence in the nation. South Sudan is heavily reliant on oil and agriculture. It boasts of several oil reserves capable of producing major revenue to support the economy¹¹⁷—nonetheless, the cyclical hostilities coupled with additional erosion of Juba’s control over territory, has significantly muddled investment in the oil and gas industry. Even with these complexities, the oil reserves have attracted foreign interest for decades. Below is a map of South Sudan.

Figure 4: Map of South Sudan



(Source: Geographic Guide)

Contextual Analysis

Politics

Table 2:

Index or Indicator	Score (2020)
Freedom House Political Rights	-6/40 = not free
Freedom House Civil Rights	4/60 = not free
Corruption Perception Index, South Sudan	179/180
Population (World Bank, 2018)	10.98 million

Source: *Freedom in South Sudan*

¹¹⁷ Kimenyi, Mwangi S., and John Mukum Mbaku. *Governing the Nile River Basin: the Search for a New Legal Regime*. Washington (D.C.): Brookings Institution Press, 2015, 15.;

Deep historical grievances and ethnic differences have been a longstanding feature of the country. South Sudanese have been forced to depend on their capacities rather than the state for security and economic survival, leading to the militarisation of ethnic identities. This has birthed a difficult challenge to building social cohesion and national identity because of the fragmentation of society.¹¹⁸ It also manifests in the informal justice system involving retaliation attacks between communities and clans in the nation, creating a cycle of violence and killing. A view buttressed by Rolandsen who holds that “a combination of a weak patrimonial state, a wartime mentality and lack of peaceful mechanisms for political contestation and transition”¹¹⁹ is the foundation of the current conflict dynamics. The situation has been further complicated by the apparent interest of other states in the region. For example, Uganda has in the past intervened in the conflict in South Sudan,¹²⁰ Eritrea and Sudan have been accused of supporting the opposition forces, while Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have been involved in either supporting peace processes or hosting peace talks between protagonists.¹²¹

According to Rudincová, although the civil war in South Sudan has been reduced to an ethnic conflict between Dinka who are a majority, and the Nuer, ethnicity serves as a scapegoat.¹²² Rightly so, weak governance structures, inequitable distribution of resources, and power politics among South Sudanese elites¹²³ have led to what De Waal refers to as “violent kleptocracy.”¹²⁴ Incessant corruption among the political and military elite has also perpetuated a lack of trust and accountability.¹²⁵ This is a great hurdle that South Sudan has to overcome because the lack of basic infrastructure development, particularly at the local level could be viewed as propagating historical and ongoing marginalization of different groups. According to the Sentry, Winnie Kiir, President Salva Kiir’s daughter is reported to have established a mining venture with a Chinese investment organisation in 2016. The organisation received mining permits to a region where inhabitants were forcefully displaced by the military.¹²⁶ Four years earlier, the president had requested 75 government officials to take back oil receipts that were stolen in exchange for amnesty. The kleptocrats managed to siphon over four billion United States dollars, the equivalent of a third of the country’s oil income from 2005-2011. These ministers were never indicted due to weak legal and anti-corruption systems.^{127 128}

Economy

South Sudan’s industry and infrastructure are severely under-developed due to years of civil war.¹²⁹ Recurrent fighting within the nation has also disrupted the economy. A great number of the population is heavily reliant on subsistence agriculture and humanitarian aid. Development has also been hampered by poorly executed decentralization and budget deficits reducing local growth prospects, in the education, health, and social services sectors. Dependence on

¹¹⁸ Cissé Hassane, N. R. Madhava. Menon, and Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger. *Fostering Development through Opportunity, Inclusion, and Equity*. Washington: World Bank, 2014, 503.;

¹¹⁹ Øystein H. Rolandsen, Another civil war in South Sudan: the failure of Guerrilla Government?, 2015, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9:1, 163-174, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2014.993210;

¹²⁰ Back, Irit. *From Sudan to South Sudan: IGAD and the Role of Regional Mediation in Africa*. Leiden: Brill, 2020, 76;

¹²¹ (Rossi, 2018, 176-7) Murison Katharine, *Africa South of the Sahara 2003*. Europa Publications: 2002, 1017.;

¹²² Rudincová, Kateřina. “Viability of a Secessionist State in Africa: Case Study of South Sudan.” *Acta Politologica* 9, no. 3 (2017), 74;

¹²³ Rudincová, Kateřina. “Viability of a Secessionist State in Africa: Case Study of South Sudan.” *Acta Politologica* 9, no. 3 (2017), 74.;

¹²⁴ De Waal, Alex. “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan.” *African Affairs* 113, no. 452 (2014), 363.;

¹²⁵ Freedom House. “South Sudan.” <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-sudan/freedom-world/2020> Section C; Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which is 179 out of 180 (2019, par 1). Bakegedde, Mathew. *Stop Child Soldiers*. Xlibris Corporation, 2013, 32.;

¹²⁶ The Sentry. “The Taking of South Sudan: The Tycoons, Brokers and Multinational Corporations Complicit in Hijacking the World’s Newest State.” The Sentry, September 2019, 3. <https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/TakingOfSouthSudan-Sept2019-TheSentry.pdf>;

¹²⁷ African Development Bank. “The Political Economy of South Sudan.” African Development Bank Group, 2018, 9. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/The_Political_Economy_of_South_Sudan.pdf; ¹²⁷ Holland, Hereward. “South Sudan Officials Have Stolen \$4 Billion: President.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, June 4, 2012, par 1-2. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-corruption-idUSBRE8530QI20120604>; Al Jazeera. “South Sudan Asks Officials to Return Stolen Funds.” News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, June 6, 2012, par 1-4 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/06/201265233043136384.html>; Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera. “South Sudan Asks Officials to Return Stolen Funds.” News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, June 6, 2012. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/06/201265233043136384.html>

¹²⁹ LeRiche, Matthew, and Matthew Arnold. *South Sudan: from Revolution to Independence*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 167.

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international aid organizations for the provision of essential services in some regions is unsustainable. South Sudan is also weighed down by huge debt because of increased military expenditure and elevated levels of government corruption.¹³⁰

Nonetheless, South Sudan is rich in natural resources and fertile agricultural land with abundant water supplies. The country's oil reserves, which are the third-largest in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria and Angola^{131 132} have been able to generate revenue to fund 98% of its budgetary needs.¹³³ According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the drop in oil prices, gross domestic product is projected to drop to 4.9% in 2020 further decreasing to 3.2% in 2021. This indicates the country's vulnerability to fluctuations in oil prices and oil production levels.¹³⁴ As it stands, South Sudan's economy will continue to be connected to Sudan because it lacks the requisite infrastructure to refine, transport, and ship its oil, it, therefore, relies on its relationship with Sudan for the refineries and shipping facilities located in Port Sudan.¹³⁵ Moreover, South Sudan's oil fields are situated along the border with Sudan, in Abyei. This remains a hotly contested area as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement did not address it fuelling cyclical conflicts between Southern and Northern Sudan military forces.^{136 137} Abyei's fertile land is another bone of contention between the two nations. The Barh-el-Arab is also known as the Kiir River which is not seasonal, and is of great value to farmers and pastoralists such as the Misseriya from Sudan and Dinka from South Sudan.^{138 139} The natural resources in Abyei have resulted in both countries claiming sovereignty over the region, militarising the region leading to cyclical clashes.^{140 141}

Religion

In South Sudan, religion is not a divisive issue. The majority of the population is Christian followed by traditional religions and Islam.¹⁴² Religious leaders have been at the forefront of fighting for peace and development in the country. For example, the South Sudan Council of Churches led efforts that had an impact on the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.¹⁴³

¹³⁰ The Taking Of South Sudan, The Tycoons, Brokers, and Multinational Corporations Complicit in Hijacking the World's Newest State, 2019, 5. <https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/TakingOfSouthSudan-Sept2019-TheSentry.pdf>; Freedom House, "South Sudan Overview." 2018,C2 <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-sudan/freedom-world/2018>;

¹³¹ Oqubay, Arkebe, and Justin Yifu Lin. China-Africa and an Economic Transformation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, 184.; ¹³² International Monetary Fund, 2014, 4) International Monetary Fund. African. Republic of South Sudan: 2014 Article IV Consultation- Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Press Release. International Monetary Fund, 2014.;

¹³³ United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA World Factbook 2016-17. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2016, 691.;

¹³⁴ International Monetary Fund. "Republic of South Sudan and the IMF." International Monetary Fund, July 2020. <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/SSD>;

¹³⁵ Mines Bureau, Geological Survey, and Interior Department. Minerals Yearbook: Area Reports: International Review 2014 Africa and the Middle East. U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018, 402.;

¹³⁶ Republic of the Sudan: Country Study Guide. 1. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: International Business Publications, USA, 2017, 45; Akongdit, Addis Ababa Othow. Impact of Political Stability on Economic Development: Case of South Sudan. Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2013, 82.

Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: International Development Committee. South Sudan: Prospects for Peace and Development: Fifteenth Report of Session 2010-12. London: Stationery Office, 2012, 10.;

¹³⁷ Hastrup, Anders. The War in Darfur: Reclaiming Sudanese History. London: Routledge, 2015, 154; Herbst, Jeffrey Ira., Terence McNamee, and Greg Mills. On the Fault Line: Managing Tensions and Divisions within Societies. London: Profile, 2012, 60; Salih, Mohamed. Economic Development and Political Action in the Arab World. London: Routledge, 2016, 82.;

¹³⁸ Unruh, Jon Darrel, and Rhodri Williams. Land and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, 2007.;

¹³⁹ Tunsjo, Øystein. Security and Profit in China's Energy Policy: Hedging against Risk. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, 97.;

¹⁴⁰ Muchie, Mammo, Phindil Lukhele-Olorunju, and Oghenerobor B Akpor. The African Union Ten Years after Solving African Problems with Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2013, 165; Salih, Mohamed. Economic Development and Political Action in the Arab World. London: Routledge, 2016, 82; Vaughan, Christopher, Mareike Schomerus, and Lotje de Vries. The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 52.;

¹⁴¹ Vaughan, Christopher, Mareike Schomerus, and Lotje de Vries. The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 52.;

¹⁴² Jeffrey, James. "Church and Conflict in South Sudan." Church and Conflict in South Sudan | Inter Press Service, June 2018, 9. http://www.ipsnews.net/2018/07/church-conflict-south-sudan/?utm_source=rss;

¹⁴³ Jeffrey, James. "Church and Conflict in South Sudan." Church and Conflict in South Sudan | Inter Press Service, June 2018,10. http://www.ipsnews.net/2018/07/church-conflict-south-sudan/?utm_source=rss ;

Social

Once South Sudan attained independence from Sudan, Arab dominance was no longer a unifying factor. Thus differences were transferred to ethnic groups.¹⁴⁴ Inter-ethnic violence has become common place.¹⁴⁵ The 64 ethnic groups are synonymous with individual national enclaves with their own distinct culture and political biases possibly due to low literacy levels or education.¹⁴⁶ This has led to what is referred to as political tribalism which has been used systematically to enforce ethnic solidarities, compete for natural resources and access political power.¹⁴⁷

South Sudan also has poor development indicators due to weak governance structures and decades of civil war. According to Freedom House, gender inequality and gender-based violence have permeated society because of its history of war.¹⁴⁸ The armed conflicts worsened pre-existing differences and have made women and men extremely vulnerable to violence. Young men and boys were abducted and/or forcefully recruited into armed groups while women and girls were also recruited as soldiers or sexual slaves.¹⁴⁹ As a result of a dearth of livelihood alternatives, girls and boys have been advised by their families to enlist in armed groups while others were attracted to the potential of power through violence. Rape of men, women, and children as well as other forms of violence have also been used as a weapon of war.¹⁵⁰ The effect of this is the normalisation of violence and a country with high numbers of people suffering from post-traumatic disorder leading to the creation of a culture of violence and disrespect for human lives.¹⁵¹

Human trafficking of South Sudanese is also another challenge the nation has been grappling with. According to the United States Embassy in Sudan, the majority of the cases go unnoticed because government officials are not held accountable for the crimes committed.¹⁵² There have also been widespread reports of abductions, slavery, and brutal killings.¹⁵³ which can be attributed to the 1. 84 million IDPs in the country.¹⁵⁴ A huge portion of the population in South Sudan lives under the poverty line and lives as IDPs relying on humanitarian assistance for survival. According to the African Development Bank, South Sudan's unemployment rate stands at 50% for youth aged 15-24. This is underpinned by limited education systems, lack of work experience and nepotism.¹⁵⁵

Conceptualization of Peace Structures for Faith-based and Civil Society Organizations

This section highlights the existing literature on the peace structures of faith-based and civil society organizations (CSOs), reviewed under four comprehensive themes: Theories of Change; intervention methods and strategies employed by Faith-based and CSO Peace Structures; Gender roles in peacebuilding and the extent of women's participation in peacebuilding

¹⁴⁴ Nyadera, Israel Nyaburi. "South Sudan Conflict from 2013 to 2018." ACCORD, December 2018, 18. <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/south-sudan-conflict-from-2013-to-2018/>.

¹⁴⁴ Quarcoo, Ashley. "A Brief Guide to South Sudan's Fragile Peace." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 12, 2019, par 2. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/12/brief-guide-to-south-sudan-s-fragile-peace-pub-80570>.

¹⁴⁶ Rolandsen, Øystein, and Nicki Kindersley. "PDF) South Sudan: A Political Economy Analysis." ResearchGate, 2017, 2. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327860585_South_Sudan_A_Political_Economy_Analysis;

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 3-4).;

¹⁴⁸ Freedom House. "South Sudan." Freedom House, 2020. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-sudan/freedom-world/2020>;

¹⁴⁹ De Luca, Laura, Sylvester Bongani Maphosa, and Alphonse Keasley. *Building Peace from Within*. Oxford: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2014, 91.;

¹⁵⁰ Fitzpatrick, Brenda. *Tactical Rape in War and Conflict: International Recognition and Response*. Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2016, 32.

¹⁵¹ Carrión Victor G. *Assessing and Treating Youth Exposed to Traumatic Stress*. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association Publishing, 2019, 446.

¹⁵² Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, February 1, 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/328.html>.

¹⁵⁹ Africa Review. "South Sudan: 'Outraged' UN Experts Say Ongoing Widespread Human Rights Violations May Amount to War Crimes | Africa Renewal." United Nations. United Nations. Accessed July 25, 2020, par 1-3. <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/south-sudan-%E2%80%9999-un-experts-say-ongoing-widespread-human-rights-violations-may-amount-war>.

¹⁵⁴United Nations Office of the Coordination of the Humanitarian Affairs. “New Research Finds 1.5 Million Internally Displaced Persons in South Sudan.” United Nations Office of the Coordination of the Humanitarian Affairs, October 10, 2019, par 1. <https://www.unocha.org/story/new-research-finds-15-million-internally-displaced-persons-south-sudan>.

¹⁵⁸ African Development Bank. "The Political Economy of South Sudan." African Development Bank Group, 2018, 22. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/The_Political_Economy_of_South_Sudan.pdf.

activities; the role of religious leaders in addressing conflicts and advocacy initiatives aligned with social change and policy implementation.

Theory of Change

The term Theory of Change (TOC) has several definitions each elaborating different concepts.¹⁵⁶ According to Fisher and Harrington “A ‘Theory of Change’ represents people’s understanding of how change happens – the pathways, factors and relationships that bring and sustain change in a particular context.”¹⁵⁷ Keystone Accountability defines a TOC as, “an exciting and often liberating process of interaction that helps organisations see beyond their familiar frames and habits”¹⁵⁸ allowing programmatic staff to comprehend the full multifaceted nature of the change they wish to see and envision new arrangements in discourse with others.¹⁵⁹

Nwake on the other hand holds that “a theory of change is essentially an explanation about how a group of stakeholders expects to reach a commonly understood long-term goal” which depends on characterizing all the fundamental and adequate preconditions needed to achieve a given long-term outcome.¹⁶⁰ The commonality in the various definitions is that a TOC describes how and why a particular initiative works.¹⁶¹ Within the program management literature, TOCs were developed as associate extensions of logic coming up with models, such as the log frame.¹⁶² This is demonstrated by the fact that several organisations use “if ... then” statements to explain how change is conceptualised.¹⁶³ In the context of the social practice literature, TOCs arose from the need of project implementers to consistently and consciously mirror the underlying theories for development practice.¹⁶⁴ Accordingly, TOCs are most often used to show and test suppositions and conjectured pathways of progress,^{165 166} to guide the collection of data¹⁶⁷, or to clarify the impact or changes discovered through analysis.¹⁶⁸ In this research, the term Theory of Change is used to mean, “an outcomes-based approach which applies critical thinking to the design, implementation, and evaluation of initiatives and programs intended to support change in their context.”¹⁶⁹ By and large, TOCs improvements incorporate an examination of how an intervention changes in a specific region, a portrayal of the pathways through which this change is required to occur, and a system for testing whether and how change happens.¹⁷⁰

The process of formulating TOCs often begins with the examination of a circumstance and setting that requirements change, through identification of the ideal change. This includes a thorough contextual analysis drawing on information and proof from existent literature.¹⁷¹ The TOCs generally have two parts, a visual portrayal, for instance, of key factors, partners and pathways of progress, and a connected story.^{172 173} The TOC account mostly remembers data

¹⁵⁶ Stein D, Valters C. Understanding Theory of Change in International Development. The Justice and Security Research Programme Paper 1. London: Justice and Security Research Programme – London School of Economics; 2012, p3.;

¹⁵⁷ Larry W. Harrington, Myles J. Fisher. 2014. Water Scarcity, Livelihoods and Food Security: Research and Innovation for Development. Routledge, 10.;

¹⁵⁸ Keystone Accountability, Developing a theory of change: guide to developing a theory of change. August 2009, 4. <http://www.keystoneaccountability.org/sites/default/files/2%20Developing%20a%20theory%20of%20change.pdf>;

¹⁵⁹ June Lennie, Jo Tacchi. Evaluating Communication for Development: A Framework for Social Change. Routledge, 2013, 117.;

¹⁶⁰ Apollo M. Nkwake, 2012. Working with Assumptions in International Development Program Evaluation: With a Foreword by Michael Bamberger, Springer Science & Business Media, and p.76.;

¹⁶¹ Anderson, A. (2004). Theory of Change as a Tool for Strategic Planning: A Report on Early Experiences. The Aspen Institute: Roundtable on Community Change, p. 2.;

¹⁶² Valters C. Theories of Change in International Development: Communication, Learning, or Accountability? Justice and Security Research Program Papers. London: The Asia Foundation; 2014.;

¹⁶³ CARE International UK. (2012). Defining Theories of Change. January, London, p.5.;

¹⁶⁴ Stein D, Valters C. Understanding Theory of Change in International Development. The Justice and Security Research Programme Paper 1. London: Justice and Security Research Programme – London School of Economics; 2012, p3.;

¹⁶⁵ Breuer E, et al. Using workshops to develop theories of change in five low and middle income countries: lessons from the programme for improving mental health care (PRIME). Int J Ment Health Syst. 2014; 8, 15; 15.;

¹⁶⁶ De Silva MJ, et al. Theory of Change: a theory-driven approach to enhance the Medical Research Council’s framework for complex interventions. Trials. 2014; 15:267.;

¹⁶⁷ Jordans MJ, et al. Setting priorities for mental health care in Nepal: a formative study. BMC Psychiatry. 2013;13, 332.;

¹⁶⁸ Anderson, A. (2004). Theory of Change as a Tool for Strategic Planning: A Report on Early Experiences. The Aspen Institute: Roundtable on Community Change, p. 2.;

¹⁶⁹ Vogel I. Review of the Use of “Theory of Change” in International Development. London: Commissioned by the UK Department for International Development; 2012, 2-3.;

¹⁷⁰ James, Cathy. (2011). Theory of Change Review: A report commissioned by Comic Relief. London, p. 4.;

¹⁷¹ Vogel, I. (2012). Review of the use of “Theory of Change” in international development. p.24.;

¹⁷² Danielle Stein and Craig Valters, Understanding Theory of Change in International Development, JSRP Paper 1, 2012, 3.;

¹⁷³ Keystone Accountability for Social Change (2008). Developing a theory of change: A guide to developing a theory of change as a Framework for inclusive dialogue, learning and accountability for social impact, p. 18.;

about the setting for which an intervention is executed (incorporating social, political, and natural conditions), the current status of the issue, the intended outcome of long-term change, a narrative of the process,¹⁷⁴ sequence of change, and the basic assumptions made.¹⁷⁵ In other words, TOC is an administration and assessment apparatus supporting basic deduction in the plan, execution, and assessment of programs.

By distinction, TOCs give an in-depth clarification of assumptions and pathways of the amendment and are progressively perceived as ‘living documents’, amenable to incorporating new information and assumptions.¹⁷⁶ Likewise as the unintended consequences in implementation, -updated TOCs could guide a final analysis.¹⁷⁷

According to the United Nations Development Group, a good TOC should be “clear, plausible, consulted and based on evidence.”¹⁷⁸ While the Department for International Development (DFID) holds that, TOCs ought to “draw on nationally owned objectives and frameworks... each step tested with evidence particularly to support assumed behavioural changes, and political economy analysis should also be deep and explicit.”¹⁷⁹ In this direction, strong emphasis is put on the significance of an intensive clash (or structural) examination in fragile circumstances in addition to an examination of the drivers of the contention.¹⁸⁰ Lederach champions the understanding of different levels of conflict which include (intrapersonal, relational, structural, and cultural). However, in most cases, implementers develop TOCs throughout the initial stage of conceptualising a project, usually on their own or together with evaluators. This is solely done as a one-time exercise and is in some cases referred to as programmatic evaluation. TOCs are usually revisited throughout programme implementation, however, these revisions are - rarely documented. In general, TOCs are re-emerging as an important element of evaluation approaches, like realist analysis¹⁸¹ or efforts to foster a “whole-system view.”¹⁸² Valters cautions that, without an accentuation on the measure, TOCs risk turning into an administration instrument that neglected to encourage the desired learning and reflection.¹⁸³

As meanings of TOC differ broadly, organisations and donors also differ in their understanding and having an assortment of purposes. In light of this, it is imperative that TOC approaches be perceived across a continuum. Along this continuum, four uses of TOCs can be conceptualised: First, Strategic planning: TOCs encourage associations to plan the change cycle, its expected results, and - venture execution. For these reasons, TOCs can frequently be used with log frame approaches.¹⁸⁴ Second, Monitoring and Evaluation: TOCs articulate expected cycles and results

¹⁷⁴ Shapiro, I. (2006). Extending the Framework of Inquiry: Theories of Change in Conflict Interventions. Berghof Handbook, 5.

¹⁷⁵ Vogel I. Review of the Use of “Theory of Change” in International Development. London: Commissioned by the UK Department for International Development; 2012, 19-20.

¹⁷⁶ Anderson, A. (2005). The Community Builder’s Approach to Theory of Change. Washington DC: The Aspen Institute, p.13.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 19.

¹⁷⁸ United Nations Development Group, Theory of Change Concept Note, P.5 <https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/16.-2016-10-18-Guidance-on-ToC-PSG-LAC.pdf>

¹⁷⁹ DFID. (2012). Results in Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Situations. Available at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/documents/Publications/Managing-results-conflict-affected-fragile-states.pdf>, p.6.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 10

¹⁸¹ Schierhout G, et al. Evaluating the effectiveness of a multifaceted, multilevel continuous quality improvement program in primary health care: developing a realist theory of change. *Implement Sci.* 2013;8, 119.

¹⁸² Smith N, Barnes M. New jobs old roles - working for prevention in a whole-system model of health and social care for older people. *Health Soc Care Commun.* 2013; 21(1):79–87.

¹⁸³ Valters C. Theories of Change: Time for a Radical Approach to Learning in Development. London: Overseas Development Institute; 2015.

