

**HIPSIR Research Series, No. 1/2023/01**

# **CONFLICT MONITORING IN AFRICA FOR STRATEGIC INTERVENTION**

## **HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT)**

**Case Studies of  
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia,  
Kenya and South Sudan**

**Editors: Elias Opongo, SJ and Anthony Egan, SJ  
with Hezbon Awiti and Saturnin Modeste Agramako**



**Centre for Research, Training and  
Publication (CRTP)**

**Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and  
International Relations (HIPSIR)**

**Hekima University College**

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CONFLICT MONITORING IN AFRICA FOR STRATEGIC INTERVENTION:  
CASE STUDIES OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC), ETHIOPIA, KENYA AND  
SOUTH SUDAN.

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## **INTRODUCTION**

## HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) Report 2023

Conflict monitoring and peace-building projects are dynamic ventures. In-depth conflict analysis of the causes, trends, and possible conflict interventions should be an on-going activity. This year 2022 Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) updates the conflict situations in DRC, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Kenya with more emphasis on DRC and Ethiopia where conflict has been on rise in the recent past. Moreover, the 2022 report included gender inclusion and ethnics exclusion analysis in peace building process as well as the Coivid-19 impact analysis on security and economy of the four countries under study compared to 2021 CMT report. The findings of the study can be used to update and inform the peace-builders and conflict resolution experts on the conflict level for the appropriate implementation of effective strategies.

Conflict, especially between communities and nations has always been a dominant concern for societies and civilizations.<sup>1</sup> The Second World War (1939-1945) was a turning point in the tolerance of war. It was the largest armed conflict in human history, raging across the world and causing an estimated fifty million military and civilian deaths.<sup>2</sup> This stimulated an awareness of the need to develop preventive strategies to mitigate conflict and its devastating effects. In addition, from the conflict monitoring exercise, preventive measures can be suggested and implemented to ensure peace restoration in the conflict-affected areas.

During the Cold War, a bipolar system of world politics emerged along with new contenders for international leadership which included the invention and subsequent proliferation of weapons. Thereafter, the post-Cold War period in the 1990s saw the emergence of intra-state conflicts in several nations and increased civil wars. The government should make effort to accept all parties to the conflict as “equals” in conflict situations<sup>3</sup>. Political and economic preferences of a group over another are to be eschewed and jettisoned by the government. Papagianni and Federman argued that it is right to have a wider inclusion of parties (youths, women, and social groups) in conflict management and peace building process because it encourages trust, cooperation and relationship-building among even people who perceive themselves as enemies.<sup>4</sup> During transitional periods like elections, opposition parties usually demand inclusive and just politics. Thus, the government should not resist nor deny this offer to them but rather enable wider political debates and representation of wider social groups and gender for the possibility of the emergence of

1 J., Burton, & F., Dukes, eds, Conflict: Reading in Management and Resolution, p. 1.

2 E., Roosevelt, World War II (1939-1945), <https://www2.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/world-war-2.cfm> (Accessed June, 2019).

3 Buzan, B., Buzan, B. G., Waver, O., Waever, O., & Buzan, O. W. B. (2003). *Regions and powers: the structure of international security* (Vol. 91). Cambridge University Press.

4 Papagianni, K., & Federman, S. (2022). Enabling Inclusive Peace Mediation and Negotiation. *Untapped Power: Leveraging Diversity and Inclusion for Conflict and Development*, 265

other desirable alternatives of new political leaders devoid of wartime political legacies.

Despite a decline in intra-state conflicts in Africa<sup>5</sup> since the early 2000s, we still have civil conflicts in the Central Africa Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Violent extremism has also been recently experienced in Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, among others.<sup>6</sup> Based on the country conflict situation content analysis, the conflict reports and updates from January to December 2022 revealed that the four countries under consideration (Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and DRC), are still experiencing socio-economic and political related conflicts. The global conflict tracker of May 2022 updated by the Centre for Preventive Action indicates that there is increasing inter-communal violence and attacks and there is need to improve humanitarian support especially in South Sudan.<sup>7</sup>

A 2022 United Nations' News Report on peace and security showed that between February and April 2022, a total of 72 civilians were killed in South Sudan, and 11 injured with 64 cases of sexual violence reported.<sup>8</sup> In Ethiopia, the Ethiopian government and rival Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) forces signed a "permanent cessation of hostilities" peace deal on 3<sup>rd</sup> November, 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa<sup>9</sup>. Furthermore, as Kenya also experienced signs of ethnicized political tension arising amongst citizens during and after the August 2022 elections.

According to March 2022 updates of war in DRC, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Report indicates that human rights in DRC have not improved significantly due to the constant attacks by armed groups against civilians and this has persistently increased in the Eastern province<sup>10</sup>. Therefore, to explore strategies of managing and possibly resolving conflicts, an in-depth analysis of the causes, trends, and manifestations of conflicts is important.

Additionally, the psychological and behavioral elements as well as the systematic order of

5 S. A. Rušad, Conflict Trends in Africa, 1989–2018: An Update, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), p. 5.

