CONFLICT MONITORING IN AFRICA FOR STRATEGIC INTERVENTION

HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT)

Case Studies of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan

Editor: Elias Opongo, SJ
with **Linus Kawuondi** *and* **Joyce Gakii Raichenah.**

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Artwork by **Infocus Merchandisers**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

1. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War witnessed a rise in the study of armed conflict, including its causes, effects, and much more extensively its mitigation and prevention. The problem of conflict, especially between communities and nations has always been a dominant concern for societies and civilizations.[1] The Second World War (1939-1945) was a turning point in the tolerance of war. It was the largest armed conflict in human history, raging across the world and causing an estimated fifty million military and civilian deaths.[2] This stimulated an awareness of the need to develop preventive strategies to mitigate conflict and its devastating effects. During the Cold War, a bipolar system of world politics emerged along with new contenders for international leadership which included the invention and subsequent proliferation of weapons. Thereafter, the post-cold war period in the 1990s saw the emergence of intra-state conflicts in several nations and increased civil wars. Presently, despite a decline in intra-state conflicts in Africa[3] since the early 2000s, we still have civil conflicts in the Central Africa Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC), Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia and South Sudan, whereas violent extremism has been experienced in Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, among others.[4]

To explore strategies of managing and possibly resolving conflicts, an in-depth analysis of the causes, trends, and manifestations of conflicts is important. Additionally, the psychological and behavioral elements as well as the systematic order of sectarian exclusion that generates conflict needs to be understood. This means that the development and implementation of an appropriate conflict-monitoring tool as a model of conflict analysis is requisite to the peacebuilding discourse. From the conflict monitoring exercise, preventive measures can be considered to ensure that the conflict is transformed and peace restored among the various parties involved. Hence, this project focused on the development of a Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) with the selected sample countries being the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan.

These countries were selected for inclusion in the study because of the following reasons. DRC represents African states that have been experiencing protracted conflicts especially with regard to the competition for natural resources, inter-ethnic conflicts,

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1   J., Burton, & F., Dukes, eds, Conflict: Reading in Management and Resolution, p. 1.
2   E., Roosevelt, World War II (1939-1945), Accessed June &, 2019, url: https://www2.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/world-war-2.cfm.
3   S. A. Rustad, Conflict Trends in Africa, 1989–2018: An Update, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), p. 5.
4   J. Cilliers, Violence in Africa: Trends, Drivers and Prospects to 2023, p. 2.

national boundaries, poor governance, and the multiplication of militia groups. DRC not only has fertile agricultural land and a rich diversity of wildlife but also huge deposits of minerals like copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, uranium, platinum, and palladium amongst others. However, the unending state of violent conflicts that have characterized the country's history remains a major concern of the country.

Ethiopia is the most recent addition to the countries we monitored conflict in 2021. It is a unique case study of the implications of governance structures. Ethiopia is governed by an ethno-federalism model that gives regions considerable independence to the extent of being able to vote to secede.[5]Though this system was set in place to address conflict between regions by giving them a certain extent of independence, it has also been the source of conflict in recent years. Ethiopia will give insights on understanding conflict brought on by tensions of government systems.

Kenya represents other countries across Africa experiencing occasional conflicts and terror attacks. While the country is generally stable and enjoys strong economic performance regionally, it has had numerous overlapping conflicts ranging from ethnic clashes, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), election-related violence, and terrorism. At the core of Kenya's conflicts are issues concerning social fragmentation, negative ethnicity, political animosity, corruption, and impunity. Other issues include land disputes, discrimination, and marginalization, the penetration of Al-Shabaab's ideologies into the country's local politics, and the proliferation of small arms.

Finally, South Sudan has experienced intermittent conflict since it gained its independence in 2011. At the center of South Sudan's conflict is a myriad of factors such as political arrangements for power-sharing, agreements on the number of states, demobilization of the armed forces, and the formation of a government of national unity. Since the 2013 eruption of conflict in South Sudan, there have been several peace agreements between President Salva Kiir's faction and that of his former deputy Riek Machar. Though the peace agreement signed in 2020, brought an end to a five year conflict,[6] implementing the agreement has been slow with fears that widespread conflict would be ignited once again.[7]

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5   Ethiopia's Constitution of 1994, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994.pdf?lang=en (accessed November 18, 1994).
6   Sam Mednick, "Old grudges and empty coffers: South Sudan's precarious peace process," The New Humanitarian, January 21, 2021, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/01/21/south-sudan-peace-deal-violence-famine (November 25, 2021).
7   United Nation, "South Sudan's Transitional Government Must Build on Gains, Speed Up Implementation of Peace Agreement, Mission Head Says in Security Council Briefing," https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14457.doc.htm March 21, 2021.

HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT)

The remaining part of this report is divided into four main sections. The first section deals with the conceptualization of the conflict monitoring tool, followed by an analysis of existing conflict monitoring tools. The second section provides a background of the conflict and peace situations in each of the countries under study. This will be followed by an analysis of the factors that tend to influence the status of peace or conflict. The third section outlines the methodology used in conducting the study. This includes research design, sampling, and data collection strategies, as well as analysis of the data and a systematic explanation of the development and application of the HIPSIR CMT. The final section outlines the diverse areas of concern in the study and some recommendations for action.

Conflict Curve Assessment

In order to monitor conflict levels, the HIPSIR CMT was designed for conflict curve assessment. To accomplish this, a modified version of Lund's Curve was adopted (See Lund's curve in figure 1 below). Lund's curve is elaborate and gives different methods of intervention employed in conflict resolution. In addressing ongoing conflicts, Lund's curve of conflict is a useful tool[8] to indicate the various stages of a conflict. According to Marian Hassan, the conflict curve seeks to achieve seven goals. First, it indicates the stage of a conflict. Second, it points to possible interventions that can be adopted by different actors. Third, it plays an important role in identifying the indicators for conflict early warning. Fourth, it shows five stages of a conflict. Fifth, it assesses how conflict escalates from one stage to another. Sixth, it is ideal for identifying patterns in the conflict. Finally, it shows the increasing or decreasing intensity of a conflict situation.[9]

8   "Curve of Conflict," United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/public-education/students/curve-conflict
9   Marian Hassan, "Conflict Curve/Stages 0f Conflict," *The Peace and Collaborative Development Network (PCDN)*, June 27, 2010. https://pcdnetwork.org/blogs/conflict-curvestages-of-conflict/

Figure 1: Conflict Curve Representing Different Levels of Conflict

(Source: Conflict Curve Representing Different Levels10)

Also, Niklas Swanström and Mikael Weissmann discuss the life cycle of conflict. Noting that conflict is dynamic,[11] it is essential to understand the life cycle of a conflict to know when and how to make a strategic intervention. Once again this highlights the need for a conflict monitoring tool that monitors the conflict cycle to understand how and when to strategically intervene to avoid an escalation of conflict and its (more often than not) devastating consequences. The conflict model is therefore simplified to look like an "upside done U"[12] denoting an ideal conflict cycle that is divided into different phases of a conflict.

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10 Conflict Curve Adopted from United States Institute of Peace, Accessed June 7, 2019, url: https://www.usip.org/public-education/students/curve-conflict.

11 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann. Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and beyond: a conceptual exploration, p. 9.

12 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p. 10.

HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT)

According to Swanström and Weissmann these phases of the conflict are:

Table 1: Stages of Conflict

STAGE OF CONFLICT	DESCRIPTION
Stable peace	Where there exists very little or any tension between parties and there is cooperation between parties, economically, socially, and environmentally. There is also cooperation in non-sensitive areas.
Unstable peace	Presence of negative peace and increased tensions between parties.
Open Conflict	Whereby the conflict has been identified and conflict parties are ready to engage in the conflict, even if militarized options have not been adopted.[13]
Crisis	Militarized options are preferred, sporadic acts of violence and the eventuality of war is imminent.
War	Intense, widespread violent conflict.

(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005, p. 11)

While the five stages present an escalation of conflict, according to Swanstrom and Weissmann for the de-escalation of conflict the progression is reversed, till the situation arrives back at stable peace.

The conflict curve is as below:

Figure 2: The Conflict Cycle

(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005, p. 13)

13 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p.11.

Swanström and Weissmann also acknowledge that this conflict curve is idealistic as conflict does not always follow such a predictable progression; because of its dynamic nature, each conflict situation adopts its unique conflict curve. They, therefore, highlight various scenarios that could characterize a conflict cycle.

1. To begin with a conflict can re-occur over time, "and pass through the different stages over and over again."[14] It thus takes on the form of a wave as below:

Figure 3: Conflict Curve A

(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005, p. 15)

2. Secondly, the above conflict wave does not occur predictably as indicated. In reality, they highlight, a conflict can re-escalate at any phase of the conflict curve.[15] Indeed what is usually observed is that a conflict will often reoccur between the crisis and war phases, either because crisis management breaks down or conflict resolution strategies adopted are not effective. The conflict curve is as below:

Figure 4: Conflict Curve B

(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005, p. 15)

3. Third, a conflict situation sometimes gets entrenched between the escalation phases of open conflict and crisis never reaching the level of war. Such conflicts are usually left

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14 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p. 15.
15 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p. 15-16.

HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT)

without a concrete resolution making them prone to further escalation in the future. The conflict curve would therefore look like this:

Figure 5: Conflict Curve C

(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005, p. 16)

4. Swanstrom and Weissmann also point out that sometimes, conflicts will waver between unstable peace, open conflict, and crisis. Somewhat similar to the previous example, while the conflict may not fully escalate to war, it usually remains unresolved over a long period as shown below.

Figure 6: Conflict Curve D

(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005, p. 16)

Finally, they also hold that conflicts can also occur concurrently, meaning that during a specific time and space multiple conflicts driven by diverse issues can be occurring side by side.[16] This is illustrated by the conflict curve below:

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16 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p. 17.

Figure 7: Conflict Curve E

(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005, p. 17)

Also, in other instances there could be a core conflict with smaller (sub) conflicts occurring alongside it, each of these sub conflicts would have its conflict cycles.[17] Once again this complicates the conflict curve. Such a conflict situation would be indicated with the model below:

Figure 8: Conflict Curve F

(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005, p. 17)

Therefore their point is that conflict is not neatly simplified and consequently it does not follow a predictable progression as imagined by the conflict curve. Nonetheless, a conflict curve is useful in indicating trends. Understanding the conflict curve and the various phases that a conflict progresses through is integral to the monitoring of conflict and consequently informs the intervention and resolution strategies to be employed to effectively mitigate and eventually resolve a conflict to realize stable (positive) peace. Therefore over time, having successfully monitored conflict in the region periodically, the HIPSIR CMT will be in a position to represent various conflict scenarios with the use of the conflict curve.

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17 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p. 17.

The HIPSIR CMT conflict curve is therefore an innovation combining the concept of a conflict curve as detailed by Michael Lund and Swanstrom and Weissmann and the levels of conflict as detailed by Marian Hassan in Table 2. The conflict curve from Swanstrom and Weissmann indicates five stages of a conflict, namely: stable peace, unstable peace, open conflict, crisis, and war, while Lund's curve indicates three stages of conflict i.e. peace, conflict, and war.[18] However, the HIPSIR CMT chose to use the levels of conflict as detailed by Marian Hassan. This is because they indicate escalation and de-escalation levels of conflict thus making it easier to identify indicators that describe each level of conflict clearly. Having clear indicators to describe each level of conflict is important as this would ensure having a clear understanding of what level a conflict situation might be at a given point in time. Subsequently, this identification would inform what intervention strategies to be applied.

The second innovation is that the HIPSIR CMT has a numerical scale of measuring conflict levels, unlike Lund's and Swanstrom and Weissmann's models. This scale was developed through a rigorous process of selecting measurable indicators of conflict and statistical calculations that were tested over time to ascertain their accuracy in measuring conflict levels. Conflict level or the severity of a conflict, according to the HIPSIR CMT, is measured on a scale ranging from negative two (-2) and positive three (+3). In this case, the CMT has six levels that are statistically calculated using 34 indicators of conflict (see Appendix). These levels and their respective numerical denotation are explained below.

Table 2: Level of Conflict under HIPSIR CMT

Conflict Level	Description
Peace **(0)**	At this stage, there is no conflict whatsoever.
Latent **(1)**	This level is characterized by incompatible goals between one or more parties but hidden from the public. If not identified early and proper intervention not taken to address the causes of the tension, a confrontation occurs.[19]
Confrontation **(2)**	At this stage, the conflict is more open. There could be intolerance that may lead to confrontational behavior. If no interventions take place, the situation may become polarized leading to a crisis.[20]
Crisis **(3)**	At this level, there is war or open conflict.

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18 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p. 11.

19 Marian Hassan, "Conflict Curve/Stages 0f Conflict," *The Peace and Collaborative Develo*pment Network (PCDN), June 27, 2010, https://pcdnetwork.org/blogs/conflict-curvestages-of-conflict/

20 Marian Hassan, "Conflict Curve/Stages 0f Conflict," *The Peace and Collaborative Development Network* (PCDN), June 27, 2010, https://pcdnetwork.org/blogs/conflict-curvestages-of-conflict/

Conflict Level	Description
Outcome (-2)	Either one party in the conflict is defeated. Also, there may be an intervention from a third party that leads to a ceasefire. It may also occur when the conflict is ripe for intervention and all parties are tired and ready for dialogue. The force of the government could also lead to an outcome.
Post Conflict (-1)	When the issues are finally resolved and relationships normalize. If the cause of the incompatible goals among the parties is not addressed, the tension can occur and revert to pre-conflict or confrontation stages.

(Source: Marian Hassan)

In some instances, many issues of a cycle of conflict are not fully addressed and this sets the stage for a subsequent conflict. A similar situation may also occur if state machinery is generally weak and not able to enforce enduring peace. The result is usually another outbreak of war. The HIPSIR CMT conflict curve is shown in the figure below.

Figure 9: HIPSIR CMT Conflict Curve

(Source: CRTP Research)

Conceptualization of Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT)

The development of the HIPSIR CMT was based on the theory of change, which "explains how a given intervention, or set of interventions, are expected to lead to specific development change, drawing on a causal analysis based on available evidence."[21] The key indicators show that the tool is set to monitor phenomena that are

21 Corlazzoli, Vanessa. White, Jonathan. Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security, and Justice

consistently observed, signaling if the conflict will be escalating or deescalating. This can be explained by the fact that each indicator plays a certain role in the development of a conflict situation. Consequently, each actor reacts in a certain manner whenever a change in each of the indicators of measuring conflict level changes, which determines how the conflict situation unfolds. In response to such changes, peace practitioners are expected to intervene to deescalate the conflict. Theories of change are envisioned to be helpful and practical.

The HIPSIR CMT seeks to generate information by monitoring conflicts to disseminate it to peace practitioners within each specific conflict situation monitored. The consumers of the information are expected to help restore peace across the continent to improve the economic, social, cultural, and political conditions of the people. In this case, the HIPSIR CMT seeks to promote peace by monitoring key indicators that point to concerns that would need attention. By doing so, measures can be taken based on the information provided to prevent an escalation of conflict.[22] In-depth analysis, consideration of stakeholders' views, and lessons drawn from previous and existing peacebuilding efforts shall drive the theory of change within the context of the HIPSIR CMT. From the understanding of the situation and context of conflict, an institution or country can develop a theory of change that addresses the drivers of conflict and seeks sustainable solutions to the problem.

According to Babbitt, Chigas, and Wilkinson. (2013):

> A theory of change explains why we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context. It is intended to make all of our implicit assumptions more explicit, in order to (1) clarify which drivers of violent conflict we are addressing; (2) state clearly what the intended outcome of programs will be; and (3) fully articulate how and why the program will address the drivers of conflict and achieve its intended outcomes.[23]

The theory of change is appropriate in understanding conflicts in Africa that are complex due to the numerous drivers and actors involved. Such an approach helps in the identification of actors-centered solutions to address the drivers of conflict effectively by leveraging comparative advantages throughout the change process. Moreover, the theory not only identifies the assumptions made, but it also addresses the possible risks that may undermine peace efforts. In this case, changing the highly dynamic conflict situation in

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Programmes: Part II: Using Theories of Change in Monitoring and Evaluation. DFID: Department for International Development, 2013.
22 Ibid
23 Babbitt, Eileen, Diana Chigas and Robert Wilkinson. (March 2013). Theories and indicators of change briefing paper concepts and primers for conflict management and mitigation. United States Agency for International Development.

Africa requires constant spatial and temporal analysis of indicators and their relationship for actors to intervene effectively. This is the only way that actors can make positive contributions to de-escalating conflicts across the continent.

The theory promotes learning within as well as between conflict cycles, which is one of the main objectives for monitoring conflict using the conflict curve. Each cause of conflict is well articulated using the theory of change before assumptions are made concerning any proposed peacebuilding strategies that are expected to promote peace. Over time, the assumptions shall be tested against all the evidence that shall be gathered using the CMT. This includes successes and failures of past peace interventions, which seeks to ensure that the logic for promoting peace is sound. If such interventions fail or perform dismally, the theory of change seeks to help actors make the necessary corrections on time. According to Babbitt, Chigas, and Wilkinson (2013), "new learning and lessons from monitoring and evaluation help refine assumptions and inform decisions on how an approach should be adapted to deliver planned results."[24] This forms the basis for monitoring conflict and providing information to peace practitioners across Africa. The HIPSIR tool, grounded in the theory of change, can be adjusted to accommodate other indicators whenever circumstances change.[25]

Monitoring conflict is important because it acts as the basis for bringing the opinions of all actors together to develop peacebuilding strategies that are more likely to succeed. The theory of change explains how partnership networks as well as partnership strategies can be managed. It supports consensus building through the engagement of all actors. In this case, it encourages various actors to understand how the contributions of each other can be tailored towards achieving sustainable peace. The HIPSIR CMT will achieve this by helping all stakeholders in peacebuilding projects to understand as well as support each other's contributions to the implementation of peacebuilding efforts. This is based on the premise that strengthening collaboration to achieve sustainable peace cannot be achieved without a proper understanding of the conflict situation and collaborative efforts. The HIPSIR CMT is therefore meant to help organizations and individuals in defining what contribution they should make in peacebuilding besides seeking support from other stakeholders on the implementation of peacebuilding strategies.[26]

On realizing the need to bring together all actors through the creation of a platform for gathering and sharing of information, the Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and

24 Corlazzoli, Vanessa. White, Jonathan, 2013
25 Babbitt, Eileen, Diana Chigas and Robert Wilkinson. (March 2013). Theories and indicators of change briefing paper concepts and primers for conflict management and mitigation. United States Agency for International Development.
26 Corlazzoli, Vanessa. White, Jonathan, 2013

International Relations (HIPSIR) therefore developed a conflict monitoring tool (CMT) also known as the HIPSIR CMT. Through its development, the HIPSIR CMT seeks to contribute to the practice of conflict monitoring in Africa by fostering cooperation in generating information from Africa and by Africa at all levels of the society. The use of the HIPSIR CMT will allow for a broader identification of the causes of conflict and propositions on possible ways of resolving conflicts. Following its development, the HIPSIR CMT is one of the numerous existing tools. Some of the existing conflict monitoring tools and data sources are discussed below.

Existing Tools for Conflict Monitoring

The *Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)* is majorly involved in conducting "research on the conditions for peaceful relations between states, groups, and people."[27] Its emphasis is on understanding issues that either unite societies or split them. Some of the issues that PRIO investigates include how conflicts emerge, their effects on people, how societies respond to them, and how to resolve them.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been in existence since 1966. Its main aim is "to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament."[28] To achieve this, it constantly collects data from open sources, analyses it, and uses the results to make recommendations. Consequently, it is significantly involved in the policy analysis where it makes recommendations to parliamentarians, diplomats, journalists, and other experts in the field of security.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is a Swedish based conflict monitoring tool and data source.[29] It has been providing event-based data on violence for over 40 years. It relies on information from news reports that it codes before entering into the system. It controls data quality by conducting a post-estimation validation exercise.

The Global Peace Operations Review is a US-based tool that was created in 1966. It "covers more than one hundred multilateral active peace operations." [30] It is based on the assumption that while peace operations are of great need, there is a need to adjust to the dynamics of conflicts. It also emphasizes the use of operations of peace enforcement that does not exclude deployment of military force when necessary.

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27 "About," PRIO, https://www.prio.org/About/
28 "Home," Sipri, https://www.sipri.org/
29 "About," UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/
30 "About," Global Peace Operations Review, https://peaceoperationsreview.org/

The Human Security Report Project (HSRP) is similar to SIPRI and PRIO in that it is a research center that was developed in Canada to "track global and regional trends in organized violence, especially because of terrorism and warfare."[31] Through its researchers, HSRP prepares online publications documenting global trends of conflict and violence. Its data on security statistics are dated back to as early as 1946.

The Institute for Economics and Peace is not only known for developing metrics for peace analysis but also its quantification of the economic value of the same.[32] In other words, it focuses on four study areas: measuring peace, positive peace, the economics of peace, and understanding risk. It releases the Global Peace Index annually that "measures national peacefulness, ranking 163 countries according to their levels of peace."[33] It collects at least 5000 data sets concerning eight factors that it uses to measure positive peace besides acting as a guide for overcoming conflicts and promoting lasting peace. It relies on data on 13 types of costs incurred on issues related to conflict to compute the economic valuation of violence as well as fear. Furthermore, the institute measures violence risks using data that it has been collecting since 1996.

Conflict Alert[34] is a system of monitoring conflict that tracks and reports violent incidences, their causes, as well as their human costs in the Philippines. Its development in 2015 was based on two databases. It makes a regional comparison of conflict situations with an intention "to shape policymaking, development strategies, and peacebuilding approaches by providing relevant, robust, and reliable conflict data."[35] Its data sources include incident reports from police offices, news reports, and members of multi-stakeholder validation groups (MSVGs). Once the data is collected, it is sorted, encoded, validated, and analyzed. The information is disseminated in the form of charts, graphs, tables, and mapped locational context.

Based in the USA, *the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)* "is a disaggregated conflict collection, analysis, and crisis mapping project. ACLED collects the dates, actors, types of violence, locations, and fatalities of all reported political violence and protest events across Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, Latin America, and the Caribbean, and Southeastern and Eastern Europe and the Balkans." [36] It identifies various forms of

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31 "Human security report project," http://www.csbsju.edu/documents/peace studies/human security report project. docx
32 "About," Institute of Economics and Peace, http://economicsandpeace.org/about/
33 "About," Institute of Economics and Peace, http://economicsandpeace.org/about/
34 "Conflict Alert," Conflict Alert, http://conflictalert.info/about/
35 "Conflict Alert," Conflict Alert, http://conflictalert.info/about/
36 "About," ACLED, https://www.acleddata.com/about-acled/

conflict across the world, the actors involved, historical documentation of political violence as well as protests that occur in many countries across the world.

Good Governance Africa established in 2012 seeks to improve governance in Africa for the betterment of its citizens. It is a "research and advocacy non-profit organization with centers across Africa focused solely on improving governance across the continent."[37] One of its tools related to conflict, is their Conflict in Africa Monitor (CAM). Their conflict monitoring tool is "designed to track and analyse major conflict hotspots across the continent, with the objective of providing decision makers with the data and tools necessary to develop informed policy solutions to mitigate or end political violence and conflict."[38]

The Kivu Security Tracker (KST), which is based in the US, was developed in 2017 "to map violence by state security forces and armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo to better understand trends, causes of insecurity and serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law."[39] Just like the Conflict Alert Tool, the KST reports violent incidences that armed groups and security forces perpetuate.[40] Trained researchers collect the data daily after which it is entered into a database. They also review media reports, exchange information with other organizations, and verify the information before publishing reports.[41]

Table 3: Summary of Conflict Monitoring Tools and Data Sources

Date	Name	Country	Scope
1980s	Uppsala Conflict Data Program	Sweden	Global
2011	ACLED	USA	Global
2011	Conflict Alert	Philippines	Philippines
2017	The Kivu Security Tracker	USA	Eastern Congo
1959	Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)	Norway	Global
1966	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)	Sweden	Global
2005?	Human Security Index Project	Canada	Global
1990s	Global Peace Operations Review (under CIC)	USA	Global
2012	Good Governance Africa	South Africa	Africa
2007	Institute of Economics and Peace (Global Peace Index)	Australia	Global

(Source: CRTP Research)

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37 https://gga.org/about-us/
38 https://gga.org/africa-digital-databank/conflict-in-africa-monitor/#governance-barometer
39 "Kivu Security Tracker," Kivu Security Tracker, https://kivusecurity.org/about/project
40 "Methodology," Kivu Security Tracker, https://kivusecurity.org/static/KST_Methodology_Nov2017.pdf
41 "Methodology," Kivu Security Tracker, https://kivusecurity.org/static/KST_Methodology_Nov2017.pdf

Having reviewed the aforementioned tools and data sources HIPSIR CMT comes in as an additional tool that adds value to conflict monitoring, particularly in Africa. Additionally, HIPSIR combines both secondary gathering of data with qualitative research by relying on key informant interviews. This approach gives voice to people closely related to the conflict situations, while at the same time it triangulates and validates the information collected from newsprint and other popular media sources.