¹⁸⁴ UNIFEM. (2010). UNIFEM Framework and Guidance Note for Capacity Development. Available at http://www.unpd.md/employment/2010/50100/092/Annex_2_UNIFEM_HQ_Capacity_Dev_Strategy_March_2010.PDF

that can be evaluated after some time. This permits organisations to evaluate their commitment to the change process and to reconsider their TOC if need be.¹⁸⁵ Third, depiction: TOC permits organisations to convey their picked change process to internal and external organisational partners. A straightforward portrayal of an organisation's TOC can be perceived as an insignificant method of drawing on TOC.¹⁸⁶ Forth, learning: TOCs cause individuals to explain and build up the hypothesis behind their organisation or programme. This identifies with a comprehension of TOC as a reasoning instrument.¹⁸⁷ This is done by targeting a specific actor-level as the starting point to conceptualise change.¹⁸⁸

Intervention Methods and Strategies Employed by Faith and CSO Peace Structures

According to Chambers and Kopstein the concept of civil society is vague as they argue that “Civil society, it would appear, can be many things to many people and take many shapes in many cultures. This implies that we should consciously choose the type of civil society we want.”¹⁸⁹ However, Goodwin, Pettit, and Pogge support the understanding of CSOs as a societal arena independent from both the economic and political society with a role of influence generation in a democratic association.¹⁹⁰ They suggest that the state can promote good civil society through policies – these include policies aimed at providing subsidies, tax exemptions, and partnerships among others – aimed at enhancing their capacity to produce the “right sort of moral effects.”¹⁹¹ The CSOs include a variety of organisations including established NGOs, labour organisations, and church bodies as well as informal networks and communities of mutual support. They encourage people to freely exercise their rights under the constitution and other legislation, for example, by meeting in favour of their interests, volunteering to advance a valuable cause, or protesting government policies.¹⁹² Moreover, according to the Sonke Gender Justice Network, CSOs represent a good framework to lobby for law enforcement or amendment; provide research-based input to laws and policies considering their regular consultations with communities at the grassroots level; hold the government accountable for its violations of laws and duties, and be the voice of the marginalized community to the international and national community.¹⁹³

As observed by Fairhurst and Wall, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, as an innovative approach to international development policy led by self-identified fragile states which include: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor Leste, and Togo, among others suggests that integral and successful development in poor and war-torn countries requires a certain level of peacebuilding as well as state-building.¹⁹⁴ This represents therefore an opportunity for CSOs as well as other organizations to actively participate and advocate for peace and development at multiple levels.¹⁹⁵ Government authorities often recognize and even promote the involvement of CSOs in the delivery of services. Nevertheless, government

¹⁸⁵ OECD (2008); UNEG. (2011). Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation: Towards UNEG Guidance. Available at http://www.uneval.org/papersand-pubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=980; Dart et al. (2010); Van Stolk, C., Ling, T. and Reding, A. (2011). Monitoring and evaluation in stabilization interventions: Reviewing the state of the art and suggesting ways forward. RAND Europe, prepared for DFID Stabilization Unit;

¹⁸⁶ Ellis, J., Parkinson, D., & Wadia, A. (2011). Making Connections: Using a theory of change to develop planning and evaluation;

¹⁸⁷ OECD (2008); UNEG. (2011). Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation: Towards UNEG Guidance. Available at http://www.uneval.org/papersand-pubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=980;

¹⁸⁸ Shapiro (2006), p.5-6.;

¹⁸⁹ Simone Chambers, Jeffrey Kopstein. 2001. *Bad Civil Society*. Vol. 29, in *Political Theory*. Sage Publications. Accessed November 2020. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591701029006008> p.854;

¹⁹⁰ Goodin, Robert E., Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge. 2007. *A companion to contemporary political philosophy*. 2nd. Vol. II. Blackwell publishing. Accessed November 2020. p458;

¹⁹¹ Simone Chambers, Jeffrey Kopstein. 2001. *Bad Civil Society*. Vol. 29, in *Political Theory*. Sage Publications. P855;

¹⁹² United Nations Development Programme. 2006. “UNDP and Civil Society Organization: A toolkit for strengthening partnerships.” Accessed November 2020. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2141UNDP%20and%20Civ%20p3>;

¹⁹³ Sonke Gender Justice Network. 2013. “Policy advocacy toolkit: How to Influence Public Policy for Social Justice and Gender Equality in Africa.” Accessed November 2020. <http://menengage.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Policy-Advocate-Toolkit.pdf> p13;

¹⁹⁴ Wall, Rachel Fairhurst and Kristen. 2014. *Civil Society Engagement in the ‘New Deal’*. March. Accessed November 2020. <https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2014/03/24/civil-society-engagement-in-the-new-deal/>;

¹⁹⁵ Ibid;

officials do not always easily accept the requisite steps to encourage citizens' engagement in policy making and governance.¹⁹⁶ There are various intervention methods and strategies employed by faith and CSO peace structures in various countries as discussed below.

In the context of **Kenya**, considering that post-election violence is chronic in the country, Githigaro suggests that, although the contentious presidential elections were a catalyst for violence, inherent social inequality was the origins of this violence, which made the situation worse.¹⁹⁷ The participation of CSOs and faith-based organization is not new in the country. For example, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), perceived as having significant experience in the field of peacebuilding and management; has historically been involved in the resolution of resource-based and boundary conflicts in the country as a response to the ethnic clashes in 1992, 1997 and 2007.¹⁹⁸ The interventions of NCCCK consisted mostly of providing social services such as food and first aid to displaced people in addition to psycho-social support to victims of trauma.¹⁹⁹

In the context of **Ethiopia**, Broeckhoven et al. identified a gap in the literature regarding the participation of CSOs in peacebuilding and development in Ethiopia. Indeed, they argue that,

It is unknown how one assesses the legitimacy – the accountability, effectiveness, and transparency – of CSOs and their de-legitimization in a political context in which those CSOs face significant pressure and repression by the State. Moreover, there is no baseline data or longitudinal literature that help compare whether the efficacy and legitimacy of CSOs were improved or worsened after the adoption of the restrictive Charities and Societies Proclamation 2009.²⁰⁰

However, Rahmato et al recognize that CSOs/NGOs have participated actively in addressing challenges related to the promotion of good governance in the country. This is through service delivery and relief operations considering factors such as the lack of awareness about human rights at the community level coupled with the limited democratic culture which has characterised the country for decades.²⁰¹

Moro argues that in the context of **South Sudan**, as a region that has historically been characterised by protracted conflicts even when it was still part of the former republic of Sudan, it is beneficial to look back on major peace processes and conciliation attempts that have taken place to understand the role of CSOs and the faith-based organizations in peace-making and reconciliation organisations. In Moro's analysis of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the 2015 Comprehensive Agreement he highlighted that CSOs were not involved in these processes as in those instances, the conflicting parties preferred striking deals among themselves. However, he acknowledges that CSOs were highly involved at the grassroots level through promoting peaceful dialogue, cohabitation, and tolerance among local populations.²⁰² According to him, this helps analysts and policy makers - recognize shortcomings that harm the position of CSOs.²⁰³

Many CSOs, along with foreign organisations, provide resources to fill a void that government

¹⁹⁶ Wall, Rachel Fairhurst and Kristen. 2014. Civil Society Engagement in the 'New Deal';

¹⁹⁷ Githigaro, John Mwangi. 2012. "Faith-Based Peacebuilding: A Case Study of the Council of Churches of Kenya." January. Accessed November 2020. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/51073216.pdf>. P1-6;

¹⁹⁸ Ibid;

¹⁹⁹ Ibid;

²⁰⁰ Broeckhoven, Nicky et al. 2019. Reopening political space for CSOs under pressure. The case of Ethiopia's sustainable development CSOs. Research report, Tilburg University. Accessed November 2020. https://includeplatform.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Verschuuren_Research_report.pdf;

²⁰¹ Dessalegn Rahmato, Akalewold Bantirgu, Yoseph Endeshaw. 200/. "CSOs/NGOs In Ethiopia: Partners in Development and Good Governance." A Report Prepared for the Ad Hoc CSO/NGO Task Force, Addis Ababa, p. 80-83. Accessed November 2020. <http://www.crdaethiopia.org/Documents/CSOs-NGOs%20in%20Ethiopia%20-%20Partners%20in%20Development.pdf>;

²⁰² Moro, Leben Nelson. 2015. CSOs/CBOs and faith-based organizations-led peace and reconciliation efforts. Policy brief, p. 1-2, THE SUDD INSTITUTE. Microsoft Word - CSO_Moro_2015.doc (reliefweb.int).;

²⁰³ Ibid p. 4;

policy has failed to resolve because of resource constraints or disregard. CSOs are more trusted than other groups particularly governments and opposition authorities thanks to their closer bond to the people at the grassroots level.²⁰⁴ For example, when the country relapsed into violence in December 2013, local CSOs, such as HealthLink, Theso, Nile Hope, and faith-based groups responded to the needs of victims.²⁰⁵

In the context of **the Democratic Republic of Congo**, Faith-Based organizations and CSOs have been active actors in the country's efforts for peacebuilding in multiple ways. According to the ICNL (International Centre for Not for profit Law), civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo comprises multiple actors from local to national levels who, like in most civil society organizations, aim to promote economic development through the provision of social services to the populations they are involved with.²⁰⁶ The complex socio-political context characterized by high political influence and polarizations in the country has fuelled the perception that CSOs operate either on the side of the opposition parties which seek change or collaborate and support ruling parties.²⁰⁷ Koko in his analysis of the evolution of the role of CSOs during the wars that the country experienced, reaffirms that, CSOs have been heavily linked with politicians considering their easy access to the populations at all levels. However, he highlights that CSOs have participated actively in peacebuilding efforts through capacity building, mediation, reconciliation as well as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives.²⁰⁸

Gender Roles in Peacebuilding and the Extent of Women's Participation in Peacebuilding Activities

Over time, governments globally have dedicated themselves to protecting and advancing women's rights and by extension the gender roles and extent of women's participation in peacebuilding. In addressing this, three international frameworks are particularly pertinent to this objective. In 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which set up a worldwide bill of rights for women and a plan to ensure the exercise of those rights.²⁰⁹ In 1995, during the Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development, and Peace; 189 states endorsed the Beijing Platform for Action and resolved to empower women and address their demands across 12 vital zones of concern,²¹⁰ including armed conflict. In 2000, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1325) and a few ensuing resolutions²¹¹ on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) voiced the significance of fusing women and the wealth of their experiences in prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery,²¹² and their inclusion in every aspect of dynamic international, regional, state and local decision-making bodies. Numerous states – 67 to date²¹³ – have made 1,325 National Action Plans (NAPs)²¹⁴ to express their dedication and to execute corresponding policy and programming at state and

²⁰⁴ Ibid p. 5-10;

²⁰⁵ Ibid;

²⁰⁶ International Center for Not for profit Law. 2020. Democratic Republic of the Congo. October. Accessed November 2020. <https://www.icnl.org/resources/civic-free-dom-monitor/congo-drc;>

²⁰⁷ Ibid;

²⁰⁸ Koko, Sadiki. 2016. The role of civil society in conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1998-2006. Accessed November 2020. <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/role-civil-society-conflict-resolution-democratic-republic-congo-1998-2006/>. Par 15-26;

²⁰⁹ 3. United Nations, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, December 18, 1979.;

²¹⁰ The Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (Beijing: United Nations, September 1995), Beijing full report E.pdf (un.org)

²¹¹ Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, and 2122.;

²¹² United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1325 (New York: United Nations, October 2000);

²¹³ Peace Women, "Member States," PeaceWomen.org, accessed September 21, 2017, <http://www.peacewomen.org/member-states/>;

²¹⁴ Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik, and Aisling Swaine, "Women in Peace and Security through United Nations Security Resolution 1325: Literature Review, Content Analysis of National Action Plans, and Implementation," IGIS WP 13/GGP WP 09 (Institute for Global and International Studies, 2014), 10;

local levels.²¹⁵ African governments have focused attention on gender equality in present regional and international instruments and frameworks in addition to Beijing Platform for Action, CEDAW, UNSCR 1325, Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, Maputo Protocol, Africa Agenda 2063, and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and development of the advancement of NAPs, however, there is a basic absence of execution and accountability.

While National Action Plans for the execution of UNSCR 1325 have been created in different nations, the resourcing, and execution of these plans while differing from nation to nation is generally still a challenge. Additionally, a few nations depend more on other national strategies procedures, rather than their NAPs. The Regional Advocacy Strategy hence attempts to encourage sufficient implementation of strategies/plans that a nation has to advance women's participation at all levels. All these steps are backed by the understanding that peacebuilding activities without the inclusion of women is impractical, and women are usually at the forefront of peacebuilding at all levels in society. Moreover, over and over it has been exhibited that women are the 'early warning system' for violence, taking note of shifts in attitude and behavior before conflict escalates. There are several ramifications of gender roles in peacebuilding activities in various countries as discussed below.

In the context of the **Democratic Republic of Congo**, women in DRC have historically been active in matters of conflict resolution as they played a great role in negotiation and advocacy activities that led to the brokering of many peace accords such as the 2002 Sun City talks.²¹⁶ As per the observations of the Council on Foreign Relations (n.d), women in DRC participated in creating coalitions that would ask for cease fires and advance women's agenda during peace talks as well as prevent conflicting actors from stalling or backing out of negotiations.²¹⁷ Furthermore, women have participated in mass actions aiming at promoting peace and advocating for the implementation of the 30% quota in elected positions.²¹⁸ The exclusion of women affects all levels of society in the Democratic Republic of Congo and is apparent at the grassroots level where women are predominantly absent from policymaking. This is supported by International Alert (n.d.), as it suggests that the key impediment to women's involvement is multi-sectoral gender inequality.²¹⁹ Further, according to UN Women (n.d.) the status of women's participation is also dependant on local traditions that do not favour the inclusion of women in decision making because the gender role attributed to them is to take care of children and household tasks.²²⁰ According to Bihamba, the condition of women deteriorates with an increase in the number of armed groups in the eastern region that contribute to the continuing mass rape and displacement of communities.²²¹

In the context of **Ethiopia**, Moreda suggests that women in the country are still denied influential positions where they can significantly influence decision-making institutions despite their numerical superiority in the country and their contribution to its economic development.²²² This imbalance in power and opportunities is due to deeply rooted traditional norms.²²³ Although

²¹⁵ United Nations and International Alert, *Planning for Action on Women and Peace and Security: National Level Implementation of Resolution 1325 (2000)* (New York: United Nations, 2010), 27-28;

²¹⁶ The Council on Foreign Relations, "Democratic Republic of Congo – The Sun City Agreement 2002," Women's role: In Brief, Council of Foreign Relations, accessed June 03 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/democratic-republic-congo>;

²¹⁷ The Council on Foreign Relations, "Democratic Republic of Congo – The Sun City Agreement 2002.";

²¹⁸ Ibid;

²¹⁹ International Alert. n.d. "Women, citizenship and peacebuilding in DRC." Accessed October 20, 2020. <https://www.international-alert.org/projects/women-citizenship-and-peacebuilding-drc>;

²²⁰ UN Women. n.d. "Women's participation in stabilization and conflict prevention in North Kivu." Accessed November 2020. https://www.unwomen.org/mdgf/B/DRCon-go_B.html;

²²¹ Bihamba, Justine Masika. 2018. "Peace & Equal Political Participation of Women in the DRC." July. Accessed November 2020. <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/peace-equal-political-participation-women-drc>;

²²² Moreda, Tefera Assefa. 2017. *Nature of Women Empowerment in Ethiopia (Constitutional and Policy Provisions)*. Ambo University. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321753588_Nature_of_Women_Empowerment_in_Ethiopia_Constitutional_and_Policy_Provisions;

²²³ Ibid, p2;

there are policies that exist to protect women's inclusion in decision making processes and ensure their access to productive resources, the implementation of the policy and laws on women empowerment still lags.²²⁴ Interventions such as Women in Leadership and Governance and the Liaison to the African Union (AU) have been conceptualized and initiated to support a gender responsive implementation of the AU's Agenda 2063 among others to promote the emphasis on the women's agenda.²²⁵ The 2018 reshuffle of government by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed was an unprecedented political development as women represented 50% of the newly formed government.²²⁶

In the context of **Kenya**, women participated actively in the post-election peace processes as it included women from diverse ethno-cultural affiliations in the country. Further to their efforts at unification and conflict resolution they advocated for attention being paid to the root causes of conflict on the issues of land, elected representation and constitutional reforms which were included in the final peace agreement. Additionally, Kenyan women's lobbying activities led them to efficiently cooperate with international institutions such as the United Nations and the African Union.²²⁷ This strategy helped to ensure that Kenyan women's voices were heard at the highest level of mediation and on the negotiation table. It also contributed immensely to the achievement of the peace agreement and processes.²²⁸ However, the World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) suggests that the participation of women is watered down in some instances by the fact that they are silent or behave as proxies for the men who assisted them to get elected or attain administrative positions in government. It was recommended that if women in leadership positions are not focusing on issues significant for other women, urging them to do so is an occasion to connect with them more overtly. They put emphasis on the need to work with men, particularly with regard to changing perspectives toward women's roles. Such efforts would progress women's participation and empowerment in peacebuilding in regions where cultures continue to belittle women.²²⁹ This is exhibited by the fact that women in Kenya are involved in peace, particularly at the community level, yet their efforts or voice goes unheeded. In light of this experience, the WFDD suggests focused capacity building and enhanced visibility for women's peacebuilding efforts. Since a wide range of peacebuilding activities with women are taking place with little documentation, it is therefore worth providing a platform to share and contribute.²³⁰

In the context of **South Sudan** Balogun notes that, the participation of South Sudanese women has always been active throughout the long history of conflict in the country. Indeed, he suggests that women's participation in conflict – as combatants and victims – and its resolution – as peacebuilders – is often not recognized as it depends on several factors such as the patriarchal traditional customs, funding limitations and political interests.²³¹ He supports the perception that the framework for international peacebuilding and negotiation favours the exclusion of a majority of women, children and people with disabilities as it mostly prioritizes those who were directly active in the war as combatants.²³² South Sudanese women leaders also contributed to the 2017 cease-fire agreement, discouraging sexual violence in conflict. It also included strong commitments to protect civilians and reunify women and children. Other roles played

²²⁴ Ibid, p3;

²²⁵ UN Women, "Ethiopia," UN Women, accessed June 19, 2019, <https://africa.unwomen.org/en/where-we-are/eastern-and-southern-africa/ethiopia>;

²²⁶ Rachel Vogelstein, "Women This Week: Equality in Ethiopian Cabinet," The Council on Foreign Relations, entry posted October 19, 2018, accessed June 20, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/women-week-equality-ethiopian-cabinet>;

²²⁷ Meredith Preston and Njoki Wamai, "Beyond the numbers";

²²⁸ Elizabeth Sugh and Agnes Ikwuba, "Women in mediation and conflict resolutions: Lessons, challenges, and prospects for Africa", IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science 22, no. 1(January 2017): 01-06, accessed October 20 2020, <http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol.%2022%20Issue1/Version-2/A2201020106.pdf>;

²²⁹ World Faiths Development Dialogue, Peace and Stability in Kenya: The role of religious actors, 2015. <https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkeley-center/150804WFDDPeaceStabilityKenyaRoleReligiousActorsEventSummary.pdf>;

²³⁰ Ibid;

²³¹ Balogun, Funmi. 2020. "Women's Meaningful Participation in Peacebuilding: Reflections from South Sudan." November. Accessed November 2020. <https://africanfeminism.com/womens-meaningful-participation-in-peacebuilding-reflections-from-south-sudan/>;

²³² Ibid;

by women in the South Sudan peace process include staging mass actions in protest over the killing of civilians and rape, through organizing workshops and community dialogue. Further, Mai suggests that women in South Sudan have acquired in depth knowledge expertise and skills through their engagement in peacebuilding work in governance. This is – through the multiple calls for policy reforms and/or implementation aimed at including more women in leadership positions, reconciliation initiatives and economic empowerment at grassroots level. This also includes financial support and promotion of women and youth owned businesses – even though they are victims of GBV during times of war.²³³

Role of Religious Leaders in Addressing Conflicts

There is a vast and rich literature debating the role of religious leaders and institutions in conflict resolution. Indeed, there are many academic and policy-oriented publications suggesting that religion is a “useful if not necessary instrument for achieving peace.”²³⁴ According to Appleby and Thomas, religion has a crucial role to play in conflict resolution as it incorporates a system of values that promote peace and unity in divided societies. However, they warn against a reductionist approach that takes the instrumentalist approach to religious values and the logic of problem-solving by underpinning or minimizing the need to resolve other concerns and include other players.²³⁵ In this sense, religious peacebuilding would be considered a misnomer, if it leads one to believe that conflict transformation by religious actors happens independently of government and other secular actors as they all play an important role.

Appleby identified a number of activities that fall within the sphere of religious organizations influence. These are: preventive diplomacy, education and training, election monitoring, conflict mediation, nonviolent protest and advocacy for structural reform, and withdrawing or providing moral legitimacy for a government in times of crisis.²³⁶ He points at the elements of a typology of religious conflict transformation, which would depend on the growth of empirical evidence in that research field.

First, Appleby highlights the period toward the end of the cold war in which religious leaders, institutions and organizations participated actively to transform conflict in three ways that had specific implications. These are: **conflict management** – which entails preventing the escalation of conflict to open violence and spilling over to other areas; **conflict resolution** – which entails the plausible removal of the inequalities between the conflicting parties through means of mediation, negotiation, and/or advocacy and testimony on behalf of one or more parties. These actions usually foster the achievement of cease-fires and reaching of peace agreements in anticipation of **structural reforms** – which entail initiatives agreed upon to address the root causes of conflicts as well as the elaboration of long-term practices and bodies that would promote peace and the improvement of relations among the society members.²³⁷

²³³ Mai, Nyathon James Hoth. 2015. The role of women in peacebuilding in South Sudan. Policy brief, The SUDD Institute, p. 1-2, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/southsudan_1.pdf;

²³⁴ Silvestri, S. & Mayall, J. 2015. The role of religion in conflict and peacebuilding. London: British Academy, p. 28-36, <https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/14098/7/>;

²³⁵ S, Thomas. 2005. The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of. Basingstoke: Palgrave,;

²³⁶ Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. The Ambivalence of the sacred. Rowman & Littlefield, p. 211-213,;

²³⁷ Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. The Ambivalence of the sacred. Rowman & Littlefield;

Finally, he supports the idea that religious actors participate in conflict transformation under three different sets of socio-political circumstances, which are:

- *The crisis mode*: As a result of its historical position and systemic existence in a strife-ridden community, and their active engagement in the social dynamics of political transition, churches, mosques, or other indigenous religious bodies became de facto arbitrary, mediators or even agents of conflict. That was the case in the fight against apartheid in South Africa in 1989. Some were largely unprepared to play the role of conflict transformer in the mainstream religious institutions. However, charismatic leadership arose, ethicists re-conceptualized and updated conventional arguments describing morality during war, and revolutionary ideas were applied by theologians as Gandhi's Satyagraha or Ubuntu in South Africa.²³⁸
- *The saturation mode*: like in crisis mobilization mode, a spontaneous, diffuse or orchestrated sequence of reactions to the danger or onset of conflict begins to transform religio-cultural conflict in saturation mode. Indigenous religious institutions are however, over time diversifying, establishing offices, inter-religious or inter-community dialogues, education and peace-building programmes: para-religious and other community frameworks are niched in their conception that conflict-changing is a full-term long-term enterprise and that personal vocations and commitments are created.²³⁹
- *The intervention mode* which he describes as the "most promising approach to religious peacebuilding that would lead to an enhanced contribution from external actors. Indeed, in this mode external religious actors intervene in conflict situations at the invitation of one of the conflicting parties in order to initiate and sustain peacebuilding processes. This would give more flexibility to local religious actors to assume leadership positions and responsibilities in the development of a saturation mode."²⁴⁰

Although Gopin agrees that all religions have, at some point, incorporated the principles of human rights, peace and dignity as well as religious leaders' involvement in the resolution of international conflicts, he recognises the participation of religion in the creation of conflicts throughout human history.²⁴¹ He further argues that there are two benefits of exploring the relationship between religion and conflict resolution theory. First, considering the multiplicity of religious sacred texts which relate to peace making, social and anti-social norms causing or preventing conflict, this would help in identifying what has worked in the past in a particular context and prevent the violent disposition therein contained. The second, considering the central role of religion in the life and social behaviour of millions of human beings, of whom many of whom are actively engaged in violent struggle. Diplomats and conflict resolution experts could benefit from an in-depth understanding of the motives for either violence or coexistence among communities.²⁴²

Religious tensions exacerbate conflicts in many vulnerable nations around the globe. However, religion can play an important role in peace building, conflict prevention and resolution.²⁴³ According to Saperstein, religion is related to peace in four ways that summarize the views of many authorities in this research field. These are:

²³⁸ Ibid. p230-236;

²³⁹ Ibid. p236-239;

²⁴⁰ Ibid. p239-243;

²⁴¹ Gopin, Marc. 2000. *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking*. First Edition. Oxford University Press. p13;

²⁴² Ibid;

²⁴³ Saperstein, David. 2013. "Why religion is important in conflict prevention." 24 September. Accessed November 20, 2020. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2013/09/why-religion-is-important-in-conflict-prevention/>. Par 1-3;

- The notion that all is formed in the image of the Divine is founded upon the ideas of human dignity and the common nature of all - is central to true peace. Religious ideals of salvation and pardon underpin crucial post-conflict efforts to reconcile society and help it heal the shattering effects of war.
- Interfaith demonstrations also concentrate on peaceful resistance to racism and injustice. An illustration of this is the religious denunciation of apartheid and segregation policies as crimes or religious communities' attempts to bring an end to ethnic cleansing in Darfur.
- Religion is an important culture and organization in civil society, often seen as a unifying principle that transcends divisive problems. It is frequently among the most secure and trustworthy institutions in crisis locations capable of contributing to conflict resolution. We could consider the accomplishments of the Sant'Egidio community, which successfully brokered the 1992 peace agreement after 30 years of civil war in Mozambique. Other examples are efforts in South Africa for interfaith reconciliation and a Muslim-Christian coalition following the Balkan conflicts.
- Local and foreign religious bodies, which both build conditions of hope, care for the needy, and security, play a significant and often unrecognized role in supporting education to provide medical service and address poverty.²⁴⁴

However, Saperstein argues that the achievements, effect or coherence of interfaith initiatives are limited. Indeed, their voices are often blocked out by the harshness of conflicts and therefore cannot acquire political influence.²⁴⁵ There are various ways in which religious leaders played a role in peacebuilding in several countries as discussed below.