6 J. Cilliers, Violence in Africa: Trends, Drivers and Prospects to 2023, p. 2.

7 Center for Prevention Action: Civil War in South Sudan, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan> (Accessed on May 18, 2022)

8 United Nations: UN condemns 'horrific' surge of violence in South Sudan, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1116862> (Accessed on May, 2022)

9 ALJAZEERA News: Ethiopia Peace Deal Hailed as a 'new dawn', <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/3/how-did-the-world-react-to-the-ethiopia-peace-deal> (Accessed on November 7, 2022)

10 OCHA. Reliefweb: Update on Democratic Republic Congo. March 29, 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/update-democratic-republic-congo-29-march-2022> (Accessed on March 30, 2022)

sectarian social groups and gender exclusion that generates conflict need to be understood and documented. This means that the development and implementation of an appropriate conflict-monitoring tool as a model of conflict analysis is requisite to the peace-building discourse. Kinsella, et al. (2009) observed that it has been seen that democracy, transparent and corruption-free governance is generally essential to the resolution of conflicts. It should be borne in mind that peace building and democratization processes are never easy. This is particularly the case during and after conflicts in societies divided along gender, social group, ethnic and political lines as found in DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan.

Drawing on the conflict monitoring exercise, preventive measures can be considered to ensure that conflict is transformed and peace restored among the various parties involved. Hence, this project focused on the development of a Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan as selected sample countries for the study. The selection of these countries were based on: DRC represents African states experiencing protracted conflicts with regard to the competition for natural resources, inter-ethnic conflicts, national boundaries, poor governance, multiplication of militia groups, failure of the UN peace mission to engage and integrate key actors as well as lack of integration and engagement of local cultures. DRC not only has fertile agricultural land and a rich diversity of wildlife but also huge deposits of minerals like copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, uranium, platinum, palladium among others. However, the unending violent conflicts that have characterized the country's history remains a major concern of the country.

Ethiopia is a unique case study for the implications of governance structures in peace stability. Ethiopia is governed by an ethno-federalism model that gives regions in terms of ethnic groups (Oromo, Tigray, Amhara, Somali, Sidama, Gurage, Weleyta and Hadiya) considerable independence to the extent of being able to vote to secede.<sup>11</sup> The adoption of an ethnic-based federal system which provides territory authority to different ethnic groups has been the driving force behind the ethnic-based conflicts in Ethiopia. Though this system was set in place to address conflict between regions by giving them a certain degree of independence; it has also been a source of conflict in recent years. Ethiopia gives insights into understanding conflict brought on by tensions within government systems.

Kenya represents African countries experiencing occasional conflicts and terror attacks. While the country is generally stable and enjoys strong economic performance regionally,

<sup>11</sup> Ethiopia's Constitution of 1994, [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia\\_1994.pdf?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994.pdf?lang=en) (accessed November 18, 1994).

it has had a number overlapping low intensity conflicts ranging from ethnic clashes, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), election-related violence, and terrorism. The nature of conflict in Kenya can be attributed to issues concerning social fragmentation, negative ethnicity, political animosity, corruption, impunity of leaders, as well as gender and social group exclusion from conflict management and peace building process. Other issues include land disputes, discrimination, and marginalization, the penetration of Al-Shabaab's ideologies into the country's local politics, and the proliferation of small arms.

Finally, South Sudan has experienced intermittent conflict since it gained independence in 2011. At the center of South Sudan's conflict is a myriad of factors such as political arrangements for power-sharing, agreements on the number of states, demobilization of the armed forces, failure of peace agreements, delayed election date, and the formation of a government of national unity. Since the 2013 eruption of conflict in South Sudan, there have been several peace agreements between President Salva Kiir's faction and that of his former deputy Riek Machar. Though the peace agreement signed in 2020 brought an end to a five-year conflict,<sup>12</sup> implementing the agreement has been slow, with fears that widespread conflict would be ignited once again.<sup>13</sup>

During the data collection process across the region for 2022 study, different challenges were experienced. These challenges were low response rate to online questionnaires in Ethiopia and some regions like Samburu, Turkana and Baringo in Kenya due poor network connectivity and unwillingness of the some respondents to fill and submit the responses online. Time management by the participants invited for focus group discussion and research validation exercises presented greater challenge more so in DRC, Ethiopia and South Sudan. For DRC specifically North Kivu region and Tigray region in Ethiopia presented major challenge of accessibility to conflict monitors contracted on the ground to collect data due to the open conflict that was common in the two regions during data collection period.

This report is divided into four sections: The first section deals with the conceptualization of the conflict monitoring tool, followed by an analysis of existing conflict monitoring tools. The second section provides a background of the conflict and peace situations in each of the countries under study. This will be followed by an analysis of the factors that

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12 Mednick S, "Old grudges and empty coffers: South Sudan's precarious peace process," The New Humanitarian, January 21, 2021, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/01/21/south-sudan-peace-deal-violence-famine> (November 25, 2021).

13 United Nations, "South Sudan's Transitional Government Must Build on Gains, Speed Up Implementation of Peace Agreement, Mission Head Says in Security Council Briefing," <https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14457.doc.htm> March 21, 2021.

tend to influence the status of peace or conflict. The third section outlines the methodology used in conducting the study. This includes research design, sampling, and data collection strategies, as well as analysis of the data and a systematic explanation of the development and application of the Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations (HIPSIR) Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT). The final section outlines the diverse areas of concern in the study and some recommendations for action.