Review of Conflict in in DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan

Unresolved conflict is detrimental to the well-being and development of citizens and a country. Cyclic conflict in the DRC, Kenya, and South Sudan is a major concern for citizens, the states and ultimately affect the socio-political stability of the regions. To address these conflicts appropriately, there is a need for constant and reliable analysis of conflict situations in order to plan adequate responses or preventive measures where necessary. Regular analysis is vital for creating good strategies for local and regional responses to conflict. This section provides a contextual analysis of literature on the three countries by giving historical and the most recent background to the conflict and peace situation.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Violent conflicts within the DRC have been recorded from the 19th century onward when King Leopold II acquired the vast territory along the Congo basin as his personal property and exploited its natural resources. He named it the Congo Free State. However, Leopold's methods of subjugating the indigenous population were so brutal that the Belgian government (in response to an international outcry) took over the territory re-naming it Belgian Congo in 1908. Belgian colonization continued the exploitation of the people and the land. Eventually, a Congolese uprising led to independence in 1960. However, the country immediately fell into a crisis and conflict over competition for political leadership. As a result, there was armed violence, coups, and secession attempts leading to numerous deaths. The crisis ended in 1965 with a coup d'état led by Joseph-Desire Mobutu who later became president and created a highly centralized government.

Mobutu's reign has been described as a 'kleptocracy' characterized by a patronage system of buying loyalty with bribes and amassing wealth from public funds and resources. In as much as there was relative political stability during his regime, significant human rights

violations were reported and the country's economy was severely affected. With the end of the cold war the West, especially the United States, no longer supported him, and they called for democratic reforms within the country, as did the citizens who had become disillusioned with his regime. Subsequently, in 1996 Laurent Kabila, with support from the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, launched a military offensive from Eastern Congo and reached the capital by May of the same year. His march towards Kinshasa was followed by reports of atrocities meted out on the civilian population. This conflict was known as the First Congo War. However, by 1998 when Kabila asked the Rwandans and Ugandans to leave the country, a conflict was ignited that went on to trigger the second Congo war from 1998-2003. This conflict also referred to as 'Africa's World War,' is often regarded as the genesis of the DRC's ongoing conflict. The war was fought between Kabila's government with support from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Chad against the RDC (Rally for Congolese Democracy), RDC-Goma, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, among other parties. To a great extent, the instability in the DRC plays out in the instability within the great lakes region. In 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son Joseph Kabila replaced him as president. In 2002, the ensuing, "July 2002 Pretoria Accord (known as the Sun City Agreement) between Rwanda and Congo, as well as the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and Congo, put an official end to the war as the transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo took power in July 2003."

Although the Second Congo War ended in 2003, it had set the stage for subsequent violent conflicts in the country which have continued to date, especially in the Eastern regions of the country. There has been a multiplication of rebel groups over the years, culminating into five main conflicts: the 2012-2013 M23 attacks backed by Rwanda; the Kivu Conflict between the DRC army (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo - FARDC) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Ituri ethnic conflict between the Lendu and Hema ethnic groups who have had historical differences over many years. In reality, the second Congo war brought in arms and increased grievances between the two communities. The fourth was the Kasai conflict between the army and customary chiefs in Kasai-Central Province in 2016-2017 while the fifth is characterized by multiple armed groups that remain active in the east. These armed groups have been responsible for the deaths of citizens, sexual and gender-based violence, abductions looting, and the displacements of people. In conclusion, as a report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) highlights,

Today's conflicts in the country are, to a large extent, a reincarnation of those of the

past. This indicates that the structural causes of the conflicts have not been adequately addressed. Thus, even apparent episodes of peace, such as under the Mobutu regime in parts of the 1970s and the 1980s, were achieved not by successful peacemaking, but through repression of popular discontent.

On 30th December 2018 the DRC held its presidential elections which brought about its first peaceful transfer of power from President Joseph Kabila to President Felix Tshisekedi given its turbulent post-colonial history. Although some armed groups contested and interfered with the elections, there has been a significant number of armed groups willing to surrender since the inauguration of President Tshisekedi. The willingness to demobilize is driven by some factors such as a new change of government, exhaustion, disillusionment, and FARDC operations against them. Even so, the DRC remains insecure as a result of the widespread presence of numerous local and foreign armed groups.

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) led by Seka Musa is active and has regrouped and enhanced its capacity in the Beni-Butembo region in North Kivu. In 2019, the group carried out attacks on civilians and security forces, recruited and used children in combat and attacks, and engaged in sexual violence and forced marriages. Former ADF abductees and ex-combatants indicate that the armed group (ADF) has varied names associated with it such as ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic Forces – National Army for the Liberation of Uganda), NALU (National Army for the Liberation of Uganda), and Madina at Tawhid Wai Muwahedeen (MTM) with the group's largest recruitment network stationed in Uganda. The ADF is reported to have carried out nearly 30 attacks within three months (between 17th March 2020 and 16th June 2020), in which at least 89 civilians lost their lives. In 2020, activity from the ADF has continued against civilians, the FARDC and Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) in Beni. From these attacks it appears that Congolese security is wanting and consequently citizens have resorted to mob justice of suspected ADF members to mete out justice. At other times mob justice has led to the death of innocent citizens confused for ADF members. For example on December 26, 2020, villagers in Bolongo killed two FARDC soldiers and one of their wives as they were mistakenly identified as ADF members.

The Conseil National pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie (CNRD) is a foreign armed group active in North and South Kivu, however, there exist tensions over control of territory with other armed groups, namely, the Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové

(NDC-R) and Nyatura armed groups. Operating in North Kivu, NDC-R bases its administration on imposed taxation and forced labor, and absorption of combatants from other armed groups.

Résistance pour un État de Droit (RED) - Tabara is a Burundian armed group operational in South Kivu and has progressively moved from the DRC into Burundi. The group consists of Burundian citizens, including former FDN (armed forces of Burundi) defectors who joined the group after a failed coup d'état in Burundi in mid-May 2015. The group is reported to be receiving financial support from contacts in Burundi and undisclosed countries in Europe. Apart from the RED-Tabara armed group, there are two other Burundian armed groups active in the DRC: Forces Nationales de Libération-Nzabampema (FNL-Nzabampema), and renegade soldiers of the failed coup d'état of 2015 in Burundi. Despite the denial of foreign military occupation by the Government of Burundi, the FDN is reported to have carried out incursions into Congolese territory against Burundian armed groups Burundi is among DRC's neighboring countries and alongside Rwanda, Zambia, South Sudan, Angola has been condemned for conducting foreign military incursions in the DRC.

An upsurge in violence has been experienced since September 2019 between communities backed by armed groups in Minembwe, Uvira Territory causing a deteriorating security and humanitarian situation. Intercommunal conflicts between the Twa and Bantu militias in Nyuzu territory have led to the deaths of over 100 civilians since January 2020. Other armed groups in DRC include Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo libre et Souverain (APCLS), Mai-Mai armed group coalition, Ngomino, and Twigwaneho armed groups. Armed groups in DRC continue to thrive through illegal production and trade of natural mineral resources, loopholes in monitoring the exploitation of natural resources, and the widespread proliferation of weapons and ammunition.

The fight against corruption is key in President Tshisekedi's agenda such that he called upon all government ministers to declare their assets to the constitutional court. Vital Kamerhe, the Chief of Staff of the President and leader of the Union pour la Nation Congolaise, was detained on 8 April 2020 on embezzlement of about $51.2 million, a charge he denies. The money was earmarked for the President's 100-day program. Despite jubilation from some CSOs that welcomed the arrest as a milestone in the fight against corruption, a section of the 16 National Assembly deputies drawn from Kamerhe's party decried the arrest and detention of their party leader. This included his

supporters holding protests over his allegedly politically motivated arrest and sentencing. On June 20, 2020, Vital Kamerhe was sentenced to 20 years in prison with hard labour. He however, appealed his sentence and on June 17 2021it was reduced to 13 years.

Although the opposition in DRC has participated in the country's political process without interference from the government's security services, some members of the governing coalition are already involved in the politics of the next general elections.

Currently, there are concerns about increasing domestic violence due to confinement measures related to COVID-19. Also, the human rights situation in the DRC remains of concern. For instance, a United Nations Security Council report on the DRC noted that "the security situation in the highlands worsened considerably and was characterized by tit-for-tat militia attacks against civilians." These incidences included deaths and injuries to civilians.

An existing border dispute between the DRC and Zambia flared up and has been ongoing since mid-March 2020 with a build-up of troops reported from both nations around Moba territory. Several soldiers from DRC were killed in sporadic clashes with their Zambian counterparts. The two governments have displayed a willingness to address the dispute and deflate the tensions through diplomacy by calling upon the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to act as a mediator and agreeing to dispatch a technical team for the peaceful resolution of the dispute.

After 60 years of independence, Congolese remain uncertain on political and democratic stability. Generally, the peaceful transition of power presented a ray of hope for sustainable peace, stability, and development in a country that has been marred by cyclic violence. The willingness by armed groups to demobilize presents an opportunity for the restoration of peace and security in the DRC. However, the implementation of the demobilization process has been delayed mainly due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Furthermore, during the June to September 2020 period, in as much as most of the country has enjoyed relative reprieve from armed conflict, security in the Eastern region of the country remains worrying especially because of the proliferation of armed groups who have continued to compete over territory and natural resources. For example, the United Nations Security Council 2020 DRC country report for September 2020, notes that in North Kivu "The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) documented at least 107 incidents attributable to

armed groups, in which 67 civilians were killed (34 men, 23 women, and 10 children) and 73 were injured (40 men, 20 women, and 13 children) across the province." Thus indicating the extent of damage both to lives, property, and livelihoods of the citizens. In December 2020, Mr. Tshisekedi announced a departure from his coalition with that of the former president Joseph Kabila. The move aimed at, "ending the crisis caused by nearly two years of tension with his coalition partner, the Common Front for Congo (FCC) of former president Joseph Kabila." These political developments risk increasing tensions in the country and constitute a significant security threat to a country that is yet to successfully resolve conflict, especially in the Eastern region.

In 2021, while the COVID-19 pandemic has continued to spread throughout the continent including DRC violence has continued within the Eastern region of the country, especially in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces. For instance, in a UN Security Council report states that since, December (2020), (till March 2021) ADF in (the North Kivu province) has conducted 44 attacks in Beni territory, resulting in the killing of 178 civilians, including 48 women and 2 boys." The security situation in the Northern region of the country has raised security concerns in the country and left citizens wary of the government's ability to guarantee their security. Several security incidents demonstrate this:

In February 2021, armed groups continued with attacks in Ituri, North and South Kivu, leading to at least 88,000 people fleeing to safe zones to avoid armed groups. In addition to this killings and kidnappings were reported in the same regions. Within the same month on February 22nd 2021, the Italian Ambassador to the DRC, another Italian official and Congolese WFP worker were killed in an attack on a UN convoy near Goma. While more than 100 armed groups operate in the Eastern region of the country, where the attack took place, many speculated that the attacks were carried out by the ADF. Three months into the year, conflict erupted in the greater Kasai region between the Lendu and Kuba tribes leading to renewed violence killing at least 13 people injuring many more and leading to the displacement of at least 40,00 people. As is often the case women and children bore the brunt of this conflict.

On May 22, 2021, Mt. Nyiragongo close to Goma erupted causing chaos that left 32 people dead, while destroying at least 36,029 homes and 400,000 people fleeing to Rwanda and nearby Sake, Rutchuru and Minova. Of particular concern was a large number of unaccompanied children who had been separated from family. Poor hygiene in displacement areas led to an outbreak of cholera, with 3201 cases and 86 deaths. The

region is yet to fully recover from the impact of the volcanic eruption.

In August, President Tshisekedi announced that he had authorized US special forced to assist the FARDC to combat the ADF which has been responsible for much of the violence in the Eastern region. It has also been classified as a terrorist group by the USA. The operation was slated to last for several weeks and was specifically targeted at combating the ADF. According the Catholic Church the group had been responsible for killing at least 6,000 civilians since 2013, while the Kivu Security tracker stated that from 2017, the group had killed more than 1200 civilians.

In September 2021, a UNHCR reported that most of the attacks I Eastern DRC had been perpetuated by the ADF. The UNCHR thus recorded "more than 1,200 civilian deaths and 1,100 rapes in 2021 in the two most affected provinces of North Kivu and Ituri. The agency says ferocious attacks have driven more than one million Congolese in the eastern part of the country from their homes this year alone." The organization also reported that the viciousness and magnitude of the attacks (by the ADF) have reached a level not seen before. These reports demonstrate that conflict in the Eastern region of the country continues unabated and has profoundly impacted citizens and the overall social fabric of the region. Between October and November 2021, Uganda experienced bomb attacks which the ADF claimed responsibility. With eth authority of the Congolese government the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) entered Eastern DRC in pursuit of the ADF. In January 2022, the UPDF tabled a budget of Ush89.7 billion ($25.6 million), indicating an intended longer stay for the army in DRC.

According to the HIPSIR CMT study (2019), the conflict in the DRC was attributed to the poor distribution of natural resources and corruption. The presence of these aspects is largely linked to complaints of economic hardships and high poverty levels in the country, which recorded a weighted mean of 2.04. Also, the acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors and the presence of demonstrations and riots were reported as dominant factors in DRC, with each indicator's mean ranked at 1.85. Conflict crisis in the country is indicated by displacements of citizens and the presence of deployed peacekeeping personnel (MONUSCO), with weighted means of 1.95 and 1.91 respectively. On the other hand, CMT-2020 revealed that DRC had a conflict level of 1.04. This was lower than the conflict level in 2019. In 2020, respondents indicated that the biggest challenge to peace intervention efforts in the region was lack of political will. They also indicated that international interference by external actors was another significant challenge.

Ethiopia

With a population of at least 112 million people, Ethiopia is a large, landlocked country in the Eastern region of Africa and one of the most populous countries in Africa, second only to Nigeria. It prides itself as having one of the oldest monarchies on the continent and one of only two countries that were almost never colonized save for a brief period between 1939 and 1941 when it was under Italian occupation. The country is also ethnically diverse and the 2017 Ethiopian census states that there are "more than 90 distinct ethnic groups in the country." The majority of the citizens are from the Amhara, Oromo, Tigray and Somali ethnic groups. The Amhara and Tigray consider themselves Habesha, "the self-proclaimed core of Ethiopia's national identity." When one thinks of Ethiopia these are the peoples that come to mind. They have dominated Ethiopian politics and while they both speak languages from the same Ethio-semetic language family, Amhara is the official working language of the country and the most widely spoken. Together the two groups constitute 32% of the population and they are predominantly Orthodox Christians.

On the other hand the Oromo from the Cushite language family group are the most populous ethnic group in the country representing at least 40% of the population. The Somali are the third largest ethnic group in Ethiopia after the Amhara while the Tigray are the fourth largest ethnic group. Aside these four major ethnic groups the Southern region of Ethiopia is occupied by the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, represented by at least 70 different languages, these ethnic groups include, "Ethio-Semitic, Cushitic, Omotic and Nilotic speakers," and are distinctly different from the Northern and Eastern ethnic groups in terms of culture and way of life.

With regard to religion, Ethiopia, has long been a center for Islam and Christianity, the two major religions in the country. Within Christianity the majority belong to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC). Other significant religions practiced in the country are Judaism and paganism. Over all, an estimated "44 percent of the population adheres to the EOTC, 34 percent are Sunni Muslim, and 19 percent belong to Christian evangelical and Pentecostal groups."

Abiy Ahmed is the current Prime Minister of Ethiopia. He comes from the Oromo community and is the first Oromo to hold position of Prime Minister. His ascent to power ushered in a new era of governance in Ethiopia in 2018. He came to power after the 2018 elections that took place after Hailemarian Desalegn stepped down from power in the same year due to widespread protests against the government. Ahmed began his

rule with sweeping reforms that many Ethiopians saw as a turn for the better. He spent his first 100 days as Prime Minister,

> Lifting the country's state of emergency, granting amnesty to thousands of political prisoners, discontinuing media censorship, legalising outlawed opposition groups, dismissing military and civilian leaders who were suspected of corruption, and significantly increasing the influence of women in Ethiopian political and community life. He also pledged to strengthen democracy by holding free and fair elections.

In all this, the hallmark of his reforms, was his historic meeting with the president of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki effecting a detente after a 20 year post war territorial stalemate between the two countries. He received international recognition for this and consequently he was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for "his efforts to achieve peace and international cooperation, and in particular for his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with neighbouring Eritrea." His reforms ignited hope in Ethiopians who had long been repressed by both the Derg and EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolution Democratic Front) regimes.

However, despite having had such a stellar start to his reign, three years into his rule Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has faced challenges that have questioned his leadership as head of government in Ethiopia. Rather than being hailed for opening the way for more democratic freedoms, his reforms met resistance, including from his own Oromo community. From June 2018, the country began to experience heightened civil unrest in the wake of the reforms set into motion by the Prime Minister. As a result of these reforms, "Local leaders (took) advantage of the new freedoms to build ethnic power bases. Groups that (had) felt excluded in a system once dominated by Tigrayans (began) flexing their muscles." In addition, "old state border disputes reignited (with) large ethnic groups that dominate in many regions demanding more territory and resources. At the same time, smaller groups, tired of being sidelined, (were) pushing back," thus resulting in increased violence in the country.

For example in July 2019, a failed coup took place in the Amhara region leading to the assassination of the regional governor Ambachew Mekonnen. This was followed by protests in October 2019, which spiraled into violence that led to the death of at least 679 civilians. There were also protests against Prime Minister Abiy, with claims that he had become a dictator propagating an authoritarian regime. These protests were instigated by popular activist Jawar Mohammed, who accused security forces of "trying to orchestrate an attack against him." In November 2019, 17 Amhara students were

abducted from Dembi Dolo University in Western Oromia and have been missing since then. The situation was only made worse by an internet and communication shutdown in Western Oromia put in place by the federal government. Therefore families were not able to communicate with the kidnapped students. One of the students who got an opportunity to speak to a relative said that they had been abducted by Oromo youth. In August 2020, protests erupted in Wolaita zone, of Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Regional State (SNNPR) over the arrest of more than 20 officials of Wolaita zone for allegedly holding a meeting that contravened COVID-19 social measures. The protests were met by a harsh reprisal from security forces that led to the death of 16 people and scores injured. In June 2020, a popular singer form the Oromo community, *Hachalu Hundessa* was assassinated. This led to protests and reprisals by a heavy handed security force, leading to the death of at least 239 people. Much of this conflict in the country is also the result of security dilemmas between ethnic groups. As Samir Yusuf explains:

> A security dilemma occurs when one actor, fearing the potentially hostile behaviour of another, initiates a power build-up to maintain its security. When this is discovered, however, there is a reactive build-up of (military) power on the part of the other actor, fearing that it could be a target. This kicks off a series of militarisation attempts on both sides, increasing the fear one has for the other, and potentially leading to an arms race.

These are few examples of the rising insecurity in the country, many of which do not get reported in the international media as well as local media since the government has on several occasions imposed information black outs, cutting off internet, mobile phone and landline communications. Currently, the most violent conflict in the country is the Tigray conflict being waged in the northern region of the country between the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) on one side and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) on the other side who are being aided by defense groups from Amhara and the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF).

The recent upswing of conflict in the country has raised alarm because there has been significant loss of lives, destruction of property, human rights abuses and massive displacement of people, not to mention destabilizing security. This unrest and conflict is indicative of a government that is struggling to assure citizens of security and provide the basic freedoms as expected of the state. However, the question begs, why the sudden surge in the frequency and intensity of violence and unrest in the country in the wake of significant reforms?

Civil unrest and ethnic conflict are not new to Ethiopia throughout its modern history. During the monarchies of Menelik II and Haile Selassie there were rebellions and coups against the monarchy. In addition, during the Derg regime in the country there were numerous uprisings culminating in the victory of the Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolution Front (EPDRF), who, "capitalised on the centralized and authoritarian tendencies of the regime to inflame ethnic-based anti-regime mobilization." In as much as the EPRDF authoritarian rule from 1991 managed to front a veneer of stability and peace over the country, "Nationalist grievances and mobilisation continued to simmer during the EPRDF's era, resulting in multiple lines of conflict." Samir Yusuf, outlines these fault lines as: 1) Opposition groups such as The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) against the regime, 2) conflicts between ethnic groups over a wide range of issues such as land, power struggles and border disputes and 3) debates over fundamental issues such as the history and identity of the country between ethnic and Ethiopian nationalists. These various fault lines were nurtured under the EDRDF regime and simmered underneath the surface until as Samir Yusuf explains they began to erupt in 2015 due to a variety of factors including, increased agitation from anti-regime movements leading to protests over political and economic problems, growing urbanization and cyber technology, and, "the TPLF (losing) its control over the institutional levers of the EPRDF." The result of this was the increase of widespread conflict which is now being witnessed in various parts of the country. Therefore, these recent conflicts in Ethiopia according to Samir Yusuf are driven by ethno-nationalist mobilizations and have been escalated by, "the advent of new actors, intensified use of cyber technology, and quite importantly, the reconfiguration of institutional arrangements in the political system." Of particular importance in understanding the surge of conflict in Ethiopia is the weakening of state institutions in particular the EPRDF which resulted in a breakdown in governance. The current Tigray conflict exemplifies this weakening of the ruling party by internal wrangles.

The present Tigray conflict was triggered on November 4th 2020, when TPLF forces overrun a federal military base in the region, declaring that theirs was a pre-emptive act, as they knew that the federal government was preparing to attack the region. Abiy responded by ordering the Ethiopian military to, "take action against the ruling party in Tigray, in retaliation for what he described as an attack by Tigray regional forces on a federal military base."

The conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia which has ensued since November 4th 2020 has no resolution in clear sight with reports of, "massacres, rape and widespread

hunger," still being reported in as much as the government has censored foreign media from reporting on the conflict in the region. There have also been reports that starvation is being deliberately used as a weapon of war, "relentlessly and systematically."Reports indicate that the conflict has led to the death of at least $50,000$ civilians and resulted in gross human rights violations. According to a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), the conflict since November 2020 has also led to civilian attacks from the Eritrean border. While the Ethiopian government had initially denied the presence of Eritrean troops in the Tigray region, in April 2021, the government finally acknowledged the involvement of Eritrean troops in the Tigray conflict.

Due to international pressure, the Ethiopian government promised that the troops would withdraw from the region. The Eritrean armed forces have been reported to have massacred civilians in Axum in November 2020 and they also pillaged and destroyed property including healthcare facilities. On November 29th 2020, three weeks after the onset of the conflict, Abiy announced that the federal government had been successful in the law enforcement exercise in Tigray when the federal troops entered the capital Mekelle. However, hostilities have continued, amounting to a humanitarian crisis. On 29th April 2021, for the first time in Ethiopia's history, lawmakers in the country designated the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) as terrorist organizations. The two groups were accused of carrying out civilian attacks on several parts of the country in the last few years. The two groups were also said to have been "exploited by foreign forces seeking to weaken, disrupt and dismantle Ethiopia," and "were politically motivated intending to disrupt and reverse a "reform/change strategy."

Regional bodies have attempted to address this conflict and bring about a resolution to the same, but have so far been unsuccessful, these regional bodies include the African Union (AU) and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In the earlier stages of the war the then AU chair-person Cyril Ramaphosa (president of South Africa) sent some eminent persons including Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (former president of Liberia) and Joaquim Chissano (former president of Mozambique) to Addis to intervene in the conflict but were unsuccessful, with Ethiopia claiming that the conflict in Tigray was a matter of law enforcement that did not require international intervention. Ethiopia also leaned on Article 4(g) of the AU Constitution, which highlights, "non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another." However, the AU also has the responsibility to protect citizens of member states through Article 4 (h), by exercising the, "right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect

of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity." The kind of conflict being experienced in the Tigray region has already caused havoc, yet the AU has not succeeded in exercising its responsibility to intervene. Whenever the issue has been raised, for example during the AU summit held virtually in February 2021, Ethiopia managed to distract the meeting from discussing the Tigray conflict.

Currently, the Executive Secretary at the AU is Worqneh Gebeyehu, "Ethiopia's former Foreign minister and a staunch ally of Prime Minister Abiy." On the other hand when the chairman of IGAD attempted to raise the Tigray conflict as an agenda item during an IGAD meeting in December 2020, his attempts were frustrated by Ethiopia. The net result of these regional bodies' unwillingness and lethargic responses to the conflict has been an increasing violation of human rights for the citizens of the region, including the internal displacement of over 222,000 people.