In the context of South Sudan, Jeffrey notes that church institutions in South Sudan are among the few stable institutions considering the protracted fifty years of conflict the country has experienced since independence. The dedication of these institutions toward the achievement of inter-religious cooperation is displayed through the collective humanitarian assistance they provided during the countries' long wars.²⁴⁶ The war death toll coupled with massive destruction and failed politics represented an opportunity for religious leaders to emerge as the only players able to be granted credibility on a national scale. This also enabled them to "lobby the international community to support the southern cause while brokering peace between the communities torn apart by war and ethnic strife."²⁴⁷

In the context of **Ethiopia**, religious leaders in the country have played an important role as advocates and advisors in matters of peace in the country. Indeed, they appeal to political leaders to assume their responsibility to peacefully resolve conflict in the country,²⁴⁸ which has many records of ethno-political clashes.²⁴⁹ For example, catholic leaders called for peaceful dialogue as tensions were threatening to pull the state into civil war in the northern area of Tigray²⁵⁰ after the government postponed the 2020 elections due to the Covid19 pandemic.²⁵¹ Religious leaders have highly condemned the displacement and the killings that the different

²⁴⁴ Ibid;

²⁴⁵ Ibid;

²⁴⁶ Jeffrey, James. 2018. "Church and conflict in South Sudan." July. Accessed November 2020. <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/church-and-conflict-south-sudan>. Par1;

²⁴⁷ Ibid;

²⁴⁸ Catholic News Agency. 2016. "After deadly protests, religious leaders in Ethiopia call for peace." October. Accessed November 2020. <https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/after-deadly-protests-religious-leaders-in-ethiopia-call-for-peace-11777>;

²⁴⁹ Gebremeden, Yared. 2018. "Ethiopia: Religious Leaders' Irreplaceable Role for Peace." April. Accessed November 2020. <https://allafrica.com/stories/201804040307.html>;

²⁵⁰ CBE/Vatican News. 2020. "Ethiopia: Church leaders appeal for peace amid growing unrest." November. Accessed November 2020. <https://www.indcatholicnews.com/news/40861> ;

²⁵¹ Esteves, Junno Arocho. 2020. "Pope appeals for peace as violence increases in Ethiopia." 28 November. Accessed November 2020. <https://catholicphilly.com/2020/11/news/world-news/pope-appeals-for-peace-as-violence-increases-in-ethiopia/> ;

past and actual conflicts have generated.²⁵²

In the context of **DRC**, faith groups exert huge influence on the public as social services providers²⁵³ – education, medical care and infrastructure – in a political system marked by years of mis-rule, weakening state capacities and prolonged conflict.²⁵⁴ The dispute in the DRC has increased the need for constructive participation in the public domain by faith-based organisations, in particular to promote the process of building peace.²⁵⁵ Religious networks facilitated the initiatives which led to the formal end of hostilities in the region, especially the Catholic Church in collaboration with other players in civil society by promoting the Inter-Congolese Dialogue convened at Sun City, South Africa in April 2003.²⁵⁶ Further, religious leaders are included in several political processes as they are considered impartial and enjoy great credibility with the public. In this sense, they have been included in electoral commissions to oversee the electoral processes for more credibility.²⁵⁷ Religious leaders collaborate with state institutions and participate in awareness raising, compassion and collaboration by for example following the attacks in the Ituri and North Kivu regions which generated thousands of displaced people.²⁵⁸

Advocacy Initiatives Aligned with Social Change and Policy Implementation

According to Roebeling and de Vries, advocacy, lobbying and activism are the common words used to refer to policy influencing. The definition of these words is not well specified and accepted, and the importance of the terms and their actions can appear to overlap. However, it is possible, without defining the words explicitly, to have an inherent sense of what activism is or advocacy and lobbying entail.²⁵⁹ They further argue that what adds to the complexity of the terms is that they are also described in relation to particular activities. Some therefore consider a meeting with lawmakers to be a lobbying operation, while the publication of a press release can be seen more as advocacy and the organisation of a sit-in will be more subject to activism.²⁶⁰

In this sense, the following terms and their implications are understood by Roebeling and de Vries as:

Lobbying: although it sometimes bears a negative connotation – the perception of people making backdoor deals with politicians – it entails a work that is not directly transparent which means it is sometimes a challenge to make lobbying accountable. It entails a consensus driven initiative which calls for some sort of interparty dialogue without which negotiations are unlikely to be successful.

Advocacy: Similarly, to lobbying, there is no clear definition of advocacy. The term can sometimes be confused with policy influencing. However, they defer from one another in the nature of activities they entail. Advocacy entails all non-violent and legal activities designed to influence policies, practices and behaviour (including lobbying).

Activism: When we think of activism it is always associated with marches, barricades and fun and innovative events aimed at drawing attention to an issue. Most of these practices are not

²⁵² CBE/Vatican News. 2020. "Ethiopia: Church leaders appeal for peace amid growing unrest;

²⁵³ U.S. Department of State. 2017. "Democratic Republic Of The Congo 2018 International Religious Freedom Report." Accessed November 2020. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CONGO-DEM-REP-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf>. P4;

²⁵⁴ Ufo Okeke Uzodike Ayo. n.d. "Religious Networks in Post-conflict Democratic Republic of the Congo: A prognosis." Accessed November 2020. <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/religious-networks-in-post-conflict-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>;

²⁵⁵ Ibid. part 1;

²⁵⁶ Ibid;

²⁵⁷ U.S. Department of State. 2017. "Democratic Republic of the Congo 2018 International Religious Freedom Report.";

²⁵⁸ Atemanke, Jude. n.d. "DR Congo Government Engages Religious Leaders in Coordinated Efforts against COVID-19." Accessed November 2020. [https://www.aciafrica.org/news/1199/dr-congo-government-engages-religious-leaders-in-coordinated-efforts-against-covid-19](https://www.aciafrica.org/news/1199/dr-congo-government-engages-religious-leaders-in-coordinated-efforts-against-covid-19;);

²⁵⁹ Ger Roebeling, Jan de Vries. 2011. Advocacy and Policy Influencing for Social Change. Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations. Accessed November 2020. https://www.ircwash.org/sites/default/files/advocacy_and_policy_influencing_fro_social_change.pdf p. 17;

²⁶⁰ Ibid. p.17;

aimed at creating or proposing consensus. They are designed to persuade or educate others, e.g. to obtain public support for a problem. Pressure on some stakeholders can be brought into play by such practices and used by third parties including the public. Since the activities related to activism are of a confrontational nature, it is important to note that activism can be approached as a legal and non-violent process or the exact opposite.

The term **awareness raising/ sensitization** is often associated alongside the three terms already explored. According to Roebeling and de Vries, it includes the collaborative sharing of knowledge between the various parties concerned, either beneficiaries or decision makers. However, they warn about awareness raising stating that:

Awareness-raising should only be a means to a more specific objective. You always must be conscious of the reasons for awareness-raising. In our experience many organisations indicate that one of their objectives is to raise the awareness of others in their policy influencing interventions. We believe that awareness-raising is part of policy influencing, but we also believe that awareness-raising alone cannot achieve policy and behavioural change. Thus, awareness raising cannot be an objective of your policy influencing intervention.²⁶¹

According to a research by the Sonke Gender Justice Network, policy advocacy is understood as a process consisting of taking strategic actions to influence and trigger the creation, improvement and/or challenge (ineffective and bad) public policy.²⁶² The study argues that policy advocacy is an effective way to reach a large number of people as well as a framework that provides people with the leverage to demand their rights and more importantly, get governmental commitment to implement strategies contained in policies and other legislations such as the funding of CSOs among others.²⁶³ According to Buckley, campaigns for policy reform rely on a wide variety of tools and strategies. These include peaceful mass marches, campaigns, letter writing, lobbying, use of media and the internet, and legal action. Further he argues that considering that campaigning is also confrontational in nature, governments are most of the time unreceptive to the advocacy for its policy change.²⁶⁴

According to Ross there is need to use a theory of change approach to advocacy in order to effectively connect the actions taken to the expected changes.²⁶⁵ She argues that the complexity of campaign and advocacy strategies can be simplified to the identification of the problem and its plausible solutions, the production of a research based analysis that would support the advocacy message on a large scale of the main message through all the means available.²⁶⁶ Klugman also supports the need for the use of a theory of change when it comes to policy advocacy as she argues that it would help in assessing whether the causes that impact changes are addressed as well as assessing whether the advocacy campaign is still community oriented especially if it is directed towards marginalised communities.²⁶⁷

She argues further that the absence of a theory of change in advocacy can impede the ability to assess the progress made. It also reduces the flexibility of adjusting the strategy.²⁶⁸ She highlights the measurable outcome of policy advocacy based on the general aims of advocacy campaigns. These are: enhanced organizational capacity, alliances, base support and research

²⁶¹ Ibid, p. 25;

²⁶² Sonke Gender Justice Network. 2013. "Policy Advocacy Toolkit: How to influence Public policy for social justice and gender equality in Africa," p. 7-8. Accessed November 2020. <http://menengage.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Policy-Advocate-Toolkit.pdf>;

²⁶³ Ibid p. 9;

²⁶⁴ Buckley, Steve. 2018. "Advocacy strategies and approaches: Overview." May. Accessed November 2020. <https://www.apc.org/en/advocacy-strategies-and-approaches-overview>;

²⁶⁵ Ross, Jenny. n.d. "Theory of change for advocacy and campaigns." Accessed November 2020. <https://www.bond.org.uk/resources/theory-of-change-for-advocacy-and-campaigns>;

²⁶⁶ Ibid;

²⁶⁷ Klugman, Barbara. 2011. "Effective social justice advocacy: a theory-of-change." *Reproductive Health* (Elsevier), p. 147-149. Accessed November 2020. doi:10.1016/S0968-8080(11)38582-5;

²⁶⁸ Ibid;

orientation. Indeed, she argues that these four outcomes lay down the foundation of advocacy campaigns as they also trigger other outcomes that showcase progress in advocacy. These subsequent outcomes are centred on a domino effect in the sense that the establishment of a consensus over the identification of a problem and its plausible solution through policy can lay the basis of a collective and inclusive advocacy effort that ensures the authenticity and validity of the advocacy message and strategy. Subsequently this would help in providing for the necessary visibility of the issue in policy processes which will ensure consistent pressure through the monitoring of policy implementation. Ultimately, this would lead to a sustained change in social norms first at lower scale – such as lower marginalization and discrimination as the society gradually changes its understanding of the dynamics behind the existing issue and its potential solution – and a change of the “population-level impact indicators” which include decreased GBV and higher literacy rates among poor communities.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁹ Ibid.;



RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study used cross-sectional research design which relied on a mixed methods approach to data collection, interpretation and analysis, from both quantitative and qualitative data. In the context of this study, the research design provided a deeper interpretation of the problem of study by combining both types of data that is quantitative or qualitative data. This design was important as it helped in the contextual understanding of the conflict dynamics in the targeted countries and the ways CSOs and other peace structures operate in order to resolve conflicts. Collected data from the field was coded, entered and analysed by a computer using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software Version 23. This would serve as the analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data. Thereafter the data was presented in the form of frequency tables, pie charts and graphs for ease of comprehension and interpretation. Content analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data which was thereafter presented as narrations.

A total of 104 organisations were reached between the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. Separate interviews and Focus Group Discussions were arranged for organisations in the same country to ensure that respondents would actively participate, contribute, and build upon experiences of working in the same operational environment.

Description of Instruments and Methods of Data Collection

Both qualitative and quantitative data was collected from primary and secondary sources in the sample countries. The collection of data was done through:

- Desktop research and review of documents which involved reports, journals and available documentation on the topic.
- Primary data collection: This was attained through a structured online survey and in-depth interviews. The questionnaire was distributed to a reasonably large number of organisations including those invited to an initial regional roundtable. In addition, primary data was collected from Zoom meetings with representatives of organisations well versed with the conflict situations in their regions.

The targeted interviews were country specific and constituted either two or three people in order to learn more about the specific situation of their organisations, operating environments and, target groups of peace interventions. These interviews conducted through zoom guaranteed good participation as well as effective and efficient management of discussions.



RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This segment interprets the country-specific data collected which is guided by the objectives, literature review and the researcher's observations. The collective responses of the participants are summarized and presented as frequencies and percentages in charts, tables and verbatim in line with the theme "Mapping of Regional Faith and CSO Peace Structures."

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The following data presented and analysed represents the findings of the research within the Democratic Republic of Congo

Demographic data

The study sought to establish the demographic data of the organization respondents. This was done through a general analysis on the demographic data obtained from the respondents which included: the gender of the respondent, the years of experience in the sector of peace and conflict resolution, the type of organization they worked in and their organization's thematic focus.

Gender

Table 3 Gender of respondents DRC

	Frequency	Percentage
Male	23	82.14%
Female	5	17.86%
Total	28	100%

(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

From Table 3 above, the gender disparity is large as approximately 18% of the respondents were women. This disparity could be dependent on the participant's willingness to contribute to the research.

Years of working in DRC

Table 4: Years of experience in peace and conflict resolution sector in DRC

Years	Frequency	Percentage
Less than a year	2	8.00%
1 – 9 years	14	56.00%
10-21 years	8	32.00%
Above 21 years	1	4.00%
Total	25	100%

(Source: CTRP Research Findings)


As presented on table 4 above, most of the respondents had worked in the peace and conflict resolutions sector between 1 and 9 years (56%). This was followed by those who have worked in the sector between 10 and 21 years (32 %). The fewest number were those active in the

sector for less than 1 year (8 %) and above 21 years (4 %) respectively. This is significant as it is indicative of the knowledge and experience of the respondents within the peace and conflict resolution sector. Thereby offering further credence to the research with regard to achieving its objectives.

Types of Organizations

Figure 5 below highlights the types of organizations reached for this research.

Figure 5: Types of organizations reached in DRC




(Source: CTRP Research Findings)

As presented in Figure 5 above, most respondents (54%) worked in Civil Society Organizations, followed by those working for Non-governmental organizations (20.83%) and International Non-governmental organizations (20.83%). The fewest number were respondents who worked for Community Based Organization with (4%). This indicates that a wide range of organizations relevant to the study were contacted for the research.

Thematic Focus of Organizations

Figure 6 below highlights the thematic focus at the base of the activities conducted by the organizations reached for this research in DRC.

Figure 6: Thematic Focus of Organisations reached in DRC



(Source: CTRP Research Findings)

As indicated on figure 6 above, the respondents worked for organizations which focused on various thematic areas. Most of the respondents identified that their thematic areas focused on Gender-Based Violence, poverty alleviation and women's human rights. Each thematic area was represented by 18% of the respondents. Furthermore, 7% of the respondents worked in organizations focusing on humanitarian support and 3% in organizations focused on psychosocial support. The highest number (32%) of the respondents worked for organizations with multi-thematic focus areas varying from a combination of several of the thematic focuses already enumerated above in addition to, governance, youth entrepreneurship and re-integration of ex-combatants.

Intervention Methods and Strategies Employed by Faith and CSO Peace Structures

This subsection explores the different intervention methods used by CSOs and faith-based organizations based on the theory of change used by the organizations represented by the respondents.

Theory of Change

As presented in the literature review section, a theory of change is basically a conceptualized roadmap to achieve a specific change. The organizations for which the respondents work used diverse theories of change that guided their intervention strategies on the basis of their theoretical focus.

For most respondents, the major areas that constitute focal points which if worked upon would bring positive change in the region include: mutual acceptance, awareness creation, communication, training, rehabilitation and reintegration, behavioural change, women and youth participation in decision making, inter-institutional collaboration (church, government, justice and legislative), non-violence education, youth and women's economic empowerment.

Here are some of the responses from the participants that showcase the domino effect associated with the basic understanding of the theory of change.

One respondent from a CSO that offers psychosocial support to victims of conflict, through research and participatory action, highlighted that “if the capacity building of human capital leads to a collective recovery of consciousness, then equity in access to resources will increase the love of decent work, eliminate idleness and initiate the construction of a strong state, producing a state and institutions that protect the human security of its people.”

Another respondent from a CSO that focuses on reducing poverty, especially among the youth believed that “young people are the lungs of sustainable development and perpetual peace. They have physical strength and quick wit; however, they are abandoned and their efforts are not taken into account by the community. By offering them a framework for the exchange of experiences, young people can discover their potential and have the opportunity to explain their actions to the general public. Our organization, Le Club des Amis de la Paix et du Development, aims to be this framework at the service of young people to allow them to optimize their assets and skills sometimes hidden for lack of guidance.”

These responses are in line with suggestions made by CARE International UK, in the formulation of a theory of change using “if...then” as a way of conceptualizing organizational approach to change.²⁷⁰ Further, these responses relate to Vogel's understanding of TOC as an outcome

²⁷⁰ CARE International UK. (2012). Defining Theories of Change. January, London, p. 5.;

based approach which applies critical thinking to the design, implementation and evaluation of initiatives and programs intended to support change in their context.²⁷¹

Table 5 below highlights the respondents' views on the possibility of adapting or changing of their initial TOC in DRC.

Table 5: Changes in DRC organizations' TOC

	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	16	59.26%
No	10	37.04%
Uncertain	1	3.70%
Total	27	100%

(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

When asked whether they had to adapt the theory of change used by their organizations and as presented on table 5 above, most of the respondents (59.26%) acknowledged that they had to adjust the theory of change used. Indeed, the respondents suggested that this adjustment in their theory of change was necessary as there was a need to consider and engage with alternative modes and approaches to conflict resolution. Further, the respondents suggested that there was a need to adapt to the diverse socio-cultural and political dynamics of the communities they were involved with on a regular basis. The respondents also attributed their redirection in theory of change as subsequent to realizing there was more potential within communities than previously anticipated.

One respondent from a CSO that focuses on reducing poverty in DRC stated that: "Initially, our vision was simply to bring young people together through a desire for constructive dialogue. Subsequently, understanding the importance of young people in building peace, we resolved to adapt our theory of change by setting up a multi-sector framework (with the 7 pillars) to bring all young people on board according to their different preferential areas. Our methodological approach is currently based on the establishment of the ESPACE-JEUNE Centers as a framework to support the strengths of young people."

Schierhout, et al. point to this by arguing that TOC are revisited throughout the implementation process as circumstances change along the way.²⁷²

On the other hand, 37.04% of the respondents suggested that they did not have to adapt or modify their theory of change. Indeed, the respondents suggested that this was not necessary as they were still assessing whether their actual theory of change was effective. In addition, some respondents suggested that there was no need for a change in their TOC as they were closely working with communities at grassroots levels which gave them a more authentic orientation. Additionally, these respondents suggested that the application of their TOC showed consistent results based on their objectives although they did not exclude the possibility of change. This relates to Vogel's argument where he suggests that the formulation process of a TOC implies an examination of the contextual setting in which change is required.²⁷³

²⁷¹ Vogel I. Review of the Use of "Theory of Change" in International Development. London: Commissioned by the UK Department for International Development; 2012, 2-3.;

²⁷² Schierhout G, et al. Evaluating the effectiveness of a multifaceted, multilevel continuous quality improvement program in primary health care: developing a realist theory of change. *Implement Sci.* 2013; 8, 119.;

²⁷³ Vogel I. Review of the Use of "Theory of Change" in International Development. London: Commissioned by the UK Department for International Development; 2012, 19-20.;

It also relates to the use of the theory of change as presented in the literature review through the understanding of OECD; Dart et al; UNEG and Van Stolk who suggest that the TOC could be used in Monitoring and Evaluation of projects, the depiction of the picked change to internal and external actors and finally in learning by allowing individuals to explain the hypothesis behind their program interventions.²⁷⁴ Only 3.4% of the respondents were uncertain about any adjustments to the theory of change in their organizations as these organizations have been using the same theory since they joined.

Organizations' General Strategy of Addressing Issues

When asked what were the general strategies used to address the issues related to their organizations' thematic focuses, most of the respondents suggested that their strategies included research and participatory action, training, promotion of gender equality, entrepreneurship, dialogue and collaboration, intergenerational cohabitation, immersive conflict investigations, promoting good governance, women's empowerment, protection of the environment, roundtables, symposia, inclusive dialogue, conferences, implementation of collaborative projects, promotion of Income Generating Activities (IGA), data collection, provision for psychosocial and medical support to victims.

Giving details of their mode of operation in addressing issues related to their thematic focus, a respondent from a CSO focusing on poverty reduction explained that, "We set up youth groups and women's groups "Peace Care Groups" in the cities and territories of the DRC. Then we train these young people in active non-violence, peaceful conflict management, trauma healing, leadership transformation and entrepreneurship. Subsequently, we give coaching sessions to these groups on the development of business plans and finally, we support the implementation of these business plans of youth/women groups by giving them a start-up fund that does not exceed 1000 USD per group of 20 - 25 people. We track the Income Generating Activities of different groups to identify areas that deserve capacity building for these groups to achieve their goals. In addition, we hold an annual general meeting where representatives of the various peace care groups take part to develop an advocacy plan for policy makers at all levels to promote the rights and access of young people and women to decent employment as sources of well-being and peace. Once the advocacy plan is available, we develop advocacy notes that we share with policy makers at all levels (local, provincial, national and international)."