### Conflict Curve Assessment


In order to monitor conflict levels, the HIPSIR CMT was designed to analyze conflicts in line with the conflict curve assessment. To accomplish this, a modified version of Lund's conflict curve was adopted (See Lund's curve in figure 1 below). Lund's conflict curve is elaborate and gives different methods of intervention employed in conflict resolution. In addressing ongoing conflicts, Lund's is a useful tool<sup>14</sup> to indicate the various stages of a conflict. Conflict curve seeks to achieve seven goals. *First*, it indicates the stage of a conflict. *Second*, it points to possible interventions that can be adopted by different actors. *Third*, it plays an important role in identifying the indicators for conflict early warning. *Fourth*, it shows five stages of a conflict. *Fifth*, it assesses how conflict escalates from one stage to another. *Sixth*, it is ideal for identifying patterns in the conflict. *Finally*, it shows the increasing or decreasing intensity of a conflict situation.<sup>15</sup>

### Figure 1: Conflict Curve Representing Different Levels of Conflict

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<sup>14</sup> Lund S. M., "Curve of Conflict," United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/public-education/students/curve-conflict>, 2012

<sup>15</sup> Marian Hassan, "Conflict Curve/Stages Of Conflict," *The Peace and Collaborative Development Network (PCDN)*, June 27, 2010. <https://pcdnetwork.org/blogs/conflict-curvestages-of-conflict/>



(Source: Conflict Curve Representing Different Levels<sup>16</sup>)

Niklas Swanström and Mikael Weissmann also discuss the life cycle of conflict. Noting that conflict is dynamic,<sup>17</sup> and it is essential to understand its life cycle so as to know when and how to make a strategic intervention. Thus the need for a tool that monitors the conflict cycle to understand how and when to strategically intervene to avoid an escalation of conflict and its (more often than not) devastating consequences. The conflict model denotes an ideal conflict cycle that is divided into different phases of a conflict.

According to Swanström and Weissmann these stages of the conflict are:

<sup>16</sup> Conflict Curve Adopted from United States Institute of Peace, Accessed June 7, 2019, url: <https://www.usip.org/public-education/students/curve-conflict>.

<sup>17</sup> Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann. Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and beyond: a conceptual exploration, p. 9.

**Table 1: Stages of Conflict**


STAGE OF CONFLICT	DESCRIPTION
Stable peace	Where there exists very little or any tension between parties and there is cooperation between parties, economically, socially, and environmentally. There is also cooperation in non-sensitive areas.
Unstable peace	Presence of negative peace and increased tensions between parties.
Open Conflict	Whereby the conflict has been identified and conflict parties are ready to engage in the conflict, even if militarized options have not been adopted. <sup>1</sup>
Crisis	Militarized options are preferred, sporadic acts of violence and the eventuality of war is imminent.
War	Intense, widespread violent conflict.

(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005)

While the five stages present an escalation of conflict, according to Swanstrom and Weissmann for the de-escalation of conflict the progression is reversed, till the situation arrives back at stable peace.



Figure 2: The Conflict Cycle




(Source: Swanström and Weissmann, 2005, p. 13)

Swanström and Weissmann also acknowledge that this conflict curve is idealistic as conflict does not always follow such a predictable progression; because of its dynamic nature, each conflict situation adopts its unique conflict curve. They, therefore, highlight various scenarios that could characterize a conflict cycle.

To begin with, a conflict can re-occur over time, “and pass through the different stages over and over again.”<sup>18</sup> It thus takes on the form of a wave as below:


**Figure 3: Conflict Curve A**



(Source: Swanström and Weissmann, 2005, p. 15)

Secondly, the above conflict wave does not occur predictably as indicated. However, a conflict can re-escalate at any phase of the conflict curve.<sup>19</sup> Indeed what is usually observed is that a conflict will often reoccur between the crisis and war phases, either because crisis management breaks down or conflict resolution strategies adopted are not effective. The conflict curve is as below:

**Figure 4: Conflict Curve B**




(Source: Swanström and Weissmann, 2005, p. 15)

Thirdly, a conflict situation sometimes gets entrenched between the escalation phases of open conflict and crisis never reaching the level of war. Such conflicts are usually left without concrete resolution, making them prone to further escalation in the future. The conflict curve would therefore look like this:

**Figure 5: Conflict Curve C**


<sup>19</sup> Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and beyond: a conceptual exploration, p. 15-16.



(Source: Swanström and Weissmann, 2005, p. 16)

Moreover, Swanström and Weissmann also point out that sometimes conflicts will waver between unstable peace, open conflict, and crisis. Somewhat similar to the previous example, while the conflict may not fully escalate to war, it usually remains unresolved over a long period as shown below.

**Figure 6: Conflict Curve D**




(Source: Swanström and Weissmann, 2005, p. 16)

Further, they also hold that conflicts can also occur concurrently, meaning that during a specific time and space multiple conflicts driven by diverse issues can be occurring side by side.<sup>20</sup> This is illustrated by the conflict curve below:

**Figure 7: Conflict Curve E**


20 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p. 17.



(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005, p. 17)

Also, in other instances there could be a core conflict with smaller (sub) conflicts occurring alongside it, each of these sub conflicts would have its conflict cycles.<sup>21</sup> Once again this complicates the conflict curve. Such a conflict situation would be indicated with the model below:

**Figure 8: Conflict Curve F**



(Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005, p. 17)

Therefore, their point is that, conflict is not neatly simplified and consequently it does not follow a predictable progression as imagined by the conflict curve. Nonetheless, a conflict curve is useful in indicating trends.

Understanding the conflict curve and the various phases that a conflict progresses through is integral to the monitoring of conflict and consequently informs the intervention and resolution strategies to be employed to effectively mitigate and eventually resolve a conflict to realize stable (positive) peace. Therefore, over time, having successfully

<sup>21</sup> Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p. 17.

monitored conflict in the region periodically, the HIPSIR CMT will be in a position to represent various conflict scenarios with the use of the conflict curve.