In March 2020, the Ethiopian government postponed the elections, citing COVID-19 restrictions. The House of Federation (the Ethiopian equivalent of a Senate) had passed a resolution outlawing the unilateral conduct of elections as illegitimate, it being the only national electoral board with the mandate to conduct elections. However, this was not received well by opposition parties including the TPLF which declared Prime Minister Abiy's government illegitimate when the federal government passed their electoral mandate in October 2020. Consequently, the TPLF went ahead to conduct elections in the region of Tigray in September 2020 in defiance of the federal government's directive to postpone all elections. As they conducted their regional elections in September 2020 the, "TPLF leaders declared their intention not to recognize the federal government, parliament, the House of Federation and other regional states as legitimate bodies to conduct the country's affairs." This was not received well by the federal government who declared the regional elections null and void.

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which is a political party, para-military group and former ruling party, was also against Dr. Abiy's government over his decision to dissolve the EPRDF (Ethiopia People's Revolution Democratic Front) and constitute the Prosperity Party.

Leaders of the TPLF were disgruntled with this decision as they felt they had been sidelined having been used to power as the most dominant group in the EPRDF over its 30 year rule. Consequently, the group decided to go solo and not join the Prosperity Party. In addition to this the TPLF was also suspicious of agreements signed between

Abiy and his counterpart in Eritrea, which helped normalize relations between the two countries. These events were important to the TPLF as they shared the longest border with Eritrea among Ethiopia's states.

Some commentators blame Abiy and his government for the conflict in the Tigray region. Tamrat Gebremariam, for example, is of the opinion that Prime Minister Abiy was too simplistic and reductionist in his grand political goal of "undoing what he sees as a federal system based on linguistic-cultural fault lines but fragmenting Ethiopia." He believes that Prime Minister Abiy was too confident in his ability to rid Ethiopia of these fault lines, consequently he has not been successful and has resorted to an authoritarian rule to accomplish his goals in an increasingly polarized country. Contrary to these opinions, others place fault squarely at the feet of the TPLF. For example, Yohannes Gedamu argues that it if the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) national army had not subdued the TPLF in the Tigray region, it "could have triggered an endless, bloody civil war across Ethiopia and marked the beginning of the country's disintegration. The federal government and neighboring regional states had no option other than to do everything they could to stop the TPLF's aggression in Tigray before it spilled over to other parts of the country."
 He argues that other ethnic groups such as the Oromia and especially the Amhara have suffered at the hands of the TPLF when it was in power and that the rebellion in Tigray required the attention of the federal government. He further argues that, "the ongoing conflict in the country is not the result of differing visions of Ethiopia's future, as some claim, but a direct consequence of groups like the TPLF stoking ethno-nationalist tensions and rekindling historic animosities to divide Ethiopia." He states that, while the Abiy government is not perfect, Ahmed Abiy has tried to unite Ethiopians. Consequently, while Ethiopia during the EPRDF regime strove to project an image of a singular Ethiopian identity through the suppression of ethnic-mobilizations the reality underneath the surface was that ethnic differences were very much alive and only required the opportune moment to erupt.

The history of Ethiopia, especially since the nineteenth century has been chequered with the tensions of ethnic identity vs national identity, as each ruler or regime since the late nineteenth century has pursued either polar identities for the good of the country. These tensions have often been the fault lines of most conflicts in the country. Tewodoros II brought an end to the *Zemene Mesafint* (Era of Princes) by being crowned Emperor. A formidable warrior who fought his way to power, he abolished the monarchy and sought to centralize authority. However, he was not successful in uniting the country and after he committed suicide in 1868, two contenders for the crown Kassa Mercha (later

Yohannes IV) and Menelik (later Menelik II) jostled to be named *Negus Nagast* (King of Kings). Yohannes IV a Tigrean rose to dominance claiming the title while Menelik from Shoa preferred to consolidate his power rather than compete for the crown at the time. Later, after Yohannes IV's death Menelik II assumed the role of emperor seeking a more national outlook for the country as opposed to the existing feudalism that was the norm. However, the Tigrean nobility were not happy with this turn of events and as Shiferaw Bekele notes, "…the Tigrean nobility …were bitterly disappointed that the crown had been taken out of their region. And although they could not marshal resources to get it back, they nursed a form of resentment which got passed down to their descendants, all the way down to the twentieth century." These seeds of discontent would grow to inform the Tigray region that they had a right to self-determination and thus entrench the current federal government in Ethiopia. To add to this, after the famous battle of Adwa, Menelik II, perhaps not desiring to over-extend himself after Ethiopia's victory over the Italians, left the Northern highlands of Tigray region to Italian rule and Tigrayans resented this.

Therefore, in as much as Menelik II in the 19th century sought to create a national Ethiopia, "[t]he traditional national ethos, symbolism and historical experience that constituted the foundation of the identity of the people of the historic core of Ethiopia could not easily be used for the newly incorporated people of the empire because they had strong religious and ethnic traits, distinct, from those of the Shoans." Menelik II was succeeded by Haile Selassie who also nationalist oriented made efforts to forge a national identity, however, he was not fully successful, "because many of the civil wars and conflicts which the country went through after the World War II sprang precisely from the ethno-regional forces that refused to accept the Ethiopian national identity."

One example is the Woyane Rebellion began in 1942 by Haile Mariam Reda a young man who had formerly been a *shifta* (outlaw). He mobilized the Tigrean peasants to a rebellion which initially beginning as a protest of heavy taxation by the central authority spun into a full blown rebellion with the Tigreans mounting attacks against the central authority. Addis Ababa in retaliation sent several rounds of troops to the Tigray region to subdue the rebellion. It was only due to the central authority's superior artillery and assistance from British forces that they were able to quell the rebellion in 1943, as the Tigrean rebels had amassed high numbers of troops from the peasantry. In as much as this rebellion has several similarities to the current Tigray conflict Paul Henze highlights that at that time, "The Woyane rebellion was motivated primarily by Tigrean pride and particularism; separatism played no part." It is this pride and sense of particularism that

would later grow to demand separatism and consequently entrench ethnic particularism in the country.

While Ethiopia under Haile Selassie's monarchy developed from ancient monarchy to a modern state by 1974, "Ethiopians were already becoming concerned with economic stagnation and the inability of the government to formulate long-term economic policies that would ensure self-sustained growth." Within the same year the monarchy was topped by the Derg (a group of lower ranking officers in the Ethiopian army) headed by Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, who later on went to be president. Initially desiring to rule secretly without toppling the government the Derg, a Marxist oriented organization that promoted Ethiopian Socialism, went on to rule the country in a bloody rule of 17 years where, "[r]esettlement, villagization, mass political organizations, and the command economy conspired to alienate the people from their natural allegiances. The state's inability to compromise politically further encouraged the breakup of the larger nation." The Derg were overthrown in 1991 by the EPRDF an alliance of four regional insurgency groups including, the Oromo People's Democratic Organization, the Amhara National, Democratic Movement, the South Ethiopian People's Democratic Front, and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front. However, the TPLF (founded in 1985 by university students) was the dominant organization in the group in the alliance. The EPRDF went on to establish the Federal Republic of Ethiopia. Undoing what previous regimes had sought to achieve, nationalism, the EPRDF, led by the TPLF set out to reconstitute the country around a federal system based on ethnicities. Although, it formed an alliance with other insurgency groups to oust the Derg regime under the guise of establishing a democratic Ethiopia based on democratic principles, it still harbored self-determination ideals which was the basis of the group's creation in the first place in 1985. Mohamed Girma, explains that, "the difference between the Derg and EPRDF is not so much ideological: they both grew up as Marxists. Their differences emerge in their understanding of the nation. The former created a new communal consciousness using *enat-ager* (motherland), while the latter portrayed each ethnic group as "mothers" in themselves."

Meles Zenawi from the Tigray region was president of the country from 1991 to 1994. When a new constitution was promulgated in 1995, he led the country as prime minister till his death in 2012. Under Melse Zenawi's leadership the country was able to develop and grow economically as the EDRDF adopted social democracy with pro-western policies. However, despite a decade of impressive economic growth especially between 2010 and 2020, the ethno-federal configuration of the country worked to weaken the

state, and the economic decline since then has also been linked to the recent flare up of ethnic conflict.

Federalism is a type of governance style that focuses on self-rule. Daniel Elazer states that federalism, "has to do with the need of people and polities to unite for common purposes yet remain separate to preserve their respective integrities." It is designed to, "achieve some degree of political integration based on a combination of self-rule and shared rule." Jan Erk and Lawrence Anderon, on the other hand describe federalism as, "as a way to accommodate territorially based ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences in divided societies, while maintaining the territorial integrity of existing states." Ethiopia governance is based on ethnic-federalism, in which political units are based on ethnicity. Therefore a region is identified by its people, language and customs. However, while the ethnic-federalism was adopted by the EPRDF to ensure no ethnic group concentrated power at the center (as the Amhara had previously done) it has concomitantly been the source of ethnic conflict for the country, as it has heightening ethnic differences. Eck and Anderson argue that demands for self-rule as perpetuated by the TPLF through the EPRDF, are often rooted in the belief that the group's social, economic or cultural survival is threatened by the actions or inactions of the central state, or the group may simply chafe at the perceived efforts of the central state to interfere with issues that are considered exclusively regional concerns. It is these concerns that fueled the direction towards ethno-federalism in the country.

Semir Yusuf, states that, "[a]lthough Ethiopia is not new to ethnic-based conflicts, their scale and intensity in the short time since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali's rise to power has been alarming." Indeed this is the observation of those interested in conflict in Ethiopia. The federal configuration of the country has played a role in entrenching ethnic differences in the country, thus fueling ethnic conflict. For example, the 1995 constitution of Ethiopia in Article 39 stipulates the rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples. Article 39 (1) states that, "Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession." This provision alone amongst others in the section in effect allows the creation of separate autonomous states within the larger state. They also have the right to, "a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and Federal governments." On the other hand Article 62 (9) stipulating Powers and Functions of the House of the Federation states that, "It shall order Federal intervention if any State, in violation of this Constitution, endangers the constitutional order." These two articles are contradictory, as

they on one hand give power to the ethnic state while at the same time infringing upon their autonomy. Once again the tension between national identity and ethnic identity is displayed. Consequently, longstanding grievances and increasing polarization over historical and complex questions about land, politics, and identity, have led to deadly violence among ethnic communities in Ethiopia.

During the EPDRF regime, TPLF defended its policies of ethno-federalism by stating that, "the ideological basis for its policy of ethnic federation was based on the idea that central development policies in Ethiopia had historically been hegemonic and exploitative and were thus a major determinant in previous internecine strife and civil war." Semir Yusuf, on the other hand explains that ethno-fedralism in Ethiopia has both empowered and disempowered ethnic groups in Ethiopia in this way, "the centralised party structure with the TPLF seats at the top generated a strong sense of Tigrean domination over some major ethnic groups in the country. Moreover, the ownership of each federal unit by one ethnic group gave rise to a divisive politics that set apart 'natives' from 'newcomers', and rendered the latter victims in the hands of the former." Ethnic conflict in Ethiopia is currently a significant threat to governance, security and economic development in the country is not addressed holistically.

However, conflict in Ethiopia is also not only as a result of ethnicity. In as much as ethnic mobilization is the most dominant form of conflict in the country. Other types of conflict that have been witnessed in the country include power struggles within regions. In the case of Ethiopia, regions by law have significant autonomy to the extent of voting for secession. Consequently political actors with the region compete for power often pitting citizens against one another. The foiled coup in the Amhara region led by the chief of army in Amhara is an example of power struggles within regions that also fuel conflict in the country.

The federal government system has also fueled conflict as regions seek to expand their borders. For example the conflict in the Tigray region has also embedded within it border disputes between the Amhara and the Tigray. The Amhara claim that land (almost a quarter of the Tigray region) was taken from them 30 years ago." Therefore Tigreans in this disputed areas have been chased away leading to high number of displaced people. While the EPDRF's authoritarian rule managed to suppress this dispute during the EPRDF regime, when TPLF was essentially in power. Now as a result of the weakened state institutions and ruling party, these border disputes have come to the light and are being settled.

Socio-economic factors are also a source of conflict in the country. The distribution of resources by the federal government to the regions has not been fair and equitable. With the dominance of the TPLF during the EPRDF regime resources were disproportionally channeled to the Tigray region at the expense of other regions giving rise to economic inequalities that are now more noticeable. This unfair distribution of resources across region is yet another cause of the Tigray conflict as the Tigray region is now out of power and inaccessible to state resources. Bekalu Atnafu Taye explains this disparity by giving the example of the Sidama ethnic groups in Ethiopia having three million people and failing to get the status of a regional state whereas the Harari whose overall population is 185 000 has been accorded a regional state. In the 2006–07 Ethiopian fiscal years, the Harari region received approximately 90 million Ethiopian birr (ETB) but the Sidama Regional Zone got less since it did not have the regional status level. These are some of the reasons that led to the Sidama (the fifth largest ethnic group in the country) to vote for secession on November 20, 2019. In addition to this, despite Ethiopia having impressive GDP growth, the country continues to be mired in poverty. A burgeoning youth population who are unemployed has also led to a frustrated youth population who have been easily co-opted into conflicts.

Therefore apart from ethnic mobilization fueling conflict in Ethiopia, political, social and economic grievances have also been a source of conflict in the country. Therefore, the CMT-2021 will be monitoring conflict in Ethiopia. The country represents a unique case study of a government configuration that promotes ethnic differences vigorously, thus creating fault lines that exacerbate ethnic conflict. It is at the same time an interesting case study of conflict monitoring in Africa, in the sense that ethnic conflict is limited to regions within the country and as Samir Yusuf puts it, "Many people still lead ordinary lives, not necessarily directly affected by the recent round of conflicts, although with security concerns of differing levels of gravity." Despite an upsurge in the frequency and intensity of conflict as well as weakened state structures, the country has not descended into chaos, as has been the result of ethnic conflict in other countries within Africa. This study therefore seeks to monitor conflict in Ethiopia to inform strategic interventions to addressing the conflict.

Kenya

Today, the world and especially Africa grapples with intra-state conflict as the major type of conflict. Since independence Kenya has not experienced a large-scale civil war similar to that of most of its East African neighbors however, Kenya has overlapping

conflicts ranging from cycles of election-related violence, sexual and gender-based violence, communal violence, to terrorist attacks. Most conflicts in Kenya are catalyzed by environmental, political, economic, competition over natural resources, ethnic identity struggles, the proliferation of small arms, poverty, and marginalization.

Since independence Kenya has experienced several inter-communal clashes or violence. These localized ethnic conflicts are often linked to competition over land ownership and land use often triggered by the search for water and pasture, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and insecurity perpetrated by identity-based communal militias. For example, Mount Elgon located in the western region of Kenya experienced conflict between the local communities over local land while Tana River County located in eastern Kenya witnessed two waves of ethnic-instigated violence in 2001 and 2012 between the Pokomo and Orma and Wardei.

For decades, the relations between Pokot and the Marakwet, Turgen, Turkanas, Kalenjins and the Il-Chamus communities in Rift Valley have been marred by perennial disputes culminating in series of attacks and counter-attacks over agricultural land, livestock, and resources at the Pokot-Marakwet border. The clashes between 2016 and 2019 led to over 120 deaths, dozens maimed and injured, thousands internally displaced, property destroyed, and the closure of over 20 schools along the border. Following a series of peace dialogues, the two communities signed a peace pact in July 2019.

Apart from the West Pokot-Marakwet dispute, West Pokot is embroiled in another dispute with Turkana in Kainuk and in Baringo South along a shared border between the counties over livestock theft and land encroachment. Subsequent violence has led to the disruption of movement between the Lodwar and Kitale highway, the loss of lives, and the destruction of property. Perennial violent inter-communal clashes have also been reported between the Turkana and Samburu communities along the Turkana and Samburu County borders, between Borana and Meru communities along the Meru-Isiolo common border, between the Samburu and Maasai communities living on the border of Laikipia and Isiolo Counties, between the Borana and Gabbra communities in Marsabit County, and between the Pokomo and Somali communities living along the Tana River and Garissa County border. Conflicts in the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya take the form of cattle rustling, displacements, and cycles of revenge attacks. Cattle raids are carried out for bride price purposes, prestige and financial gains, and to replenish livestock reserves. In most cases, cattle raiding conducted for financial benefits involve excessive violence exacerbated by the proliferation of arms.

Since the colonial period, the peripheral (frontier) regions in Kenya have been left behind in terms of development, this has resulted in grievances founded on group-based exclusion and ethnic divisions. Even though devolution was aimed at addressing these structural factors to conflict it is also argued to exacerbate others. Devolution of power and resources has contributed to conflicts between or among clans, widespread corruption, and heightened politicization of ethnicity. For example, in Mandera County there exists a long history of conflict and clashes between two Somali sub-clans - the Garee and Murale - over pasture and water as well as local power.

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is a violation of human rights, which is a recurring aspect in Kenya largely as a result of harmful traditional and cultural practices, poverty, a patriarchal society, and a breakdown of rule of law during electoral periods. Sexual violence has been prevalent during elections in Kenya since the 1990s. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) in 2007/08 documented 900 cases of electoral-related sexual violence against girls, women, boys, and men, perpetrated by militia groups, security personnel, and civilians. During the 2017 elections at least 201 cases were documented in 11 of the 47 counties by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights monitors. This election-related sexual violence is often used as a "weapon" to "punish, terrorize or dehumanize communities and individuals, and to influence voting conduct and the outcomes of elections, including by displacing people so that they do not vote." SGBV during the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly spiked since the end of March 2020.

Elections-related violence in Kenya can be traced to the onset/inception of multi-party politics in the country in 1992 to date with the 2007/08 election described as the "severest bloodshed" and deadliest in the history of the country. The 2007/8 post-election violence led to more than 1100 deaths, 650,000 internal displacements, and a deeply divided country. Electoral violence in Kenya often manifests itself through political assassinations, threatened or attempted murder, physical harm, hate speech and intimidation, vandalism, and voter bribery. Risks of election violence in Kenya has contributed to heightened tensions and an atmosphere of anxiety around political campaigns and the voting period. The country's history of electoral violence is attributed to numerous underlying conflict drivers, such as the perception of historic marginalization and inequality by certain ethnic groups, high levels of youth unemployment, political power centered on the executive, a culture of impunity, claims of election rigging, perceptions of Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) bias, and highly centralized ethno-politics.

Following relatively peaceful elections in 2013, in August 2017 the presidential election was declared null and void by the Supreme Court. This led to a re-run of the election in October 2017, which was boycotted by the opposition. In this election, President Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the winner with Raila Odinga disputing the outcome. Following the nullification of the August presidential election by the Supreme Court, the judiciary faced threats and intimidation by Kenyatta and other senior government officials. In November 2017, President Kenyatta was inaugurated for a second term in office, while Raila Odinga organized a parallel inauguration ceremony for himself on 30th January 2018, where he took an oath as the "People's President" in an unofficial swearing-in ceremony. The struggle for power and legitimacy between the two protagonists plunged the country into a period of uncertainty and a series of government-induced repression. For instance, private media stations that had covered Raila's inauguration ceremony were shut down for two weeks and some journalists and bloggers were threatened, arrested, or detained. Tom Kajwang, the lawyer who administered the oath was prosecuted (among other opposition politicians) and Miguna Miguna (a then close ally of Raila) was arrested and deported. In the turbulent aftermath, excessive use of force by security agents, especially the police against protesters in opposition strongholds were documented.

Incidences of unlawful killings and beatings by police during protests were reported during election protests in late 2017 and early 2018 where police and other security agencies were responsible for the loss of lives of more than 100 opposition supporters in Nairobi and Western Kenya. Within one month (1st September 2017 and 25th October 2017), the KNCHR documented 25 deaths and over 111 cases of police instigated injuries. It was reported that between August 2017 and March 2018 police officers and other government agencies targeted at least 15 human rights activists and victims of police brutality who faced arrest threats upon exposure of human rights violations during the election period. Even though excessive use of police force was prevalent throughout the election period, incidences of police brutality and abuses by security agents are widespread across the country. For example, to preserve the Mau water catchment areas in Embobut Forest the Kenya Forest Service officers were reported to have used excessive force against the Sengwer community.

Following a meeting at the president's office in Harambee House in Nairobi, President Kenyatta and Odinga entered into a political deal manifested in them shaking hands and agreeing to a truce in March 2018 to ease political tensions that were building up. In the deal, President Kenyatta's deputy William Ruto was conspicuously left out, an aspect that sets an interesting political dynamic in Kenya's political sphere where alliances based

on ethnic identities are the norm. The aftermath of the Kenyatta-Odinga agreement was the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) aimed at improving Kenya's democracy, building bipartisanship, and unity. The BBI task force released a report in November 2019 after holding public participation fora across the 47 counties to collect views of more than 7000 citizens based on nine core agenda points. The report was disseminated to the public for further discussion which the task force was to take into consideration and present the final report. The BBI report was officially launched on 26th October 2020, with a call for Kenyans to read the document for themselves to make an informed decision about it. The BBI report sought to address nine identified areas affecting Kenyans. These are corruption, lack of ethos (negative politics), divisive politics, divisive elections, safety and security, responsibility and rights, inclusivity, shared prosperity, and ethnic antagonism and competition. The report left the country embroiled in a debate concerning proposals made in it. Some of the most contentious proposals of the report under debate were constitutional changes particularly on the creation of a parliamentary system of governance with a prime minister and two deputy prime ministers. This is viewed as an answer to the winner-take-all presidential election outcome and the resulting powerful executive. However, the president will still appoint his prime minister and deputy prime ministers and could fire them at will, hence still perpetuating the practice of the winner takes all. The BBI has also raised significant concerns about the cost of implementing such expenses that will be incurred to implement the changes to the executive.

At the end of September 2020, economist Dr. David Ndii together with Jerotich Seii, James Ngondi, Wanjiru Gikonyo and Ikal Angelei filed a petition with the High Court asking for a ruling on three important issues on constitution amendment bill 2020 (BBI Bill) including whether the basic framework of the constitution may be changed. Okiya Omtata, a public defender, was also one among the petitioners. "The petitioners' lead argument was that the legal and judicial doctrines and theory of the basic structure of a constitution, the doctrine of constitutional entrenchment clauses, unamendable constitutional provisions, the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments, theory of unamendability of eternity clauses, essential features, supra-constitutional laws in a constitution and the implied limitations of the amendment power in the constitution are applicable in Kenya to substantively limit the ability to amend the Constitution under Articles 255-257 of the Constitution." In a five-judge panel led by Justice Odunga and including Jairus Ngaah, Teresia Matheka, and Chacha Mwita, the judges unanimously ruled that the BBI Process was irregular, unlawful, and unconstitutional. A total of 17 topics were examined by the justices and found out that President Kenyatta breached the

constitution by initiating the BBI constitution amendment bill. The court ruled that the constitution amendment bill procedure should have been initiated by ordinary Kenyans. The court also declared that BBI's constitutional committee was unconstitutional. After the appeal by the BBI steering committee, the court of appeal upheld the high court ruling and declared the BBI constitutional amendment 2020 unconstitutional. Indeed, the ruling nullifying the constitutional amendment through the BBI bill 2020 has altered the course of Kenyan politics since the handshake in 2018.

Since 2018, the handshake agreement continues to hold as political realignments abound with a focus on the next election in 2022. As the bond between President Kenyatta and Odinga grows stronger, that of Kenyatta and his deputy drifts apart. The Deputy President has been largely seen as being partly opposed to the handshake and the BBI, with the relationship between the two marked with accusations and counter-accusations. On his part, President Kenyatta largely accuses his deputy of focusing on the 2022 election at the expense of concentrating on building their legacy of the big four agenda (1. Enhancing manufacturing, 2. Food security and nutrition, 3. Universal health care, and 4. Affordable housing) and concomitant projects. On the other hand, the deputy president accuses the president of curtailing his political ambitions to succeed him. President Kenyatta has since built new alliances around his deputy's political opponents: the Orange Democratic Movement, KANU, Chama cha Mashinani, Wiper Democratic Movement, and Amani National Coalition. These political shifts have heightened the political uncertainty reigning in the country with the situation made more complex by the economic and social uncertainty following the COVID-19 pandemic, locust invasion, and flooding in some parts of the country.

Since the onset of the COVID - 19 pandemic in Kenya in March 2020, the education sector has been affected due to the closure of schools and institutions of higher learning. The closure led to the commencement of e-learning modules, lessons through frequency radio and television to promote continuous learning. However, this has not trickled down to all the regions in the country, particularly to those living in marginalized areas where they cannot afford internet services or other such mediums of communication. The pandemic has also affected labor and social security since numerous employees in formal and informal employment have lost their jobs and livelihood. Reduced earnings and job cuts have led to some Kenyans, especially those who rely on casual work, finding it difficult to cater to their basic needs – including rent. To contain the virus, the government instituted a curfew and lockdown measures with the police responsible for enforcement. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) reported

that police officers were responsible for 117 cases of inhuman and degrading treatment and torture and 10 deaths between March 2020 and June 2020. Similar to many countries globally, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a socio-economic impact on Kenya which further complicates efforts to address political and developmental challenges.