Organizational Program Dissemination Strategy

Most of the respondents indicated that their organizations disseminate their program objectives to the communities they are involved with in diverse ways. Some dissemination strategies highlighted by the respondents included exchange meetings, training workshops and capacity building; audio-visual reports, social media, involvement in churches, schools, universities, professional and family environments, the establishment of peace groups in cities and territories, awareness raising on gender and inclusiveness issues, youth associations, state and para-state authorities' and door-to-door awareness campaigns. As an illustration, a respondent from an NGO, which focuses on poverty reduction, psychosocial support, children and women's rights and gender based violence highlighted that their dissemination strategy is conducted "through community mobilization by bringing community members together to give the spirit of the program, the added values and the impact of the program in the community. Organizing community meetings and dialogues between community leaders, the public and

²⁷⁴ OECD (2008); UNEG. (2011). Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation: Towards UNEG Guidance. Available at http://www.uneval.org/papersand-pubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=980 ; Dart et al. (2010); Van Stolk, C., Ling, T. and Reding, A. (2011). Monitoring and evaluation in stabilization interventions: Reviewing the state of the art and suggesting ways forward. RAND Europe, prepared for DFID Stabilization Unit;

the organization. In a nutshell our strategy includes information and the involvement from all stakeholders from the beginning of the programme’s implementation to its completion.”


Guiding Values to Organization Problem Resolution Approach

Most of the respondents pointed to several values that guide and inform their approach to the resolution of contextual problems in the areas where they work. These are: cohesive leadership, a sense of challenge, team spirit and competitiveness, synergy, love and loyalty, integrity and professionalism, impartiality and transparency, peace and justice, patriotism and freedom, human rights and dignity, solidarity and mutual trust.

Organization Strategy Satisfaction Level

Figure 7 below highlights the respondents’ level of satisfaction with regard to the strategies they used in their organizations.

Figure 7: DRC Organization strategy satisfaction level



(Source: *C RTP* Research Findings)

As presented in Figure 7, most of the respondents were either satisfied (65.38%) or very satisfied (15%) with the strategy employed by their organizations. The remaining (19%) adopted a neutral stance on the question.

Despite the general level of satisfaction in their strategies, most of the respondents identified several areas of improvement in these strategies for enhanced social change. These include the enhancement of the following areas: intergenerational exchanges, cross-border trade areas, unemployment monitoring, citizen engagement, women’s empowerment, advocacy, mobilization, capacity building, scope of operations; participation and input of women in project planning and management; support in networking; entrepreneurial initiatives; awareness creation strategies; access to income-generating activities, job creation, youth mentoring, the fight against hunger and poverty, reconciliation strategies; lobbying scale; training of local negotiators and mediators; funds for peace-building; donors involvement and the inclusion of the locals.


Gender Roles in Peacebuilding and the Extent of Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding Activities

This sub-section explores the influence of gender roles in peacebuilding based on the assessment of the general status, areas of women’s inclusion in peacebuilding processes and the impact of cultural perceptions on women’s inclusion. The section also explores the application of the UNSCR 1325 by the organizations for which the respondents worked as well as the lessons learnt from its application.

Women’s Participation approach to Conflict Resolution

As the research aimed at identifying the extent of women’s participation and gender roles in peacebuilding, it was important to understand in what ways and approaches women contributed to peace efforts in the country.

Figure 8: Women’s participation approach to conflict resolution in DRC



(Source: Research Findings)


As presented in Figure 8 above, the respondents indicated that women participated in community conflict resolution in diverse ways, including advocacy campaigns (59%), policy implementation (10%), lobbying for peace (10%), negotiation (7%) and mediation (7%). It is noteworthy that a significant percentage of women’s participation in conflict resolution is through advocacy campaigns. The effectiveness and prominence of advocacy campaigns as preferred avenue for women’s participation in conflict resolution confirms the vital role that women played in advocacy activities and mass actions which led to the Sun City agreement in 2002 among other peace processes.²⁷⁵ Finally, 7% of the respondents perceived that women are involved in all the ways enumerated in addition to their participation in research aimed at finding ways to reach peaceful resolutions to conflict.

Cultural Perceptions and Gender Imbalance

Figure 9 below highlights the respondents’ view on the extent of cultural perceptions that contribute to gender imbalance in peace and conflict interventions in DRC.

²⁷⁵ The Council on Foreign Relations, “Democratic Republic of Congo – The Sun City Agreement 2002,” Women’s role: In Brief, Council of Foreign Relations, accessed October 03, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/democratic-republic-congo>;

Figure 9: Cultural perception and gender imbalance in DRC




(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Although the study findings show the multidimensional participation of women in peacebuilding activities, Figure 9 above, reflects respondents' perceptions that though at different levels, cultural perceptions contribute to gender imbalance in peace and conflict interventions. This is in line with the observations made by International Alert (n.d.), UN Women (n.d.) and Bihamba (2018) who all suggest that strongly imbedded cultural distributions of gender roles and the proliferation of armed groups in DRC present the major challenge to women's participation to peacebuilding activities.²⁷⁶

Women's Participation in Peacebuilding

Figure 10 below highlights the respondents' view on the diverse roles played by women in peacebuilding activities in DRC

Figure 10: Women's role in peacebuilding activities in DRC



(Source: CTRP Research Findings)


²⁷⁶ UN Women. n.d. "Women's participation in stabilization and conflict prevention in North Kivu." Accessed November 2020. https://www.unwomen.org/mdgf/B/DRCon-go_B.html. Bihamba, Justine Masika. 2018. "Peace & Equal Political Participation of Women in the DRC." July. Accessed November 2020. <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/peace-equal-political-participation-women-drc>.

Seeking to determine the influence of gender roles on women's participation in peace building, Figure 10 above indicates that respondents recognized the involvement of women in peacebuilding activities (above 76%) and that they held substantial influence in addressing conflict (above 60%). In addition, the respondents suggested that women benefited from the support of men in peace and conflict interventions (65%). However, the respondents were for the most part uncertain or disagreed with the suggestion that women are involved in decision making (above 60%) as well as that women held leadership positions (above 50%) although in the DRC constitution adopted in 2012, establishes a 30% quota in elected positions for women.²⁷⁷

Organizational Application of UNSC Resolution 1325

The UNSCR 1325 was adopted by many states around the globe in 2000 as a resolution aimed at the enhancement of women's participation in decision making processes.²⁷⁸ When asked to rate the level of application of the UNSCR 1325 and as displayed on figure 11 below, most of the respondents suggested that their organization's application of the UNSC resolution 1325 was either fair (40%), good (40%) or very good (15%). Only 5% of the respondents deemed the application of UNSC resolution 1325 to be low.

Figure 11: Organization' application of UNSCR 1325 in DRC



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

To most of the respondents, the major lessons learnt from the implementation of activities related to the UNSCR 1325 are centred on the importance and need to support more women involved in conflict resolution as peace should be a joint effort of all actors and affected victims. The respondents also made several other observations such as realizing that the resolution engaged more women from urban areas than women in remote areas. Additionally, the respondents highlighted the need for a wide scale vulgarization of the resolution realizing that the resolution makes provisions for the promotion of women's rights aimed at completing local laws. However, these laws suffer from a lack of implementation. A respondent from an NGO focused on poverty reduction, women's rights and offering psycho-social support highlighted that through UNSCR 1325, they had learnt to, "focus on the improvement of women's participation in the peace process; valuing women's experiences, the position of women's leadership in peace, security; evaluation of provisions and practice in order to overcome obstacles and reduce gaps in order to gradually ensure changes in practice, to generate momentum and therefore better results for a lasting peace and development."

²⁷⁷ The Council on Foreign Relations, "Democratic Republic of Congo – The Sun City Agreement 2002," ;

²⁷⁸ Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, and 2122.;


The Role of Religious Leaders in Addressing Conflicts

This subsection explores the different roles that religious leaders have played in conflict resolution in the region and the general areas of collaboration between faith-based organizations and CSOs as well as the factors preventing better collaboration between them

Religious Leaders’ Participation in Peacebuilding in DRC

Figure 12 below highlights the respondents’ view on the diverse roles played by religious leaders in peacebuilding activities in DRC.

Figure 12: Religious leaders’ participation approach to peacebuilding in DRC



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

The research sought to determine the extent to which respondents agreed with the following statements investigating the role of religious leaders in peace building. As shown in Figure 12 above, the respondents recognized the substantial influence that religious leaders hold in addressing conflict (100%) and their effective collaboration with CSOs and local communities in peacebuilding (above 90%) as well as engaging and empowering women as peacebuilders. However, the respondents were either uncertain or disagreed that religious leaders engage women in political decision making.


These findings are in tandem with the observations made by Ufo and the US Department of state as they suggest that religious leaders assume an important role in the socio-political arena as promoters of peace and conflict resolution in the context of the DRC.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁹ Ufo Okeke Uzodike Ayo. n.d. “Religious Networks in Post-conflict Democratic Republic of the Congo: A prognosis.” Accessed November 2020. <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/religious-networks-in-post-conflict-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>. U.S. Department of State. 2017. “Democratic Republic of the Congo 2018 International Religious Freedom Report;.”

Level of Confidence in Religious Leaders' Ability to Address Conflicts

In order to establish the relevance of religious leaders' participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in DRC, the respondents were asked to rate their level of confidence in the ability of religious leaders to efficiently resolve conflicts.

Figure 13: Level of confidence in religious leaders in DRC



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

As shown in Figure 13 above, majority of the respondents asserted that the level of confidence in religious leaders' ability to address conflict was either high (72%) or very high (5%). According to the respondents this can be attributed to the high influence they hold in the community as spiritual leaders. They are believed to be impartial in their ability to guide people towards finding peaceful solutions to conflicts as they involve the conflicting parties in their initiatives. A respondent from an NGO that focuses on poverty reduction, highlighted this by stating that, "they (religious leaders) are most listened to by their faithful and often their word is taken with great consideration.... Religious leaders have a special role in helping prevent conflict because they have a direct connection with believers. They alone have the legitimacy to state a religious discourse in the service of peace." This perception of religious leaders is supported by Appleby and Thomas who highlight that religious leaders play an important role in peacebuilding as they are present throughout most of the processes and include secular actors.²⁸⁰

A minority of the respondents asserted that the level of confidence in religious leaders was either low (19%) or very low (5%) based on the perception that they fail to include youth and women in their approaches to conflict transformation. In addition, these respondents suggested that religious leaders are at times the source of conflict creation rather than conflict transformation. This concurs with the observations of Gopin who observed that although religion carries principles of justice and peacebuilding in general, it may also represent a substantial factor of conflict in the society.²⁸¹ As one respondent from a CSO offering psychosocial support stated, "even if by nature the leaders of religious denominations enjoy the confidence of believers, there are unfortunately many among them who abuse their positions and who, in turn, compromise their status and constitute in this case actors of demotivation of many souls."

²⁸⁰ S. Thomas. 2005. *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of...* Basingstoke: Palgrave. Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. *The Ambivalence of the sacred.* Rowman & Littlefield. p211-213;

²⁸¹ Gopin, Marc. 2000. *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking.* First Edition. Oxford University Press. p13;

Conflict Resolution Strategies of Religious Leaders

According to the respondents, religious leaders apply diverse strategies for conflict transformation and resolution. These were generally centred on the promotion of social dialogue through prayer sessions, seminars and consortia between CSOs and religious denominations; the creation of organizations that work with communities to raise awareness; inclusion of vulnerable groups in public affairs; encouraging the practice of good morality; promoting collaboration with the CSOs and the creation of meditation committees in parishes.

A respondent working with an NGO that focuses on poverty reduction, psychosocial support, children and women's rights and gender-based violence explained that, "religious leaders have a special role in helping prevent conflict because they have a direct connection with believers. They alone have the legitimacy to state a religious discourse in the service of peace, a discourse against violence and to say that one cannot kill and rape in the name of religion. In this spirit, it is important to stress that inter-religious dialogue is not only an invaluable instrument of peace to disarm and defuse prejudice and discrimination, but also to enable fruitful cooperation in the service of the common good. It is from these strategies that religious leaders have applied in our context for the resolution and transformation of conflicts. The dialogue between public authorities and religious leaders each working in this field and according to his own responsibilities in the search for the common good. They address the challenges that arise in our societies, come together as a platform to defend a noble cause. Early warning of security risks, helping to include victims, and denouncing the stigmatization of victims are part of the strategies that religious leaders use to prevent, resolve and transform conflict."

The activities summarised by this respondent support the views of Gopin, Appleby and Thomas as they assess the role and activities undertaken by religious leaders in conflict resolution. Specifically, in the context of the DRC, it agrees with the observations made by the US department of state on the role religious leaders play at grassroots levels as service providers in times of conflict and as mediators in peacebuilding processes.

Collaboration Areas between FBOs and CSOs

The respondents were asked to assess ways in which FBOs and CSOs could collaborate in order to address the following issues:

Social Cohesion

The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to social cohesion, FBOs and CSOs should collaborate and coordinate joint operations aimed at promoting a culture of peace and wholesome inclusivity in respect of national and international laws. In this sense they should collaborate with state institutions to discourage negative practices in the communities.

Inter-religious Relations

The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to inter-religious relations, FBOs and CSOs should work together in designing peace projects, forming consortia and putting pressure on the government through lobbying, advocacy and teaching their values to transform the community at large. Furthermore, the respondents suggested that FBOs and CSOs should engage in policy reforms while monitoring the status of human rights violations, migrations. They should also advocate against any form of conflict since ethnic, religious or resource-based clashes are often seen in the country.

Women's Participation in Leadership

The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to women's participation in leadership, FBOs and CSOs should work together toward advocacy for the respect of women's rights, their economic empowerment and inclusion in decision making bodies. One respondent, however, pointed at the failure of CSOs and FBOs to be inclusive of all because of socio-cultural dynamics, stating that, "indeed, our patriarchal mind should change. Both FBOs and CSOs still not integrated very well women in their structure. Some churches do not even allow women in leadership positions because of their beliefs, and this encourage others to undermine women's participation."


Youth Inclusion

The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to Inter-religious relations, FBOs and CSOS should work toward the promotion and support of youth economic empowerment as well as their inclusion in the socio-political arena in the country.

Factors that Prevent Collaboration among CSOs and FBOs

Figure 14 below highlights the respondents' views on the prevailing factors preventing the collaboration of FBOs and CSOs in DRC.

Figure 14: Prevailing factors that prevent collaboration among CSOs and FBOs in DRC



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

When asked if there were prevailing factors preventing the collaboration of FBOs and CSOs as shown in Figure 14 above, respondents (33.33%) acknowledged the existence of such factors. They identified, conflicts of interest, lack of experience, clashes with certain leaders of religious denominations, conflict of shared responsibilities, stigmatisation, political interests, different beliefs and approaches. To illustrate this a respondent from a CSO focusing on peace consolidation and youth entrepreneurship pointed out that, "Each church has its own philosophy or doctrine to follow while CSOs are not necessarily linked to doctrines and each member has his or her own belief. And so, these two different things." On the other hand, other respondents (66.67%) denied the existence of prevailing factors preventing the collaboration of FBOs and CSOs as they suggested that FBOs and CSOs work together toward social cohesion and collaborate in diversity. As one respondent from a CSO within the human rights domain explained, "CSOs and FBOs are all governed by the same law and, in most cases, have almost the same goal of cultivating peace between communities."

Advocacy Initiatives Aligned with Social Change and Policy Implementation

This subsection explores the different advocacy strategies used by the organizations for which the respondents worked in order to influence policy making toward positive change.

Advocacy Strategy

Most of the respondents identified diverse advocacy strategies used by their organizations to achieve their objectives. Some of these strategies as highlighted by the respondents include, lobbying, social dialogue with stakeholders in the conflict, documenting the facts and research actions, training of local leaders, mediation, assistance, negotiation, networking with other organizations, advocacy with decision-makers, follow-up, through the media and social groups, awareness campaigns, conferences, workshops, surveys, non-violent protests, give awareness sessions in churches, face-to-face with the authorities and administrative letters. As one respondent from a CSO focused on poverty reduction explained, in their organization, “Lobbying, media and communication and public engagement are often used. Lobbying, being the direct relationship with decision makers. We capitalize on the most direct relationship we have with a few decision makers. The aim is to convince the decision-makers directly in order to influence, for example, the results of a Negotiation. Through media and communication, it can help us get the messages and arguments across a large number of audiences by mobilizing we are passing on the actions of awareness, of public adherence to the cause.” This reflects as Buckley’s views where he argues that campaigns for policy reform rely on a wide variety of tools and strategies.²⁸² It also concurs with Roebeling and de Vries’s understanding of different advocacy strategies and what they imply so that they can be employed to influence policy making ²⁸³

Expected Social Change

Through their interventions, most of the respondents wanted to see several social changes such as: behavioural change, enhancement of the community’s responsibility, sustainable peace and development, wholesome cohesion and collaboration, employment creation, respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms (especially women and girls), a supportive environment encouraging healthy competition, promotion of good governance, promotion of security and protection against GBV, empowerment of vulnerable groups, effective DDR, social inclusion, non-partisan application of justice, enhanced multilevel women’s inclusion in leadership.

As one respondent from an NGO focused on poverty alleviation stated: “We aspire to develop protective communities so that change comes from the community itself. We create holistic community circuits. In this way, the community raises awareness on the problem of sexual violence or any other community problem, identifies cases of violence, refers them to the appropriate health and protection structures, follows them and assists people when they return to the community.” This concurs with the views of Ross and Klugman who suggested that advocacy strategies required an element of TOC as it would help in identifying the existing issues and its possible solutions as well as making sure the advocacy is still community oriented.²⁸⁴

Indicators of Change

Majority of the respondents identified a number of indicators that the desired change happened. These include: increased number of youth and women-oriented projects implemented, enhanced non-discrimination policing, regular dialogue between different social strata, enhanced intercommunal collaboration, increased participation and inclusion of marginalized groups,

²⁸² Buckley, Steve. 2018. “Advocacy strategies and approaches: Overview.” May. Accessed November 2020. <https://www.apc.org/en/advocacy-strategies-and-approaches-overview;>

²⁸³ Ger Roebeling, Jan de Vries. 2011. Advocacy and Policy Influencing for Social Change. Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations. Accessed November 2020. https://www.ircwash.org/sites/default/files/advocacy_and_policy_influencing_fro_social_change.pdf. P17;

²⁸⁴ Ross, Jenny. n.d. “Theory of change for advocacy and campaigns.” Accessed November 2020. <https://www.bond.org.uk/resources/theory-of-change-for-advocacy-and-campaigns>. Ibid Klugman, Barbara. 2011. “Effective social justice advocacy: a theory-of-change.” Reproductive Health (Elsevier). Accessed November 2020. doi:10.1016/S0968-8080(11)38582-5. P147-149;


increased agricultural production, increased representation of women and youth in decision making bodies, enhanced familial self-reliance, enhanced levels of security.

Here are additional indicators as enumerated by one of the respondents who stated, that the, “Number of elements of armed groups disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated socio-economically into the community. Number of public servants paid or paid decently at the end of each month. Many of the senior civil servants, business managers brought to justice, convicted with severe and exemplary sanctions. Number of multi-sector community programs launched to create as many paid jobs. Number of national roads, agricultural service roads rehabilitated or built. Number of micro hydroelectric dams built in chiefdoms to create small and medium-sized mining and agri-food processing companies. Many of the physical structures of school, health, recreation, socio-professional built in the different chiefdoms to facilitate access to basic services...”

Advocacy Strategy Impact on Change

Figure 15 below highlights the respondents ‘views on whether their advocacy strategies brought about the desired changes in the communities they are involved with.

Figure 15: Impact of advocacy strategy on change in DRC



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)


Most of the respondents (95%) affirmed that their advocacy strategy had led to several changes. Indeed, the respondents suggested that people easily support what they have designed themselves. Further, they argued that once the stakeholders are involved in identifying the change to be made, their contribution to change will be without reluctance.

Other positive changes had been witnessed by the respondents such as: the establishment of governments that take into account the representation of women, the increased enrolment rates of girls, the formulation and implementation of gender sensitive laws and regulations, a change of behaviour of decision makers, enhanced partnerships, collaboration and inter-ethnic team work, enhanced support from local communities and the reconstruction of a climate favourable for dialogue and mutual trust.

Needed Support Assessment

Figure 16 below, highlights the respondents ‘view on the resources they need to supplement those that are available to them for a greater impact of their activities on communities.

Figure 16: Needed support assessment in DRC



(Source: CRTP Research findings)

As presented in the Figure 16 above, majority of the respondents (57.14%) pointed to a need for stronger alliances to bridge the gap between the advocacy resources held and those missing. The remaining respondents identified the need for immersive outreaches (23.81%) that is, multidimensional sensitization of communities. Further there is also need for greater participation through media (9.52%) and greater involvement in research (9.52%).

Ethiopia

The following data presented and analysed represents the findings of the research for Ethiopia.

Demographics

The study sought to establish the demographic data of the respondents. This data included: gender of the respondents, the years of experience in the sector of peace and conflict resolution, the type of organization they worked in and their organization’s thematic focus.

Gender

Table 6: Gender of respondents Ethiopia

	Frequency	Percentage
Male	9	56.25%
Female	7	43.75%
Total	16	100%

(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Years of Working in Ethiopia

Table 7: Years of experience in peace and conflict resolution sector in Ethiopia

Years	Frequency	Percentage
Less than a year	25.00%	4
1 – 9 years	31.25%	5
10-21 years	37.5%	6
Above 21 years	6.25%	1
Total	100%	16

(Source: CRTP Research Findings)


From Table 6 above, a gender disparity can be observed, although the disparity is not large which can be attributed to the people holding offices in the organisations reached and willingness to participate in the study.

As shown on Table 7, most of the respondents had worked on peace and conflict initiatives between 10 and 21 years (37.5%) and 1 and 9 years (31.25 %). Those less than 1 year (25 %) and above 21 years (6.25 %) respectively. This representation proved valuable for this study as majority of the participants were considered knowledgeable on the subject of peace and conflict and therefore the information gathered was credible and a true reflection of their experiences.

Types of Organizations

Figure 17 below highlights the types of organizations reached for this research in Ethiopia

Figure 17: Types of organizations reached in Ethiopia




(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

As indicated in Figure 17 above, the respondents represented a diversity of organizations, relevant to the research topic. 81% of the respondents worked in FBOs, while 12% worked in Faith-NGOs. Lastly, 6% of the respondents worked for CSOs. This implies that a different range of organizations and their experiences have been included in this study.

Thematic Focus of Organization

Figure 18 below highlights the thematic focus at the base of the activities conducted by the organizations reached for this research in Ethiopia.

Figure 18: Thematic Focus of Organizations reached in Ethiopia



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

As indicated in Figure 18 above, majority of the respondents (37.5%) worked in organizations focused on inter-religious dialogue; followed by 18.7% who worked in both organizations focused on poverty alleviation, and research and training. Finally, 6.2% of the respondents worked in organizations focused on humanitarian support, gender-based violence and Refugees and IDPs.

Intervention Methods and Strategies Employed by Faith and CSO Peace Structures

This subsection explores the different intervention methods used by CSO and faith-based organizations based on the theory of change used by the organization of the respondents.

Organization Theory of Change

As presented in the literature review section, a theory of change is basically a conceptualized roadmap to achieve a specific change. The organizations for which the respondents work used diverse theories of change that guided their intervention strategies based on their theoretical focus. In this sense, the respondents suggested that change in the communities they are involved with could be accomplished through, creating awareness within the society about love, peace, unity, entrepreneurship and hard work, positive thinking; promotion of mutual love, programmatic approach, the culture, God’s word, Change and hope, the Bible and the Lutheran Confession and Catholic Social Teaching.

A respondent from a faith-based organization focused on inter-religious dialogue explained that, “The theory of change behind our strategy is adapting to the local context and to the already established mechanisms of resolving conflicts and technically supporting the process of conflict transformations into a peace building effort.”

This relates to an argument made by Vogel who suggested that the formulation process of a TOC implied an examination of the contextual setting in which change is required.²⁸⁵

Finally, a respondent from a CSO working on research and training, highlighted that, “If people are empowered and engaged irrespective of who they are and where they are from in conflict prevention and peace-building endeavors, there will be a better chance of understanding others valid human claim because empowerment and engagement will create a safer space for all as

²⁸⁵ Vogel I. Review of the Use of “Theory of Change” in International Development. London: Commissioned by the UK Department for International Development; 2012, 19-20;

they share their fears and concerns.” Similar to the responses from DRC, these responses are in line with the suggestion of CARE International UK, in the formulation of a theory of change using “if... then” as a way of conceptualizing organizational approach to change.²⁸⁶

Table 8 below highlights the respondents’ views on the possibility of adaptation or change of their initial TOC in Ethiopia.