### **HIPSIR CMT Conflict Curve**

The HIPSIR CMT conflict curve is a tool developed by the Centre of Research, Training and Publication to monitor the conflict levels across different regions. It is an innovation combining the concept of a conflict curve as detailed by Michael Lund and Swanstrom and Weissmann and the levels of conflict as detailed in Table 2. The conflict curve from Swanstrom and Weissmann indicates five stages of a conflict, namely: stable peace, unstable peace, open conflict, crisis, and war, while Lund's curve indicates three stages of conflict i.e. peace, conflict, and war.<sup>22</sup> However, the HIPSIR CMT chose to use the levels of conflict as detailed by Marian Hassan. This is because they indicate escalation and de-escalation levels of conflict thus making it easier to identify indicators that describe each level of conflict clearly. Having clear indicators to describe each level of conflict is important as this would ensure having a clear understanding of what level a conflict situation might be at a given point in time. Subsequently, this identification would inform what intervention strategies to be applied.

The second innovation is that the HIPSIR CMT has a numerical scale of measuring conflict levels, unlike Lund's and Swanstrom and Weissmann's models. This scale was developed through a rigorous process of selecting measurable indicators of conflict and statistical calculations that were tested over time to ascertain their accuracy in measuring conflict levels. Conflict level or the severity of a conflict, according to the HIPSIR CMT, is measured on a scale ranging from negative two (-2) and positive three (+3). In this case, the CMT has six levels that are statistically calculated using 34 indicators of conflict (see Appendix). The HIPSIR CMT conflict curve is shown in the figure below.

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22 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p. 11.



**Figure 9: HIPSIR CMT Conflict Curve**

These levels and their respective numerical denotation are explained below.

**Table 2: Description of conflict levels**

<b>Conflict Level</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Peace</b> <b>(0)</b>	At this stage, there is no conflict whatsoever.
<b>Latent</b> <b>(1)</b>	This level is characterized by incompatible goals between one or more parties but hidden from the public. If not identified early and proper intervention not taken to address the causes of the tension, a confrontation occurs. <sup>2</sup>
<b>Confrontation</b> <b>(2)</b>	At this stage, the conflict is more open. There could be intolerance that may lead to confrontational behavior. If no interventions take place, the situation may become polarized leading to a crisis. <sup>3</sup>
<b>Crisis</b> <b>(3)</b>	At this level, there is war or open conflict.
<b>Outcome</b> <b>(-2)</b>	Either one party in the conflict is defeated, or there may be an intervention from a third party that leads to a ceasefire. It may also occur when the conflict is ripe for intervention and all parties are tired and ready for dialogue. The force of the government could also lead to an outcome.
<b>Post Conflict</b> <b>(-1)</b>	When the issues are finally resolved and relationships normalize. If the cause of the incompatible goals among the parties is not addressed, the tension can occur and revert to pre-conflict or confrontation stages.

(Source: Marian Hassan, 2010)

In some instances, many issues of a cycle of conflict are not fully addressed and this sets the stage for a subsequent conflict. A similar situation may also occur if state machinery is generally weak and not able to enforce enduring peace. The result is usually another outbreak of war.

### **Conceptualization of Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT)**

On realizing the need to bring together all actors through the creation of a platform for gathering and sharing of information, the Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations (HIPSIR) developed a conflict monitoring tool (CMT) known as the HIPSIR CMT. Through its development, the HIPSIR CMT seeks to contribute to the practice of conflict monitoring in Africa by fostering cooperation in generating information on the best strategies to manage conflict.

To effectively monitor conflict and develop goal-oriented conflict resolution or peace-building interventions, there is need to understand the theory of change, which “explains how a given intervention, or set of interventions, are expected to lead to specific

development change, drawing on a causal analysis based on available evidence.”<sup>23</sup> A theory of change explains why certain actions will produce desired change in a given context. It is intended to make all the implicit assumptions more explicit, in order to clarify which drivers of conflict are being addressed, what are intended outcome of the conflict situation and articulate how and why the situation should be addressed as per the drivers of conflict to achieve the intended outcomes.<sup>24</sup> Further, the theory of change is appropriate in understanding conflicts in Africa which are complex due to the numerous drivers and actors involved. Such an approach helps in the identification of actors-centered solutions to address the drivers of conflict effectively by leveraging comparative advantages throughout the change process.

Based on the theory of change, the HIPSIR conflict monitoring tool can be used to suggest the action needed to manage the conflict to ensure peace stability based on the data collected. For instance, if the main driver of conflict is youth, then based on the theory of change we can assume that they are not relatively engaged in constructive work and then if jobs can be created for them, there is anticipation that the youths will be engaged and will not be used as conflict perpetrators.

The conflict monitoring tool can be used to monitor conflict indicators that are consistently observed, to understand whether the conflict is escalating or deescalating for appropriate policy recommendations. This can be explained by the fact that each indicator plays a certain role in understanding a conflict situation. In the context of theory of change, indicators are mainly used to assess the assumptions, outputs, outcomes sustainability in comparison with the expectation informed by the design of the program.<sup>25</sup> For instance, if conflict management experts in conflict-affected areas accept a new conflict resolution method different from the previous method due to changes in the intensity of the conflict, then in response to such changes, peace practitioners are expected to intervene and suggest appropriate strategies.

Therefore, the HIPSIR CMT seeks to generate information by monitoring conflicts and disseminate up-to-date information on the conflict trends of the selected countries

<sup>23</sup> Corlazzoli, Vanessa. White, Jonathan. *Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security, and Justice Programmes: Part II: Using Theories of Change in Monitoring and Evaluation*. DFID: Department for International Development, 2013.