According to the HIPSIR CMT 2019 study, inequitable distribution of resources and high levels of graft with a weighted mean of 2.14, to a large extent contributes to conflicts and high poverty levels in Kenya. There is a marked deterioration of government functions (weighted mean of 1.99) and weakened government functions (weighted mean of 2.00) as illustrated by increased reports of criminal activity and attacks, rampant police brutality, and conflict-related sexual violence. Even though the study indicated that Kenya has a high risk of conflict based on pre-conflict findings, the country was ranked as the most peaceful compared to South Sudan and the DRC.

In 2020, the CMT data analysis involved regional analysis for Kenya, to establish a nuanced understanding of conflict dynamics. From the CMT-2019, it was understood that conflict drivers in Kenya are different across regions hence the necessity to disaggregate the data in the CMT-2020. For the CMT-2020 seven regions which include Central region, Coast region, Eastern region, Nairobi, North Eastern, Rift Valley, and Nyanza/Western. In the central, domestic violence, sexual and gender-based violence and police brutality were the prevalent human rights violation in the region with a conflict level of 0.16. Coast region on the other hand had a conflict level of 0.85 with police brutality (42%), resource-based conflict (40%), gender-based violence (39%) and theft (38%) being the most prevalent conflicts in the Coast region. The Eastern region conflict level stood at 0.88 with cattle rustling rated as the most prevalent (76%), followed by resource-based conflict (75%) and inter-ethnic violence (67%). Nairobi region had a conflict level of 0.7 with 61% of the respondents perceiving police brutality as the most prevalent conflict or human rights violation. Other conflicts or human rights violations rated highly as most prevalent in Nairobi region in 2020 include resource-based conflict (41%), theft (32%), and domestic violence (32%). North Eastern had a conflict level of 0.57 with 58% of the respondents identifying inter-ethnic violence as the most prevalent conflict or human rights violation in the North-Eastern region. Also, 54% identified resource-based conflict as the most prevalent conflict, while 50% identified sexual and gender-based conflict as the most prevalent conflict in Nairobi region in 2020. Rift Valley had a conflict level of 0.9, with 40% of the respondents' highlighting resource-based conflict as being the most prevalent type of conflict in the region. Other notable conflicts or human rights violations mentioned by the respondents were inter-ethnic violence 38% and cattle

rustling 37%. Western and Nyanza recorded a conflict level of 0.63 with 44% of the respondents highlighting sexual and gender-based violence as being highly prevalent in the region. Other conflicts or human rights violations that were mentioned as being highly prevalent were police brutality (36%) and domestic violence (29%).

Consequently, in as much as the whole of Kenya was not experiencing open and widespread conflict in the 2020 CMT report, there are underlying conditions that were highlighted which if they were not adequately unearthed and addressed had the potential of triggering violent open conflict.

South Sudan

For several decades, the people of South Sudan united to fight for their freedom. They had been exploited, subjected to slavery, abused, and discriminated against, not only on racial but also on religious grounds. Before secession, South Sudan was ignored, and development indicators, be they of health, infant mortality, maternal mortality, drinking water, sanitation, or food security, were among the worst in the world.
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Hence, South Sudan's clamor for change could not be suppressed or ignored. With different rebel groups engaged in guerrilla fights with the government based in Khartoum, South Sudan demanded autonomy and self-determination. This justified rebellion as the only way to confront the oppressive and dictatorial leadership based in Khartoum. Consequently, Sudan suffered an intra-state protracted conflict that had diverse effects on the human population and the economy of the country. Between 1983 and 2005, about two million people lost their lives, over four million were internally displaced (IDPs), and over eight hundred thousand were displaced as refugees.

The adverse effects of the civil war attracted the attention of the international community. As a result, there were different attempts to end the violence through dialogue and negotiation in a mediation process spearheaded by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and funded by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway (the Troika Nations). It is through such mediation that a peace agreement was reached with reforms of going to "the referendum on unity versus separation." However, the government of Khartoum was not committed to fully implementing the reforms which they had agreed upon. Due to pressure from the United States and the international community, there was a referendum that saw over ninety percent of the southerners vote in favor of secession. Through struggle and persistence in the pursuit of independence,

the South Sudanese remained firm in adopting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Their dream was actualized on 9th July 2011 when South Sudan became the world's newest country through its secession from Sudan. Basic changes were embodied in the terms of separation. Fundamental interests like border demarcation, oil, and the tariffs for use in the Sudanese pipeline, transitional financial arrangements, citizenship, currency, and other issues had to be addressed. Additionally, the international community offered assistance and coordinated various programs of the CPA to help in building the state of South Sudan.

The people of South Sudan were relieved of a long period of oppression and denial of development. They were optimistic that their independence, the constitution, and cooperation between their new leaders would set a precedent for unity, peace, and prosperity. This hope was short-lived when violence broke out in South Sudan in 2013. As a result, it is estimated that over fifty thousand people have been killed and possibly as many as 383,000, according to recent estimates, and nearly four million people were internally displaced or fled to neighboring countries. There have been various peace initiatives and interventions by the local, regional, and international community to address this conflict. However, a peace agreement signed in August 2015 failed to offer a resolution to the conflict and a revitalized peace deal signed in September 2018 seemed promising but did not bring peace to the country. Finally, on February 22 2020 President Salva Kiir and his former deputy turned foe, Riek Machar, signed an agreement to form a coalition government, raising hopes for peace in this troubled country.

Questions have been raised on which conflict resolution approach would be best applied to change the South Sudan situation. Strategies so far applied by the UN and Africa Union military interventions present in South Sudan have influenced the methods of intervention of various regional countries. From the onset of the South Sudan civil war in December 2013, IGAD chaired by Ethiopia took up the role of mediation to help strike a peace deal between the two main belligerent parties. These talks have however proved to be difficult because IGAD member states Sudan and Uganda were backing different sides in the war, Machar and President Salva Kiir, respectively. For instance, Ugandan forces were reported to be on the ground in Juba helping Salva Kiir's government fight Riek Machar. Hence, Kiir took a hardline position while negotiating since he was assured of protection by the Ugandan government.

Magnus Taylor notes that South Sudan's 2011 independence directed its neighbors' rivalry toward competition for influence over the new state. Sudan for a long time had

been exporting oil that came from the fields in South Sudan. Thus, they still wanted to control the new regime and continue benefitting from the oil. Uganda on the other hand had previously had a conflict with Sudan on the border issue before South Sudan's independence.

During the 1990s, Uganda was suspicious of Islamist Sudan's apparent desire to expand Arab and Islamic influence southwards. There were also suspicions that the Sudan government financed the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The Ugandan government in turn decided to finance and support the Southern Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). However, the Ugandan government in recent years has shifted from security interests to economic interests. Hence, the intervention by the regional bloc changed the dynamics of the conflict and the negotiation process leading to a prolonged civil war.

The United Nations on the other hand has defended its operations in South Sudan. In a statement by the U.N. Secretary General's Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, the UN emphasized its main responsibility is to protect civilians and assist in the process of ending the war. He urged the South Sudan government to cooperate with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to allow the men and women in the blue helmets to discharge U.N. Security Council resolution 2327 (2016) that calls on the warring parties to return to the peace process and empowers UNMISS to use the necessary tools to protect civilians. Nonetheless, this cannot rule out the fact that regional self-interests have led to the methods of intervention that in turn, have influenced the prolonged conflict. As such, the fatality rate has increased over the years and many people have been displaced due to the civil war. For instance, the UNSC September 2020 report on South Sudan notes that inter-communal conflict increased throughout the country, especially in greater Jonglei, Lakes, Unity, Warrap, and Western Bahr el-Ghazal. Thus, it is important to look at the statistical enumeration that rates the level of conflict.

A report by UNMISS, the fight against impunity remains minimal thus making peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan difficult. UNMISS reports that 585 people were killed while 305 others injured and thousands forcibly displaced throughout South Sudan as a result of the ongoing conflict in Jonglei and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area between the months of March 2021 and July 2021. Ms Yasmin Sooka, the chairperson of the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan while reporting to the Human Rights Council in Geneva underlined that the human rights situation in South Sudan

had considerably deteriorated as from March of 2021 with an increase in the cases of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, as well as rape and conflict related sexual violence. Ms. Sooka further stated that between June and August of 2021, more than 100 civilians were killed in an ethnic conflict in Tambura in Western Equatoria with an additional 80,000 to about 120,000 people reportedly displaced by the conflict. The Chairperson also cautioned that the humanitarian community in South Sudan is being attacked more and more in the recent years, particularly from the period of March 2020, and humanitarian assistance is being suspended and assistance workers relocated. Another issue of concern raised by the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan was the increased looting of public funds by the country's top leaders that has led to the deterioration of government services thus endangering the security situation in the country.

Despite the dire security situation in the country, it is worth noting that progress has been made in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed in 2018. On 21st February 2020, President Salva Kiir dissolved the Transitional Government of National Unity with the appointment of Riek Machar as First Vice -President and Taban Deng Gai, James Wani Igga, and Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior as Vice - Presidents. The pre-transitional period came to an end following the inauguration of the new presidency of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity on 22 February 2020. In June 2020, President Salva Kiir and First Vice- President Riek Machar reached an agreement on the distribution of state governorship between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG) and the SPLM in Opposition. Between the period of 1ST January 2021 and 31st of March 2021, President Salva Kiir completed the appointments of all governors and deputy governors of all the ten states and also appointed state ministers, advisors, independent commissioners and County commissioners. The appointments of state governments in three administrative areas of Abyei, Ruweng and the Greater Pibor remain pending.

Although there is notable progress in the implementation of R-ARCSS, there remains setbacks that are worth noting. There is increased fragmentation among the opposition parties such as within SSOA, SPLM/A-IO as well as within the office of the president (OP). President Salva Kiir has been accused of encouraging and facilitating defections and desertions within the SPLM/A-IO whereas some members of the OP accuse the president of failing to consult in key decision-making issues. The internal discord within SPLM/A-IO caused by internal leadership tensions and the perception of marginalization

along ethnic identity continues to instigate instability. South Sudan faces the threat of COVID-19 and escalating violence that jeopardizes the country's ceasefire reign. The pandemic has delayed the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement as the Joint Transitional Security Committee issued a directive on 25 March 2020 on the suspension of activities in training centers. These centers are designated to accommodate personnel that transition from cantonment sites or used for DDR purposes. The resultant restriction on freedom of movement due to the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to high risks of gender-based violence. On the other hand, civilian deaths, abduction of women and children, destruction of property, looting, and displacement of more than 60,000 people have been reported in intercommunal clashes, including cattle raiding and revenge attacks taking place in Jonglei, Unity, Lakes, Warrap and the West Equatoria States. An increase in inter-communal conflict has been attributed to the governance vacuum at the state and sub-state levels. Despite the existence of a ceasefire, Government and SPLM/A-IO have been involved in a series of clashes with the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) in late April and Mid-May 2020.

The HIPSIR CMT 2019 study ranked South Sudan (2.84) at the highest risk of conflict compared to the DRC (1.83) and Kenya (1.68). Conflicts in South Sudan were largely attributed to the inequitable distribution of resources and corruption (weighted mean of 2.53) that result in high levels of poverty (weighted mean of 2.86) recorded in the country. Poor governance (weighted mean of 2.29), weakened government functions (weighted mean of 2.39), and the acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors (weighted mean of 2.27) were observed as dominant features to conflict escalation in South Sudan. Apart from the break-down of government functions (weighted mean of 2.23), displacements of citizens (weighted mean of 2.52) and the presence of peacekeeping personnel (i.e. UNMISS) in the country (weighted mean of 2.21) were also pointed out as key indicators to the conflict crisis in South Sudan. The transition from crisis to stability and the peace process is hindered by the intensity of violence (weighted mean of 1.25), failure of combatants to comply with a ceasefire (weighted mean of 1.61), limited commitment to the implementation of peace agreements (weighted mean of 1.42), and the failure to sufficiently address root causes to the conflict hence conflict de-escalation is least in South Sudan.

In 2020, the HIPSIR CMT study ranked South Sudan at a conflict level of 0.9. Most of the respondents in the HIPSIR CMT 2020 study highlighted that most of the occurring conflicts in South Sudan were cattle rustling, political violence and competition for resources. The study also reiterated the key drivers of the conflict

in South Sudan to be unaddressed historical grievances, high levels of corruption, and the government failure to provide basic needs such as employment, food and security. IOM analysis report of South Sudan in 2020 confirms these finding by stating that South Sudan indeed experienced incidences of insecurity and were also hit by acute food shortage during the period of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

2. METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This study applied a cross-sectional research design by comparing diverse perceptions and analyses from different contexts. The design was important in understanding the actual context of conflicts, their multi-level perspectives, as well as the cultural influences involved. The research also applied a mixed-method approach, which accommodated quantitative as well as qualitative methods of data collection that helped in formulating the CMT using a holistic approach of interpretation. The mixed-method approach was also important in the rigorous use of quantitative research that helped in examining the magnitude of conflict and the frequency in which the conflict indicators were observed.

Target Population

The target population was mainly individuals with informed levels of knowledge of the prevailing security situation from the general public, civil society organizations, NGOs, and key informants from the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. Examples of professions represented by respondents included political/community leaders, security personnel, media practitioners, teachers, the business sector, and religious leaders. The population also included people involved in peace processes within the targeted four countries. The research only included participants over the age of 18 years who gave their informed consent to participate in the study.

Sampling Procedure

Convenience and purposive methods of non-probability sampling were used. First, the countries were selected purposively to represent various conflict situations in the continent. Secondly, the participants were selected based on their availability and willingness to take part in the study. Inclusion criteria were used to ensure that only those people who had the desired attributes and experience participated in the study.

Data Collection Tool

A questionnaire was designed while guided by the objectives of the study as well as the findings of the literature review. The questionnaire included both open-ended and

closed-ended questions designed around 64 indicators for measuring conflict levels. To test the validity and reliability of the tools, the study included a wider consultation with experts in the field, as well as a test run of the questions with individuals in different countries. There was also a roundtable discussion on the reliability of the tool with experts in peacebuilding. From the above consultations, 34 indicators were validated as appropriate for measuring different stages of conflict in a country (see a copy of the questionnaire in Appendix A). A draft questionnaire was developed and translated from English to French, Amharic and Oromia to ensure easier data collection in DRC and Ethiopia.

Data Collection Procedure

A total of 528 questionnaires were filled in across the four countries. In DRC data was collected using hard copies due to limited internet connectivity. In Ethiopia and South Sudan, both one line questionnaires and hard copies were administered, while in Kenya all the data was collected on line. Data collection for this research was conducted between June and September 2021. For the data collection we used conflict monitors in each of the countries. These conflict monitors were informed on conflict scenarios in each country and could therefore select and approach our target responds. In addition to questionnaires, we also collected in depth data on conflict in each of the countries by conducting Focus Discussion Groups (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). In each country we conducted at least one FGD and a minimum of five KIIs with our target respondents. (Details of data collected per country will be in Chapter 5 of this report).

Limitations of the Research

The CMT in 2021, encountered a least two limitations. The first, one has been a limitation since the onset of the research on 2019, namely the question of how many indicators could be included per conflict level, and secondly, how to ensure that indicators were representative of a specific conflict level. The questionnaire could also not have too many indicators as this would make it cumbersome for a respondent to fill in. These challenges were addressed by ensuring that a thorough literature review was conducted on conflict in each country. From the literature review indicators were selected that could be considered representative of a conflict level, and also deemed universal across the four countries to ensure reliability of the questionnaire.

Secondly, in Kenya, aiming at covering all counties in Kenya resulted in wide coverage (data collected from 22 counties) but sparse representation per County. Data analysis was therefore only conducted in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Uasin Gishu and Isiolo. Locations that were most prone to conflict in the country and had at least 13 respondents.

3. DATA ANALYSIS

Application of Conflict Monitoring Tool and Data Analysis

Below is a summary of the data analysis procedure and report for the four countries. Data analysis for Kenya was undertaken as per regions within the country, while the data analysis for DRC, Ethiopia and South Sudan was analyzed as a country. For DRC data collection only took place in the Eastern part of the country.

Data analysis was conducted using both qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods. Content analysis was applied for questions 13 and 15 of the questionnaire which were open-ended questions. Statistical descriptive analysis was applied to questions 1 – 6 and 14. Questions 1 – 3 were mainly used to get an indication of the profession (to identify the source of information given) and location (to identify the location of conflict). On the other hand, questions 3 – 6 and 14 gave additional information on the current conflict in the region, thus giving background information on the level of conflict index calculated. Finally, questions 7 – 12 were used to identify and calculate the level of conflict using a formula developed by the Centre for Research, Teaching, and Publication (CRTP) to specifically calculate the level of conflict.

Below is the specific procedure for analyzing the level of conflict.

Step 1: Identification of Indicators of Conflict

Thirty-four (34) indicators were used to calculate the statistical rating of the severity of the conflicts. Each level had a unique group of indicators. A full list of the indicators under each of the five levels of conflict are listed in Appendix B.

Step 2: Rating Participants' Responses

The indicators were presented to the participants of the study who rated them using a four-point Likert scale. The Likert scale measured whether these indicators were observed and if so, the frequency of their occurrence. In this case, the choices of the scale were '*Not observed*', '*Rarely Observed*', '*Sometimes Observed*', and '*Consistently Observed*'.

Step 3: Summarizing Participants' Responses

The primary data from each country were summarized using frequencies for each indicator under the four choices of the Likert scale. The more such indicators for category one [levels zero (0), negative two (-2), and a negative one (-1)] are observed, the higher the chances that the region or country is either enjoying relative peace or moving towards the realization of peace. On the contrary, the more consistent indicators for category two [levels one (1), two (2), and three (3)] are observed, the higher the chance that the conflict situation is escalating.

Step 4: Weighting the Responses

Weights were introduced for the four categories of the Likert Scale because a 'Not observed' case of an indicator contributes differently in determining the conflict level compared to another case of 'Consistently observed' response of the same indicator. However, the weighting for the responses for indicators levels zero (0), negative two (-2), and a negative one (-1) and those for levels one (1), two (2), and three (3) were rated in reverse order. This was meant to maintain consistency in calculating the conflict levels. In other words, the weighting of the '**Not observed**' indicators in category one was meant to mirror the **'Consistently observed'** category two indicators and vice versa.

Example:

The first indicator in conflict Level zero (L_0I_1) states:

[L_0I_1]: There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to proceed without interruption

(The consistent observation of this indicator means that the country is experiencing peace.)

The first indicator in conflict Level one (L_1I_1) states:

[L_1I_1]: There are complaints of economic hardships (drastic increase in inflation, high cost of living)

(The consistent observation of this indicator means that the conflict situation is escalating.)

In this example, a **'Consistently Observed'** response for L_0I_1 implies a '**Not Observed**' response for L_1I_1. Theory indicates that it is less likely that an enabling environment envisioned in L_0I_1 will be accompanied by consistently observed complaints of economic hardships as stated in L_1I_1. Therefore, the weighting of the responses for the two categories of indicators was based on the following interpretations.

(i)   An increase in the frequency in which category one indicators are observed means that the conflict is de-escalating and vice versa.

(ii)   An increase in the frequency in which category two indicators are observed means that the conflict is escalating and vice versa.

Table 4 below shows the weights that were assigned for the responses for each conflict level.

Table 4: Weighting of Participants' Responses

Level	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
Level 0	3	2	1	0.01
Level 1	0.01	1	2	3
Level 2	0.01	1	2	3
Level 3	0.01	1	2	3
Level -2	3	2	1	0.01
Level -1	3	2	1	0.01

(Source: CRTP Research)

Table 4 below presents a summary of country-weighted means per each of the 34 indicators. In this case, the interpretation is that a greater weighted mean depicts a case of a higher conflict level. To build lasting peace, actors should seek to ensure that these weighted means are as close to zero as possible. In this case, zero is the ideal weighted mean where the region or country enjoys absolute peace. For example, all indicators in level zero, negative two, and negative one should be consistently observed for the region to have absolute peace. On the contrary, none of the indicators in levels one, two, and three of the CMT should be observed in an ideal situation of absolute peace. Since the utopian situation of absolute peace cannot be practically achieved, the levels of conflict under the CMT are expected to oscillate between negative two and positive three.

Figure 10: Conflict Level Constants in DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan

Conflict Level	Indicator	DRC	Ethiopia	Kenya	South Sudan
	There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to proceed without interruption.	1.85	1.76	1.08	1.59
	There is peaceful co-existence between different ethnic communities	0.94	1.25	0.96	1.51
	The government at different levels are providing adequate public services	1.92	1.26	1.29	1.63

Level 0	There are good relations between the government and the international community	0.94	1.26	0.89	1.49
	There is perceived equitable distribution of resources	2.26	1.43	1.83	1.93
	There is perceived low levels of corruption	2.05	1.81	2.09	1.76
	There is enjoyment of human rights (bill of rights)	2.18	1.69	1.36	1.78
	Level Total	**1.73**	**1.49**	**1.36**	**1.67**
	There are complaints of economic hardships, e.g. high cost of living	1.32	2.24	2.58	1.81
	Unresolved historical grievances are being brought up and discussed	1.99	2.08	1.92	1.39
	Perceived social exclusion by some communities/groups	1.52	2.03	2.18	1.59
Level 1	There are reports of hate-speech or inflammatory remarks by leaders and youth groups	1.26	2.27	2.18	1.68
	There is a rise in the level of criminal activities/gang groups	2.22	1.51	2.12	1.83
	Discontent over lack of provision of social services by the government	2.42	1.48	2.18	1.90
	Level Total	**1.79**	**1.94**	**2.19**	**1.70**
	There are violent demonstrations /riots	2.3	1.97	1.57	1.46
	There is acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors	1.87	1.81	1.48	1.78
Level 2	The protagonists have preference for armed violent confrontation over peaceful resolution to conflict	1.56	1.85	1.51	1.81
	Existence of inter-ethnic /clan mobilization or groupings for violence	1.46	2.09	1.83	1.73
	There is an increase in negative propaganda to promote violence	1.12	1.6	1.89	1.68
	There is increased reports of human rights violations e.g. armed robbery, police brutality, kidnappings, murder, gender and sexual based violence etc.	2.37	2.05	2.16	1.76
	There is a disruption of economic activities e.g. looting and theft/destruction of property	1.76	1.53	1.77	2.00
	Level Total	**1.78**	**1.84**	**1.74**	**1.75**
	There is open conflict between different groups and damage of properties	1.59	2.07	1.46	1.95
	There is media information blackout	1.2	1.07	1.27	1.90
Level 3	Government is unable to provide security to its citizens as a result of conflict	2.28	1.32	1.65	2.05

	There is displacement of citizens which could lead to a humanitarian crisis as a result of conflict	2.07	2.11	1.50	1.98
	There is presence of government security forces to intervene against violent conflict or are involved in the conflict	1.62	1.95	1.66	1.98
	There are attempts at international interventions through regional/international bodies	1.42	1.55	1.08	2.10
	There are reports of an unusually high number of deaths and injuries	2.14	1.6	1.48	2.00
	There are reports of an unusually high number of sexual violence against men, women and children	1.98	1.19	1.68	1.51
	Level Total	**1.79**	**1.61**	**1.47**	**1.93**
	There is a reduction in the intensity of warfare	1.43	1.38	1.35	1.71
	There is ceasefire	1.51	2.07	1.52	1.49
Level -2	Some combatants have surrendered their arms	1.08	1.7	1.94	1.54
	Some combatants are moving to cantonment areas	1.53	1.85	2.08	1.56
	Key actors in conflict are involved in peace processes	1.68	2.12	1.36	1.49
	Peace agreements have been signed by protagonists	1.22	2.26	1.83	1.39
	Peacebuilding activities have been initiated	0.92	1.73	1.02	1.56
	Level Total	**1.34**	**1.87**	**1.59**	**1.53**
	Refugees and IDPs are returning back home	1.08	1.07	1.62	1.51
	Regular economic activities are resuming	0.89	1	1.21	1.56
Level -1	There is an improved security situation as a result of the presence of government security agencies to protect civilians	1.43	1	1.20	1.76
	A government justice process has been initiated to address conflict crimes	1.64	1.42	1.68	1.76
	There is an absence of violence or fear of violence	1.87	1.4	1.38	1.61
	The causes of conflict are currently being addressed	1.05	1.41	1.60	1.69
	Level Total	**1.33**	**1.22**	**1.45**	**1.65**

(Source: CRTP Research)

Step 5: Introduction of Constants

Constants were then introduced in each conflict level. The aim of introducing the constant

was to uniquely identify the conflict levels on a scale between negative two (-2) and positive three (+3) as earlier stated. The constants for levels 0, 1, 2, 3, -2, and -1 were 0, 1, 2, 3, -2, and -1 respectively. In other words, all the values in the data summary were multiplied by constants respective to their conflict level. Also, the total frequencies were also multiplied by the constants.