Table 8: Changes in Ethiopia organizations’ TOC

	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	5	31.25%
No	7	43.75%
Uncertain	4	25%
Total	16	100%

(Source: Research Findings)

When asked whether they had to adjust the theory of change used by their organizations as presented on Table 8 above, 43.7% of the respondents indicated that they did not have to change the theory of change used by their organizations as the strategies initially laid as well as their implementation procedures worked for them and presented positive results. These respondents also suggested that their theories of change were well adopted among communities as it was initially based on the contextual reality on the ground and the experience of the organization in the sector. As one respondent from an organization focusing on poverty alleviation put it, “as a Faith-Based organization that is involved in social development as well as engaged in Social Justice and Peace, the Catholic Church has well tested Social Teaching with Universal values to embrace the entire person without any precondition.”

On the other hand, 31.2% of respondents indicated that they had to adapt the theory of change used by their organizations. To them, there was an increasing need to adapt to the changes happening in the socio-cultural and security context of the targeted communities which sometimes called for a redirection of approaches used during interventions. One respondent from an FBO focused on inter-religious dialogue described the adjustments they made to their theory of change as follows, “we adopted a change in our process of peace building from conducting direct trainings and mass conferences to small scale dialogues at different levels. i.e. women, youth and local government authorities treated separately, our interventions strategies were also changed from structural (entity) focus to people focus, etc.”

These correspond with the observations of OECD (2008) and UNEG (2011) who supported that as tool for monitoring and evaluation throughout the implementation process, TOC can be re-evaluated after some time and modified if need be.²⁸⁷

Lastly, 25% of the respondents were unsure about their use of the theory of change as some of them either suggested that in some instances, a lack of understanding of the goals and objectives of the organization by all concerned stakeholders and miscommunication has been a challenge to achieving the planned goals.

²⁸⁶ CARE International UK. (2012). Defining Theories of Change. January, London, p.5.;

²⁸⁷ OECD (2008); UNEG. (2011). Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation: Towards UNEG Guidance. Available at http://www.uneval.org/papersand-pubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=980 ;

Organization General Strategy of Addressing Issues

When asked what were the general strategies used to address the issues related to their organizations' thematic focuses, the respondents suggested that their strategies included the following, provision of formal education, research, community dialogue, advocacy, interreligious collaboration, logistic support and spiritual guidance, empowering starting from the grassroots level, awareness creation, reconciliation programs and initiatives, social services, conferences, forums, TV programs, praying and fasting.

Describing these strategies, one respondent from an FBO championing women's rights explained it this way, "the organization that I am working in is addressing the issues through training, consultation on women's holistic development and gives the opportunity to dialogue with co-workers."

Organizational Program Dissemination Strategy

The respondents suggested that their organizations disseminate their program objectives to the community they are involved with in diverse ways. Some highlighted avenues include, workshops, media, community dialogue, seminars and magazines, pamphlets, teaching, preaching, congregational and well-structured church units. One respondent from an FBO focused on inter-religious dialogue explained that, "we primarily disseminate our program objectives and goals through local peace committees we have in our structures, throughout meetings, community gatherings and trainings we hold, or through different settings of media and other outlets such as publications and press announcements." On the other hand, another respondent from an FBO targeting poverty alleviation highlighted that their primary dissemination strategies included, "selecting influential figures from the community such as community elders, religious leaders, community-based organizations and their leaders, women representatives, and youth as well as key figures from the government in order to achieve the objective of durable community peace. Community mapping is very important to bring about the desired change with the community through their active participation."


Guiding Values to Organization Problem Resolution Approach

The respondents indicated several values that guide and inform their approach to the resolution of contextual problems in the areas where they work. These are, mutual respect, dialogue, dignity of all humanity and equal rights for all, co-existence, mutual understanding, the value of peace, unity, moral integrity, social justice, prayer, neutrality, empathy, honesty, the tradition and culture of the country and sharing good experiences among the new generation and their families. One respondent from an FBO focused on inter-religious dialogue said that, "we use either scientific and spiritual approaches or a mix of traditional and spiritual approaches to resolve local conflicts in a way that brings together conflicting groups into common dialogues and peace discussions." Yet another respondent from an FBO working on poverty alleviation added that, "peace is among the core focus areas of my organization. The Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY) has been and is still working on resolving conflicts in different parts of the country. The EECMY had a strong value for peace even though there are some interventions from the government in religious organizations that could affect the Church being independent and a strong advocate for peace."

Organization Strategy Satisfaction Level

Figure 19 below highlights the respondents' level of satisfaction with regard to the strategies they used in their organizations.

Figure 19: Ethiopia Organization strategy satisfaction level



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

The respondents were either satisfied (56.2%) or very satisfied (18.7%) with the strategies employed by their organizations in peace and conflict intervention. However, 25% of the respondents indicated a neutral stance on their level of satisfaction. It is noticed that in both DRC and Ethiopia, the respondents were rather highly satisfied with the peace and conflict intervention strategies used by their organizations.

Despite the overall level of satisfaction, most of the respondents in Ethiopia identified several areas of improvement with regard to their strategy for social change. These include, increased commitment from both sides of conflicting parties; deeper exploration of the root cause of conflicts, enhanced establishment of the inter religious council of Ethiopia; enhanced women’s and youth involvement in peacebuilding and leadership, independence from donor and government influences, enhanced cultural reform strategies, tension prevention and anticipation and addressing emerging regional issues. As an illustration, here are a few answers from the respondents. According to a respondent from an FBO working on inter-religious dialogue, “we need to improve our engagement strategies, which also requires working hand in hand with the government and with other incumbent political parties, with other Faith-Based civil organizations and etc.” On the other hand, another respondent from an organization focusing on poverty alleviation said that, “there are many things to be improved in the areas of social construction, transformation of mind set, concept of ethnicity and religion and natural resource management and sharing resource equitable.”


Gender Roles in Peacebuilding and the Extent of Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding Activities

This sub-section explores the influence of gender roles in peacebuilding based on the assessment of the general status and areas of women’s inclusion in peacebuilding processes and the impact of cultural perceptions on women’s inclusion. The section also explores the application of the UNSCR 1325 by the organizations for which the respondents worked as well as the lessons learnt from its application.

Women’s Participation Approaches in Conflict Resolution

Figure 20 below highlights the respondents’ view on the diverse approaches from which women participate in conflict resolution in Ethiopia.

Figure 20: Women’s participation approaches to conflict resolution Ethiopia



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)


As presented on the Figure 20 above, the respondents perceived that women participated in community conflict resolution in diverse ways including mediation (37.2%), negotiation (25%), lobbying for peace (18.7%), advocacy campaigns (12.5%) and policy implementation (6.2%). Comparing these findings with DRC, it’s noted that women’s participation varies with the country. In DRC, women’s participation was most evident in advocacy campaigns while in Ethiopia as noted above, women’s participation is most evident in mediation processes. This concurs with the observations of Modera (2017) who suggests that women in Ethiopia are still denied influential positions where they can significantly influence decision making institutions despite their contribution to the economic development of the country.²⁸⁸

Women’s Role in Peacebuilding Ethiopia

Figure 21 below highlights the respondents’ view on the diverse roles played by women in peacebuilding activities in Ethiopia.

²⁸⁸ Moreda, Tefera Assefa. 2017. Nature of Women Empowerment in Ethiopia (Constitutional and Policy Provisions). Ambo University. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321753588_Nature_of_Women_Empowerment_in_Ethiopia_Constitutional_and_Policy_Provisions](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321753588_Nature_of_Women_Empowerment_in_Ethiopia_Constitutional_and_Policy_Provisions;);

Figure 21: Women's role in peacebuilding activities in Ethiopia



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)


The research sought to determine the extent to which respondents agreed with the statements investigating the influence of gender roles on women's participation in peace building. As shown in Figure 21 above, it's noted that women in Ethiopia receive very little support from men in peace and conflict interventions in addition to not being involved in peacebuilding activities. This contrasts with the findings in DRC where these aspects were found to be significantly higher. However, much like in DRC, the respondents asserted that women in Ethiopia are very influential in addressing conflict. However, the respondents tended to agree that women hold leadership positions (over 50%) and are influential in addressing conflict (over 65%). This could be as a result of having women being highly included in government where they could potentially hold great influence. For example, the 2018 reshuffle of government by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed was an unprecedented political development as women represented 50% of the newly formed government.²⁸⁹

Cultural Perception's Contribution to Gender Imbalance

Figure 22 below highlights the respondents' view on the extent of cultural perceptions that contribute to gender imbalance in peace and conflict interventions in Ethiopia.

²⁸⁹ Rachel Vogelstein, "Women This Week: Equality in Ethiopian Cabinet," The Council on Foreign Relations, entry posted October 19, 2018, accessed June 20, 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/women-week-equality-ethiopian-cabinet>;

Figure 22: Cultural perception and gender imbalance in Ethiopia




(Source: CRTTP Research Findings)

Although the study findings show the multidimensional participation of women in peacebuilding activities and as indicated in Figure 22 above, an overwhelming majority of the respondents (above 90%) agreed that cultural perceptions contribute to the gender imbalance in peace and conflict interventions. Only 6.2% of the respondents were uncertain about this. This also supports the observations of Modera who argued that deeply rooted traditional norms presented a major cause of imbalance in power and opportunities for Ethiopian women.²⁹⁰ Comparing these findings with DRC, it's noted that in both countries cultural perceptions represent a major challenge to a gender-balanced involvement in peace and conflict interventions. This could also explain the lack of support women receive from men and fairly low inclusion in political decision making positions as shown on Figure 10 and 21.

Organizational Application of the UNSC Resolution 1325

UNSCR 1325 was adopted in 2000 as a resolution aimed at the enhancement of women's participation in decision making processes.²⁹¹ When asked to rate the level of application of the UNSCR 1325 and as displayed in Figure 11 below, most of the respondents suggested that their organization's application of the UNSC Resolution 1325 was either fair (31.2%), good (43.7%) or very good (6.2%). On the other hand, the remaining respondents found it not applicable (18.7%) to the work of their organizations as women's agenda was not part of the thematic focus.

Figure 23: Organization's application of UNSCR 1325 in Ethiopia



(Source: CRTTP Research Findings)

²⁹⁰ Moreda, Tefera Assefa. 2017. Nature of Women Empowerment in Ethiopia (Constitutional and Policy Provisions). Ambo University. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321753588_Nature_of_Women_Empowerment_in_Ethiopia_Constitutional_and_Policy_Provisions;

²⁹¹ Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, and 2122.

To most of the respondents, there are multiple lessons learnt from the implementation of activities related to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 participation pillars. However, most of the respondent argued that these lessons are centered on the demonstration that there is a great potential in cooperation and inclusivity among different actors in peace processes. This is especially so as it showed the significant role that women play within the community in peace building process, in as much as culture at times downplays their involvement. Further, through the application of the UNSCR 1325, the respondents found that women showed great ability at mediation and elaboration of long-lasting solutions to conflicts.

As one respondent from an organization focusing on inter-religious dialogue put it, “women are represented in the trainings arranged for religious leaders, youth and local authorities and in every project activity we implement. Despite the fact that women do not hold strong leadership positions in some religious institutions, attempts were made to make sure there are women representatives from all religious institutions at the training and peace conferences. The role of women in peace building are discussed and religious institutions that do not give leadership positions to women were challenged by their peers to rethink their positions. A special training on the role of women is conducted at different times and we are working to translate the Security Council resolution 1325 into local languages. We have also made requirements to engage women from the total training participants at our organization’s policy manual and we are working to this favor.” Following that a respondent from an inter-religious dialogue organization added that, “participation calls for increased participation of women at all levels of decision-making, including in national, regional, and international institutions; in mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict; in peace negotiations; in peace operations, as soldiers, police, and civilians; calls specifically for the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, including in emergency and humanitarian situations, such as in refugee camps; calls for improving intervention strategies in the prevention of violence against women, including by prosecuting those responsible for violations of international law; strengthening women’s rights under national law; and supporting local women’s peace initiatives and conflict resolution processes; calls for the advancement of relief and recovery measures to address international crises through a gendered lens, including by respecting the civilian and humanitarian nature of refugee camps, and considering the needs of women and girls in the design of refugee camps and settlements.”


The Role of Religious Leaders in Addressing Conflicts

This subsection explores the different roles that religious leaders have played in conflict resolution in the region as well as the general areas of collaboration between faith-based organizations and CSOs including the factors preventing good collaboration between them.

Level of Confidence in Religious Leaders in Conflict Resolution

Figure 24 below highlights the respondents ‘views on the level of confidence in religious leaders’ ability to resolve conflict in Ethiopia

Figure 24: Level of confidence in religious leaders in Ethiopia



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Majority of the respondents asserted that the level of confidence in religious leaders' ability to address conflict to be either high (50%) or very high (18.7%). According to the respondents, this is attributed to the perception that they showcase high neutrality in situations of conflict which puts them in a position where they are trusted to properly conduct peacebuilding initiatives independent from government influence. As one respondent from an FBO focusing on Inter-religious dialogue explained, "in our context, particularly Ethiopia, where more than 90% of its citizens are affiliated to one or another religious institute, it is very easy to say people adhere to religious values and facts. Therefore, religious leaders have a strong say and are opinion leaders to address issues related to peace and other sensitive issues important to the community. The religious leaders in these categories could only be accepted as authorities and have a power to pass decisions and convince people to act upon it. People also have strong confidence in their ability to address conflicts. The people assume religions or simply thoughts of religion to be true, correct and unquestionable, they are socially legitimized beliefs which are announced as a requirement to which everyone must conform. Therefore, religious leaders hold a high level of confidence from the people in their ability to address conflicts."

However, the remaining respondents asserted that the level of confidence in religious leaders' ability to address conflict was either low or very low both at 12.5%. In addition, 6.25% of the respondents indicated they did not know. For respondents who indicated a low confidence in religious leaders' ability to address conflict was based on their inability to confront the government for its transgressions as well as the instances where they were perceived not neutral in conflict situations and were occasionally the cause of conflict. For example, one respondent, from an FBO focused on poverty alleviation explained that, "current situations in Ethiopia are worse than what the world knows. Even though things seem calm and peaceful in the capital, the story is different in different regional areas of the country. Religious leaders have restrained themselves from addressing these issues to the government." Thus, indicating the lacuna some respondents perceive has been left by religious leaders in addressing conflict in the country. Comparing these findings with DRC, it's noted that in both countries, religious leaders hold a considerably high level of confidence from local communities.


Conflict Resolution/Transformation Strategies of Religious Leaders

According to the respondents, religious leaders apply diverse strategies for conflict transformation/resolution. These are, facilitating platforms and situations for dialogue, supporting key logistics for the representatives of the community to come and have discussions about the peace issues, spiritual and technicality guidance and support whenever peace interventions are ongoing, mediation between conflicting parties, catholic social teaching through social media especially TV, use of their moral authority to change mind sets and respect each other. However, one respondent from a research and training FBO suggested that, “these days, in many cases, it is the religious leaders themselves who are the source of conflict to maintain their position. Conflict is a good strategy for them to stay in their position for a prolonged time.” Adding to this, another respondent suggested that there are circumstances where there is skepticism about the strategies of religious leaders in association with other institutions, for example the respondent highlighted that, “The government has brought religious leaders together to form an entity to address issues concerned with conflict resolution. But the fact that this was initiated by the government itself holds back religious leaders from taking part in conflict resolutions where the government itself is part of the conflict.”

Religious Leaders’ Role in Peacebuilding

Figure 25 below highlights the respondents’ view on the diverse roles played by religious leaders in peacebuilding activities in Ethiopia.

Figure 25: Religious leaders’ participation approach to peacebuilding in Ethiopia



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

The research sought to determine the extent to which the respondents agreed with the statements investigating the role of religious leaders in peace building. As shown in Figure 25 above, the respondents perceived that religious leaders were influential in addressing conflicts (above 75%), engaged communities in peacebuilding (above 80%) and collaborate with CSOs (above 75%).

60%). However, the respondents were either uncertain or disagreed that religious leaders engaged women in political decision making and empowerment. This corroborates Esteves's observations where he highlighted the crucial role played by the Catholic Church in the Tigray conflict as they call for peaceful dialogue for the resolution of the conflict.²⁹² Comparing these findings with DRC, it's noted that in both countries, religious leaders are very influential in addressing conflict and engage in communities in peacebuilding. However, it is also noted that in both countries, most of the respondents asserted that religious leaders provide very little support in the empowerment of women as peacebuilders as well as engaging them in political decision making.

Collaboration Areas of FBOs and CSOs

The respondents were asked to assess the ways in which FBOs and CSOs could collaborate in order to address the following issues.

Inter-Ethnic relations

The respondents suggested that inter-ethnic conflicts are the most prevalent in the country and therefore in order to address issues related to inter-ethnic relations, FBOs and CSOs should work together to create awareness among the society on how the people should respect each other's ethno-cultural heritage. According to one respondent from an organization focused on poverty alleviation, "as a multi ethnic nation, Ethiopia needs FBOs and CSOs in bringing a smooth relationship between different ethnic groups because FBOs and CSOs usually have common intervention areas beyond single ethnic groups. Therefore, in places where government fails to deliver the expected results in terms of inter-ethnic relations, FBOs and CSOs have to form a strong collaboration to address the missing areas of government."

Inter-religious Relations

The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to Inter-religious relations, FBOs and CSOs should work together in designing peace projects, forming consortia and should put pressure on the government through lobbying, advocacy and teaching their values to transform the community at large. They also need to engage in policy reforms and must be a watch for human rights violations, migrations and should advocate against any form of conflict whether ethnic, religious or resource-based clashes that are often seen in the country. A successful peace process needs integration, alignment and cooperation at all levels.

Women's Participation in Leadership

Most of the respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to women's participation in leadership, FBOs and CSOs should promote personal growth and leadership development among the family and society. Additionally, the respondents suggested that FBOs and CSOs should collaborate with the Inter-Religious Council of Ethiopia that has a Women, Children and Youth Department.

Youth Inclusion


The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to women's participation in leadership, FBOs and CSOs should promote and advocate for holistic changes that include youth from both genders in their interventions as they represent the majority of the country's population.

²⁹² Esteves, Junno Arocho. 2020. "Pope appeals for peace as violence increases in Ethiopia." 28 November. Accessed November 2020. <https://catholicphilly.com/2020/11/news/world-news/pope-appeals-for-peace-as-violence-increases-in-ethiopia/>;

Prevailing Factors Preventing the Collaboration of FBOs and CSOs

Figure 26 below highlights the respondents' views on the prevailing factors preventing the collaboration of FBOs and CSOs in Ethiopia.

Figure 26: Prevailing factors that prevent collaboration among CSOs and FBOs in Ethiopia



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

As presented in Figure 26 above, majority of the respondents (62.5%) suggested that there are no prevailing factors preventing collaboration among CSOs and FBOs as they tend to have the same nature, exchange ideas and work in harmony. They suggested that as long as they show a willingness to work together there should be no prevailing factors preventing it.

However, 37.5% of respondents suggested that there were prevailing factors that prevent the collaboration of CSOs and FBOs. They asserted that this is due to the existence of a lack of trust among these organizations as well as a lack of commitment and expertise, government policies, ethnic based politics and intolerance and competition rather than collaboration. A respondent representing an FBO focused on poverty alleviation explained that, “both CSOs and FBOs prefer working alone rather than a collaboration. This could be because of no legal principle to guide them to work together to address social issues, or it could be because of political influence on either side of organizations.”

Advocacy Initiatives Aligned with Social Change and Policy Implementation

This subsection explores the different advocacy strategies used by the organizations for which the respondents worked in order to influence policy making toward positive change.

Organizational Advocacy Strategy

According to the respondents, their organizations used diverse advocacy strategies such as, working with the community closely, preaching, dialogue, training workshops, awareness raising meetings, online and social media campaigns, radio, TV, behind the scenes advocacy and lobbying, documentations of human rights violations, campaigning and public demonstrations, non-cooperation and civil disobedience, partnerships and targeted outreach. One respondent from an FBO targeting poverty alleviation explained that “Evidence based advocacy strategy is sought. The organizations advocate for structural solution to structural problem in order to bring systemic change for interconnected social problems.” This concurs with Buckley’s views where he argues that campaigns for policy reform rely on a wide variety of tools and strategies.²⁹³ Which also concurs with Roebeling and de Vries’s understanding of the different advocacy strategies and what they imply so that they can be employed to influence policy making.²⁹⁴

²⁹³ Buckley, Steve. 2018. “Advocacy strategies and approaches: Overview.” May. Accessed November 2020. <https://www.apc.org/en/advocacy-strategies-and-approaches-overview;>

²⁹⁴ Ger Roebeling, Jan de Vries. 2011. Advocacy and Policy Influencing for Social Change. Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations. Accessed November 2020. https://www.ircwash.org/sites/default/files/advocacy_and_policy_influencing_fro_social_change.pdf. P17;

Expected Social Change from Interventions

Through their interventions, the respondents wanted to see several social changes such as, peaceful and tolerant communities, stability, freedom and justice between religions, attitude change, collective community participation, collaboration and cooperation, livelihood improvements in rural and marginalized areas, child and youth friendly environments. One respondent from an organization focusing on inter-religious dialogue asserted, “we want to see a bottom-up social change which mainly focuses on relationships and affects both attitudinal and behavioral transformations of a particular society through a provision of peace education, human values and rendering preventive and responsive services to destructive and negative forms of conflict and violence in the community.” Another respondent from an organization addressing gender-based violence added that, “gender-based violence is expressed from home to society and in the country in different ways. From time to time it decreases but still it is a problem that we are fighting against.”

This supports Ross and Klugman’s views as they suggest that advocacy strategies required an element of TOC as it would help in identifying the existing issues and its plausible solutions as well as making sure advocacy is still community oriented.²⁹⁵


Indicators of Change

According to the respondents, these are the indicators of desired change, enhanced respect in the institutions, increased equality and respect in the society, the decrease of early marriage and genital mutilation, and faith-based conflicts, increased cooperation rather than competition over scarcities, peaceful coexistence among diverse communities, dignified living standards, increased gender parity, increased inter-religious collaboration, increased delivery of social services (education, health, food security structure). One respondent explained that, “some of the indicators we use are from a number of peace structures established from grassroots level to a national level (includes peace committees, forums, dialogue groups,) peace conferences, list of peace accords and agreements.”

Advocacy Strategy Impact on Change

The respondents were asked to assess whether their advocacy strategy brought the desired change in the communities they are involved with. This is illustrated in figure 27 below.

Figure 27: Impact of advocacy strategy on change in Ethiopia



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)


²⁹⁵ Ross, Jenny. n.d. “Theory of change for advocacy and campaigns.” Accessed November 2020. <https://www.bond.org.uk/resources/theory-of-change-for-advocacy-and-campaigns>; Klugman, Barbara. 2011. “Effective social justice advocacy: a theory-of-change.” Reproductive Health (Elsevier). Accessed November 2020. doi:10.1016/S0968-8080(11)38582-5. P147-149;

Majority of the respondents (93.7%) asserted that their advocacy strategies had brought change in the communities. Some of these indicators include increased successful teaching and dialogue, enhanced networking, enhanced awareness through social media participation, change in areas of genital mutilation, gender-based violence and early marriages, increased delivery of basic social needs such as food, shelter, education and medical care. One respondent from an inter-religious organization stated, “it brought the church at the front line to be heard on the rights of marginalized and oppressed communities and enabled congregations and believers to stand for peace and become sources of transformations with their God-given dignities and rights.” Comparing these findings with DRC, it’s noted that in both countries the strategies employed by the respondents’ organizations brought about the desired changes.

Needed Support Assessment

Figure 28 below, highlights the respondents’ view on the resources they need to supplement those that are available to them for a greater impact of their activities on communities.

Figure 28: Needed support assessment in Ethiopia



(Source: CRTP Research findings)

As indicated in Figure 28 above, majority of the respondents (44%) pointed at a need for stronger media involvement to bridge the gap between advocacy resources held and those missing. The remaining respondents identified the need for strengthened alliances (25%) and greater involvement in research (31%).