<sup>24</sup> Babbitt, Eileen, Diana Chigas and Robert Wilkinson. (March 2013). *Theories and indicators of change briefing paper concepts and primers for conflict management and mitigation*. United States Agency for International Development.

<sup>25</sup> Corlazzoli, V. and White, J (2013). *Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security, and Justice Programmes: Part II: Using Theories of Change in Monitoring and Evaluation*. DFID: Department for International Development.



for appropriate policy formulation and strategic interventions. The consumers of the information are expected to help restore peace across the region to improve the economic, social, cultural, and political conditions of the people. In this case, the HIPSIR CMT seeks to promote peace by monitoring key indicators that point to concerns that would need attention. By doing so, measures can be taken based on the information provided to prevent an escalation of conflict<sup>26</sup>. The use of the HIPSIR CMT will allow for a broader identification of the causes of conflict and propositions on possible ways of resolving conflicts. Following its development, the HIPSIR CMT is one of the numerous existing tools. Some of the existing conflicts monitoring tools and data sources are discussed below

### Existing Tools for Conflict Monitoring

*Conflict Sensitivity Resource Pack*. This tool was designed for governments, donors and civil society involved in development, humanitarian assistance and peace building. It recommends the use of perception-based indicators, (for example, does the respondent feels more or less safe) alongside the objective indicators (such as violence incidences) to capture the intangible effects of the conflict.<sup>27</sup> This is because classifying conflict indicators by group helps conflict monitoring experts to detect conflict sensitivity concerns. Moreover, the tool is important to peace-builders because peace-building initiatives need to be both conflict sensitive and accountable to peace-building criteria. However, the major limitation of the tool is that it does not provide detailed guidance for every type of intervention or cross-cutting issues in a conflict

*Gender and Conflict Sensitivity tool*. This tool helps Peace-builders to analyze how gender is affected differently by conflict and how they may seek to resolve the conflict differently, how gender inequality can trigger conflict tension, as well as the intersection of gender with other social divisions such as religion, ethnicity etc.<sup>28</sup> The strength of this tool is that it incorporates gender and considers the role of gender in conflict management and peace building.

The *Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)* is majorly involved in conducting “research on

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26 Ibid

27 Haider, H., (2014). *Conflict Sensitivity: Topic Guide*. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.: [http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/gsdrc\\_cs\\_topic\\_guide.pdf](http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/gsdrc_cs_topic_guide.pdf) (Accessed on May 15, 2022)

28 Gender and Conflict Analysis Toolkit for Peacebuilders (2015): <https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/CR%20Gender%20Toolkit%20WEB.pdf> (Accessed on May 15, 2022)

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the conditions for peaceful relations between states, groups, and people.”<sup>29</sup> Its emphasis is on understanding issues that either unite societies or split them. Some of the issues that PRIO investigates include how conflicts emerge, their effects on people, how societies respond to them, and how to resolve them.

*The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)* has been in existence since 1966. Its main aim is “to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament.”<sup>30</sup> To achieve this, it constantly collects data from open sources, analyses it, and uses the results to make recommendations. Consequently, it is significantly involved in policy analysis where it makes recommendations to parliamentarians, diplomats, journalists, and other experts in the field of security.

*The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)* is a Swedish based conflict monitoring tool and data source.<sup>31</sup> It has been providing event-based data on violence for over 40 years. It relies on information from news reports that it codes before entering into the system. It controls data quality by conducting a post-estimation validation exercise. The limitation of this tool is that it relies on information on news reports for data which might affect the data quality and authenticity.

*The Global Peace Operations Review* is a US-based tool that was created in 1966. It “covers more than one hundred multilateral active peace operations.”<sup>32</sup> It is based on the assumption that while peace operations are of great need, there is a need to adjust to the dynamics of conflicts. It also emphasizes the use of operations of peace enforcement that does not exclude deployment of military force when necessary.

*The Human Security Report Project (HSRP)* is similar to SIPRI and PRIO in that it is a research center that was developed in Canada to “track global and regional trends in organized violence, especially because of terrorism and warfare.”<sup>33</sup> Through its researchers, HSRP prepares online publications documenting global trends of conflict and violence. Its data on security statistics are dated back to as early as 1946.

*The Institute for Economics and Peace* is not only known for developing metrics for peace analysis but also its quantification of the economic value of the same.<sup>34</sup> In other words, it

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29 “About,” PRIO, <https://www.prio.org/About/>

30 “Home,” SIPRI, <https://www.sipri.org/>

31 “About,” UCDP, <https://ucdp.uu.se/>

32 “About,” Global Peace Operations Review, <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/>

33 “Human security report project,” [http://www.csbsju.edu/documents/peace\\_studies/human\\_security\\_report\\_project.docx](http://www.csbsju.edu/documents/peace_studies/human_security_report_project.docx)

34 “About,” Institute of Economics and Peace, <http://economicsandpeace.org/about/>

focuses on four study areas: measuring peace, positive peace, the economics of peace, and understanding risk. It releases the Global Peace Index annually that “measures national peacefulness, ranking 163 countries according to their levels of peace.”<sup>35</sup> It collects at least 5000 data sets on eight factors that it uses to measure positive peace besides acting as a guide for overcoming conflicts and promoting lasting peace. It relies on data on 13 types of costs incurred on issues related to conflict to compute the economic valuation of violence as well as fear. Furthermore, the institute measures violence risks using data that it has been collecting since 1996.