Step 6: computation of the Conflict Level

From the results from step 5 above, the level of conflict was calculated using the following formula.

Figure 11: Formula for Calculating the Conflict Level

$$C1 = \frac{\sum c_{ij}[(f_{ij})W_{ij}]}{\sum (c_{ij}f_{ij})}$$

Where
   $C1$ = the conflict level
   c_{ij} = the constant of the ith row in the jth column
   f_{ij} = the frequency for the ith row under the jth column
   w_{ij} = the weighting for the ith row under the jth column
   i = the indicator number listed from level 0 to level -1 and appearing as rows
   j = Likert scale options that are listed in four columns as *'Not observed'*, *'Rarely observed', 'Sometimes observed',* and *'Consistently observed.'*

(Source: CRTP Research)

The findings of the HIPSIR CMT (2020) are in the following section.

4. DATA ANALYSIS REPORTS

Democratic Republic of Congo

(Source: Creative Commons)

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is not new to conflict having experienced years of conflict especially in the Eastern regions of the country. Taking advantage of a weak security structure as well as widespread underdevelopment, armed groups have proliferated in the region, leading to increased instability, the loss of lives, the destruction of property and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, in addition to rising

food insecurity for millions in the country.[42] Consequently the humanitarian situation in the country is critical, with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) categorizing it as one of the most neglected crises in the world due to "overwhelming needs and an acute lack of funding, as well as media and diplomatic inattention."[43]

In May 2021, President Tshisekedi declared a state of siege in North Kivu and Ituri to address the insecurity in the regions due to armed groups.[44] The state of siege was aimed at giving the military the mandate to respond to the proliferation of armed groups. Later on 22 May 2021, Mt Nyiragongo, erupted leading to the death of at least 32 people and the displacement of 234,000 people alongside the destruction of property.[45]

Conflict Level: 2.45

With a conflict level of 2.45. The DRC is on the confrontational stage of conflict. This relates to escalating rivalry between opposing conflict parties. It is displayed by incidences of open conflict. If left unaddressed there could be an escalation in the frequency and intensity of conflict.

Data Collected:

- 150 questionnaires (hard copies)

- 2 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), 1 Bukavu, 1 Goma

- 8 Key Informant Interviews, 3 – Bukavu, 5 – Goma

- 1 validation meeting in Goma

Data collection was conducted in the Eastern region of the country between June and July 2021, collecting data across North Kivu province and South Kivu province. Therefore the conflict level is indicative of conflict in the Eastern region of DRC. Due to limited internet connectivity in the region, using an online questionnaire was not effective; therefore data was collected using hard copy questionnaires The questionnaire was also translated into French in order to facilitate an easier data collection process. Respondents for this research were engaged during the data collection process, seeking to know how they could get the findings of the research after the data collection process. Many were

42 European Commission, "Democratic Republic of the Congo – Increasing Violence," June 02, 2021, https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/daily-flash-archive/4209 (accessed August 18, 2021).
43 Norwegian Refugee Council, "DR Congo Tops List of World's Most Neglected Crises," May 27, 2021, Website, https://www.nrc.no/news/2021/may/dr-congo-tops-list-of-worlds-most-neglected-crises/ (accessed August 17, 2021).
44 European Commission, "Democratic Republic of the Congo – Increasing Violence," June 02, 2021, https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/daily-flash-archive/4209 (accessed August 18, 2021).
45 United Nations Children's Fund, "UNICEF Democratic Republic of Congo Humanitarian Situation Report No. 5," https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report%20No.%205%20-%20May%202021.pdf (accessed August 16, 2021).

also curious to know how the research could be used to address conflict in the region which they recognize contributes to the underdevelopment of the region.

Respondent Profile:

Geographical Representation - In North Kivu, data was collected in Goma, Rutchuru, Sake, Beni and Masisi, while in South Kivu data was collected in Bukavu, Kalehe and Uvira. Cumulatively, in the region, 59% of the respondents were from North Kivu, while 40% were from South Kivu. Specifically, 53% of the respondents were from Goma, while 36% of the respondents were from Bukavu, the remaining 11% of the respondents represented other regions in both provinces.

Profession, Experience and Knowledge of Conflict – The majority of the respondents for this research in the Eastern region of DRC were peace practitioners representing 32% of the respondents. They were followed by respondents from academia (22%), political/community leaders (14%) and civil society (13%). There was consequently a relatively even distribution of professions across the respondents, representing various perspectives of the peace and conflict situation in the region. In addition, overall 44% of the respondents had 3 – 4 years of experience in their profession while 42% had more than 5 years of experience in their profession, giving an indication that respondents had adequate experience in their areas of profession to comment on peace and security issues in the country. For the FGD and KIIs in Goma and Bukavu, the participants and interviewees were representatives from civil society, government, religious organizations, women, youth, community leadership and media representatives.

Understanding the types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations prevalent in Eastern DRC

When asked what types of conflicts or human rights violations respondents had observed in the region, 53% of the respondents pointed to armed robbery as being the most prevalent type of conflict in the region, while 48% of the respondents perceived Sexual and Gender Based Violence to be the most prevalent human rights violation in the region. In addition, another 47% highlighted theft as being most prevalent in the region. Similar to the types of conflict highlighted by respondents in the CMT-2020, these types of conflicts as highlighted by respondents in this current study are often activities carried out by armed groups. This is indicative of the proliferation of armed groups in the region as well as a weak security sector that is unable to guarantee security for citizens of the Eastern region of DRC. The Center on International Cooperation and the Kivu

Security Tracker has recorded over 120 armed groups currently active in DRC.[46] Many of these armed groups have existed for decades and are sometimes splinter groups of other groups.[47] They also range from "disorganized village militias to professional rebel organizations"[48] and include foreign and local armed groups. Activities of armed groups have manifested in a spike in kidnappings, killings and the displacement of people.[49] In August 2021, a press release from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that within the span of two weeks:

> Humanitarian workers in Kongolo and Mbulula (Tanganyika Province) had recorded 243 incidents of rape, 48 of which involved minors, in 12 different villages. This is an average of 17 reported attacks each day. The actual figures are thought to be even higher as reporting of gender-based violence (GBV) remains taboo in most communities. In addition to the huge physical and psychological trauma from being raped, survivors of sexual violence can face stigma and possible exclusion from their families.[50]

The state of siege declared by the president in May 2021 is an indication of the impact that armed groups have had on the region. As a result, of the state of siege, "civilian governance was transferred to a military governor and a police vice-governor, and increased powers of search and arrest were given to the police and military"[51] to "swiftly end the insecurity which is killing our fellow citizens in that part of the country on a daily basis."[52]

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46 Center on International Cooperation, "The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo: Missed Opportunities, Protracted Insecurity, and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies," Website, https://cic.nyu.edu/publications/landscape-armed-groups-eastern-congo-missed-opportunities-protracted-insecurity-and (accessed August 18, 2021)

47 Ibid.

48 "The national army and armed groups in the eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of insecurity," Rift Valley Institute, Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen, and Maria Eriksson Baaz, 2013,8

49 Lisa Schlein, "UN Alarmed by Atrocities by Armed Groups in Eastern DRC," *VOA News*, February 11, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/africa/un-alarmed-atrocities-armed-groups-eastern-drc (accessed August 20, 2021)

50 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, "UNHCR gravely concerned about systematic sexual violence in DR Congo's Tanganyika Province," August 13, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2021/8/611618344/unhcr-gravely-concerned-systematic-sexual-violence-dr-congos-tanganyika.html (August 20, 2021)

51 Security Council Report, "Monthly Forecast, July 2021," 6,https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF-CF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2021_07_forecast.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021)

52 "DRC declares 'state of siege' in violence-hit eastern provinces," Al Jazeera, May 01, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/1/dr-congo-declares-state-of-siege-in-violence-hit-provinces (accessed August 16, 2021)

Figure 12: Types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Eastern DRC

(Source: CRTP Research)

While most of the population welcomed the government's involvement in addressing conflict in the region, analysts have wondered how effective the government will be.[53] These armed groups profit from not only minerals but also trade in charcoal, hardwood, cannabis, fish and wild animals.[54] They also rely heavily on illegal taxation and food collection from villages to survive.[55] The Kivu Security Tracker opines that, "much of the violence in the eastern Congo is driven by the need of armed groups, most of whom have existed in their current or previous incarnations for many years, to survive by extracting resources and fighting for their turf. Outside interventions to disrupt this inertia have not been successful."[56] Beyond the activities of armed groups participants of the FGD in Goma spoke of ethnic and land-based conflicts as being equally prevalent. On the other hand participants in the Bukavu FGD identified land disputes, conflict related to politics and elections as well as identity conflicts between communities.

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53 "DRC declares 'state of siege' in violence-hit eastern provinces," Al Jazeera, May 01, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/1/dr-congo-declares-state-of-siege-in-violence-hit-provinces (accessed August 16, 2021)

54 Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen and Maria Eriksson Baaz, "The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity," *Rift Valley Institute*, 35, https://riftvalley.net/sites/default/files/publication-documents/RVI%20Usalama%20Project%2011%20The%20National%20Army.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021)

55 Ibid.

56 Kivu Security Tracker Report, "The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo: Missed Opportunities, Protracted Insecurity, and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies," February 2021, 8.

What is driving Conflict in Eastern DRC?

Vast quantities of literature have been produced on the triggers of conflict in Eastern DRC in a bid to understand the possible factors that ensure conflict is protracted, while exploring possible strategic interventions. That being said, conflict in the DRC is often perceived and presented as being resource based conflict. However, deeper investigation reveals that conflict in the region is far more complex and nuanced. 82% of the respondents perceived unemployment as being the most prevalent conflict driver, followed by 62% of the respondents who pointed to the proliferation of armed groups and finally 60% tied the triggers of conflict in the Eastern region to government failure (in providing basic needs, security).

In general unemployment in any country is a cause of concern as it has impacts on economic growth and development. In the case of DRC, high rates of unemployment, especially youth unemployment, often have an impact on conflict as well. Specifically, youth who do not have gainful employment will resort to joining armed groups for financial gain or even in pursuit of purpose. As one interviewee from civil society put it, "*the lack of employment leads some people and young people in particular to resort to illegal weapons to obtain daily bread by force and by means of violence.*"

The complexity of the context that young people find themselves in was illustrated in a study conducted by Search For Common Ground (SFCG). The study revealed that, "a range of political, socio-economic, and social-psychological push factors contribute to an individual choosing to partake in violence. The range of responses and push factors suggest that rather than there being a single dominant factor, the final decision to commit violence is the result of a complex interaction between different push factors."[57] Therefore, while unemployment may be said to be an umbrella push factor to youth being involved in armed conflict, beneath it are a myriad of factors that require attention. On the other hand when it comes to government failure being a trigger of conflict, this points to both the administrative aspects of government in providing services for the citizens and also speaks of a failure of government to protect citizens.

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[57] Search for Common Ground, *Perceived Risk Factors Driving Youth Involvement in Violence in Eastern DRC: Situational Analysis and Programming Options*, April 2021, 23.

Figure 13: Key Drivers of Conflict in Eastern DRC

(Source: CRTP Research)

This was further emphasized by 80% of the Goma FGD participants who highlighted the causes of conflict in Eastern DRC as being, "*Impunity, lack of will of the leaders; inheritance disputes, lack of property titles, lack of implementation of land laws, corruption of administration and justice officials and the marginalization of the weak, poverty, non-collaboration between communities, and unfair sharing of land.*" Land disputes in Eastern DRC continue to increase as individuals and communities compete over limited land resources. Gillian Mathys and Koen Vlassenroot confirm this identifying several land related factors that lead to conflict. These are:

> The existence of overlapping legal frameworks and weaknesses in statutory land law; increased competition over land, including among elites and between autochthonous and migrant communities, sometimes resulting from large-scale displacement; and the poor performance of the administration and justice system in the settlement of land disputes.[58]

Land disputes are therefore often, "related to wider conflict dynamics, which are the result of an interplay between struggles for power and resources, identity narratives and territorial claims."[59] However, in as much as land conflicts feature prominently in conflict in Eastern DRC, they are often overlooked, [60] subsumed within the larger discourse of

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58 Gillian Mathys and Koen Vlassenroot, *'It's not all about the Land': Land disputes and Conflict in the Eastern Congo*, Rift Valley Institute, PSRP Briefing Paper 14, September 2014, 1.

59 Ibid.

60 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Guidance Note, "Land and People in Protracted Crises: Building stability on the land," 4, http://www.fao.org/3/i6635e/i6635e.pdf

resource based conflict (focused on mineral resources). The triggers of conflict in Eastern DRC, therefore, reflect the complexities that often characterize protracted conflict.

Who is most responsible for conflict in Eastern DRC?

In understanding the parties most involved in conflict, 62% of the respondents pointed to the Government (police, army) as being most responsible for conflict in the region. On the other hand 43% perceived prominent individuals (opposition leaders, rebel leaders, government leaders, community leaders) to be most responsible, while 37% of the respondents highlighted neighboring countries/Individual states and regional/ international state actors (AU, UN, EU) as being most responsible for the conflict. Participants in the Bukavu FGD gave similar views pointing to the international community as well as foreign and national armed groups as being most responsible for conflict in the region. On the other hand members of a validation exercise conducted in Goma, emphasized that when it came to government being responsible for conflict in the region, government was not limited to the police and army but more importantly includes the executive, judiciary and parliament. Since these arms of government are decision making arms of government. As highlighted in the previous section, government failure is reflective of both an inability to provide services for the citizens and also in the inability to protect citizens.

Figure 14: Conflict Actors Most Responsible for Conflict in Eastern DRC

Actors	Most responsible	Moderately responsible	Responsible	Not responsible	Unsure
Government (police, army)	62%	25%	9%	2%	2%
Armed groups/political militia groups	36%	40%	17%	5%	1%
Prominent individuals (opposition leaders, rebel leaders, government leaders, community leaders)	43%	34%	17%	1%	5%
Neighboring countries/Individual states	37%	26%	21%	4%	11%
Regional/International state actors (AU, UN, EU)	37%	33%	13%	5%	12%
Multinational corporations	32%	28%	23%	4%	13%

(Source: CRTP Research)

Founded in 2003, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) has been plagued with factionalism,[61] and other dysfunctions that impede its

61 Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen and Maria Eriksson Baaz, "The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity," Rift Valley Institute, 44, https://riftvalley.net/sites/default/files/pub-

ability to function as it should. Consequently, it has been accused of being in cohorts with armed groups and perpetuating human rights violations such as sexual and gender based violence.[62]   Not surprisingly, this has eroded government's credibility and good will amongst citizens in the Eastern region. One interviewee from a religious organization asked to identify the actors most responsible for conflict, concurred with the questionnaire findings stating that,

> Key actors are first of all the authorities (The politicians who are thirsty for power and want to acquire it by means of violence and repression), then the governments of the states of the region, who do not make good decisions. They do not go in depth in relation to the real causes of the conflicts in the region, the tendency is to respond superficially but the real problems are not addressed.

This statement expresses the frustration of many with government and their leaders. Beyond this, neighboring countries have played a significant role in the conflict in the region. For instance Rwanda and Burundi wage their own wars in the region,[63] with several armed groups such as the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Front national de libération (FNL) from Burundi.[64] Attacks by these foreign groups have caused Congolese to counter mobilize in defense.[65] Internationally, there have been calls by citizens to have MONUSCO wind up its activities in the country stating that it been unable to protect citizens in the Eastern region.[66]

What are the biggest challenges to resolving conflict in Eastern DRC?

With regard to resolving conflict in DRC, 63% of the respondents highlighted peace agreements not being fully implemented, as being the biggest hindrance to addressing conflict, while 62% of the respondents pointed to lack of political good will, international interference by external actors and COVID-19 pandemic challenges as being the biggest hindrances to addressing conflict in the region. While several peace agreements have been signed in DRC to this effect, in many instances these peace agreements have not been fully implemented resulting in an escalation of conflict. For example the Sun City Accords signed in 2002, that finally among other agreements led to the Global and Inclusive Agreement of December 2002 was scuttled with political leaders not honoring

lication-documents/RVI%20Usalama%20Project%2011%20The%20National%20Army.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021)
62   Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, Peace & Security Report, "The Democratic Republic Of Congo (DRC) Conflict Insights DRC," April 2021, 6.
63   Kivu Security Tracker Report, "The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo: Missed Opportunities, Protracted Insecurity, and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies," February 2021, 8.
64   Ibid., 9
65   Ibid., 9.
66   David Zounmenou, "Anti-MONUSCO protests send a clear message to Tshisekedi," *Institute of Security Studies*, May 05, 2021, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/anti-monusco-protests-send-a-clear-message-to-tshisekedi (accessed August 20, 2021).

their commitments.[67] Participants form the validation on the other hand added that it was rather the constitution not being honored that was a significant challenge to conflict resolution.

Figure 15: Challenges to resolving conflict in Eastern DRC

Challenges	Very Challenging	Moderately Challenging	Not a Challenge	Not sure if it is a Challenge
Lack of political goodwill	62%	34%	1%	3%
Authoritative government	25%	45%	13%	17%
Fragile government	42%	36%	10%	13%
Mis-trust amongst parties in conflict	27%	44%	17%	12%
Negotiations not involving all parties	41%	43%	6%	10%
Tensions between parties unabated	26%	51%	15%	9%
Breakdown of peace talks	29%	50%	6%	15%
Peace agreements not fully implemented	63%	26%	7%	4%
Unmet demands from conflict parties	32%	35%	13%	19%
Exclusion of other interest groups in peace talks (e.g. women's groups, community based organizations etc)	27%	47%	9%	17%
External funding of armed groups	59%	32%	1%	7%
Availability of small arms and light weapons	56%	42%	2%	1%
Poor development in the region/country	38%	43%	12%	7%
Unresolved grievances from past conflicts	44%	52%	2%	2%
International interference by external actors	62%	36%	1%	0%
COVID-19 pandemic challenges	62%	30%	1%	7%

(Source: CRTP Research)

Peace agreements between the government and armed groups in the Eastern DRC have been numerous but not effective in effectively addressing conflict. While the intra-state peace agreement between the DRC government and the M23 armed group (2013)[68] and the *Déclaration finale du forum sur la paix dans le territoire de Nyunzu* signed in 2015 between the pygmies and Luba tribe,[69] helped address specifics groups and conflicts, peace agreements have been limited in their effectiveness. Closely linked to this is lack of political good will to address conflict in the country. While there have been numerous

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67 Paul Nantulya, "When Peace Agreements Fail: Lessons from Lesotho, Burundi, and DRC," The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, April 30, 2021, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/when-peace-agreements-fail-lessons-from-lesotho-burundi-and-drc/(accessed (accessed August 20, 2021).
68 United Nations Peace Maker, "Peace Agreements Database Search," https://peacemaker.un.org/declaration-Nyun-zu-2015 (accessed November 19, 2021).
69 Ibid.

attempts by the government to address conflicts in the region, many of these attempts have been unsuccessful and consequently citizens have been skeptical of the government and political class's commitment to addressing conflict. This challenge is compounded by political leaders often employing the services of armed groups to advance their careers. A report by the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) explains why this is often the case:

> Liaising with armed groups yields numerous advantages for political actors. First, it reinforces their power within their local constituencies. Not only does it enhance their influence over local authorities, it also provides an edge in conflicts and in electoral and economic competition. Furthermore, maintaining contacts to armed groups allows political actors to increase their popular support, especially where armed groups are seen to safeguard communities' interests and security. An enhanced local power position may in turn translate into increased access to provincial and national power circles. By having leverage over armed groups and being able to mobilize local followers, politicians and businesspersons become people to reckon with.[70]

Within this context good will towards resolving conflict from political leaders is hard to come by. If anything, political leaders through their linkages with armed groups, contribute to protracted conflict in the region. These sentiments were echoed during the Goma FGD and interviews, where the challenges of conflict resolution were highlighted as being "*the non-existence of a rule of law and poor governance, poor conflict management, lack and / or insufficiency in the popularization of land laws, lack of understanding of certain leaders, the search for the private interests of certain ill-intentioned people, and lack of dialogue between the different actors of conflict.*"

Economic Impact of Conflict in Eastern DRC

Conflict does not occur in isolation restricted to the belligerents, rather conflict is often all consuming with various impacts on the society and economy. In the case of Eastern DRC respondents highlighted that conflict in the region had had a significant impact on agricultural activities in several ways. For instance due to conflict there was limited access to agricultural lands, making it difficult to transport agricultural produce from farms to markets. Armed groups also took over agricultural land preventing residents from cultivating their land. Consequently, conflict ensured that agricultural activities were stalled for fear of being attacked. With regard to mining activities, for fear of being attacked miners will be hesitant to go out and mine, which has an impact on their livelihoods and ability to meet basic needs. In addition, some respondents explained

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70 Judith Verweijen and Claude Iguma Wakenge, "Understanding Armed Group Proliferation in the Eastern Congo," Rift Valley Institute PSRP Briefing Paper 7, December 2015, 2, https://riftvalley.net/sites/default/files/publication-documents/Understanding%20Armed%20Group%20Proliferation%20in%20the%20Eastern%20Congo%20by%20Judith%20Verweijen%20and%20Claude%20Iguma%20Wakenge%20-%20RVI%20PSRP%20Usalama%20Project%20Briefing%20%282015%29.pdf (accessed August 16, 2021)

that because of ill negotiated mining contracts the country and consequently the citizens barely benefited from mining activities by international organizations. Finally, armed groups often burn down shops and market centers preventing economic activities form thriving. All these factors alongside others inter-play to ensure that citizens are left in poverty and not surprisingly several Key Informant Interviewees pointed to poverty as being a driver of conflict in the region. In many instances, poverty has led young people to join armed groups creating a cycle that self-perpetuates, and thus entrenching conflict in the region. Therefore, addressing conflict in the region requires looking into the economic triggers and benefits of conflict indicative of a greed and grievance theory being played out in the region.

Resolving Conflict in DRC

Throughout the long history of conflict in the Eastern region of the country, peace interventions have been undertaken at different levels and using various strategies to address the conflict. Some of the most effective peace interventions so far in the region according to respondents were:

Communally (Peace interventions within and by the local community/location/County)

Several respondents highlighted the effectiveness of peace awareness programs, within the Eastern region of DRC which have allowed residents in the region to be more equipped on issues of peace and conflict. These programs also target the youth who are most likely to be involved in conflict. For instance through collaboration with peace committees at the communal level, the World Food Program (WPF) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) were able to help restore social cohesion, in the Tanganyika province where there have been violent clashes between different communities for years.[71] Prayer was also highlighted by several respondents has being an effective peace intervention.

Nationally (peace interventions at the national level)

Effective peace interventions at the national level were similar to those at the communal level with participants highlighting that dialogue and peace talks had been most effective. Peace fora were also mentioned as being effective. For instance there is the Beni Peace Forum which brings together 25 local organizations to report on violence and human rights violations in Eastern DRC. It is also involved in training its member

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71 Katarzyna Jaskiewicz and Ben Anguandia, "Food for peace: WFP and FAO Work to end Conflict and Hunger in DRC," ReliefWeb, May21, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/food-peace-wfp-and-fao-work-end-conflict-and-hunger-drc (accessed August 19, 2021)

on monitoring and response. The network has "strengthened communication and trust between authorities and communities,"[72] which is especially crucial within a context of mistrust of government authorities. On the other hand PAX has been involved in projects in Eastern DRC that seek to strengthen relations between state and the society.[73]

Regionally (EAC, IGAD, Africa Union etc.)

At the regional level, respondents pointed to regional peace conferences, and peace accords as being most effective at addressing the conflict in as much as successes have been limited. Dialogue was also an important aspect of these peace interventions. Regional interventions in the conflict in DRC are complex because as it stands some of the country's neighbors are parties to the conflict. Therefore, while peace agreements such as the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region (2013), signed by 11 countries in the region including Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda,[74] has made some steps in increasing regional security cooperation, [75]there is still much that the region can do to address conflict in the Eastern region of DRC.

Internationally (UN, other countries/organizations outside Africa)

International peace interventions were similar with regional peace interventions. Respondents once again highlighted the importance, of dialogue and mediation, peace fora that create awareness on the importance of peace. MONUSCO would be considered an international peace intervention. However, as already discussed, citizens have little faith in MONUSCO's ability to protect them from armed groups. Consequently there is a significant push, especially from the public to have MONUSCO wind down their activities in Eastern DRC. This section had the least responses perhaps highlighting that respondents had little information of peace interventions at the international level and if any how effective they had been.

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72 Peace Direct, "DR Congo, "Website." https://www.peacedirect.org/where-we-work/dr-congo/ (accessed August 20, 2021).