Kenya

The following data presented and analysed represent the findings of the research in the particular context of Kenya.

Demographic Data

The study sought to establish the demographic data of the respondents. This was done through a general analysis of the demographic data obtained from the respondents which included, gender of the respondents, the years of experience in the sector of peace and conflict resolution, the type of organization they worked in and their organization’s thematic focus.

Gender

Table 9: Gender of respondents Kenya

	Frequency	Percentage
Male	41	65%
Female	22	35%
Total	63	100%

(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

From Table 9 above, the gender disparity is large as 35% of the respondents were women. This disparity could be dependent on the participant’s willingness to contribute in the research.

Years of Working in the Sector

Table 10: Years of experience in peace and conflict resolution sector in Kenya

Years	Frequency	Percentage
Less than a year	6.35%	4
1 – 9 years	63.49%	40
10-21 years	19.05%	12
Above 21 years	11.11%	7
Total	100%	63


(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Most of the respondents had worked in the sector of peace and conflict resolutions initiatives between 1 and 9 years (63%). These were followed by those who have worked in the sector between 10 and 21 years (19 %). The fewest number were those active in the sector for less than 1 year (6 %) and above 21 years (11 %) respectively. This is a significant aspect of the study in the sense that it reflects the knowledgeable nature of the respondents on matters of peace and conflict resolution initiatives.

Types of Organizations

Figure 29 below highlights the types of organizations reached for this research in Kenya.

Figure 29: Types of organizations reached in Kenya




(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

As indicated in the figure above, the respondents worked in diverse organizations acting at different levels. 32% of the respondents worked in Non-Governmental Organizations, while 29% worked in Community-Based Organizations. 26% of the respondents worked for Faith-Based Organizations and 8% worked for Civil Society Organizations. There were also some respondents (5%) who worked in academic institutions especially in the Higher Education Sector.

Thematic Focus of Organization

Figure 30 below highlights the thematic focus at the base of the activities conducted by the organizations reached for this research in Kenya.

Figure 30: Thematic Focus of Organizations reached in Kenya



(Source: CTRP Research Findings)

The organizations for which the respondents work for have diverse thematic focuses as presented in Figure 30 above. Indeed, 22% of the respondents worked in organizations focused on Gender Based Violence, 14% in organizations focused on research and training, 3% in organizations focused on refugees and IDPs, 8% in organizations focused on humanitarian support, 14% in organizations focused on inter-religious dialogue, 12% in organizations focused on psycho social support and 12% in organizations focused on poverty alleviation. 15% of the respondents worked for organizations with multi-thematic focuses varying from a combination of several of the thematic focuses enumerated above in addition to environmental conservation, governance and rule of law, countering violent extremism, conflict transformation and education.

Intervention Methods and Strategies Employed by Faith and CSO Peace Structures

This subsection explores the different intervention methods used by CSO and faith-based organizations based on the theory of change used by the organizations of the respondents.

Theory of Change

As presented in the literature review section, a theory of change is a conceptualized roadmap to achieve a specific change. The organizations for which the respondents work used diverse theories of change that guided their intervention strategies based on their thematic focus. In this sense, the respondents suggested that change in the communities they are involved with could be accomplished through, empowering women for an empowered and developed society; equal opportunity for all in terms of education and leadership; nurturing and empowering children for community development, reduction in human rights violations; women and children’s rights

protection and promotion, empowering vulnerable groups; self-reliant families, team work, reduction of drug and substance abuse, effective resource management, mentorship, poverty reduction, effective planning and monitoring of projects, youth engagement.

As one respondent from a CSO focusing on championing women's rights and ensuring accountability in governance, explained, "we believe that if we strengthen the capabilities of state and non-state actors to exercise their rights and fulfill their responsibilities provided in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, other laws and the international human rights instruments through legal empowerment, evidence-based advocacy, human rights education, training, and mentorship, partnership and networking; then citizens can increasingly use their improved abilities and knowledge to claim their rights, enhance their participation, demand accountability, resolve their grievances, respect others rights and fulfill their responsibilities. If this happens, then state and non-state actors will enhance their responsiveness in fulfillment of citizen's rights and freedoms, increase their accountability to their human rights obligations, refrain from violating citizen's rights, and protect citizens' rights. Ultimately citizens can greatly realize and enjoy their rights and fundamental freedoms."

While a second participant from a youth research and training center believed that, "if, women and youth capacities are enhanced (through training, mentorship, linkages and technical support) then, women and youth will be able to engage in self-advocacy and actively participate in peace processes because, they will have acquired self-confidence, knowledge and skills and will have established support networks."

From these examples we can clearly notice the gradual outcome-based approach in the formulation of these organizations' TOCs used by the respondents 'organizations.

Table 11 below highlights the respondents' views on the possibility of adaptation or change of their initial TOC in Kenya.

Table 11: Changes in Kenya organizations' TOC

	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	30	41.67%
No	28	38.89%
Uncertain	6	8.33%
Total	72	100%

(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

When asked whether they had to adjust the theory of change used by their organizations and as presented on table 11 above, 41% of respondents suggested that that they had to change the theory of change used by their organizations. To them, diverse projects and times sometimes required different approaches as the theory may not always match the reality on the ground. This has pushed some organizations to widen the scope of their partnerships as they were confronted with an increased need for humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, some respondents attributed their change in theories of change to a need to conform to the needs and desires of the majority.

To illustrate the need for adjusting a theory of change, one respondent from an NGO focusing on humanitarian support explained how, "The Young Muslim Association (YMA) started on 16th July 1964 as a small charity working solely in Nairobi. Its mission was social welfare

and youth awareness work. In 1968, after war had ravaged North-Eastern Kenya, the YMA members traveled to Garissa and found countless people made homeless and without support; chiefly among whom were an untold number of orphans who were in the most vulnerable of states. This started their efforts in setting up an orphanage and outreach programs to support and steadily improve the lives of thousands of children over the coming years.”

On the other hand, 39% of respondents suggested that they did not have to change or adapt the theory of change they used as the strategies initially laid as well as their implementation procedures worked for them. These respondents suggested that their theories of change were well adopted among communities and presented effective results during the evaluation processes.

8% of the respondents were unsure about their use of the theory of change as some of them either suggested that they did not occupy positions in their organizations strategic planning department or that they were still to wait for their mid-term evaluations to be carried out or that although they did not engage with the theories of change, their impact on communities was still strong.

Organization General Strategy to Address these Issues

When asked what were the general strategies used to address the issues related to their organizations’ thematic focuses, most of the respondents suggested that their strategies included the following: advocacy, educative outreach sessions, mentorship classes, conferences, monitoring on the ground, capacity building, research and litigation, social media, provision of improved access to reproductive health services and human rights to refugees and IDPs, training on income generating projects, religious forums and organized religious conferences, talent nurturing, legal redress, peace meetings and dialogue forums, public involvement, free lunch on school days, table banking, savings, poultry farming, horticulture farming, bringing likeminded academicians together to deliberate on current peace and conflict issues, capacity building for both state and non-state actors; policy support; partnerships and linkages; inter-generational dialogue and academic programs. As an illustration one of the respondents from an INGO, focusing on poverty alleviation suggested that, “through addressing of the underlying or root causes that leads to the main problem. For example, if we address conflicts, we can easily reduce poverty at the end of the day.” Concurring with these suggestions, Githigaro in his analysis of the post-election conflict in Kenya argues that inherent socio-political inequalities that were not addressed only made the conflict situation worse.²⁹⁶ In this sense, the strategies involved in addressing the underlying problems can prove effective in the prevention and de-escalation of conflicts in communities.

Program Dissemination Strategy

The strategy that an organization selects to disseminate their program objectives varies across organizations as well as the type of program objectives being disseminated. For this research respondents submitted various strategies of disseminating their program objectives. These are, planned activities schedule, outreach and community intervention programs, video shows, education, policy formation influence, policy implementation, round table meetings, FGDs, and outreach engagements, reports, physical forums, church structures, mentors, orientations, message dissemination, mediation with the community leaders, collaboration and networking advocacy, print and electronic media, involving community leaders, field visits, inception workshop and community engagements, advocacy, outreach programs, advocacy meetings,

²⁹⁶ Githigaro, John Mwangi. 2012. “Faith-Based Peacebuilding: A Case Study of the Council of Churches of Kenya.” January. Accessed November 2020. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/51073216.pdf>. P1-6;

grants, capacity development, annual general, themed football tournaments and workshops.


Guiding Values to Intervention Approach

The respondents indicated several values that guide and inform their approach to the contextual problems in the areas where they work such as, respect of human rights, empowerment and dignity of women, peace, equality and education, child development and skills adoption, integrity, faith, resilience, preservation of life and rescue, participatory development, honesty, responsibility, innovation, solidarity and cooperation, inclusion, empowerment, voluntarism, sensitization on small scale farming using locally available materials and creating a market for communities, information sharing, accountability and visibility, patience, stewardship, professionalism, partnership servanthood, transparency, accountability, ethics, culture, knowledge, empathy, compassion, openness, simplicity, courage and endurance, diversity, love, respect and pluralism. One of the respondents from an INGO focusing on poverty alleviation explained further that for their organization, “the specific values that our approach enhances is the religious values that are enshrined in respective religions of Africa: peaceful coexistence, mercy, cooperation, cohesion and integral human development.” While another respondent from an NGO focusing on research and training within peace and conflict transformation sector said that, “we’re anchored on the ‘Do No Harm’ principle which advocates for conflict sensitivity. We also acknowledge that peace can’t be achieved by one party/organization, we therefore employ the teamwork aspect and join hands with other stakeholders within the regions to achieve the objectives.”

Strategy Satisfaction Level

Figure 31 below highlights the respondents’ levels of satisfaction with regard to the strategies they used in their organizations.

Figure 31: Kenya organization strategy satisfaction level



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Most of the respondents suggested that they were either satisfied (66%) or very satisfied (29%) with the strategies employed by their organizations. However, the remaining (5%) respondents took a neutral stance on the question. It is noticed that in Kenya, DRC and Ethiopia, the respondents were rather highly satisfied with the peace and conflict intervention strategies used by their organizations. This could be explained by the fact that in all the enumerated countries, majority of the respondents asserted that they had reached the social changes they initially set as shown on Figure 15 and 27.

Despite the general level of satisfaction of the strategies used by their organizations, the respondents identified several areas of improvement. These include: the enhancement of the following areas, campaign modules, implementation matrices and data collection analysis and reporting, litigation and adoption networks, education, calls for extra stake holders involvement, diversity to other areas, psycho-social support mechanisms, youth involvement, advocacy skills, funding, collaborations, planning, and sharing of data, accountability, women financial empowerment, network partnership, awareness creation from the grassroots and identification of root causes of conflicts, grassroots actors involvement, research based programming, enhanced lobbying for policy change and implementation. One respondent from an NGO working against gender based violence suggested that there is a need to, “develop new ideas -out of the box thinking. COVID 19 has also shown us that we need to rethink how we engage on issues that relate to people and make the campaign more personal. So review our content, how we package the information and disseminate it. We must build a people movement and to do that we must speak their language, voice their pain and then move with them in the journey for healing.”


Gender Roles in Peacebuilding and the Extent of Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding Activities

This subsection explores the influence of gender roles in peacebuilding based on the assessment of the general status and areas of women’s inclusion in peacebuilding processes and the impact of cultural perception on women’s inclusion. The section also explores the application of UNSCR 1325 by the organizations for which the respondents worked as well as the lessons learnt from its application.

Women’s Participation Approach

Figure 32 below highlights the respondents’ view on the diverse approaches from which women participate in conflict resolution in the country.

Figure 32: Women’s participation approach to conflict resolution Kenya



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)


Most of the respondents indicated that women were engaged in conflict resolution at communal level through advocacy campaigns (42%). While other respondents asserted that women participate through negotiation (12%), arbitration (6%), lobbying for peace (17%), and mediation (17%).

One of the respondents from an FBO explained that, “women are very practical. They have ability to compel men to sit and negotiate for peace. The Story of Nuer and Dinka women is worth mentioning. When Nuer and Dinka men failed to reach an agreement on a certain dispute, the women of the two ethnic group sat for a meeting and decided to refuse to sleep with their husbands thus refusing to carry a child who will be killed soon because of the men’s refusal to make peace among themselves. The stalemate continued for some time and the men called for the meeting and agreed to make peace.” It is noticed that in both DRC and Kenya, the respondents asserted that women’s participation in conflict resolution is mainly through Advocacy campaigns. In the context of Kenya, this agrees with the observations of Preston and Wamai as they highlighted the important advocacy work performed by Kenyan women during the 2007 post-election peace processes. Their participation through active advocacy led to multi-sectoral changes in the issues of land and elected representation that were included in the country’s constitution.²⁹⁷

Women’s Role in Peacebuilding in Kenya

Figure 33 below highlights the respondents’ view on the diverse roles played by women in peacebuilding activities in Kenya

Figure 33: Women’s role in peacebuilding activities in Kenya



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

The research sought to determine the extent to which the respondents agreed with the statements investigating the influence of gender roles on women’s participation in peace building. As presented in Figure 33 above, women are actively involved in peacebuilding (above 90%). This offers an interesting observation when comparing the perceptions of women’s involvement in peace building across countries. Indeed, comparing these findings with DRC, and Ethiopia, there is consensus over the view that women in all three countries are very influential in


²⁹⁷ Meredith Preston and Njoki Wamai, 2011 “Beyond the numbers.” March. 11. 18KWOATreportmodified220211_0-March-2011.pdf (hcentre.org);

addressing conflict. However, the results in Kenya show that the respondents predominantly agreed that women were included in decision making (above 80%), hold leadership positions (above 80%) as opposed to DRC (less than 50%) and Ethiopia (less than 50%) where these figures are relatively lower. In the context of Kenya, these findings correlate to the literature by Sugh and Ikwuba who highlighted the participation of Kenyan women in peace processes which enhanced their position in influencing conflict resolution strategies.²⁹⁸

Culture and Gender Imbalance

Figure 34 below highlights the respondents’ view on the extent of cultural perceptions that contribute to gender imbalance in peace and conflict interventions.

Figure 34: Cultural perception and gender imbalance in Kenya



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

As presented in Figure 34 above, majority of the respondents (more than 80%) agreed at different levels that cultural perceptions contribute to gender imbalance in peace and conflict interventions. The remaining respondents were either uncertain (3%) or disagreed with this (8%). This related to the observations of world Faith Development Dialogue (WFDD), that argues that the participation of women is watered down in some instances as they are silent or behave as proxies to men who assisted them to get elected and attain administrative positions in governmental institutions as a result of cultural norms that continue to belittle women and their efforts.²⁹⁹ This could also explain the findings on Figure 33 as it showed that women in peace and conflict interventions in Kenya receive fairly average support from men (58%).

Organization’s Application of UNSC Resolution1325


The UNSCR 1325 was adopted by many states around the globe in 2000 as a resolution aimed at enhancing women’s participation in decision making processes.³⁰⁰ When asked to rate the level of application of the UNSCR 1325, as displayed in Figure 35 below, majority of respondents rated their organizations work in covering aspects of United Nation’s Security the Council’s Resolution 1325 participation pillar to be either fair (31.2%), good (42%) or very good (15.6%). On the other hand, the remaining respondents found the application of the resolution as being either bad (3.13%) or not applicable (7.8%) to the work of their organizations as it was not related to the thematic focus of the organizations they worked for.

²⁹⁸ Elizabeth Sugh and Agnes Ikwuba. “Women in mediation and conflict resolutions: Lessons, challenges, and prospects for Africa”. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science 22, no. 1(January 2017): 01-06, accessed October 20 2020, <http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol.%202022%20Issue1/Version-2/A2201020106.pdf>;

²⁹⁹ World Faiths Development Dialogue, Peace and Stability in Kenya: The role of religious actors, 2015. <https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkeley-center/150804WFDDPeaceStabilityKenyaRoleReligiousActorsEventSummary.pdf>;

³⁰⁰ Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, and 2122.;

Figure 35: Organizations' application of UNSCR 1325 in Kenya



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

According to the respondents, the lessons learnt from the implementation of activities related to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 participation pillar are centered around the high potential benefits of working together towards the general achievement of women's participation and involvement in all aspects of the socio-political and economic life in the country. Indeed, the respondents acknowledged the potential that women possess in their ability to show genuine leadership at the local and national level. Pointing to the areas in which women's participation could be further be improved, one respondent from a research and training NGO explained that, "first, young women are in the grey area between UNSCR 1325 and 2250 and their particular concerns are not addressed. Second, Inter-generational dialogue still needs to be addressed. Third, Cultural and gender stereotypes still inhibit effective participation of young women in decision making." From their experiences in implementing Resolution 1325, respondents learnt that there are factors that also influence its implementation. These are, time, planning, funding, political goodwill, community goodwill, women's trust and will to participate, peace/conflict status in the region,

On the other end, another respondent from an NGO focused on poverty alleviation highlighted the need to understand Resolution 1325 not as an exclusive call for women's participation but as a call for all genders to collaborate towards building an enabling environment. He stated that, "participation of women in peace building doesn't mean excluding men but rather working together to achieve sustainable peace within our spaces. Women's involvement should be as stakeholders and not as victims and vulnerable individuals."


The Role of Religious Leaders in Addressing Conflicts

This subsection explores the different roles that religious leaders have played in conflict resolution in the region as well as in the general areas of collaboration between Faith-Based organizations and CSOs as well as the factors preventing good collaboration between them.

Level of Confidence in Religious Leaders in Addressing Conflict

Figure 36 below highlights the respondents' views on the level of confidence in religious leaders' ability to resolve conflict in Kenya.

Figure 36: Level of confidence in religious leaders in Kenya



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Most of the respondents believed the level of confidence in religious leaders’ ability to address conflicts to be either high (66%) or very high (13%). The respondents explained that this was based on the following factors, the high respect towards religious leaders, enhancement of inclusivity of conflicting parties, tactful dealing with issues, firm stance on issues of peace despite pressure; religious places are known to be peaceful and any activity revolving to that is trusted, they possess enhanced structure and network. One of the respondents from an NGO focusing on humanitarian support said that, “in Northern Eastern Kenya and other areas inhabited by people who profess Islamic faith, religious leaders, the Sheikhs and Imams, are the ones calling the shots in terms of dispute resolution. The Sheikhs and Imams are a respected lot in this area, at least in defusing tensions when they arise. Whenever there is a crisis or a likelihood of one occurring (early warning), the immediate response by the religious leaders is usually to initiate a dialogue process. This is normally done analyzing the conflict, identifying the issues and the warring clans or groups and dispatching a team of “neutral” religious leaders to the warring communities in order to prevail upon them to agree to dialogue.”

Similar to DRC and Ethiopia, religious leaders in Kenya benefit from high levels of confidence being religious leaders.

Another group of respondents believed that the level of confidence in religious leaders’ ability to address conflicts to be either low (17%) or very low (5%) based on the following reasons, a lack of seriousness with Kenyan religious leaders, they sometimes fail to disclose information to all community members, they are perceived to be effective at the grassroots level but have little effect at the national level, some religious leaders are also perceived as subject to political influence and ethnic partiality. One respondent from an NGO focused on research and training on peace and conflict transformation, explained that, “in most cases they are well respected and therefore what they say counts but sometimes some get involved in politics thereby reducing their influence within the communities.”

Religious Leaders’ Strategy for Conflict Resolution

To most of the respondents, religious leaders apply diverse strategies with regard to conflict resolution/transformation. These are, arbitration, negotiation and agitation, participate in constitution amendment (since they give spiritual guidance to other leaders), collaboration


with political parties, psycho-social support, strengthening of already existing peace structures (e.g. peace monitors and agencies), preaching and hosting the victims of the violence, peaceful confrontation of issues and dialogue, capacity building, strengthening of existing peace structures, active non-violence approach on matters peace, lobbying for peace by engaging national leaders and influential people.

One respondent from an NGO focused on humanitarian support asserted that, “religious leaders use a number of strategies when mediating between the warring communities all of which are based on Islamic teachings and borrowed from the Holy Quran and the teachings of the Prophet. During their sermons and teachings including at the lowest level, the Madrasas, Islamic values and conflict resolution mechanisms are emphasized in order to entrench the understanding of Islamic concept of peace. One of the major exercises the religious leaders undertake during mediation include the facilitation of justice especially in cases which include payment of damages and blood price with emphasis on honoring the deals.”

Religious Leaders’ Participation

Figure 37 below highlights the respondents’ view on the diverse roles played by religious leaders in peacebuilding activities in Kenya.

Figure 37: Religious leaders’ participation approach to peacebuilding in Kenya



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

The research sought to determine the extent to which respondents agreed with the statements investigating the role of religious leaders in peace building. As shown on Figure 37 above, the respondents tended to agree that religious leaders were influential in addressing conflicts (above 85%), engaged communities in peacebuilding (above 90%) and collaborate with CSOs (above 65%) as well as engaged and empower women as peacebuilders (80%). Much like in the findings in DRC (33%) and Ethiopia (13%), it is noted that religious leaders in Kenya tend not to sufficiently engage women in political decision making (48%). From this

observation, there is a gap in literature that would explain the fairly average support from religious leaders for women in political decision-making position.

Areas of Collaboration Opportunities for FBOs and CSOs

The respondents were asked to assess the ways in which FBOs and CSOs could collaborate in order to address the following issues:

Inter-Ethnic relations

According to the respondents FBOs and CSOs should collaborate with more synergy as they enhance cohesion and integration of values in communities. Indeed, they highly contribute to inter-ethnic relations thus the need to work together in addressing this by the use of various congregation members who come from various communities. Further, they should organize dialogue forum where the biases and prejudices are shared in order to come up with viable solutions and enhance collaboration.

Inter-religious relations

According to the respondents FBOs and CSOs as key actors in conflict resolution should collaborate to address the issues related to interreligious relations through enhancement of networking and partnerships to capacity build religious leaders from diverse faiths to be more proactive in conflict resolution. This is in addition to CSOs and FBOs providing technical support and coordination of activities and for the creation of platforms for engagement. One of the respondents from an FBO focused on inter-religious dialogue argued, “when conflict takes the religious form it becomes more difficult to solve it. Positive inter-religious relations help to avoid that. When conflict either ethnic, religious or social grievance rooted ones, religious solutions are appropriate and lasting. Because the religious leaders have trust and confidence from the faithful. When the people do not trust the government.”

Women’s Participation in Leadership

According to the respondents FBOs and CSOs should work more closely in order to support efforts needed to help women propel themselves into various decision-making positions (advocacy for realization of the 2/3 gender rule on elected positions), enhance their access to proper education. The respondents supported that women in leadership positions are better at providing others with fair pay and good benefits. They bring out the best and when given a chance to lead their leadership has had a stabilizing effect on growth. One of the respondents suggested that CSOs and FBOs should work towards the creation of safe spaces where women can talk and using networks and linkages to reach out to leaders for more engagement

Youth Inclusion

The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to youth inclusion, FBOs and CSOs should collaborate towards the creation of an environment favorable for youth empowerment through the promotion and support of youth initiatives aimed at helping them realize their potential. Indeed, according to the respondents, youth represent a large part of the population but are the most vulnerable and discriminated against in the country especially as they carry the burden of unemployment and lack of good leadership.

One of the respondents from a CBO focused on humanitarian support highlighted that, “every time young people want leadership positions, they are told they are not ready. The respondent suggested that what needs to be done is good capacity building for our young people to gain

the confidence before the lose hope. Every aspect of training should be led by qualified young people in order to motivate their peers.”

The respondents suggested the collaboration between FBOs and CSOs to organize dispute resolution mechanism purely for youth as well as promoting the financial empowerment of youth through Income Generating Activities.