*Conflict Alert*<sup>36</sup> is a system of monitoring conflict that tracks and reports violent incidence, their causes, as well as their human costs in the Philippines. Its development in 2015 was based on two databases. It makes a regional comparison of conflict situations with an intention “to shape policymaking, development strategies, and peacebuilding approaches by providing relevant, robust, and reliable conflict data.”<sup>37</sup> Its data sources include incident reports from police offices, news reports, and members of multi-stakeholder validation groups (MSVGs). Once the data is collected, it is sorted, encoded, validated, and analyzed. The information is disseminated in the form of charts, graphs, tables, and mapped locational context.

Based in the USA, *the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)* “is a disaggregated conflict collection, analysis, and crisis mapping project. ACLED collects the dates, actors, types of violence, locations, and fatalities of all reported political violence and protest events across Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, Latin America, and the Caribbean, and Southeastern and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.”<sup>38</sup> It identifies various forms of conflict across the world, the actors’ involved, historical documentation of political violence as well as protests that occur in many countries across the world.

*Good Governance Africa* established in 2012 seeks to improve governance in Africa for the betterment of its citizens. It is a “research and advocacy non-profit organization with centers across Africa focused solely on improving governance across the continent.”<sup>39</sup> One of its tools related to conflict is the Conflict in Africa Monitor (CAM). This conflict monitoring tool is “designed to track and analyze major conflict hotspots across the continent, with the objective of providing decision makers with the data and tools

35 “About,” Institute of Economics and Peace, <http://economicsandpeace.org/about/>

36 “Conflict Alert,” Conflict Alert, <http://conflictalert.info/about/>

37 “Conflict Alert,” Conflict Alert, <http://conflictalert.info/about/>

38 “About,” ACLED, <https://www.acleddata.com/about-acled/>

39 <https://gga.org/about-us/>

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necessary to develop informed policy solutions to mitigate or end political violence and conflict.”<sup>40</sup>

*The Kivu Security Tracker (KST)*, which is based in the US, was developed in 2017 “to map violence by state security forces and armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo to better understand trends, causes of insecurity and serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.”<sup>41</sup> Just like the Conflict Alert Tool, the KST reports violent incidences that armed groups and security forces perpetuate.<sup>42</sup> Trained researchers collect the data daily after which it is entered into a database. They also review media reports, exchange information with other organizations, and verify the information before publishing reports.<sup>43</sup>

**Table 3: Summary of Conflict Monitoring Tools and Data Sources**

Date	Name	Country	Scope
1980s	Uppsala Conflict Data Program	Sweden	Global
2011	ACLED	USA	Global
2011	Conflict Alert	Philippines	Philippines
2017	The Kivu Security Tracker	USA	E a s t e r n Congo
1959	Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)	Norway	Global
1966	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)	Sweden	Global
2005?	Human Security Index Project	Canada	Global
1990s	Global Peace Operations Review (under CIC)	USA	Global
2012	Good Governance Africa	South Africa	Africa
2007	Institute of Economics and Peace ( Global Peace Index)	Australia	Global
2002-2003	Conflict Sensitivity Resource Pack	Kenya, Uganda	Global
2015	Gender and Conflict Sensitivity Tool	Sri Lanka Global	Global

(Source: HIPSIR Research)

*HIPSIR CMT*: Having reviewed the aforementioned tools and data sources, HIPSIR CMT comes in as an additional tool that adds value to conflict monitoring, particularly in Africa. It combines both secondary gathering of data with qualitative research by relying on key informant interviews. This approach gives voice to people closely related to the conflict situations, while at the same time it triangulates and validates the information

<sup>40</sup> <https://gga.org/africa-digital-databank/conflict-in-africa-monitor/#governance-barometer>

<sup>41</sup> “Kivu Security Tracker,” Kivu Security Tracker, <https://kivusecurity.org/about/project>

<sup>42</sup> “Methodology,” Kivu Security Tracker, [https://kivusecurity.org/static/KST\\_Methodology\\_Nov2017.pdf](https://kivusecurity.org/static/KST_Methodology_Nov2017.pdf)

<sup>43</sup> “Methodology,” Kivu Security Tracker, [https://kivusecurity.org/static/KST\\_Methodology\\_Nov2017.pdf](https://kivusecurity.org/static/KST_Methodology_Nov2017.pdf)

collected from newsprint and other popular media sources.

## **Review of Conflict in DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan**

Unresolved conflict is detrimental to the well-being and development of citizens and a country. Cyclical conflict in the DRC, Kenya, and South Sudan is a major concern for citizens, the states, peace builders and conflict management experts. This is not least because of its effect on the socio-political stability of the regions. Therefore, efforts should be made equally by both peace building experts and the countries' governments towards ensuring that an "integrated" approach in analyzing the on-going conflict and conflict drivers in DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan is considered towards achieving sustainable peace and effective peacebuilding programs in these conflict torn countries. To address these conflicts appropriately, there is a need for constant and reliable analysis of conflict situations in order to plan adequate responses or preventive measures where necessary. Regular analysis is vital for creating good strategies for local and regional responses to conflict. This section provides a contextual analysis of literature on the four countries by giving historical and the most recent background to the conflict and peace situation.

### **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**

The warfare in DRC can be traced back immediately after independence and since then the country has been in occasional conflicts. Violent conflicts within the DRC have been recorded from the 19<sup>th</sup> century onward when King Leopold II acquired the vast territory along the Congo basin as his personal property and exploited its natural resources. He named it the Congo Free State. However, Leopold's methods of subjugating the indigenous population were so brutal that the Belgian government (in response to an international outcry) took over the territory re-naming it Belgian Congo in 1908.<sup>44</sup> Belgian colonization continued the exploitation of the people and the land. Eventually, a Congolese uprising led to independence in 1960. However, the country into a crisis with multiple conflicts over competition for political leadership. As a result, armed violence, coups, and secession attempts led to numerous deaths. The problem ended in 1965 with a coup d'état led by Joseph-Desire Mobutu who later became president and created a highly centralized government.