73 PAX, "Restoring trust between state and society in DR Congo," https://paxforpeace.nl/what-we-do/programmes/restoring-trust-between-state-and-society-in-dr-congo (accessed August 20, 2021).

74 United Nations Peace Maker, "Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, February 24, 2013, https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-framework-agreement2013 (accessed August 20, 2021).

75 United Nations Security Council, "Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, March 23, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2021_306_E.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).

Recommendations for Resolving Conflict in Eastern DRC

With regard to possible interventions that could be considered to address conflict in the Eastern region of DRC, respondents gave several recommendations:

Government and Security:

Government has the responsibility to provide security for its citizens, therefore, prioritizing the issue of security in the region is of utmost importance, while the state of siege enforced in North Kivu was intended to address increasing armed group activity in the region, the national assembly in November 2021, noted that it has done little to address insecurity. Therefore rather than have a state of siege that has been ineffective, government should analyze its response to conflict in the region, with the aim of looking for more effective avenues for ensuring security. One such idea could be to promote collaboration between the population and the military so that the population can help the army to identify members of armed groups. Politicians can also play a role in supporting security measures by desisting from supporting armed groups for their selfish interests. Differences with neighboring countries should also be addressed as this is another source of conflict.

Economy and Unemployment:

Job creation should also be prioritized, since many of the young people involved in armed groups often do so because of lack of employment. The government should also ease the means of doing business as this will encourage more people to be involved in businesses to support themselves. For instance women who open small businesses are often threatened by police and therefore cannot freely carry out their businesses. In addition, there is a multiplicity of taxes which slow down the development of young people in entrepreneurship.

Peacebuilding Activities:

Continual training on peaceful conflict resolution is required as these are avenues that can be used even by ordinary citizens to address conflict in their communities. With regard to high level mediation, there is the need to understand the antecedents of conflict as this will better inform conflict resolutions mechanisms. Beyond this, there is also the need to intensify awareness raising of surrendering weapons and the fight against the illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons in the population.

Conflict Level Trends in DRC

CRTP has monitored conflict in DRC for three years. In 2019, the conflict level was 1.834 with respondents highlighting the biggest challenges to conflict resolution as being, unrealistic demands from conflict parties, poor development in the country, and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. This is indicative of the complexity of resolving conflict in a country that lacks strong and stable government leadership whilst still being a country endowed with vast natural resources. In 2020, DRC had a conflict level of 1.04. Impediments to resolving conflict as indicated by respondents in 2020 were lack of political will, interference by external actors (neighboring countries or international countries) and unresolved grievances from past conflicts. A lower conflict in 2020, was also impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic with regard to accessing respondents as well as the quality of respondents. However, that aside the activities of armed groups in the Eastern region of the country were still reported.

Ethiopia

(Source: Creative Commons)

Ethiopia conducted elections on June 21, 2021, the first since 2005. Although some parties (such as the Oromo Liberation Front) boycotted the elections with claims that the elections were biased, the elections were largely conducted peacefully with a majority of the citizens stating that these were the most democratic elections that the country had conducted. According to the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, "Voter turnout was just more than 90 percent among the more than 37 million people who had been registered to vote."[76] The results were announced on July 10, 2021, with the ruling Prosperity Party winning 410 out of the 436 seats.[77] However, the elections were overshadowed by ongoing conflict in the Tigray region of the country as well as ethnic violence and the displacements of millions.[78] Conflict in Ethiopia has escalated in the recent past leading to the deaths and the displacement of millions.[79]

Conflict Level: 2.56

A conflict level of 2.56 indicates a confrontational stage of conflict. This stage of conflict is characterized by incidences of open conflict, there is also increased intolerances by rival actors. If no interventions takes place there is the likelihood of widespread escalating open conflict.

Data Collected:

- 101 questionnaires: 38 Survey Monkey, 63 hard copies

- One Focus Discussion Group

- Seven Key Informant Interviews

In Ethiopia data was collected from a total of 101 respondents. 38 responses were collected online using Survey Monkey while 63 responses were collected from hard copy questionnaires. The hard copy questionnaire was translated into Amharic, the official working language of the country. The questionnaire was also translated to Afaan Oromo spoken by the largest ethnic group in the country, the Oromo. Because of historical differences many Oromo are reluctant to speak Amharic.

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76 "Ethiopia: Abiy's Prosperity Party wins landslide election victory," *Al Jazeera*, July 10, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/10/ethiopias-ruling-party-wins-national-election-in-landslide (accessed August 13, 2021).
77 Ibid.
78 "Ethiopia: Abiy's Prosperity Party wins landslide election victory," Al Jazeera, July 10, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/10/ethiopias-ruling-party-wins-national-election-in-landslide (accessed August 13, 2021).
79 International Organization for Migration, "Over 1.7 Million People Displaced Due to Conflict Need Urgent Assistance in Northern Ethiopia: IOM," May 05 2021, https://www.iom.int/news/over-17-million-people-displaced-due-conflict-need-urgent-assistance-northern-ethiopia-iom#:~:text=Addis%20Ababa%20%E2%80%93%20Over%201.7%20million,Displacement%20Tracking%20Matrix%20(DTM). (accessed August, 03, 2021)

Respondents Profile:

Geographical Representation - Over half (56%) of the respondents submitted data for Addis Ababa, 20% of the respondents submitted data for Oromia region, the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) 8% and Amhara region 5%. There was also data submitted representing Dire Dawa and Gambella (3%), Somali, Sidama and Tigray each 1%.

Because of the security situation in the country, it was not possible to visit specific areas of the country where there is ongoing conflict; consequently the majority of the respondents were from areas where there was no open conflict. That said, all the 10 regions of the country had representation in the data collection in as much as conflict in the County varies across regions. Being an inaugural study of the country, this report will present a conflict level of the country as a whole.

Profession, Experience and Knowledge of Conflict - Out of the 101 respondents, the majority were religious leaders 30%, followed by civil society 21%, while academia and government officials were both represented by 10% of the respondents. In addition to this, 87% of the respondents had over 5 years' experience in their profession. More specifically, 25% of the religious leaders had over 5 years' experience, indicating that the respondents for this research were adequately experienced and knowledgeable on conflict and security issues in the country and make a meaningful contribution to understanding conflict in Ethiopia.

Understanding the types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations prevalent in Ethiopia

We asked respondents to identify which conflicts or human rights violations they perceived as most prevalent in their region. 57% of the respondents pointed to armed robbery, while 33% of the respondents indicated that political violence was most prevalent in the country. Lastly, 22% of the respondents perceived inter-ethnic violence to be the most prevalent conflict and/or human rights violations noted in the country. On the other hand, while numerous media reports and articles have highlighted increased inter-ethnic and political violence in the country in recent years, it is worth noting that conversely 49% of the respondents perceived inter-ethnic violence as being less prevalent, while 29% perceived political violence as less prevalent.

This could be attributed to more than half of the respondents being from Addis Ababa, which is home to Ethiopians from various regions and is relatively peaceful, as compared

to some other regions of the country. That being said, one respondent from Addis Ababa highlighted that, "*In the case of Addis Ababa, there is a growing tension between farmers and city dwellers in relation to the extension of Addis Ababa*," reminiscent of violent riots against the government's plans to expand Addis Ababa into Oromo territory in 2014.[80]

With regard to the high score on the prevalence of armed robbery, a peace practitioner working with a religious organization highlighted that in recent times there has been an increase in the availability of arms in the country as well as a rise in *shifta* (outlaws). Availability of arms has led to an increase in armed robbery especially of banks across the country. Other types of conflicts by highlighted by respondents include:

- Religious conflicts between Christians and Muslims

- Boundary disputes, for example between people living in Amaro and the Gujii (Oromo sub-group)

- Resource based conflict e.g. In Benishangul-Gumuz a region which has gold mines in the region and this has been a cause behind evicting residents of the region. The territory being fought over is very strategic as it provides a route to Sudan.

Figure 16: Types of Conflict /Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia

(Source: CRTP Research)

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80 Minority Rights Group International, Website, https://minorityrights.org/2014/08/12/ethiopias-master-plan-good-for-development-damaging-for-minorities-2/ (accessed August 13, 2021).

What is driving Conflict in Ethiopia?

When it came to understanding the key drivers of conflict in the country. 75% of the respondents pointed to ethnicized politics as the most prominent driver of conflict, while 65% of the respondents were of the opinion that the most prominent driver of conflict in the country was unemployment. Finally historical unaddressed grievances (56%) rounded off the top three drivers of conflict in the country.

Figure 17: Key Drivers of Conflict in Ethiopia

(Source: CRTP Research)

These key drivers of conflict in the country as highlighted by respondents is consistent with reports made by news outlets, which have reported incidences of ethnic driven conflict, most often driven by real or perceived historical grievances.[81] For example a news report stated that, "Scores of people have been killed in clashes this year (2020) between the Amhara and the Oromo, Ethiopia's two largest ethnic groups. In the country's west, the Gumuz have been accused of massacring people from both the Amhara and Oromo groups."[82] An interview conducted with peace practitioners from civil society in Ethiopia, affirmed this, stating that there exist historical grievances between the Oromo and Amhara, which have caused conflict.

On the other hand the Tigray conflict in northern Ethiopia is the result of ethnized politics and risks escalating to full blown ethnic conflict as, "with reports that Tigrayan and Amhara forces are recruiting more youths to fight in the country's north."[83] A

81 "Why is ethnic violence surging in Ethiopia?" *Al Jazeera*, April 19, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/19/why-is-ethnic-violence-surging-in-ethiopia (accessed August 13, 2021).
82 Rodney Muhumuza, "Ethiopia 'at a crossroads' amid spiraling ethnic conflict, " AP News, May 04, 2021, https://ap-news.com/article/ethiopia-ethnic-conflicts-coronavirus-africa-health-37b65b752727e265a735c301e59397f0 (accessed August 13, 2021).
83 Mohammed Yusuf, "Observers Worry Tigray Fighting is Shifting to Ethnic Conflict, " VOA News, July 16, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/africa/observers-worry-tigray-fighting-shifting-ethnic-conflict (accessed August 13, 2021).

politician we interviewed described conflict in the country this way, "*Most of the conflict is politically motivated and have ethnic overtones, such as ethnic identity. For example conflict in Benishangul-Gumuz, Amhara and Oromia. Other reasons include attempts at gaining dominance and attaining power over regions and their resources*." The conflicts that the country is experiencing often also have historical antecedents. For instance within the Tigray conflict, there has been conflict between the Amhara and Tigray over the fertile lowland areas of western Tigray. [84] The area was annexed when the dominant TPLF came to power through the EPRDF. As one participant of the FGD conducted in Addis Ababa said, "*one of the causes of conflict is history. For example the country has experienced different ideologies, socialism, and democracy. All these ideologies have their own stream of conflict*." A fellow participant concurring explained the political trajectory of the country:

> The country experienced ethnic federalism in the 1960s with university students and events such as the Wolade uprising. The major ethnic groups were in the middle of these conflicts. In the 1960s while other countries were fighting for freedom, Ethiopia was experiencing socialism. Consequently, in the 1960s students were very much against imperialism which led to the radicalization of students who eventually went on to create and lead groups such as the TPLF. The TPLF were very ethno-centric. Ethnic groups often include existential factors. Ethnic based conflict is an existential factor in Ethiopia and the educated class is very involved in it. Till now universities are centers for discussion and bargaining. – Peace Practitioner

Then what explains the surge in conflict in the country in the recent past? A politician we interviewed, explained it as follows:

> Political change, reforms, this was actually expected to happen. We have previously had a very autocratic government, with citizens enjoying very few rights. For example journalists were often detained. The former EPRDF was in power after Mengistu and this regime was also dictatorial. The new government has given freedoms. Regions which did not have an opportunity before to secede, now have the opportunity to do that. Consequently, there are more than 10 regions that now want their own independent status. Former political parties such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) are now considered terrorists and were opening media houses tec. These new groups have also been a source of conflict. In addition, external pressure from other countries such as Sudan and Egypt, because of GERD are a cause of conflict.

Consequently, when considering the drivers of conflict in Ethiopia, rather than being taken in isolation, where one driver is perceived as more prominent than the other, drivers of conflict in Ethiopia (as is in some other countries in Africa) are more often

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84 Agence France-Presse , "'Survival Struggle': Ethnic Standoff Drives New Phase of Tigray War," VOA News, July 14, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/africa/survival-struggle-ethnic-standoff-drives-new-phase-tigray-war (accessed August 13, 2021).

than not complex and complicated. Intertwined with one another and difficult to address in isolation.

Who is most responsible for conflict in Ethiopia?

There was little disparity on those perceived most responsible for conflict in the country. 38% of the respondents perceived Prominent individuals (opposition leaders, rebel leaders, government leaders, community leaders), as being most responsible for conflict in the country, while 36% placed the most responsibility on Armed groups/political militia groups and 30% respondents pointed to Neighboring countries/Individual states. Other significant mentions of actors most responsible for conflict in Ethiopia include Regional/International state actors (AU, UN, EU) (28%) and the Government (police, army) (24%).

Figure 18: Actors Most Responsible for Conflict in Ethiopia

Actors Responsible	Most responsible	Moderately responsible	Responsible	Not Responsible	Unsure
Government (police, army)	24%	10%	35%	11%	19%
Armed groups/political militia groups	36%	9%	16%	26%	12%
Prominent individuals (opposition leaders, rebel leaders, government leaders, community leaders)	38%	10%	26%	21%	5%
Neighboring countries/Individual states	30%	13%	17%	31%	9%
Regional/International state actors (AU, UN, EU)	28%	5%	18%	33%	16%
Multinational corporations	14%	8%	18%	35%	25%

(Source: CRTP Research)

The mention of Neighboring countries/Individual states as responsible actors was a common thread from the FGD participants and informant interviews, with most respondents highlighting the GERD natural resource conflict between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over the Nile. Most respondents were resistant to other countries' influence with regard to the dam. With regard to the Tigray conflict, some respondents felt that international/regional bodies had failed to address the conflict, while other respondents disagreed stating that the country should solve its own problems, "African solutions to African problems." A sample of divergent respondent views on the role of regional and international communities are indicated below:

Beyond the actors listed above, during our interviews it emerged that on the local level, especially with regard to ethnic and community conflict, women were also actors in conflict. As one interviewee explained, "*women send out their husbands to go to fight e.g. in Gujii, the women want their husbands to be heroes and in so doing urge them to go out and fight for the community*."

What are the biggest challenges to resolving conflict in Ethiopia?

With regard to challnges to resolving conflict in Ethiopia, 71% of the respondents perceived unmet demands from conflict parties as being the most challenging road block to addressing conflict in the country. On the other hand, 68% identified the exclusion of other interest groups in peace talks (e.g. women's groups, community based organizations etc.) as being most challenging to addressing conflict, while 66% indicated Lack of political goodwill was a significant challenge to conflict resolution. It comes as no surprise these challenges have been highlighted by respondents as the most road blocks to conflict resolution. This is clearly demonstrated with the conflict in the Tigray region where conflict between the government and the regional government continues to escalate with no durable resolution currently in sight.[85] Beyond these above challenges to conflict resolution in the country. Some respondents also perceived a lack of leadership in the country both from the political and religious class, stating as follows:

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85 Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Dangerous trends in Ethiopia: Time for Washington's tough love," Brookings, August 09, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/09/dangerous-trends-in-ethiopia-time-for-washingtons-tough-love/ (accessed August 13, 2021).

Figure 19: Challenges to resolving Conflict in Ethiopia

(Source: CRTP Research)

Resolving Conflict in Ethiopia

In as much as conflict in Ethiopia appears to be complicated and complex, the result of a myriad of trigger points, it is not beyond the reaches of conflict resolution. Respondents highlighted several peace interventions that have been implemented in the recent past to address conflict. These interventions, though having various levels of success, can inform the conceptualization of future interventions. Some past and current and peace interventions highlighted by respondents include:

Communally (Peace interventions within and by the local community/location/ County:

Religious leaders - Every now and then local elders and religious leaders tried to mediate in conflict resolution process, however, with varying success. As one respondent put it, in Ethiopia:

> Sometimes the government has sent religious leaders to a specific area that is experiencing conflict, especially in the areas where there was conflict however the people were not receptive to religious leaders and did not listen to them. This is because in the past religion and state has not been separated. Therefore, people often think that religious leaders who have been sent by the government only want to impose what the government wants, which may not be in the interest of the people. Therefore in general religious leaders do not have a big impact on conflict in the country. – Religious Leader

Community Leaders - A conflict that happened in Oromia region (around Burayo) was resolved by an intervention of local community level (referring to conflict in Oromia, where non-Oromo groups including the Gamo were targeted and killed.[86]

Nationally (peace interventions at the national level):

Government - At the national level most respondents highlighted that the government through the Ministry of Peace has been involved in peace interventions to address conflict in the country, however specific interventions were not shared. Notwithstanding a respondent (from civil society) from Addis Ababa, stated that, *"I don't observe anybody at national level addressing conflict, Gov't is the one which is stirring national conflict."*

Civil Society - Some respondents also highlighted that nationally civil society was involved in addressing conflict.

Recommendations to Resolving Conflict in Ethiopia

Looking beyond, peace interventions that have been attempted or implemented, we asked respondents to give their point of view on what could be done to resolve conflict in the country:

Government:

Respondents highlighted that one of the chief roles of the government is to provide security for citizens. The government can therefore act of various aspects of governance to address conflict. To begin with, the constitution should be implemented. Rather than work only for certain communities as opposed to others,government should serve everyone equally. In addition, some respondents pointed to ethno-federalism as a driver of conflict, and therefore the constitution should be amended as it can be a tool for addressing conflict. In addition, government should also not take a reactive role, but should be at the forefront of addressing the current conflict by calling opposing parties to the negotiation table.

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[86] "Ethiopia: Investigate police conduct after deaths of five people protesting ethnic," Amnesty International, September 17, 20218, clasheshttps://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/ethiopia-investigate-police-conduct-after-deaths-of-five-people-protesting-ethnic-clashes/ (accessed August 13, 2021)

Regional/international community:

Regional and international organizations can actually do a lot in addressing conflict. For instance an organization like IGAD can invite the parties in the region for national dialogue. The AU and IGAD can also invite Sudan and Egypt to address the issue with Ethiopians with regard to the GERD. The AU should look deeply into the country's issues to address the situation, while playing a neutral role. According to one respondent this is what we call, African problems, African solutions. Solutions are not easy but they are possible. That is why high level intervention is required. National dialogue need to bring in all relevant stakeholders, this can move the situation forward.

National Dialogue:

The international community can take the role of requesting the country to have national dialogue, but it needs to be inclusive. This is important in order to understand how the country can proceed from thereon. A commission has been established to address the country's issues, however it has not done much. Conflict in the country is a difficult task to address, but it can be resolved. However, it will take time. The government structure should be looked into and the government should be more inclusive. It is a parliamentary system and though it is a good system it also has its weaknesses. The country needs a leader who has the charisma to change the country's circumstances. This leader should also come from a smaller community, since larger communities have dominated the political scene for too long. State institutions are also weak and therefore need to be strengthened, for example the electoral board. Most institutions are created to serve a specific region and not national interests.

Ethiopia is currently at a crossroads where decisions made could have significant ramifications for the country. Once considered a haven of stability in a conflict ravaged region, the country is now having to face its own weaknesses, weaknesses that have lurked under the surface for deceased and have only had a chance to come to the fore in the recent past. The country also has to contend with a governance structure that which according to some is a panacea to conflict while to others is a cause of conflict. CMT-2021 highlights that drivers of conflict in the country include ethnicized politics, unemployment and historically unaddressed grievances as the most prominent drivers of conflict in the country. The Tigray Conflict in 2021 is symbolic of the tensions that the country has to grapple with on order to move forward in a country where regional and national preferences compete. The leadership (both regional and national) therefore needs to give room to dialogue to chart a reimagined future for the country.

Kenya

Referred to as the economic and commercial hub of East Africa, and one of the fastest growing economies in the world, Kenya is significantly a multi-ethnic nation with over 40 different ethnic groups often characterized by overlapping conflicts mostly witnessed during the electioneering period. In the recent years, high levels of sexual and gender violence, intercommunal violence, cycles of electoral and terrorist assaults have continuously been reported in Kenya.

(Source: Creative Commons)

In 2021 similar to 2020, we analyzed data for Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Isiolo and

Usain Gishu to highlight, locations in Kenya that experience various types of conflict, especially election related conflict.

Conflict Level: 2.45

Data Collected:

- 178 questionnaires (representing 22 counties)

- Three Focus Discussion Group (Nairobi, Marigat, Baringo)

- Ten Key Informant Interviews

Respondents' Profile

Profession, Experience and Knowledge of Conflict - Majority of the respondents from Kenya were peace practitioners with 1-2 years of experience within the locality where they live in as shown in figure 8. There were also individuals from other professions like doctors, lawyers, human resource managers and individuals working in the development sector who filled the questionnaire. The criteria for selection of the participants was based on the individuals who had an understanding of the security situation in the country and, therefore, the years of the respondents' experience within the area of study was vital in determining the quality of the responses.

Figure 20: Number of years of Experience of respondents' professions

(Source: CRTP Research)

Kenya's conflict level of 2.4 implies that the country is at the confrontational level of conflict where parties involved are more openly expressing their frustrations and grievances with certain intolerant behavior. The major type of conflicts in Kenya identified by most respondents was resource-based conflict (44%) domestic violence (40%), and sexual and gender-based violence (32%) as indicated in figure 21. The majority of the respondents also indicated that sexual and gender-based violence (48%) and domestic violence (48%) was among some of the moderately prevalent conflicts or human rights violations in Kenya.

Understanding the Types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations prevalent in Kenya

Resource based conflict i.e., competition for revenue sharing, land grabbing, competition in the management of natural resources was identified as the most prevalent conflict in Kenya. Competition for land and other resources has been a major factor fueling conflict in many parts of Kenya, and commonly identified as a major source of conflict among the pastoralist's communities in Kenya. The FGD conducted in Marigat highlighted the fact that the underlying cause of conflict in the borders of Baringo County, Laikipia County, West Pokot County and Turkana County were the competition for fertile lands and water sources meant for the large herds of cattle kept by communities living in these counties. Additionally, in most of the major cities in Kenya, that is Nairobi, Kisumu and Mombasa, eviction of squatters and other residents from lands with disputes have been a major cause of conflict in Kenyan Urban areas. As Luke Mitai Obala argues, the persistence in urban inequity in terms of land distribution and ownership since the colonial era has largely influenced ethnic, boundary and political related conflict in Kenya.[87]

Indeed, Kenya experiences multiple, overlapping conflicts, which sometimes coincide with electoral cycles that act as triggers for politically motivated violence. These conflicts include militia activity in urban areas; communal violence in the Rift Valley, Coast region and elsewhere; spill over conflict from neighbouring Somalia with implications for unrest in the north-east; and the confluence of separatism and Islamist mobilization in the Coast province. Cases of conflict that have occurred in the month of September 2021 include the recent clashes in Ol-Moran, Laikipia west and Mochogoi area in Baringo County that has led to several fatalities and the displacement of thousands of people. Isiolo County which is predominantly known as a pastoralist dryland has been

87 Obala, M.L., The relationship between urban land conflicts and inequity: The case of Nairobi, https://land.igad.int/index.php/documents-1/countries/kenya/urbanization-3/843-the-relationship-between-urban-land-conflicts-and-inequi-ty-the-case-of-nairobi-1/file.

a hotspot of violence for several years. In the month of July 2020, bandits killed five people and escaped with about 300 herds of cattle.[88] Marsabit County in Northern Kenya has experienced disrupted livelihoods and loss of lives. Violence in areas like Marsabit County is persistent, ranging from economic boycotts and hate speech to unexplained deaths and small wars. The causes of these various conflicts are related to Kenya's deep and persistent fault lines, relating to factors such as socio-political marginalization and elite manipulation of identities for political mobilization.[89] These multiple, overlapping conflicts in Kenya profoundly shape the nature of conflict and vulnerability of civilian populations in particular to violence and require distinct responses.

Figure 21: Types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Kenya

(Source: CRTP Research)

What is driving Conflict in Kenya?

The majority of the respondents (64%) highlighted unemployment as one of the key drivers of conflict in Kenya. Indeed, unemployment has been identified as a factor that could contribute to instability and violence in many African countries and which needs intervention. Young people are potentially a tremendous force for change in conflict-affected countries, both positively and negatively. Accordingly, it has been suggested

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88 Gardaworld: Bandits in Isiolo, https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/504511/kenya-bandits-killed-three-people-in-merti-isiolo-county-july-20
89 Obala, M.L., The relationship between urban land conflicts and inequity: The case of Nairobi, https://land.igad.int/index.php/documents-1/countries/kenya/urbanization-3/843-the-relationship-between-urban-land-conflicts-and-inequity-the-case-of-nairobi-1/file.

that large rates of youth unemployment make countries unstable in general and thus more prone to armed conflict. In a 2013 study by the African Development Bank (AfDB) on the effects of youth unemployment on political instability, the authors find empirical evidence that youth unemployment is significantly associated with an increased risk of political instability, particularly in countries where youth unemployment, as well as social inequalities and corruption are high.[90] Other key drivers of conflict in Kenya identified by the respondents include high levels of corruption at 63% historical unaddressed grievances (53%), government failure to provide basic needs such as security (47%), ethicized politics (49 %), perceived/presence of economic marginalization (48%) and violence for economic gain (41 %) as indicated in figure 22.