Social Cohesion

According to the respondents FBOs and CSOs can promote social cohesion through increased partnership and networking as there is a need for a cohesive society and improved welfare of all. They have the capacity to encourage all stakeholders to work together for the benefit of peace and inclusivity. FBOs and CBOs should collaborate toward strengthening the capacity of community members to interact, understand as well as work with other communities. The methods and activities that they can employ to promote social cohesion include: Joint sporting activities such as athletics, football, volleyball, netball; community linkages and exchange programs among communities; mutually beneficial entrepreneurial and business ventures within communities living together; joint cultural events and activities such as festivals, ceremonies among communities and inter-communal charity initiatives.

Prevailing Factors Preventing the Collaboration of FBOs and CSOs

Figure 38 below highlights the respondents ‘views on the prevailing factors preventing the collaboration of FBOs and CSOs in Kenya.

Figure 38: Prevailing factors that prevent collaboration among CSOs and FBOs in Kenya



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Most of the respondents perceived that there are prevailing factors that prevent collaboration among CSOs and FBOs. These are, poor infrastructure and capital, strict budget lines, unwillingness and different interests, time, poverty and corruption, lack of partnership and selfishness, political interference, unhealthy competition and duplication of programs, lack of coordination, ideological differences, lack of sharing data and information, level of societal confidence, limitation of CBOs in their mandate and the focus of FBOs on religious matters.

One of the respondents from a CSO focused on addressing gender-based violence explained that, “People are not sure how to engage with them as they are seen to be “too religious” and would not engage in political issues. However, if they could understand that it is about social justice, perhaps more people and organizations would reach out to them”

Comparing these findings with DRC and Ethiopia, it's noted that in the context of Kenya, the collaboration between FBOs and CSOs is greatly impacted by the prevailing factors above mentioned.

20% of the respondents believed there were no prevailing factors hindering collaboration between CSOs and FBOs, as a respondent from an NGO focused on humanitarian support pointed out, "FBOs are part of an important element of Civil Society Organizations. Both have become an integral part of the civil society in many areas of social outreach. They both constitute a potent force as critical enablers or social capacity builders in areas of work that neither the state nor any other private entity is able to penetrate. They simply complement each other." There is cordial working relationship between religious leaders and civil society.

Advocacy Initiatives Aligned with Social Change and Policy Implementation

This subsection explores the different advocacy strategies used by the organizations for which the respondents worked in order to influence policy making toward positive change.

Advocacy Strategy

The organizations represented by the respondents employ diverse advocacy strategies to achieve their objectives. Some of these strategies include, community approach, media, planned outdoor activities and community engagements, door to door education, organized meetings/barazas, trainings and litigation filing, public engagements, organized community health interventions and camps, town hall meetings, organized community engagements, trainings, outreach engagements, local leaders involvement, mobilization, lobbying and information sharing, road shows, message development, FGDs and field activities, community awareness and participation, public sharing and mediation. One respondent from an FBO focused on inter-religious dialogue stated that, "Education for women, no girl to remain at home. We tried hard in different counties to take schools to the communities because if the schools are far, women or girls have less opportunity. In any meetings or formation of the committee, we make sure that women are represented equally or to some degree depending on the situation of the place and culture."

Other strategies shared by a respondent from a CBO championing children's rights include, "Sports and football to be specific. Because many people in my community are constantly engaged in it. That's why my organization finds it easy to mobilize people and take the best moments of the game to engage the audience who are the community. Through helping women and girls as well as the community to come up with peace building and conflict resolutions themselves." This concurs with the views of Buckley, who argues that campaigns for policy reform rely on a wide variety of tools and strategies.³⁰¹ It also concurs with the understanding of Roebeling, and de Vries on the different advocacy strategies (lobbying, awareness creation, activism, etc.) and what they imply so that they can be employed to influence policy making.³⁰²

Expected Social Changes

Through their interventions, the respondents wanted to see several social changes such as, a violence free society, respect for women and children's rights, creation of self-reliant communities, empowerment, skills and career development, justice and harmony, reduction of gender-based violence, involvement of local communities in areas of peacebuilding, increased

³⁰¹ Buckley, Steve. 2018. "Advocacy strategies and approaches: Overview." May. Accessed November 2020. <https://www.apc.org/en/advocacy-strategies-and-approaches-overview>.

³⁰² Ger Roebeling, Jan de Vries. 2011. Advocacy and Policy Influencing for Social Change. Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations. Accessed November 2020. https://www.ircwash.org/sites/default/files/advocacy_and_policy_influencing_fro_social_change.pdf. P17;

literacy levels for all and inclusiveness of the marginalized in decision making. One of the respondents from an FBO focused on inter-religious dialogue said that, “we want the interfaith leaders to acquire a higher level of self-awareness; that they have a crucial responsibility in enhancing sustainable peace and development.” This supports Ross and Klugman’s views as they argue that advocacy strategies require an element of TOC as it would help in identifying the existing issues and its plausible solutions as well as making sure the advocacy is still community oriented.³⁰³


Indicators of Change

According to the respondents, these are the indicators that point to desired change having taken place, reduced incident cases of violence against women and girls, creation of schools in disadvantaged areas, respecting children’s right through more reported cases of child abuse (voicing or speaking out), increase in entrepreneurship sectors, reduction in human rights violations, provision of emergency services, an equitable society, increasing number of targeted people accessing and adopting family planning services, an increase in the number of women trained on peace building skills, livelihoods and advocacy approaches, increased family stability, more women in decision making positions, increased access to information, change in attitude and mode of engagement from violence to non-violence, healthy cohabitation, less poverty records, rule of law, equity and inclusion, low rate of crime, increased level of tolerance between faiths and local communities, intercommunal exchanges, increased intercultural collaborations, peaceful coexistence and continuous dialogue among different faiths and inclusive policies enacted in parliament.

Advocacy Strategy and Change

The respondents were asked to assess whether their advocacy strategy brought the desired change in the communities they are involved with. This is illustrated on Figure 39 below.

Figure 39: Impact of advocacy strategy on change in Kenya



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Most of the respondents (95%) indicated that their advocacy strategy had led to several changes. The positive changes that were progressively being witnessed among the respondents were, increased knowledge on rights and responsibilities; increased jobs creation and opportunities, reduced conflict and abuse cases; active participation of the influential decision, stability in families, positive feedback from M&E, increased community development; collective


³⁰³ Ross, Jenny. n.d. “Theory of change for advocacy and campaigns.” Accessed November 2020. <https://www.bond.org.uk/resources/theory-of-change-for-advocacy-and-campaigns>.
Klugman, Barbara. 2011. “Effective social justice advocacy: a theory-of-change.” Reproductive Health (Elsevier). Accessed November 2020. doi:10.1016/S0968-8080(11)38582-5. P147-149;

ownership for sustainability, increased women’s inclusion in leadership positions; peaceful co-existence in the society, reduced food poverty index, adoption of policy, inclusive roundtable discussion; positive policies and legislation in place, increased research based advocacy. One of the respondents from an FBO focused on inter-religious dialogue described that, “The schools were built close to the community, now almost the number of the girls is exceeding that of boys in the schools. We have given women more financial support than the men towards supporting themselves and their families. We believe if a mother is educated the education of the entire family is guaranteed.” Similar to DRC and Ethiopia, it’s noted that most of the respondents in Kenya asserted that their advocacy strategies brought about the desired changes

Needed Assistance Assessment

Figure 40 below, highlights the respondents ‘view on the resources they need to supplement those that are available to them for a greater impact of their activities on communities

Figure 40: Needed support assessment in Kenya



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Majority of the respondents (36%) pointed to a need for stronger alliances to bridge the gap between advocacy resources held and those missing. The remaining respondents identified the need for immersive outreaches (22%), greater participation of the media (22%) and greater involvement in research (20%).

South Sudan

The following data presented and analysed represent the findings of the research in the particular context of South Sudan.

Demographics

The study sought to establish the demographic data of the organization respondents. This was done through general analysis of the demographic data obtained from the respondents which included: gender of the respondent, the years of experience in the sector of peace and conflict resolution, the type of organization they worked in and their organization’s thematic focus.

Gender

Table 12: Gender of respondents South Sudan

	Frequency	Percentage
Male	7	70%
Female	3	30%
Total	10	100%

(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

From Table 12 above, a gender disparity can be observed, although the disparity is not large which can be attributed to the people holding offices in the organisations reached and willingness to participate in the study.

Years of Working in South Sudan

The respondents' number of years of working in the region was important in understanding their views on peace and conflict interventions in South Sudan. Table 13 below shows the distribution of the sample population.

Table 13: Years of experience in peace and conflict resolution sector in South Sudan

Years	Frequency	Percentage
Less than a year	10%	1
1 – 9 years	50%	5
10-21 years	20%	2
Above 21 years	20%	2
Total	100%	10


(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Most of the respondents had worked on peace and conflict initiatives between 1 and 9 years (50%). Those above 21 years (20 %), above 21 years (20 %) and less than one year (10%) respectively. This representation proved valuable for this study as majority of the participants were considered knowledgeable hence the information gathered was credible and a true reflection of their experiences.

Types of Organizations

Figure 41 below highlights the types of organizations reached for this research in South Sudan.

Figure 41: Types of organizations reached in South Sudan




(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

As indicated on the graph above, the respondents worked in diverse organizations within various capacities. 40% of the respondents worked in Non-Governmental Organizations, followed by 30% who worked in Faith-Based Organizations. 20% of the respondents worked for Community-Based Organizations and 10% worked for Civil Society Organizations.

Organizational Thematic Focus

Figure 42 below highlights the thematic focus at the base of the activities conducted by the organizations reached for this research in South Sudan.

Figure 42: Thematic Focus of Organizations reached in South Sudan



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

The organizations for which the respondents work have diverse thematic focuses as presented on the above graph. Indeed, 10% of the respondents worked in organizations focused on Gender-Based Violence, another 10% in organizations focused on research and training; 10% in organizations focused on inter-religious dialogue, 30% in organizations focused on poverty alleviation. The highest number (40%) of the respondents worked for organizations with multi-thematic focuses varying from a combination of several of the thematic focuses enumerated above in addition to, governance and rule of law, transitional justice and freedom of expression.

Intervention Methods and Strategies Employed by Faith and CSO Peace Structures

This subsection explores the different intervention methods used by CSO and faith-based organizations based on the theory of change used by the organizations of the respondents.

Theory of Change

As presented in the literature review section, a theory of change is basically a conceptualized roadmap to achieve a specific change. The organizations represented by the respondents employed diverse theories of change that guided their intervention strategies based on their theoretical focus. In this sense, the respondents suggested that change in the communities they are involved with could be accomplished through, participation of all citizens in governance especially women and youth, behavior change, self-reliance, lifestyles that are in tandem with the environment, culture and civility, integration of scripture, faith and practice, gender equality. Here are some of the responses from the participants that show the domino effect associated with the basic understanding of the theory of change.

One respondent from an FBO focused on poverty alleviation stated that, “if social, ecological and economic systems are more resilient and equitable, and communities and individuals undertake behaviors that support their productivity and health, and communities are better governed and more peaceful, then communities will be able to improve stable food availability, access and utilization, and the individuals within them will be more food secure.” In addition, one respondent from a similar FBO focused on poverty alleviation added that, “community living in peace will support each other leading to sustainable development. Healthy children physically, psychologically and emotionally will be able to contribute positively toward the good of the future generation. Good governance promotes Human Rights and peaceful coexistence in the society leading to development.” Similar to DRC, Ethiopia and Kenya, the findings of the diverse formulation of the respondents’ TOCs relate to its understanding as an outcome-based approach which combines the aspects of monitoring and evaluation that help a group of stakeholders to attain a defined objective in the long run.

Table 14 below highlights the respondents’ views on the possibility of adaptation or change of their initial TOC in South Sudan.

Table 14: Changes in South Sudan Organization’s TOC

	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	7	70%
No	2	20%
Uncertain	1	10%
Total	10	100%

(Source: Research Findings)

When asked whether they had to adapt the theory of change used by their organizations and as presented on Table 14 above, 70% of respondents indicated that that they had to change the theory of change used by their organizations. To them, diverse projects and times sometimes require different approaches as the theory may not always match the reality on the ground. This has pushed some organizations to adjust their theory of change depending on the security and political dynamics at ground level. Furthermore, some respondents attributed their change in theories of change to a need for more flexibility of action. As one respondent from an NGO

aimed at advocating for women's rights put it, "Africa is very diverse, so is South Sudan. Not all conflicts, or abuses have the same basis. Each intervention is informed by an assessment to identify and isolate elements to be targeted in the process."

As portrayed on the literature review, a TOC used as a theoretical basis for monitoring and evaluation can be subject to re-evaluation in order to optimize the expected outcomes and keep track of the progress made.³⁰⁴ A total of 20% of respondents suggested that they did not have to change or adapt the theory of change they used as for some of them, the strategies initially laid as well as their implementation procedures worked for them and presented positive results. These respondents also suggested that their theories of change were well adopted among communities as it was initially based on the contextual reality on the ground.

In addition, 10% of the respondents were unsure about their use of the theory of change as some of them either suggested that they did not occupy positions in their organization's strategic planning department or that they were still to wait for their mid-term evaluations to be carried out or that although they did not engage with the theories of change, their impact on communities was still strong.

Organizational General Strategy of Addressing Issues

When asked what were the general strategies used to address issues related to their organizations' thematic focuses, the respondents indicated that their strategies included the following: evidence-based advocacy both nationally and regionally, vocational training for women, teaching women their rights, advocating against gender-based violence, teaching women peaceful methods of solving conflicts and how to become mediators, supporting small businesses owned by women, engaging men and boys in the fight against gender-based violence, Christian education, food security, livelihoods activities geared towards building resilience, capacity building, community peace dialogue and mediation, advocacy, tracing and reunification and the establishment of community-based child protection structures.

One respondent from an NGO working on women's rights stated that, "EVE Organization has always had advocacy meetings with the stakeholders who work towards the welfare of women. We have engaged women political leaders, women parliamentarians in the various caucus, state legislatures, the ministry of gender both at national and state level, the local government, religious leaders, youth, the women and the chiefs. Eve has conducted transformational leadership trainings for women parliamentarians and political leaders. We have had women parliamentarians taken for exposure visits to their counterparts in Nairobi and Kigali. We have carried out in-house trainings for young women leaders, mentoring for leadership. EVE has mobilized women led organizations to form the South Sudan women's coalition for peace which has participated in the peace process starting from the High-Level Revitalized Forum until when four of the coalition members became signatories to the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Agreement in South Sudan. We have also organized trainings on GBV in the various states. In these communities where we carry out trainings, we form GBV task-forces that ensure that women and girls are protected against the abuse of their rights." These responses are in line with the arguments of Moro who analyzed the trends of the participation of CSOs in South Sudan as he argues that they are highly involved in communities at multiple levels as they promote peaceful dialogue, cohabitation and tolerance³⁰⁵.

³⁰⁴ OECD (2008); UNEG. (2011). Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation: Towards UNEG Guidance. Available at http://www.uneval.org/papersand-pubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=980.

³⁰⁵ Moro, Leben Nelson. 2015. CSOs/CBOs and faith-based organizations-led peace and reconciliation efforts. Policy brief, THE SUDD INSTITUTE. Microsoft Word - CSO_Moro_2015.doc (reliefweb.int). p1-2;

Program Dissemination Strategy

The respondents stated that their organizations disseminate their program objectives to the community they are involved with in diverse ways including, social media like Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter; brochures and posters, radio, newsletters, traditional community Leaders’ involvement, awareness, involving all groups, ages, gender and persons with disabilities; community mobilization initiatives, meetings, trainings. As one respondent from a CBO providing psycho-social support shared, “our organization tries to empower the youth and the society at large through self-awareness and self-empowerment by actually helping them overcome their own mental obstacles.”


Guiding Values to Organization’s Problem Resolution Approach

The respondents indicated several values that guide and inform their approach to the contextual problems in the areas where they work. Some of these values shared include, the involvement of ordinary citizens in decision making, compassion, integrity, loyalty, love, common good, women rights, community understanding, honesty, forgiveness and reconciliation, social teaching of the Church, peace building and conflict resolution. One respondent from an organization focusing on gender-based violence stated that they value, “Working in partnership with government, especially at local level, to promote democratic election procedures, reforms of legal system, the establishment of integrated education systems, appropriate language policies and human rights legislation.”

Organization Strategy Satisfaction Level

Figure 43 below highlights the respondents’ levels of satisfaction with regard to the strategies they used in their organizations.

Figure 43: South Sudan organization strategy satisfaction level



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Most of the respondents indicated high (80%) or very high (20%) satisfaction with regard to the strategies used by their organizations in peace and conflict interventions.

Despite the general level of satisfaction in regards to the social change strategies used by their organizations, most of the respondents identified several areas of improvement. These include: the enhancement of a community approach and the increased involvement of the government, religious leaders and other NGOs in human rights especially women and children.

The respondents also spoke of the necessity to increase women and youth empowerment and build their capacities through education scholarships, peacebuilding trainings and other financial means to participate effectively to the development at community level. In addition to this, they mentioned the need for long term funding and creating associations and consortia with organizations with the same objectives to implement activities to cover the large geographical area. As an illustration, one respondent from a CBO focused on addressing gender-based violence highlighted that, “there are many different ways for a community to bring about the changes in South Sudan, but the below is the most important: Organization for locality development also known as community development. Locality development focuses on community building by improving the process by which things get done. Whereas locality development focuses primarily on the process of working together, social planning focuses on getting results. That is, it emphasizes solving specific social problems, such as a lack of adequate housing or a very high crime rate.”


Gender Roles in Peacebuilding and Extent of Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding Activities

This subsection explores the influence of gender roles in peacebuilding based on the assessment of the general status and areas of women’s inclusion in peacebuilding processes and the impact of cultural perceptions on women’s inclusion. The section also explores the application of UNSCR 1325 by the organizations for which the respondents worked as well as the lessons learnt from its application.

Women’s Participation Approach in Conflict Resolution

Figure 44 below highlights the respondents’ view on the diverse approaches from which women participate in conflict resolution in the country

Figure 44: Women’s participation approach to conflict resolution South Sudan




(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Respondents indicated that women were engaged in conflict resolution at the communal level through, negotiation (20%), lobbying for peace (10%), mediation (20%), policy implementation (10%) and advocacy campaigns (40%). This multidimensional participation of women is supported by the literature from Balogun who suggested that women in South Sudan have always been active in conflict – as combatants and victims – and in conflict resolution as peacebuilders.³⁰⁶ Similar to DRC and Kenya, the respondents asserted that women’s participation in conflict resolution in South Sudan happens mainly through advocacy campaigns. In the specific context of the country, this agrees with Mai’s observations as he argues that women in South Sudan have been vocal and actively contributed to stabilization efforts such as the 2017 cease-fire agreement as well as many mass actions against the multiple killings of civilians and rapes.³⁰⁷

Women’s Role in Peacebuilding

Figure 45 below highlights the respondents’ view on the diverse roles played by women in peacebuilding activities in South Sudan.

Figure 45: Women’s role in peacebuilding activities in South Sudan



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

The research sought to determine the extent to which respondents agreed with the statements investigating the influence of gender roles on women’s participation in peace building. As presented in the Figure 45 above, the respondents tended to agree that women were included in decision making to a certain extent (70%), held leadership positions (70%), were supported by men (70%) and were influential in addressing conflicts (70%).

³⁰⁶ Balogun, Funmi. 2020. “Women’s Meaningful Participation in Peacebuilding: Reflections from South Sudan.” November. Accessed November 2020. <https://africanfeminism.com/womens-meaningful-participation-in-peacebuilding-reflections-from-south-sudan/>;


³⁰⁷ Mai, Nyathon James Hoth. 2015. The role of women in peacebuilding in South Sudan. Policy brief, The SUDD Institute, p. 1-2, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/southsudan_1.pdf;

Mai also confirms these findings as he argues that through their historical participation in peacebuilding, South Sudanese women acquired the skills and space to actively contribute to conflict resolution on multiple fronts.³⁰⁸

Cultural Perception and Gender Imbalance

Figure 46 below highlights the respondents’ view on the extent of cultural perceptions that contribute to gender imbalance in peace and conflict interventions in South Sudan.

Figure 46: Cultural perception and gender imbalance in South Sudan




(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Similar to DRC, Ethiopia and Kenya, it’s noted that majority of the respondents (above 90%) asserted that cultural perceptions contribute to gender imbalance in peace and conflict interventions. However it could be argued that this aspect does not have a great impact on the findings from Figure 45 in terms of support that men provide to women in peace and conflict resolution.

Organizational Application of UNSC Resolution 1325

The UNSCR 1325 was adopted by many states around the globe in 2000 as a resolution aimed at the enhancement of women’s participation in decision making processes.³⁰⁹ When asked to rate the level of application of the UNSCR 1325, as displayed in Figure 47 below, majority of the respondents rated their organization’s work in covering aspects of United Nation’s Security Council’s Resolution 1325 participation pillar to be either good (50%) or very good (40%). On the other hand, the remaining respondents found it not applicable (10%) to the work of their organizations.

Figure 47: Organization’s application of UNSCR 1325 in South Sudan



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

³⁰⁸ Ibid.;
³⁰⁹ Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, and 2122.;

According to most of the respondents, the lessons learnt from the implementation of activities related to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 participation pillar are centered around the view that this was the first time that the UNSC had devoted a resolution to women during peace and conflict therefore there is need for UN Security Council to work with Civil Society Organizations in order to achieve the goal. Additionally, they learnt that involving all groups, ages and genders towards achieving participation pillars is key to any milestone desired especially in terms of long-lasting stability. On this point, one respondent from an NGO working on improving women’s rights emphasized on these lessons learnt by stating that, “increasing women’s participation in peace activities boosts the confidence of women, enables women to be respected in the society, challenges gender stereotypes, reduces conflicts and brings about great success in resolving conflicts. Incorporating gender perspectives is essential and encourages conflict sensitive approaches when dealing with conflict.”

Another respondent from a similar organization focused on championing women’s rights observed that the security status in the country impacts the implementation of the resolution. He explained that, “the major lesson learnt is that the insecurities within the country have hindered the full implementation of the UNSCR 1325.”


The Role of Religious Leaders in Addressing Conflicts

This subsection explores the different roles that religious leaders have played in conflict resolution in the region as well as the general areas of collaboration between faith-based organizations and CSOs as well as the factors preventing good collaboration between them.

Level of Confidence in Religious Leaders in Conflict

Figure 48 below highlights the respondents ‘views on the level of confidence in religious leaders’ ability to resolve conflict in South Sudan

Figure 48: Level of confidence in religious leaders in South Sudan



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Similar to DRC, Ethiopia and Kenya, majority of the respondents asserted that the level of confidence in religious leaders' ability to address conflict to be either high (30%) or very high (50%). According to the respondents, this is due to the perception that they are drivers of change in the community and the nature of their work and experience in the field of conflict resolution has led them to be at the center of many peace processes. The respondents additionally indicated that they possess the technical know-how as well as the resources to end violence in the affected regions. Further, the participants also mentioned the willingness of religious leaders to engage with people and find mutually beneficial agreements between conflicting parties in communities.

These perceptions are similar to Jeffrey as he argues that church institutions are among the few stable institutions in the South Sudan considering the conflicts that have persisted in the regions for almost half a century. For this reason, these institutions enjoy high levels of credibility among the public since failed politics has raised the skepticism toward the ability of the government to foster long lasting peace.³¹⁰ On the other hand, 20% of respondents asserted that religious leaders suffered from low level of confidence in their ability to address conflict as the respondents suggested that they have divided themselves along tribal lines therefore compromising their impartiality.

Conflict Resolution Strategies of Religious Leaders

According to the respondents, religious leaders apply diverse strategies for conflict transformation/resolution. These include, community dialogue and community fora, community engagement and consultations, peacebuilding through development, training of political leaders on trauma and peace building, calling for ceasefires, provision for resources, capacity building, and preaching gospel values to change attitudes and mentalities.


One respondent from a CBO focused on addressing gender-based violence stated, "mediation and peacemaking by religious leaders and institutions. For example, the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches mediated the short-lived 1972 peace agreement in Sudan. In South Africa, various churches were at the vanguard of the struggle against apartheid and the peaceful transition. Among the most dramatic and most frequently cited cases is the successful mediation that the Rome-based Community of Sant'Egidio achieved to help end the civil war in Mozambique in 1992."