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<sup>44</sup> Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent, 1876-1912*, New York, Avon Books, 1991, p. 660-661; Cf. Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*, London: Pan Macmillan, 1998.

Mobutu's reign has been described as a 'kleptocracy'<sup>45</sup> characterized by a patronage system of buying loyalty and amassing wealth from public funds and resources. In as much as there was relative political stability during his regime, significant human rights violations were reported and the country's economy was severely affected. With the end of the Cold War the West, especially the United States, no longer supported him, and they called for democratic reforms within the country, as did the citizens who had become disillusioned with his regime. Subsequently, in 1996 Laurent Kabila, with support from the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, launched a military offensive from Eastern Congo and reached the capital by May of the same year. His march towards Kinshasa was followed by reports of atrocities meted out on the civilian population. The conflict was known as the First Congo War. However, by 1998 when Kabila asked the Rwandans and Ugandans to leave the country, a conflict was ignited that went on to trigger the Second Congo war from 1998-2003. This conflict also referred to as 'Africa's World War'<sup>46</sup> is often regarded as the genesis of the DRC's ongoing conflict. The war was fought between Kabila's government with support from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Chad against the RDC (Rally for Congolese Democracy), RDC-Goma, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, among other parties. To a great extent, the instability in the DRC plays out in the instability within the Great Lakes region. In 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son Joseph Kabila replaced him as president. In 2002, the ensuing, "July 2002 Pretoria Accord (known as the Sun City Agreement) between Rwanda and Congo, as well as the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and Congo, put an official end to the war as the transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo took power in July 2003."<sup>47</sup>

Although the Second Congo War ended in 2003, it had set the stage for subsequent violent conflicts in the country which have continued to date, especially in the Eastern regions of the country. There has been a multiplication of rebel groups over the years, culminating into five main conflicts:

- i. March 23 Movement (M23) attacks backed by Rwanda between 2012 and 2013
- ii. Conflict in Kivu between the DRC army (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo - FARDC) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)

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45 Daron Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier and James A. Robinson, "Kleptocracy and Divide and rule: A mode of personal rule," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2, 2-3(2004):162-192.

46 Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwanda Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009)

47 "History of the conflict," Eastern Congo Initiative. <http://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict>



- iii. Ituri ethnic conflict between the Lendu and Hema groups who have had historical differences over many years. In reality, the Second Congo War brought in arms and increased grievances between the two communities.
- iv. Kasai conflict between the army and customary chiefs in Kasai-Central Province in 2016-2017<sup>48</sup>
- v. Multiple armed groups that remain active in the east. These armed groups have been responsible for the deaths of citizens, sexual and gender-based violence, abductions looting, and the displacements of people.<sup>49</sup>

Moreover, climate of impunity for human rights violations and attacks by rebel groups has resulted in a lot of conflict in DRC.<sup>50</sup> Due to non-uniformity in the dynamics and experiences of conflict in DRC, justice perception among the citizens has been affected. This could be attributed to the diverse nature of the conflict in DRC which makes it uneasy to restore peace using one single approach strategy. However, the report opined that responding to citizens' localized knowledge of conflict and victimization by practicing maximal decentralization of transitional justice is preferable. This is because in using the strategy of maximal decentralization, the needs of the war victims and the context under which the conflict operates is easier to devise specific transitional justice processes i.e. the method applicable in Kasau may differ with that in South Kivu and Ituri parts of the DRC. This confirms that, to reduce the intensity of war in DRC, transitional justice should be practiced based on the needs of Congolese victims

In conclusion, as a report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) highlights,

Today's conflicts in the country are, to a large extent, a reincarnation of those of the past. This indicates that the structural causes of the conflicts have not been adequately addressed. Thus, even apparent episodes of peace, such as under the Mobutu regime in parts of the 1970s and the 1980s, were achieved not by successful peacemaking, but through repression of popular discontent.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>48</sup> "Conflict in the Kasai, DRC," UNCEF West and Central Africa. <https://www.unicef.org/wca/conflict-kasai-drc>

<sup>49</sup> "Analytical note on the human rights situation in the highlands of Mwenga, Fizi and Uvira territories, South Kivu province, between February 2019 and June 2020," United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, [https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/20200806.unjhro.analyse\\_hauts\\_plateaux\\_en.pdf](https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/20200806.unjhro.analyse_hauts_plateaux_en.pdf)

<sup>50</sup> Arnould, V. (2021). Reflections on a Decentralized Approach to Transitional Justice in the DR Congo. *Egmont Africa Policy Brief* No. 33 April 2021. <http://aci.pitt.edu/103641/>

<sup>51</sup> United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Addis Ababa, United Nations, 2015), p 9.

On 30<sup>th</sup> December 2018, the DRC held its presidential elections which brought about its first peaceful transfer of power from President Joseph Kabila to President Felix Tshisekedi, given its turbulent post-colonial history. Although some armed groups contested and interfered with the elections, there has been a significant number of armed groups willing to surrender since the inauguration of President Tshisekedi. The willingness to demobilize is driven by some factors such as a new change of government, exhaustion, disillusionment, and FARDC operations against them.<sup>52</sup> Even so, the DRC remains insecure as a result of the widespread presence of numerous local and foreign armed groups. According to Akamo (2021), a lack of confidence in the Congolese judicial system due to a lack of judicial freedom has also fueled conflict in DRC. This can be attributed to the Tshisekedi opposition to judicial reforms in DRC since the Kabila coalition –controlled legislature has been a challenge concerning institutional restructurings. Akamo’s peace and security report further showed that the main actors in the DRC war include: armed groups, the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), the government, civil society (religious and non-religious) and Eastern neighbors (Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi).