Figure 22: Key Drivers of Conflict in Kenya

(Source: CRTP Research)

Who is most responsible for conflict in Kenya?

In terms of identifying the major actors of conflict in Kenya, majority of the respondents highlighted prominent individuals (39%) and the government (32%) as the major actors of conflict as shown in figure 23. Regional/International states and the multi-national corporations were identified by a majority of the respondents as not responsible for

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90 Azeng, T.F., & Yugo, T.U., Youth Unemployment and Political Instability in Selected Developing Countries, Accra: African Development Bank, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working_Paper_171_-_Youth_Unemployment_and_Political_Instability_in_Selected_Developing_Countries.pdf.

conflicts in Kenya. The various types of conflicts in Kenya is often exacerbated by elements of ethnic mobilization that in most instances make certain conflicts to appear as ethnic conflict. Consequently, communal conflict, in that it is socially constructed and the dimension of identity emphasized for mobilization, is usually a tactic used by community leaders and prominent individuals in Kenya with the hope of gaining political mileage.

Figure 23: Actors most responsible for conflict in Kenya

(Source: CRTP Research)

What are the biggest challenges to resolving conflict in Kenya?

Significant challenges were identified by the respondents as obstacles to achieving peace in Kenya including lack of political goodwill (77%), mistrust amongst parties in conflict (69%), negotiations not involving all parties (68%), poor development in the region/ country (66%), and exclusion of other interest groups in peace talks (e.g. women's groups, community based organizations etc.) (63%) among others.

Conflict Levels of Select Cities and Towns in Kenya

Nairobi

Conflict Level: 2.5

Data Collected: 13 questionnaires

A conflict level of 2.5 indicates that Nairobi County is at the confrontational level of conflict with the main actors openly expressing their frustrations.

Respondents profile:

Understanding the types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations prevalent in Nairobi

Nairobi region is coterminous with the capital city of the country and it is also the most populous County. It is the center of politics, administration, and economy in Kenya. Resource based conflict i.e., competition for revenue sharing, land grabbing, competition in the management of natural resources (61%), domestic violence (43%), police brutality and theft (46%) were the most prevalent conflicts in Nairobi County. Respondents also indicated that sexual and gender-based violence (61 %) was among some of the moderately prevalent conflicts or human rights violations in Nairobi. Conflict in Nairobi is often related to issues related to economic marginalization, issues of land grabbing and election related violence (for instance during 2007/2008 and 2017). While election related violence in 2007/2008 is well documented, it is much less so. For instance between Nairobi and Kisumu 24 people lost their lives in election related violence.[91] Emma Elfversson and Kristine Höglund identify four types of conflict in Nairobi, which are distinct yet intertwined with broader complex conflict dynamics in Kenya. These four types of conflict are 1) Urban land conflict, 2) election-related violence, 3) state repression and extrajudicial violence, and 4) terrorism and radicalization.[92] These conflict types correspond with respondents' perceptions of conflict in Nairobi.

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91 Briana Duggan, Faith Karimi and Chandrika Narayan, "24 killed in post-election violence in Kenya, rights group says," *CNN*, August 23, 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/12/africa/kenya-elections-protests/index.html (accessed November 25, 2021).

92 Emma Elfversson & Kristine Höglund, "Violence in the city that belongs to no one: urban distinctiveness and inter-connected insecurities in Nairobi (Kenya)," Conflict, Security & Development 19, 4(2019): 348, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1640493

Figure 24: Types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Nairobi

(Source: CRTP Research)

What is driving Conflict in Nairobi?

In terms of identifying key drivers of conflict, most respondents identified unemployment (83%) and high levels of corruption (83%) as the most prominent conflict drivers in Nairobi County. Government failure in providing basic needs (66%), perceived/presence of economic marginalization (61%) and ethicized politics (53%) also featured as prominent conflict drivers in Nairobi County. According to the 2019 census Kenya has a youth population of 35.7 million Kenyans (75%) below 35 years.[93] While the majority of this youth population resides in rural areas, 32.73 million (68%), it is interesting to note that the majority of the youth population in urban areas is between the ages of 20 and 34.[94] In turn, this is indicative of a large number of youth who are unemployed.

Who is most responsible for conflict in Nairobi?

Majority of the respondents also identified the prominent individuals (opposition leaders, rebel leaders, government leaders, community leaders) as most responsible for the conflicts in their counties.

In terms of challenges, 76% of the respondents identified lack of political good will as major hindrance to resolving the conflicts in Nairobi. Other significant challenges to resolving the conflict includes mistrust amongst parties in conflict (66%), negotiations not involving all parties (66%), exclusion of other interests groups in peace talks (53%)

[93] Wandiri Gitogo, "Census 2019 Data Shows Kenya Has a Youthful Rural Population," *Kenyan Wall Street*, https://kenyanwallstreet.com/census-2019-datashows-kenya-has-a-youthful-rural-population/ (accessed November 25, 2021).
[94] Ibid.

and unmet demands from conflict parties (50%) as indicated in the figure below.

Mombasa

Conflict Level: 2.4

Data Collected: 13 questionnaires

Mombasa is a coastal town along the Indian Ocean in south-eastern Kenya. The city is a renowned tourist center because of the ocean, the major entry point for goods brought to Kenya and other countries in East and central Africa by cargo ship as well as the blue and white city, rom the color of its buildings. It is the oldest and second biggest city in Kenya.

Understanding the types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations prevalent in Mombasa

A conflict level of 2.4 indicates that Mombasa is in confrontational level of conflict with scenarios of human right violations, violent confrontation and elements of economic hardships. Resource based conflict was identified by 75% of the respondents as the most prevalent conflict in the County followed by domestic violence (61%), sexual and gender based violence (58%) and police brutality at 41%.

What drives Conflict in Mombasa?

Unemployment (69%) and historically unaddressed grievances were mentioned by the respondents as the most prevalent conflict driver in Mombasa. High levels of corruption (50%) and government failure to provide for basic services was also mentioned as a prominent conflict driver in Mombasa.

Figure 25: Key Drivers of Conflict in Mombasa

(Source: CRTP Research)

When it comes to identifying the prominent actors of conflict in Mombasa, 50% of the respondents identified the government as the most responsible actor to the ongoing conflicts while another whopping 46 % identified armed groups/political militia groups as the most responsible actor. Prominent individuals were also identified by 30 % of the respondents as most responsible actors.

A majority of the respondents identified lack of political good will (91 %), external funding of armed groups (83 %), mistrust amongst parties in conflict (83 %), unresolved grievances from past conflicts (81 %), peace agreements not fully implemented (75%) and poor development in the region (75%) as the major hindrance to resolving the ongoing conflicts in Mombasa. The COVID-19 pandemic challenges were highlighted by 36 % of the respondents are moderately challenging in resolving the ongoing conflicts in Mombasa.

Kisumu

Conflict Level: 2.4

Data Collected: 23 questionnaires

Kisumu, one of the major cities in Kenya is the former capital of Nyanza province and now the headquarters of Kisumu County. The city has always served as a key link of trade and transport between Lake Victoria and the towns along the coasts of Lake Victoria in Uganda and Tanzania. Mild protests and political tensions have often surfaced in Kisumu during the electioneering period particularly after the elections of 2013 and 2017.

Understanding the types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations prevalent in Kisumu

Kisumu had a conflict level of 2.4 which indicates that the County is in the confrontational level of conflict. Domestic violence (46 %), police brutality (46 %) and political violence (42%) were mentioned by the respondents as the most prevalent conflicts in the County. It is worth noting that sexual and gender-based violence (52%) was mentioned by the respondents as moderately prevalent in the County.

What drives Conflict in Kisumu?

Unemployment (82%) and high levels of corruption (82%) also featured prominently as the most prominent conflict drivers in the Kisumu. The high rate of unemployment in Kisumu was also linked to the impact of COVID-19 on people's livelihoods (67%).

In terms of identifying actors, 47.5% of the respondents mentioned the government as a key actor is the conflicts in Kisumu followed by prominent individuals (32.5%) and armed group/political militia groups as shown in the chart below.

Figure 26: Actors most responsible for conflict in Kisumu

(Source: CRTP Research)

On the challenges to resolving the conflicts, negotiation not involving all parties (82%), lack of political goodwill (77%), COVID-19 pandemic (71%), authoritative government (70%), tensions between parties unabated (67%) and exclusion of other interest groups in peace talks (67%) were the most significant hindrances to resolving conflicts in Kisumu as shown in the figure below.

Uasin-Gishu

Conflict Level: 2.3

Data Collected: 20 questionnaires

Uasin Gishu County is located in former Rift Valley province with Eldoret as its main administrative centre. The County borders Trans-Nzoia County to the North, Baringo and Elgeyo Marakwet counties to the East, Kericho and Nandi counties to the South, and Kakamega County to the west. Eldoret town within Uasin Gishu was marred by election related violence during 2007/2008 elections. Consequently, the violence witnessed in Eldoret and the surrounding counties in the wake of Kenya's election in December 2007 has often put Uasin Gishu as a County more likely to experience post-election violence.

Understanding the types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations prevalent in Uasin Gishu

Uasin Gishu recorded a conflict level of 2.3. This indicates that the County is experiencing confrontational level of conflict. Resource based conflict was highlighted by the respondents (35%) as highly prevalent type of conflict in Uasin Gishu followed by cattle rustling (31%), theft (31%), political violence (20%) and domestic violence (20%).

Figure 27: Types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Uasin Gishu

(Source: CRTP Research)

What drives Conflict in Uasin Gishu?

When it comes to identifying the key drivers to the conflict, 52% of the respondents highlighted that ethnicized politics and historically unaddressed grievances were the key drivers of conflict in Uasin Gishu County. Indeed, historical narratives about systematic displacement of the natives of Uasin Gishu by the outsiders has been a major source of land conflicts in the Rift Valley region. Boone argues that state power has been used to distribute and redistribute land rights in the Rift-valley region with settlement schemes and land-buying companies sometimes allocated forest reserves or communal land thus, resulting in long-standing conflicts over the resource.[95]

Who is most responsible for conflict in Uasin Gishu?

40% of the respondents also highlighted those prominent individuals were the most responsible to the present ongoing conflict in the County. Another 50% of the respondents indicated that the government was moderately responsible for the ongoing conflicts in the County.

What are the biggest challenges to resolving conflict in Uasin Gishu?

When it comes to challenges in resolving the conflict, 85% of the respondents indicated that mistrust amongst parties was a major hindrance to resolving conflict in the County. Other challenges included peace agreements not fully implemented (80%), lack of political goodwill (75%), negotiation not involving all parties (75%), breakdown of peace talks (70%) and exclusion of other interest groups in peace talks (70%).

Isiolo

Conflict Level: 2.6

Data Collected: 14 questionnaires

Isiolo is located in central region of Kenya and is about 285 kilometers from the capital city of Nairobi. Isiolo town grew as a result of its proximity to the British military camps that were based in Central Kenya and the inhabitants of the town were mostly descendants of the Somali who had been recruited to participate in World War I. Other inhabitants of Isiolo also include Cushitic speaking pastoralist communities and the Ameru community. Presently, most of the residents of Isiolo are pastoralists who move from one place to another in search of water and pasture for their animals. Due to the scarcity of these resources, pastoralist societies have frequently engaged in violent warfare in an attempt

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95   Boone, Catherine. "Land Conflict and Distributive Politics in Kenya." *African Studies Review* 55, no. 1 (2012): 75–103. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41804129.

to obtain and control what little is available.[96] Cattle rustling, interethnic violence, and displacement are the most common forms of conflict and violence in Isiolo.

Understanding the types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations prevalent in Isiolo

Isiolo recorded a conflict level of 2.6 which indicates that the County is experiencing confrontational level of conflict. Cattle rustling was identified as the major type of conflict in Isiolo County by 96% of the respondents. Other types of conflict identified were also inter-ethnic violence (82%), and resource-based conflict (74%). Indeed, cattle rustling is a common practice that has been a source of conflict in Isiolo County. With several Cushitic communities who practice pastoralism living alongside each other, cattle rustling as a tool for economic gain has been reported on several occasions. In certain instances, cattle rustling leads to inter-ethnic violence as other communities attack those that they perceive to have raided and stolen their cattle.

What is driving Conflict in Isiolo?

The key driver for conflict in Isiolo County was identified to be violence for economic gain (89%). Competition for natural resources was also identified by 85% of the respondents as a prominent driver to conflict in Isiolo County. Other prominent drivers of conflict to note in Isiolo include ethicized politics (76%), government failure in providing basic needs such as security (65%) and perceived/presence of economic marginalization (50%).

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96 Saferworld, Isiolo County conflict analysis, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191933/isiolo-conflict-analysis.pdf.

Figure 28: Key Drivers of Conflict in Isiolo

Drivers of Conflict in Isiolo

(Source: CRTP Research)

Who is most responsible for conflict in Isiolo?

When it comes to the actors to the conflict, armed groups/political militia groups were identified by 59% of the respondents as the most responsible actors to the ongoing conflicts in Isiolo County. Another 48% of the respondents identified prominent individuals as the key actors to the conflicts in Isiolo.

What are the biggest challenges to resolving conflict in Isiolo?

In terms of challenges to resolving the conflicts in Isiolo, 82% of the respondents indicated that lack of political good will, poor development in the County and mistrust amongst parties in conflict were major challenges to resolving conflict in Isiolo County. Other challenges highlighted by the respondents included availability of small arms and light weapons (81%), unresolved grievances from past conflicts (75%), peace agreements not fully implemented (74%), and negotiation not involving all parties (67%). International interference by external actors and Covid -19 pandemic was rated as the least challenging factors by most respondents at 25%.

Recommendations

When asked to share recommendations towards addressing current conflict in Kenya,

respondents shared the following:

- *Peace Initiatives:*

Respondents asserted that it was important to bring all the conflicting parties together and find a solution to the problem without being biased. There should also be more public sensitization on peace benefits. The respondents also identified the need for dialogue/conversation by inclusion of all parties in the peace dialogue process, as there is a lot of uncertainty with regards to the forthcoming general elections. The respondents suggested that the government ought to take an active role in strengthening local institutions to address problems arising out of communal conflict. Due to the impact of the COVID-19, the government needs to create proper mechanisms to respond to the pandemic-related needs of the citizens, without which violence is bound to erupt. Justice is an integral aspect of addressing conflict, consequently, respondents suggested that it was important to address past historical injustices among the various communities in the region. Conflicts such as land grabbing by tycoons and government officials and other historical injustices should be promptly resolved.

- *Socio-Economic:*

The respondents also suggested that the government should ensure the equal distribution of opportunities and infrastructure across the County, e.g. availability of hospitals, schools, social halls, etc. Another suggestion was that the local people should be involved in County development agendas and important projects like building roads, building infrastructure, and other economic activities which creates employment, especially for the youth. It was noted that employment for the youths was required including income-generating activities to end idleness. Other suggested youth programs included behavior change programs, life skills training, and technical skills training to give the youth a sense of purpose as well as to improve their livelihoods.

In conclusion, generally in Kenya in as much as the conflict in the country is not overt, insecurity exists in the region, occasioned by the poor functioning of existing security structures especially by the government. Unemployment and high levels of corruption is a significant driver of conflict in the region that could trigger conflict in the future if not effectively addressed.

Conflict Level Trends in Kenya

According to the HIPSIR CMT 2019 study,[97] the Kenya conflict level stood at 1.68 with issues of inequitable distribution of resources and high levels of graft with a weighted mean of 2.14, to a large extent contributes to conflicts and high poverty levels. Even though the study indicated that Kenya has a high risk of conflict based on pre-conflict findings, the country was ranked as the most peaceful compared to South Sudan and the DRC.

In 2020, the CMT data analysis involved regional analysis for Kenya, to establish a nuanced understanding of conflict dynamics as per the existing regions in Kenya. From the CMT-2019, it was understood that conflict drivers in Kenya are different across regions hence the necessity to disaggregate the data in the CMT-2020. For the CMT-2020 seven regions which include Central region, Coast region, Eastern region, Nairobi, North Eastern, Rift Valley, and Nyanza/Western. In the central, domestic violence, sexual and gender-based violence and police brutality were the prevalent human rights violation in the region with a conflict level of 0.16. Coast region on the other hand had a conflict level of 0.85 with police brutality (42%), resource-based conflict (40%), gender-based violence (39%) and theft (38%) being the most prevalent conflicts in the Coast region. The Eastern region conflict level stood at 0.88 with cattle rustling rated as the highly prevalent by 76% followed by resource-based conflict (75%) and inter-ethnic violence 67%.

Nairobi region had a conflict level of 0.7 with 61% of the respondents perceiving police brutality as the most prevalent conflict or human rights violation. Other conflicts or human rights violations rated highly as most prevalent in Nairobi region in 2020 include resource-based conflict (41%), theft (32%), and domestic violence (32%). North Eastern had a conflict level of 0.57 with 58% of the respondents identifying inter-ethnic violence as the most prevalent conflict or human rights violation in the North-Eastern region. Also, 54% identified resource-based conflict as the most prevalent conflict while 50% identified sexual and gender-based conflict as the most prevalent conflict in Nairobi region in 2020. Rift Valley had a conflict level of 0.9 40% of the respondents' highlighting resource-based conflict as being the most prevalent type of conflict in the region. Other notable conflicts or human rights violations mentioned by the respondents were inter-ethnic violence 38% and cattle rustling 37%. Western and Nyanza recorded a conflict level of 0.63 with 44% of the respondents highlighting sexual and gender-based violence as being highly prevalent in the region. Other conflicts or human rights

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97 Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations. 2019, pp. 43-44

violations that were mentioned as being highly prevalent were police brutality (36%) and domestic violence (29%).

South Sudan

(Source: Creative Commons)

Having gained independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011. South Sudan experienced a brief reprieve from conflict before disintegrating back into violence in December 2013 and later in July 2016. As a result of long periods of conflict the country has lagged in development and consequently this has led to a severe humanitarian crisis in the country. While the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan in 2018, brought an end to the widespread violent conflict in the country, the government in the country has the task of restoring peace and stability throughout the country in addition to addressing the underlying causes of conflict.

Conflict Level: 2.62

A conflict level of 2.56 indicates a confrontational stage of conflict. This stage of conflict is characterized by incidences of open conflict, there is also increased intolerances

by rival actors. If no interventions takes place there is the likelihood of widespread escalating open conflict.

Data Collected:

- 99 questionnaires

- One Focus Discussion Group in Juba

- Five Key Informant Interviews

Respondents' Profile

The HISPSIR CMT study targeted individuals who had an understanding of the security situation in the country and therefore the years of the respondents' experience within the area of study was vital in determining the quality of the responses. From the quantitative data, the majority of the respondents were individuals from the field of academia making 25% of the total respondents followed by media practitioners, peace practitioners, security personnel and the government officials, as shown in Figure 30 below. In addition, majority of the respondents for the qualitative data (40%) had over five years of experience, 38% of the respondents had 3-4 years of experience while 20.75 % of the respondents had 1-2 years of experience of work within South Sudan. Consequently, this shows that the HISPIR CMT 2021 findings represents analysis of the reality of conflicts in South Sudan, the key drivers of the conflict and the actors of the conflict as the choice of the respondents reduces the probability of methodological error.

Figure 29: Respondents' Profile

(Source: CRTP Research)

Geographical Representation

Out of the 99 respondents 58.59% of the respondents came from Juba while 41.41% of the respondents came from Rumbek in the Great Lakes State region. A focused group discussion with eight participants was conducted in Juba – South Sudan. The participants for the FGD were drawn from civil society and humanitarian organizations, political leaders, advocates of the court and individuals working with faith-based organizations in South Sudan. Five in-depth interviews were also conducted in Juba. The participants for the interviews were drawn from civils society organizations, faith-based organizations and an individual from the academia. The HISPIR CMT study 2021 therefore reached its target respondents in South Sudan.

Understanding the types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations prevalent in South Sudan

The conflict level of 2.6 shows that South Sudan is in confrontational level of conflict and while not experiencing widespread open conflict, violence between communities has been reported in some regions partly because of disputes and rivalry over resources such as land, livestock and grazing land leading to the death and displacement of thousands of people. Four of the respondents from the key informant interviews (KII's) highlighted the ongoing conflicts in different states in South Sudan including Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria driven by competition for natural resources, competition for political power, ethnicity and other economic drivers. One respondent from civil society highlighted the fact that:

> The youths in Western Equatoria region have been incited by some prominent individuals to fight and scare away the non-residents of the region from working or engaging in any form of business in the Torit (the capital of Eastern Equatoria). While majority of the young people from Western Equatoria have not received adequate education or technical training to get employment or run businesses, the region then has to rely on outsourced personnel and businesses individuals from other regions to work in the local government administration, NGO's, the health sector and even schools to ensure that some basic services are available in the region. It is unfortunate that the outsourced personnel now face violence and prosecution from the youths of the region because they are non- residents of Torit and the youths feel that non-residents are taking their jobs.

A report by Norwegian Refugee Council highlights the intensity of the ongoing conflict in the Eastern Equatoria state that has led to the displacement of about 1,500 people and affected the delivery of humanitarian services and supplies, as truck drivers from neighboring countries are unable to deliver goods/supplies to the region. The Norwegian Refugee Council report describes accounts where humanitarian workers have been

facing incidences of bullying, assault and robbery in the Eastern Equatoria state with six incidences of robbery and attacks targeting United Nations vehicles or facilities and humanitarian agencies recorded in the month of April 2021.

Additionally, the respondents from the Focused Group Discussion (FGD) and the KII's also mentioned that the violence in some of the regions in South Sudan was predominantly influenced by competition for national resources. For instance, one KII interviewee from academia and other three respondents from the FGD stated that:

> the Equatoria States which is an agriculturally rich area and considered as the 'bread basket' of South Sudan mostly inhabited by ethnic communities that are known to be practicing agricultural activities are now experiencing incursion of nomadic communities from other regions who are in search of water and grazing lands for their animals. The invasion of pastoral communities to the Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria and the Western Equatoria has led to the displacement of thousands of people, the loss of people's livelihoods and even reports of death.

Another KII interviewee from a religious organization categorically stated that,

> The incursion of the nomadic communities into the Equatoria States was a strategy by some pastoralist communities to systematically displace other communities who are the inhabitants of the Equatoria with the aim of grabbing the lands and becoming inhabitants of the region.

The report by Norwegian Refugee Council confirms these incidences by stating that "civilians were murdered and displaced during the month of February 2021 as a result of increased violence, aggravating a very real threat of starvation as farmers and families were forced to leave their homes."

Another form of violence that was noted both by the participants in the KIIs and FGD is cattle rustling in Warrap, Unity and Lakes State that has left several people either maimed or killed while communities have been displaced as they run for their safety. One respondent from civil society explained that:

> Some prominent individuals in South Sudan who gain from the practice of cattle rustling manipulate their ethnic groups/youths and mobilize them by providing lethal weapons for them to raid other communities and take their herds of cattle. In some instances, the youths who raid the community to steal the cattle also scare away the community they are raiding by killing people so that the people may ran for their safety as they remain to grab their land.

Indeed, cattle lords in South Sudan recruit and arm rural warriors to steal cattle for sale to abattoirs in towns or neighboring countries where they sell the cattle.

One of the respondents from the FDG a political leader noted that:

> The practice of cattle rustling in South Sudan has become complex with the ongoing political conflict as prominent individuals like politicians, community leaders and local elders have taken advantage of the present local disputes and used them to mobilize armed herders for political advantage. This has increased bloodshed and thus becoming an obstacle to peace-building in the country. Civilians have often been included in livestock raids which then converts the activity into lethal organized crime. Raiding of cattle is a kind of vengeance attack against enemy tribes so that you weaken their financial power by pillaging of their livestock. The commercialization of cattle raiding has become a lucrative business for several communities engaged in cattle rustling. Therefore, these transactions often take place with full knowledge and the active backing of local elders, politicians and leaders, which prevents the leaders from denouncing the behavior of cattle rustling or bringing those responsible to justice.