Religious Leaders' Role in Peacebuilding

Figure 49 below highlights the respondents' view on the diverse roles played by religious leaders in peacebuilding activities in South Sudan.

³¹⁰ Jeffrey, James. 2018. "Church and conflict in South Sudan." Accessed November 2020. <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/church-and-conflict-south-sudan>. Par1;

Figure 49: Religious leaders' participation approach to peacebuilding in South Sudan



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

The research sought to determine the extent to which respondents agreed with the statements investigating the role of religious leader in peace building. As presented on Figure 49 above, the respondents tended to agree that religious leaders are influential in addressing conflict (above 90%), engage and empower women as peacebuilders (70%), engage communities in peacebuilding (above 90%) and collaborate with CSOs (80%). This confirms the observations of Jeffrey who suggested that the involvement of religious leaders at national and local level not only gave them credibility, it also enabled them to lobby internationally and assisted in brokering peace agreements among local communities.³¹¹ Comparing these findings with DRC (33%), Ethiopia (13%) and Kenya (48%), the results in South Sudan indicate a significantly higher support from religious leaders for the engagement of women in political decision making.

Collaboration Areas of FBOs and CSOs

The respondents were asked to assess the ways in which FBOs and CSOs could collaborate in order to address the following issues:

Inter-Ethnic relations

In order to address issues related to inter-ethnic relations, respondents suggested that FBOs and CSOs should encourage impartiality and involve members of every ethnic affiliation or tribe especially the youth, in every social function and empower them to be able to make a change. Additionally, respondents suggested that there should be a promotion of education and training initiatives for peace that can comprise all activities which improve attitudes, knowledge and capabilities for conflict management. One respondent from an FBO focused on poverty alleviation shared that, “FBOs and CSOs have to work together to address tribalism so that communities can peacefully coexist and support each other for social transformation to

³¹¹ Jeffrey, James. 2018. “Church and conflict in South Sudan.” July. Accessed November 2020. <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/church-and-conflict-south-sudan>. Par1;

take place. Once the communities are living in peace and supporting each other, there will be women's participation, youth inclusion and social cohesion in the society."

Inter-religious relations

The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to Inter-religious relations, FBOs and CSOs should organize joint prayers regardless of faith and worked for the purpose of the community, social coexistence and rights of all members.

Women's participation in Leadership

The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to women's participation in leadership, FBOs and CSOs should jointly promote women's participation in leadership as a key to democracy. Civil Society Organizations have been advocating for inclusion of women in the leadership and in development at all cadres.

Youth Inclusion

The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to youth inclusion, FBOs and CSOs should ensure youth are provided with the right opportunities and training in order for them to participate in solving social-cultural issues affecting the society.


Social Cohesion

The respondents suggested that in order to address issues related to social cohesion, FBOs and CSOs should promote and focus on good social networking and cohesion as a product of community trust on systems, institutions, governance structures, while ensuring access to basics as well as mitigating inter communal distrust.

Prevailing Factors Preventing the Collaboration of FBOs and CSOs

Figure 50 below highlights the respondents' views on the prevailing factors preventing the collaboration of FBOs and CSOs in South Sudan.

Figure 50: Prevailing factors that prevent collaboration among CSOs and FBOs in South Sudan



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

While 20 % of the respondents asserted that there were no prevailing factors preventing collaboration among CSOs and FBOs, majority of the respondents (80%) asserted the opposite for the following reasons: the existence of conflicts of interest, religious bias, lack of resources or inadequate resource management, the ongoing civil war in the country, lack of trust, competition among the CSOs and donor interests. As an illustration, one respondent from an FBO focused on poverty alleviation suggested that, "they are still divided according to the

regions of origin. If the founder of the organization is from that region, then the organization has to work in that region only.” Comparing these findings with DRC and Ethiopia, it’s noted that in the context of both Kenya and South Sudan, the collaboration between FBOs and CSOs is, for the most part, negatively impacted by the prevailing factors above mentioned that tend to be similar in both countries.

Advocacy Initiatives Aligned with Social Change and Policy Implementation

This subsection explores the different advocacy strategies used by the organizations for which the respondents worked in order to influence policy making toward positive change.

Organizational Advocacy Strategy

The organizations for which the respondents work use diverse advocacy strategies among which we could mention, community driven initiatives, lobbying and campaigning during social events, meetings and on social media, online publications, inclusive participation, mindset changing, workshops, environmental advocacy, radio talk shows, advocacy for empowerment (women and youth) and community awareness approach. For example, one participant from an organization focused on championing women shared that, “engaging women parliamentarians in meetings to promote our agenda, we use the specialized committee on gender in the legislative assembly and also the influential stakeholders. We bring them together for round table discussions together with local authorities.” Buckley shares the same views where he argues that campaigns for policy reform rely on a wide variety of tools and strategies.³¹² The findings also concur with Roebeling and de Vries views on the different advocacy strategies (lobbying, awareness creation, activism, etc.) and what they imply so that they can be employed to influence policy making.³¹³

Expected Social Change from Interventions

Through their interventions, the respondents wanted to see several social changes such as, a decline in gender-based violence, more women getting employed, a more peaceful society that solves conflict amicably, personal transformation, and inspiration, self-sustained communities, food security and poverty alleviation, environmental awareness, unity and peaceful co-existence, enhanced living conditions, positive changes in social structures that favor inclusivity, equity, participation, transparency, accountability and rule of law, gender considerate policies, reduction of GBV and enhanced promotion of all human rights.

Indicators of Change

According to the respondents, these are the indicators that desired change has occurred: peace, open democracy and respect of human rights, love, tolerance, and resilience, social coexistence and participatory conflict resolution, change of mindset, enhanced literacy, enhanced living standards and higher levels of saving. As an illustration, a respondent from an NGO focused on women’s rights offered that, “solutions proposed by women for solving conflicts are being implemented and respect the number of women mediators has increased and they are consulted when there are conflict stereotypes about women are being challenged voices of women are being hard.” Another respondent working in a NGO focused on women’s rights stated that, “the first indicator in the peace process is the documented 35% women representation at all levels of leadership which was granted to the women. Secondly, the increase in the number of women

³¹² Buckley, Steve. 2018. “Advocacy Strategies and Approaches: Overview.” May. Accessed November 2020. <https://www.Apc.Org/En/Advocacy-Strategies-And-Approaches-Overview..>


³¹³ Ger Roebeling, Jan De Vries. 2011. Advocacy and Policy Influencing For Social Change. Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations. Accessed November 2020. https://www.Ircwash.Org/Sites/Default/Files/Advocacy_And_Policy_Influencing_Fro_Social_Change.Pdf; P17;

and girls who are coming out openly to report of the violation of their rights and the willingness of the authorities to take action on the reported case is an indication that change is taking place following our initiatives to bring about a change.”

Advocacy Strategy Impact on Change

The respondents were asked to assess whether their advocacy strategy brought the desired change in the communities they are involved with. This is illustrated in Figure 51 below.

Figure 51: Impact of advocacy strategy on change in South Sudan



(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Majority of the respondents (90%) asserted that their advocacy strategies had brought change in the communities considering several indicators such as, achievement of inclusive participation (age, gender and persons with disabilities), better policy formulation for the common good, increased participation in trainings, reduced tensions between individuals and groups, lower levels of illiteracy, positive individual and collective mindset change aligned to culture, environment and livelihoods as well as the positive feedback from the beneficiaries in person. As an illustration one of the respondents from an NGO that focuses on women’s rights stated that, “yes, our strategy has led to change since our messages have been able to reach a wide range of people and they have been challenging stereotypes in the society. The number of people willing to empower women has also increased as many volunteers join us when conducting activities that empower women.”

Needed Support Assessment




Figure 52: Needed support assessment in South Sudan

(Source: CRTP Research Findings)

Majority of the respondents (40%) pointed to a need for immersive outreaches to bridge the gap between the advocacy resources held and those missing. The remaining respondents identified the need for stronger alliances (30%) and a greater involvement in research (30%).



CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions from the study based on the objectives set by the research.

Conclusion

The study explored the intervention methods used by Faith-Based Organizations, CSOs and other peace structures in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan. Based on the four objectives set by this research, here are the conclusions from the study.

The study concluded that FBOs, CSOs and other faith structures in the four targeted countries operate on diverse fronts in order to resolve conflict in the communities they are involved with. As for the theory of change, all the respondents indicated that having a particular TOC that guided their interventions although there was sometimes a need to adapt to the ever-changing contextual dynamics in the communities they are involved with. For the most part, the respondents pointed at being satisfied with the intervention strategies used by their organizations, however, they did not rule out the possibility of recalibrating their approaches for more effective outcomes.

The study concludes that religious leaders are held in high esteem and are credible in the communities. Indeed, this is due to the historical involvement of religious leaders in the resolution of conflicts and peacebuilding activities as they provide social services such as education and health that the government fail to provide in some instances. In addition to this, religion carries with it the moral principles that promote harmonious cohabitation, tolerance, respect and compassion towards others.

The research also established that although religious leaders participate and include many actors in peacebuilding, they tend not to put much emphasis on promoting women in political decision making especially in the case of DRC, Kenya and South Sudan. It would be beneficial to conduct further studies into assessing the factors impeding the support from religious leader in the engagement of women in political decision making.

Although most of the respondents agreed that religious leaders and institutions cooperate with CSOs and other peace structures on resolving a number of social issues such as social cohesion and women's inclusion, the respondents suggested that conflicts of interest, lack of coordination and differences in ideology were among the main prevailing factors preventing collaboration between these organizations.

The study also concludes that the participation of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the targeted countries is still subject to the constraints of deeply rooted cultural stereotypes and gender role allocations in many communities. The advent of the UNSCR 1325 boosted the initiatives aimed at promoting the inclusion of women in peacebuilding as they have shown a great capacity to foster and stimulate the brokering of peace accords in the targeted countries. Although some aspects of the resolution have been adopted in constitutions such as the 30 % quota in elected positions, the resolution still suffers from a lack of commitment from governments and a lack of sufficient vulgarization.

The study concludes that the advocacy strategies used by the respondents' organizations brought about the desired effects. Indeed, these advocacy strategies included a wide range of activities varying from awareness creation sessions, community trainings, lobbying and workshops all aimed at enhancing the knowledge of the community on effective practices for peace and policy change for multidimensional development. However, the study also shows

that in order to bridge the gap between advocacy resources held by those organizations and those missing, these organizations need to take a multidimensional approach incorporating the creation of stronger alliances, a deeper involvement with communities, better vulgarization on social media and further initiatives in research and documenting the contextual settings in which they operate.

Recommendations

Regular mapping of CSOs and peace structures should be encouraged to enhance the scarce documentation available on the functioning of peace institutions in Africa as a continent that still experiences protracted conflicts and its consequences such as mass loss of human life, poverty and injustice.

Faith-Based Organizations should work toward enhancing their cooperation in order to conduct joint actions aimed at bettering the lives of the communities they are involved with.

FBOs, CSOs and other peace structures should work together towards the advancement of women's agenda especially the UNSCR 1325 in terms of inclusion and active participation in decision making structures.

Governments should sign national level peace contracts and commitments. This could include National Peace Action Plans with specified time lines to guarantee and ensure support for women and youths' full participation in positions of leadership and the peace process. These commitments should be fully resourced, they should be developed and implemented in collaboration with civil society, be systematic, inclusive and should also embrace regular reviews and evaluation.

Women's organizations and civil society should promote strong and sustainable peace networks at the rural and community level. These organizations predominantly operate in urban settings and greater efforts must be taken to access rural and community-based women's organizations.



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APPENDICES

APPENDICES

Appendix A: English Questionnaire

Section A: Demographic data

1. Gender: Male ☐ Female ☐

Country

2. How long have you been working on conflict and peace initiatives in the region? Kindly tick (✓) the appropriate answer.

☐ Less than a year ☐ 1- 9 years

☐ 10 - 21 years ☐ Above 21 years

3. What type of organization do you work for?

☐ Community Based Organization (CBO)

☐ Civil Society Organization (CSO)

☐ Faith-Based Organization (FBO)

☐ Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)

☐ International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO)

☐ Other (specify)

.....

Section B: Theory of Change

4. What issues do your organization address?

☐ Poverty alleviation

☐ Children's rights

☐ Interreligious Dialogue

☐ Women's Human rights

☐ Psychosocial support

☐ Research and Training

☐ Humanitarian Support

☐ Gender Based violence

☐ Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

☐ Other (s)

specify_____

5. How does your organization address these issues?
.....
.....

6. What kind of social change do you hope to see through the intervention of your activities?
.....
.....

7. What specific values inform your approach to resolving the contextual problems in your location?
.....
.....

8. What would you consider to be the theory of change behind your strategy of intervention?
.....
.....

9. What are the indicators that your desired change has taken place?
.....
.....

10. Have you had to change or adapt your theory of change?
[] Yes [] No [] Uncertain

Please explain your answer above.
.....
.....
.....

Strategy

11. In your opinion, what ways have women been engaged in resolving conflict in the community you are working in? *(Please indicate by ticking (✓) inside the box).*

☐ Negotiation

☐ Mediation

☐ Arbitration

☐ Advocacy campaigns

☐ Lobbying for peace

☐ Policy implementation

☐ Political agitation

☐ Other (s)

specify _____

12. (a) All things considered how satisfied are you with the strategies employed by your organization in peace and conflict intervention? *(Please indicate by ticking (✓) inside the box).*

☐ Very satisfied

☐ Satisfied

☐ Neutral

☐ Dissatisfied

☐ Very Dissatisfied

(b) Could you list areas of possible improvement in your strategy for social change?

.....
.....

13. Please select one of the following key issues listed below and elaborate on how FBOs and CSOs have to work together to address it?

☐ Inter-ethnic relations

☐ Youth inclusion

☐ Inter-religious relations

☐ Social cohesion

☐ Women's participation in leadership

☐ Other (s)

.....
.....

Role of Religious Leaders

14. To what extent do you agree with the statements below about religious leaders. *(Please indicate by ticking (✓) inside the box).*

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Uncertain	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Religious leaders are influential in addressing conflict					
Religious leaders engage and empower women as peacebuilders and peacemakers					
Religious leaders engage women in political decision making					
Religious leaders engage communities in peacebuilding					
Religious leaders collaborate with CSOs					

15. What strategies have religious leaders applied in conflict resolution/transformation in your context?

Kindly explain.

.....

.....

16. How would you rate the level of confidence in religious leaders' ability to address conflicts?

☐ Very high ☐ High ☐ Low ☐ Very low

☐ Don't Know

Kindly explain.

.....

.....

17. Are there any prevailing factors that prevent collaboration among CSOs and FBOs?

☐ Yes ☐ No

Kindly explain.

.....

.....

Gender roles and extent of women’s participation in peacebuilding

18. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.
(Please indicate by ticking (√) inside the box).

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Uncertain	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Women are included in decision making					
Women hold leadership positions					
Men support women in peace and conflict interventions					
Women are actively involved in peacebuilding					
Women are very influential in addressing conflict					

19. How would you rate your organizations work in covering aspects of the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1325 participation pillar?

☐ Very good ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Bad ☐ Very bad
☐ Not applicable

20. In your opinion, what have been the major lessons learnt in implementing activities related to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 participation pillar?

.....

.....

21. To what extent do you agree that cultural perceptions contribute to gender imbalance in peace and conflict interventions

Agree Very Strongly	Agree Strongly	Agree	Uncertain	Disagree	Disagree Strongly	Disagree Very Strongly

Advocacy

22. How do you disseminate your program objectives among the community you are involved with? Kindly explain.

.....

.....

23. What advocacy strategy is your organization using?

Briefly explain.

.....
.....

24. Do you think this advocacy strategy has led to change? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes/no, explain?

.....
.....

25. What support other than financial can help your organization bridge the gap between the advocacy resources you have and those you need and do not have? (*Please indicate by ticking (✓) inside the box*).

☐ Medi

☐ Research

☐ Outreach

☐ Alliances that need to be built

Appendix B: French Questionnaire

Section A: Données démographiques

1. Genre : ☐ Homme ☐ Femme
2. Pays
3. Depuis combien de temps travaillez-vous sur des initiatives du conflit et de paix dans la région? (*Veillez cocher (✓) la réponse appropriée*).
☐ Moins d'un an ☐ 1- 9 ans
☐ 10 - 21 ans ☐ Plus de 21 ans
4. Pour quel type d'organisation travaillez-vous?
☐ Organisation de Base Communautaire (OBC)
☐ Organisation de la Société Civile (OSC)
☐ Organisation Confessionnelle (OC)
☐ Organisation Non Gouvernementale (ONG)
☐ Organisation Internationale Non Gouvernementale (OING)
☐ Autre (s) (précisez)
.....

Section B:

Théorie du changement

5. Quels sont les problèmes qu'aborde votre organisation?
☐ Réduction de la pauvreté ☐ Droit des enfants
☐ Dialogue inter-religieux ☐ Droit Humain des femmes
☐ Soutien psychosocial ☐ Recherche et Formation
☐ Aide Humanitaire ☐ Violence basée sur le genre
☐ Réfugiés et personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays ☐ Autre (s)

Spécifier _____

6. Comment votre organisation aborde-t-elle ces problèmes?

.....
.....

7. Quel genre de changement social espérez-vous voir à travers l'intervention de vos activités?

.....
.....

8. Quelles valeurs spécifiques éclairent votre approche pour résoudre les problèmes contextuels de votre emplacement?

.....
.....

9. Quelle serait selon vous la théorie du changement derrière votre stratégie d'intervention?

.....
.....

10. Quels sont les indicateurs que le changement souhaité a eu lieu?

.....
.....

11. Avez-vous dû changer ou adapter votre théorie du changement?

☐ Oui ☐ Non ☐ Incertain

Veillez expliquer votre réponse ci-dessus.

.....
.....

Stratégie

12. À votre avis, de quelles manières les femmes se sont-elles engagées dans la résolution des conflits dans la communauté dans laquelle vous travaillez? *(Veuillez l'indiquer en cochant (✓) à l'intérieur de la case).*

☐ Négociation

☐ Médiation

☐ Arbitrage

☐ Campagnes de plaidoyer

☐ Couloir de paix

☐ Politique de la mise en œuvre

☐ Agitation politique

☐ Autre (s)

Spécifier _____

13. (a) Tout compte fait, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous satisfait des stratégies employées par votre organisation dans les interventions de paix et de conflit? *(Veuillez l'indiquer en cochant (✓) à l'intérieur de la case).*

☐ Très satisfait

☐ Satisfait

☐ Neutre

☐ Insatisfait

☐ Très insatisfait

(b) Pourriez-vous énumérer les domaines d'amélioration possible dans votre stratégie de changement social?

.....
.....

14. Veuillez sélectionner l'une des questions clés suivantes énumérées ci-dessous et expliquer comment les organisations confessionnelles et les OSC doivent travailler ensemble pour y faire face?

☐ Relations inter-ethniques

☐ Inclusion des jeunes

☐ Relations interreligieuses

☐ Cohésion Sociale

☐ Participation des femmes au leadership

☐ Autre (s)

.....
.....

Rôle des chefs religieux

15. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec les déclarations ci-dessous concernant les chefs religieux. *(Veuillez l'indiquer en cochant (√) à l'intérieur de la case).*

Énoncé	Tout à fait d'accord	D'accord	Incertain	Pas d'accord	Pas du tout d'accord
Les chefs religieux sont influents dans la résolution des conflits					
Les chefs religieux engagent et autonomisent les femmes en tant qu'artisans de consolidation de la paix et du maintien de paix.					
Les chefs religieux engagent les femmes dans la prise de décision politique					
Les chefs religieux engagent les communautés dans la consolidation de la paix					
Les chefs religieux collaborent avec les OSC					

16. Quelles stratégies les chefs religieux ont-ils appliqué dans la résolution / transformation des conflits dans votre contexte?

Veuillez expliquer.

17. Comment évaluez-vous le niveau de confiance et la capacité des chefs religieux à résoudre les conflits?

[] Très élevé [] Faible [] Très faible [] Je ne sais pas

Veuillez expliquer.

18. Existe-t-il des pratiques courantes qui empêchent la collaboration entre les OSC et les OC?

[] Oui [] Non

Veillez expliquer.
.....

Rôles des sexes et degré de participation des femmes à la consolidation de la paix

19. Veuillez indiquer dans quelle mesure vous êtes d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes. (Veuillez l'indiquer en cochant (√) à l'intérieur de la case).

Énoncé	Tout à fait d'accord	D'accord	Incertain	Pas d'accord	Pas du tout d'accord
Les femmes sont incluses dans la prise de décision					
Les femmes occupent des postes de dirigeant					
Les hommes soutiennent les femmes dans les interventions de paix et du conflit					
Les femmes participent activement à la consolidation de la paix					
Les femmes sont très influentes dans la résolution des conflits					

20. Comment évaluez-vous le travail de vos organisations dans la couverture des aspects du pilier de participation de la résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies?

[] Très bon [] Moyen [] Mauvais [] Très mauvais [] Sans objet

21. À votre avis, quels sont les principaux enseignements tirés de la mise en œuvre des activités liées au pilier de participation de la résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies?

.....

.....

22. Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que les perceptions culturelles contribuent au déséquilibre entre les sexes dans les interventions de paix et de conflit

Très fortement d'accord	Fortement d'accord	D'accord	Incertain	Pas d'accord	Pas du tout d'accord fortement	Pas du tout d'accord très fortement

Plaidoyer

23. Comment diffusez-vous les objectifs de votre programme parmi la communauté dans laquelle vous êtes impliqués?

Veuillez expliquer.

.....

.....

24. Quelle stratégie du plaidoyer votre organisation utilise-t-elle?

Expliquez brièvement.

.....

.....

25. Pensez-vous que cette stratégie du plaidoyer a conduit à des changements?

[] Oui [] Non

Si oui /non, veuillez expliquer.

.....

.....

26. Quel soutien autre que financier peut aider votre organisation à combler le fossé entre les ressources de plaidoyer dont vous disposez et celles dont vous avez besoin et dont vous n'avez pas? *(Veuillez l'indiquer en cochant (✓) à l'intérieur de la case).*

☐ Média

☐ Recherche

☐ Sensibilisation

☐ Alliances qui doivent être construites

Appendix C: Interview Guide

Section A: Demographic Information

Please provide the following information by filling in the required data or by putting a check (✓) against the statement that corresponds to your answer.

Interview

I. Place

2. Date

3. Time

Respondent's profile

Name (Optional):

Gender: Male [] Female []

4. How long have you been working on conflict and peace initiatives in the region?
.....

5. What type of organization do you work for?
.....

Section B: Personal insights on Mapping of Regional Faith and CSO Structures

1. What is unique about your organisations interventions?
2. What change is your organisation working towards in its area of focus (*Prompt: specific thematic area, long-term impact of organisation*).
3. What other factors contributed to the outcome of your operations as an organisation?
4. In your experience and knowledge what strategies are employed in your organisation to achieve your long-term vision.
5. In your experience, what challenges has your organisation faced in trying to achieve social change?
6. Are you aware of other organisations engaged in interacting with your organisation in your demographic? (*Prompt: collaboration or lack thereof*).
7. Does the intervention of religious leaders significantly impact the outcomes of peace

(positively or negatively)? *(Prompt: strengths and weaknesses of interventions by religious leaders).*

8. What factors are impediments to the success of your interventions in your area of operation? What do you think would be the most effective way to overcome those impediments?
9. In your view, what can FBOs and CSOs improve on in their intervention to peacebuilding and conflict resolution?
10. How does the involvement of women affect peacebuilding in your context? *(Prompt: number of women in leadership positions, role of women in peacebuilding)*
11. How can we strengthen the role of women in peacebuilding?
12. What advocacy strategies are used by your organisation to transform the conflict?
13. What challenges have you experienced in trying to resolve the conflicts?
14. In your knowledge and experience, what policies need to be implemented for there to be social change?
15. Do you have any other information that you consider relevant to the research?

Thank you for your kind cooperation in the conduct of this study.



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