Another form of violence that was raised by the participants from both the KII's and the FDG was the torture and arrest of outspoken human right activists who stand out to defend the rights of the citizens in South Sudan. The participants noted that while there were several complaints against the government for the lack of provision of basic services such as health as well as the delay of salaries for civil servants and corruption scandals, the government used abusive surveillance to frighten journalists, activist and critics leading to an environment of intense fear and the lack of the freedom of speech. A report by Aufiero and Pur narrates a dire human rights situation in South Sudan where the authorities have muzzled the citizens, journalists and activist space to raise issues and question the government.[98] A crackdown on journalists and activists has continued with reports of police shooting at protestors and even arresting activists in Juba recorded in August 2020 and March 2021.

It is thus important to note that the increased reports of inter-ethnic violence, cattle rustling, increased complaints of economic hardships, destruction of peoples/community's livelihoods and human right violation clearly shows that South Sudan is experiencing confrontational level of conflict. If no intervening mechanisms are undertaken, then the situation could possibly worsen and result to open conflict.

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98 Paul Aufiero, and Nyagoah Tut Pur, "South Sudan at a Crossroads - Challenges and Hopes 10 Years After Independence," *All Africa*, July 9, 2021, https://allafrica.com/stories/202107090210.html (accessed August 23, 2021).

Figure 30: Types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations in South Sudan

(Source: CRTP Research)

The results from the quantitative data showed that the majority of the respondents highlighted inter-ethnic violence (63%) as the most prevalent type of conflict in South Sudan followed by cattle rustling and armed robbery at 62% each, theft and recourse-based conflict at 53% each, domestic violence at 52% and political violence at 52% as shown in figure 31. As much as South Sudan political leaders signed the RA-RCSS in 2018, thus bringing an end to a conflict that had raged since 2013, conflict in South Sudan still exists, with many of the opinion that the agreement is a short-term solution that has not addressed the deep-seated roots of the conflict. While a unity government was formed in February 2020, as part of the conditions of the RA-RCSS, conflict has continued in some areas. Mostly seen as an upsurge of communal conflict in the country, much of which has presented itself as cattle raids, land grabbing, theft and competition for grazing lands.

What is drives conflict in South Sudan?

The respondents were also asked to identify the key drivers of conflict in South Sudan. The respondents pointed out that the most prominent drivers of conflict in South Sudan

were the high levels of corruption rated at 70% followed by proliferation of armed groups rated at 66%, violence for economic gain e.g., cattle rustling rated at 62% and government failure (in providing basic needs and security) rated at 61% as indicated in figure 32 below. It is also worth noting that COVID 19 pandemic was rated by the respondents as the least prominent driver of conflict in South Sudan at 48%.

Figure 31: Key Drivers of Conflict in South Sudan

(Source: CRTP Research)

The participants from the FGD and the KII's emphasized corruption and the competition for resources as the major driver of conflict in South Sudan. According to one of the respondents from civil society, ethnic mobilization has been used by community leaders, chiefs and even army generals to assemble, organize, militarize, radicalize and deploy the youths to fight for their collective ends. The respondent gave an example of the soldiers and leaders allied to President Salva Kirr and Riek Machar who have been radicalized by their leaders and would go to any extend to ensure that they defend their kingpins even though it is only the president and Riek Machar benefitting. Another respondent from academia explained that:

> Competition for natural resources has been one of the major drivers of conflict in South Sudan. Most of the leaders are fighting for power so that they can gain the control of the natural resources that are in South Sudan including oil and land. From 2018, the amount of money that comes from the mining of oil has never been accounted for. Those in power have also mobilized their ethnic communities to terrorize other communities who are occupying fertile lands so that they occupy those lands. In central Equatoria, especially in Kajo Keji, majority of the inhabitants of the area have fled their homes because of targeted violence against them and their lands are now owned by those who are powerful in government.

Indeed, the competition for natural resources has been a factor hindering South Sudan's path to peace and development. According to Clooney and Prendergast, revenues from oil related entities has been a major cause for conflict as leaders fight to control such income.[99] Consequently, South Sudan government must develop a strategy of managing and sharing the revenue from natural resources to ensure that all South Sudanese have equitable share to their natural resource. This would potentially minimize conflicts related to the competition for natural resource.

Who is most responsible for conflict in South Sudan?

In identifying the actors of the conflict, 53% of the respondents identified prominent individuals (opposition leaders, rebel leaders, government leaders, community leaders) as the most responsible for the ongoing conflict in South Sudan. Other respondents pointed to armed groups/political militia groups as the most responsible (49%) and government (36%) as shown in figure 33. A high percentage of the respondents who identified armed groups/political militia groups as most responsible for the conflict points to the reality of the availability of small arms and light weapons, which have been used especially in cattle rustling.

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99 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/clooney-and-prendergast-war-crimes-shouldnt-pay-in-south-sudan/2016/09/11/984b67da-7612-11e6-b786-19d0cb1ed06c_story.html?utm_term=.810c94e22e06

Figure 32: Actors Most Responsible for Conflict in South Sudan

(Source: CRTP Research)

What are the biggest challenges to resolving conflict in South Sudan?

Consequently, when it came to identifying existing challenges to the successful resolution of the conflict in South Sudan, respondents observed that the most significant challenges were poor development in the country (91%), lack of political good will (91%), peace agreements not fully implemented (89%), external funding of armed groups (89%), mistrust amongst parties in conflict (82%), authoritative government (82%), exclusion of other interest groups in peace talks (82%), availability of small arms and light weapons (80%), and unmet demands from conflict parties (80%) as indicated in figure 34. The FGD conducted in Juba showed that indeed there were complex issues that was making it difficult to reach a lasting peace in South Sudan. It is also worth noting that about 64.44% of the respondents highlighted the fact that COVID 19 pandemic was not a challenging factor that would affect the peace intervention processes in South Sudan.

Figure 33: Challenges to Resolving Conflict in South Sudan

(Source: CRTP Research)

Recommendations

Peace Initiatives

Respondents highlighted several aspects of peace initiatives that would help address the conflict in South Sudan. Most of the respondents underscored the need for a national dialogue that begins from the grassroots level to the national level and involves the participation of all the South Sudanese people. The respondents noted that while a national dialogue had earlier been initiated at the national level, there was no participation of the citizens in the process. The participants of the FGD noted that such a national dialogue would encourage reconciliation and healing process for the South Sudanese so that they are able to move forward. The National dialogue would also open discussions and conversations of a model of governance that will benefit all the South Sudanese and not only a few individuals in leadership.

Governance and Leadership

Governance and leadership were noted as an integral aspect of conflict resolution. The respondents recommended the need to have a transparent election and give South Sudanese the mandate to choose their new leaders. The respondents also stressed the need for the current government regime to faithfully implement all the tenets of the R-ARCSS as it will lead to a smooth transition to a new leadership elected by the South Sudanese.

It was particularly important that there is SPLM unity, party dialogue on power-sharing, and political will to address conflicts and promote democratization to ensure justice and the rule of law in the country. There is also a need for transparency concerning financial resources in South Sudan, especially oil money to provide the effective provision of services to people.

Constitution and rule of law

There is a need to strengthen law and order in the country to address the conflict. To achieve this, all laws should be enforced equally not favoring some people. Years of conflict have undermined the rule of law in the country, so much so that, "there is not enough understanding of the proper application of the rule of law and assigned roles and processes; statutory courts face a trust deficit from the citizens…"

Security

To establish security in the country inclusive local disarmament is required. This includes keeping the army away from politics. More specifically, guns should be removed from civilians and the army should be reformed which would involve training, professionalizing the army, and having old military leaders retiring. Also, there should be civic education for the military and they should also enjoy a good salary. Lastly, police training is required and prisons should be reformed.

Conflict Level Trends in South Sudan

In 2019, the HIPSIR CMT study ranked South Sudan at a conflict level of 2.84. The HIPSIR CMT study in 2019 found out that conflicts in South Sudan were largely attributed to the inequitable distribution of resources and corruption that result in high levels of poverty recorded in the country. Poor governance, weakened government functions, and the acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors were observed as dominant features to conflict escalation in South Sudan. Apart from the break-down of government functions, displacements of citizens and the presence of peacekeeping personnel (i.e. UNMISS) in the country were also pointed out as key indicators to the conflict crisis in South Sudan. The HISPIR CMT also found out that the transition from crisis to stability and the peace process in South Sudan is hindered by the intensity of violence, failure of combatants to comply with a ceasefire, limited commitment to the implementation of peace agreements, and the failure to sufficiently address root causes to the conflict hence conflict de-escalation is least in the nation.

In 2020, the HIPSIR CMT study ranked South Sudan at a conflict level of 0.9. Most of the respondents in the HIPSIR CMT 2020 study highlighted that most of the occurring conflicts in South Sudan were cattle rustling, political violence and competition for resources. The study also reiterated the key drivers of the conflict in South Sudan to be unaddressed historical grievances, high levels of corruption, and the government failure to provide basic needs such as employment, food and security. IOM analysis report of South Sudan in 2020 confirms these finding by stating that South Sudan indeed experienced incidences of insecurity and were also hit by acute food shortage during the period of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

5. CONCLUSION

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

That the Eastern region of the DRC has been in conflict for years is not in doubt. The impacts of conflict in the region are also not in doubt, with the Second Congo War being termed one of the deadliest conflicts in Africa. The current conflict in the region has many of its antecedents in that conflict. That conflict in their region has caused citizens untold suffering is also not in doubt, most residents are well aware of the causes of conflict in the region as well as how it has affected their lives. What perhaps remains in doubt is how to decisively address protracted conflict in the region.

CMT-2021 highlights three key areas of concern. First is the presence and activities of armed groups in the region already well documented in numerous studies on peace and conflict in the region. The proliferation and tenacity of armed groups in the region is one to reckon with. Their presence is entrenched and is indicative of underlying structural concerns that are more difficult to address but would be decidedly more effective in addressing conflict in the region in the long run. One of major structural concerns is governance and leadership.

Secondly, the issue of land disputes and land conflicts continues to rise in the recent years of conflict. Land signifies not only economic value, but also historical, and cultural values. This is often regarded as a collorary to the larger resource based conflict that the country at large is well known for. Understanding the dynamics of land conflict in Eastern DRC is important as it has implications not just for the country but also neighboring countries embroiled in its conflict. Land disputes and land conflicts are complicated by weak land governance structures in the country. If left unaddressed land conflicts in the Eastern DRC can expect to rise with an increasing population and further exacerbated by armed group activity.

Lastly, but not to be underestimated, is the impact of government and leadership both at the national and regional level. Nationally government leadership requires sufficient good will and wherewithal to extend its authority not only beyond Kinshasa, but to an extent that its presence is felt effectively within Eastern regions. Regionally, leadership need to rise above prevailing norms such as collaborating with armed groups for personal gain to seeking to better the lives of citizens. While external assistance regionally and international can make some gains in resolving conflict, ultimately, enduring conflict resolution should begin with the leadership. Decades of war later, the conflict in DRC

remains to be addressed by a government leadership that operates radically differently than it has so far conducted itself.

Ethiopia

2021 was our first year to conduct a conflict monitoring exercise in Ethiopia and the country has a conflict level of 2.56 indicating a future escalation of widespread open conflict. However, despite ongoing conflict in some regions of the country and an escalation in the intensity and frequency of conflict and unrest in the last few years, the country has not altogether descended into encompassing chaos and state failure. From this perspective the country offers an interesting study on intra-state conflict in Africa. That being said the country is also a land of contradictions in many ways, contradictions that have historical antecedents that are also positioned to inform the country's future trajectory.

In terms of government and politics ethnic federalism takes center stage. While enshrined in the country's constitution to address ethnic marginalization by empowering ethnic groups, the federal government still wields consider power as the major state actor. Consequently tensions between regional power and federal power create a power imbalance that is at the core of most of the current conflicts that the country is experiencing. This is not a new phenomenon in a country which has experienced central and peripheral tensions historically. Closely linked to this is the question of identity, which also has historical antecedents. Does one identify with their ethnic group or as an Ethiopian? Nationally identity is not forged countrywide and while some citizens primarily identify national others reject the national identity in favor of identifying with their ethnic group. This is once again reflective of ethno-federalism. As one respondent (a peace practitioner) quipped, "*The psychological make up of Ethiopia is not nationally aligned and history is also not aligned. For example currently, Amhara think nationally, while the Oromo think regionally*."

Beyond issues of ethnicity and politics, uneven infrastructural development across regions, a burgeoning youth population, rising unemployment and poor economic growth and development are other critical aspects of addressing conflict in Ethiopia and therefore should be highlighted above the cacophony of politics and ethnicity.

Kenya

As highlighted in the chapter 1 of this report, while Kenya does not experience widespread violence, various types of conflict are evident in different parts of the country from election related violence in major towns and cities to resource based conflict in arid areas and the ever present land related conflicts which are often ignited during the electioneering season. CMT-2021 highlights that in as much as the country is not at a crisis level. These highlighted conflict among others if left unaddressed have the potential of flaring up to open conflict. The country is anticipating elections in 2022 and therefore election related conflicts as well as the factors which ignite these conflicts as highlighted in this report, (e.g. Youth unemployment, high levels of corruption, historical unaddressed grievances, government failure to provide basic needs such as security and ethicized politics) need to be not just be identified but intentionally addressed. In many instances these drivers of conflict require political good will and integrity and strength in leadership, which in many cases is lacking. Therefore as Kenyans go to the ballot in 2022, widespread civic education is a requisite to ensure that Kenyans vote from a well-informed position.

South Sudan

With a 2011 referendum that held so much promise, leadership and politics of South Sudan have been a disappointment to the majority of citizens, who have suffered death, injuries, the destruction of property and all round poverty. Exacerbating this situation is the abundance of natural resources that only very few have benefitted from. CMT-2021 highlighted that challenges to addressing conflict in the country include poor development in the country, lack of political good will, peace agreements not fully implemented, external funding of armed groups, mistrust amongst parties in conflict and authoritarian government, among others. CMT-2021 recommends that action should be taken by the regional community to ensure that the gains made by the signing of the R-ARCSS are not lost but are rather reinforced. This includes   facilitating dialogue between government and opposition and also ensuring agreements made are not abandoned. Once again the question of leadership arises as is the case in other Africa countries.   Political leaders in South Sudan have need to approach their differences in a way for tangible differences to be made in the conflict-weary country.

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6. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Appendix A: The Data Collection Tool

A Survey for Assessing Conflict Levels in Africa (Kenya

The Center for Research, Training and Publication (CRTP) of Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations (HIPSIR), based in Nairobi - Kenya, is conducting a study to assess the conflict situation in various countries in Africa. This survey seeks to gather information that shall be used to monitor conflict for strategic intervention across the region. Your participation in this survey will be greatly appreciated.

* 1. Which country do you work/reside in?

[ ] Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

[ ] South Sudan

[ ] Kenya

[ ] Ethiopia

* 2. Please specify the geographical location (e.g. state, County, district, province or region) in the country that you will be giving information on.

* 3. Please indicate your profession and the years of experience you have in the field.

	1 - 2 Years Experience	3 - 4 Years Experience	Over 5 Years Experience
Peace Practitioner	☐	☐	☐
Political/Community Leader	☐	☐	☐
Religious Leader	☐	☐	☐
Government Official	☐	☐	☐
Academia	☐	☐	☐
Medical Practitioner	☐	☐	☐
Security Personnel (police/army)	☐	☐	☐
Civil Society	☐	☐	☐
Media Practitioner	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐

Please specify

* 4. Please indicate your profession and the years of experience you have in the field.

	1 - 2 Years Experience	3 - 4 Years Experience	Over 5 Years Experience
Peace Practitioner	☐	☐	☐
Political/Community Leader	☐	☐	☐
Religious Leader	☐	☐	☐
Government Official	☐	☐	☐
Academia	☐	☐	☐
Medical Practitioner	☐	☐	☐
Security Personnel (police/army)	☐	☐	☐
Civil Society	☐	☐	☐
Media Practitioner	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐

Please specify

* 5. Which of the following conflicts or human rights violations are prevalent in your location/region. (Please rate the following according to what you perceive as highly prevalent, moderately prevalent, less prevalent, not prevalent, and unsure).

	Highly prevalent	Moderately Prevalent	Less prevalent	Not prevalent	Unsure
Sexual and Gender Based Violence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Domestic violence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Armed robbery	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Inter-ethnic violence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Theft	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Cattle rustling	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Political violence	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Violent extremism	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Resource-based conflict (i.e. competition for revenue sharing, land grabbing, competition in the management of natural resource)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Police brutality	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Other

Please specify

* 6. In your opinion, what are the key drivers of conflict in your location/region. Please select according to what you perceive as the most prominent to the least prominent driver.

	Most prominent conflict driver	Moderately prominent conflict driver	Least prominent conflict driver	Not prominent conflict driver	Not sure
Unemployment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Perceived/presence of economic marginalization	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ethnicized politics	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Proliferation of armed groups	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Proliferation of small arms	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dishonoring peace agreements	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Competition for natural resources	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Historical unaddressed grievances	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Government failure (in providing basic needs, security)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
High levels of corruption	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Violence for economic gain e.g. cattle rustling	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
COVID 19 Pandemic	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please specify [   ]

* 7. Out of the actors listed below, please indicate those you believe are responsible for the conflict situation in your region? Please rate according to who you perceive as most responsible, moderately responsible, responsible, not responsible, and unsure.

	Most responsible	Moderately responsible	Responsible	Not responsible	Unsure
Government (police, army)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Armed groups/political militia groups	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Prominent individuals (opposition leaders, rebel leaders, government leaders, community leaders)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Neighboring countries/Individual states	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regional/International state actors (AU, UN, EU)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Multinational Corporations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Other				
	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please specify

* 8. In the following sections, we wish to ask you about the indicators of conflict you may have observed in your region. In your opinion, to what extent have you observed the following scenarios that show that there is peace stability in your region/location?

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to proceed without interruption.	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is peaceful co-existence between different ethnic communities	☐	☐	☐	☐
The government at different levels are providing adequate public services	☐	☐	☐	☐
There are good relations between the government and the inter-national community	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is perceived equitable distribution of resources	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is perceived low levels of corruption	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is enjoyment of human rights (bill of rights)	☐	☐	☐	☐

* 9. In your opinion, to what extent have you observed the following scenarios that indicate a Pre-Conflict stage, showing that the region is experiencing socio-political tensions that could lead to conflict?

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
There are complaints of economic hardships, e.g. high cost of living	☐	☐	☐	☐
Unresolved historical grievances are being brought up and discussed	☐	☐	☐	☐
Perceived social exclusion by some communities/groups	☐	☐	☐	☐
There are reports of hate-speech or inflammatory remarks by leaders and youth groups	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is a rise in the level of criminal activities/gang groups	☐	☐	☐	☐
Discontent over lack of provision of social services by the government	☐	☐	☐	☐

* 10. In your opinion, to what extent have you observed the following scenarios that show that the present security situation could lead to open conflict in your region? (Confrontation conflict level)

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
There are violent demonstrations /riots	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors	☐	☐	☐	☐
The protagonists have preference for armed violent confrontation over peaceful resolution to conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐
Existence of inter-ethnic /clan mobilization or groupings for violence	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is an increase in negative propaganda to promote violence	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is increased reports of human rights violations e.g. armed robbery, police brutality, kidnappings, murder, gender and sexual based violence etc.	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is a disruption of economic activities e.g. looting and theft/destruction of property	☐	☐	☐	☐

* 11. In determining whether your region is experiencing active armed conflict, please rate the presence of the following armed conflict indicators in your region.

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
There is open conflict between different groups and damage of properties	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is media information blackout	☐	☐	☐	☐
Government is unable to provide security to its citizens as a result of conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is displacement of citizens which could lead to a humanitarian crisis as a result of conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is presence of government security forces to intervene against violent conflict or are involved in the conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐
There are attempts at international interventions through regional/international bodies	☐	☐	☐	☐
There are reports of an unusually high number of deaths and injuries	☐	☐	☐	☐
There are reports of an unusually high number of sexual violence against men, women and children	☐	☐	☐	☐

* 12. In determining whether your region is experiencing a decline in open armed conflict, please indicate your rating of the following statements. (Outcome Level of Conflict).

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
There is a reduction in the intensity of warfare	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is ceasefire	☐	☐	☐	☐
Some combatants have surrendered their arms	☐	☐	☐	☐
Some combatants are moving to cantonment areas	☐	☐	☐	☐
Key actors in conflict are involved in peace processes	☐	☐	☐	☐
Peace agreements have been signed by protagonists	☐	☐	☐	☐
Peacebuilding activities have been initiated	☐	☐	☐	☐

* 13. Please rate the following activities of Post-Conflict reconstruction in your region.

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
Refugees and IDPs are returning back home	☐	☐	☐	☐
Regular economic activities are resuming	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is an improved security situation as a result of the presence of government security agencies to protect civilians	☐	☐	☐	☐
A government justice process has been initiated to address conflict crimes	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is an absence of violence or fear of violence	☐	☐	☐	☐
The causes of conflict are currently being addressed	☐	☐	☐	☐

* 14. In your opinion what would you consider the most important peace interventions that have been undertaken to resolve the conflict in your region? (Please highlight those undertaken locally within the country or conducted by citizens or local organizations, and those undertaken regionally by neighboring countries or regional economic communities e.t.c.).

Communally (Peace interventions within and by the local community/ location/County	

Nationally (peaceinterventions at the national level):		
Regionally (EAC, IGAD, Africa Union etc.)		
Internationally (UN, other countries/ organizations outside Africa)		

* 15. Please rate the effect of various challenges to peace interventions in bringing about a resolution to the conflict

	Very Challenging	Moderately Challenging	Not a challenge	Not sure if it is a Challenge
Lack of political goodwill	☐	☐	☐	☐
Authoritative government	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fragile government	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mis-trust amongst parties in conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐
Negotiations not involving all parties	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tensions between parties unabated	☐	☐	☐	☐
Breakdown of peace talks	☐	☐	☐	☐
Peace agreements not fully implemented	☐	☐	☐	☐
Unmet demands from conflict parties	☐	☐	☐	☐
Exclusion of other interest groups in peace talks (e.g. women's groups, community based organizations etc)	☐	☐	☐	☐
External funding of armed groups	☐	☐	☐	☐
Availability of small arms and light weapons	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poor development in the region/country	☐	☐	☐	☐
Unresolved grievances from past conflicts	☐	☐	☐	☐
International interference by external actors	☐	☐	☐	☐
COVID-19 pandemic challenges	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please specify

* 16. Based on your opinion and experience, please give your recommendation on the best way to successfully solve the conflict.

Appendix A: The Data Collection Tool

Abbreviation	Description of the Indicator

Level 0: Peace

L_0I_1	1. There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to proceed without interruption.
L_0I_2	2. There is peaceful co-existence between different ethnic communities
L_0I_3	3. The government at different levels are providing adequate public services
L_0I_4	4. There are good relations between the government and the region-al/international community
L_0I_5	5. There is perceived equitable distribution of resources
L_0I_6	6. There is perceived low levels of corruption

Level 1: Latent Conflict

L_1I_1	1. There are complaints of economic hardships, e.g. high cost of living
L_1I_2	2. Unresolved historical grievances are being brought up and discussed
L_1I_3	3. Perceived social exclusion of some communities/groups
L_1I_4	4. There are reports of hate-speech or inflammatory remarks by leaders
L_1I_5	5. There is a rise in the level of criminal activities/gang groups

Level 2: Confrontation Stage

L_2I_1	1. There are violent demonstrations /riots
L_2I_2	2. There is acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors
L_2I_3	3. The protagonists have preference for armed violent confrontation over peace-ful resolution to conflict
L_2I_4	4. Existence of inter-ethnic /clan mobilization or groupings for violence
L_2I_5	5. There is an increase in negative propaganda to promote violence
L_2I_6	6. There is increased reports of human rights violation e.g. theft, armed robbery, police brutality, gender and sexual based violence etc.

Level 3: Crisis Stage

L_3I_1	1. There is open conflict between different groups and damage of properties
L_3I_2	2. There is media information blackout
L_3I_3	3. Government is unable to provide security to its citizens as a result of conflict
L_3I_4	4. There is displacement of citizens which could lead to a humanitarian crisis as a result of conflict
L_3I_5	5. There is presence of government security forces to intervene against violent conflict or are involved in the conflict
L_3I_6	6. There are attempts at international interventions through regional/international bodies

Level -2: Outcome Stage

L_2I_1	1. There is a reduction in the intensity of warfare
L_2I_2	2. There is ceasefire
L_2I_3	3. Some combatants have surrendered their arms
L_2I_4	4. Some combatants are moving to cantonment areas
L_2I_5	5. Key actors in conflict are involved in peace processes

Level -1: Post-Conflict Level

L_1I_1	1. Refugees and IDPs are returning back home
L_1I_2	2. Regular economic activities are resuming
L_1I_3	3. There is an improved security situation as a result of the presence of govern-ment or international security agencies to protect civilians
L_1I_4	4. A government justice process has been initiated to address conflict crimes
L_1I_5	5. There is an absence of violence or fear of violence
L_1I_6	6. The causes of conflict are currently being addressed

(Source: HIPSIR Research)