Moreover, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) led by Seka Musa is active and has regrouped and enhanced its capacity in the Beni-Butembo region in North Kivu. In 2019, the group carried out attacks on civilians and security forces, recruited and used children in combat and attacks, and engaged in sexual violence and forced marriages. Former ADF abductees and ex-combatants indicate that the armed group (ADF) has varied names associated with it such as ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic Forces – National Army for the Liberation of Uganda), NALU (National Army for the Liberation of Uganda), and Madina at Tawhid Wai Muwahedeen (MTM) with the group’s largest recruitment network stationed in Uganda.<sup>53</sup> The ADF is reported to have carried out nearly 30 attacks within three months (between 17<sup>th</sup> March 2020 and 16<sup>th</sup> June 2020), in which at least 89 civilians lost their lives.<sup>54</sup> In 2020, activity from the ADF has continued against civilians, the FARDC and Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) in Beni.<sup>55</sup> From these attacks it appears that Congolese security is wanting and consequently citizens have resorted to mob justice of suspected ADF members to mete out justice.<sup>56</sup> At other times mob justice has led to the death of innocent citizens confused for ADF members. For example, on

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52 UNSC. December 2019, p. 20

53 UNSC. December 2019.

54 UNSC. June 2020.

55 UNSC. September 2020. p. 3

56 UNSC. March 2021, p. 4



December 26, 2020, villagers in Bolongo killed two FARDC soldiers and one of their wives as they were mistakenly identified as ADF members.<sup>57</sup>

The Conseil National pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie (CNRD) is a foreign armed group active in North and South Kivu, however, there exist tensions over control of territory with other armed groups, namely, the Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové (NDC-R) and Nyatura armed groups. Operating in North Kivu, NDC-R bases its administration on imposed taxation and forced labor, and absorption of combatants from other armed groups.

Résistance pour un État de Droit (RED) - Tabara is a Burundian armed group operational in South Kivu and has progressively moved from the DRC into Burundi. The group consists of Burundian citizens, including former FDN (armed forces of Burundi) defectors who joined the group after a failed coup d'état in Burundi in mid-May 2015. The group is reported to be receiving financial support from contacts in Burundi and undisclosed countries in Europe. Apart from the RED-Tabara armed group, there are two other Burundian armed groups active in the DRC: Forces Nationales de Libération-Nzabampema (FNL-Nzabampema), and renegade soldiers of the failed coup d'état of 2015 in Burundi.<sup>58</sup> Despite the denial of foreign military occupation by the Government of Burundi, the FDN is reported to have carried out incursions into Congolese territory against Burundian armed groups<sup>59</sup> Burundi is among DRC's neighboring countries and alongside Rwanda, Zambia, South Sudan, Angola has been condemned for conducting foreign military incursions in the DRC.<sup>60</sup>

An upsurge in violence has been experienced since September 2019 between communities backed by armed groups in Minembwe, Uvira Territory causing a deteriorating security and humanitarian situation.<sup>61</sup> Inter-communal conflicts between the Twa and Bantu militias in Nyuzu territory have led to the deaths of over 100 civilians since January 2020.<sup>62</sup> Other armed groups in DRC include Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo libre et Souverain (APCLS), Mai-Mai armed group coalition, Ngomino, and Twigwaneho armed groups. Armed groups in DRC continue to thrive through illegal production and trade of natural mineral resources, loopholes in monitoring the exploitation of natural resources, and the widespread proliferation of

57 UNSC. March 2021, p. 5

58 UNSC. June 2019, p. 17

59 UNSC. June 2019, p. 17

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Mulumba, 2020

61 UNSC. December 2019.

62 UNSC. June 2020., p. 4

weapons and ammunition.<sup>63</sup>

The presence of armed groups in the most affected areas such as Djugu and Irumu in Ituri, Beni and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu and Fizi territory in South Kivu has prevented many civilians from accessing fields for agricultural production since February 2022, and this has led to an increase in food insecurity levels in these affected areas, according to humanitarian actors. Since March, humanitarian actors have reported rising food prices in the Eastern provinces of the DRC, the central province of Kasai and Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC, in part due to high fuel prices and market disruptions related to the invasion of Ukraine by the Government of the Russian Federation. Thus, food prices, according to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, were more than 30 percent above average levels in these markets, with beans, maize flour, imported rice and refined vegetable oil being the products most affected by rising market rates.<sup>64</sup>

As a result, according to the World Bank report, the DRC's economy is still vulnerable to commodity price movements and the growth performance of its major trading partners that could be disrupted by geopolitical conflicts and a resurgence of the pandemic.<sup>65</sup> In 2022, an estimated 73% of the population lives on less than \$1.90 per day and development indicators are very poor; around 43% of children are malnourished. There is a need for the DRC authorities to remain vigilant and sustain reform efforts to address structural obstacles to growth.<sup>66</sup>

In addition to this, the fight against corruption is key in President Tshisekedi's economic agenda such that he called upon all government ministers to declare their assets to the constitutional court.<sup>67</sup> Vital Kamerhe, the Chief of Staff of the President and leader of the Union pour la Nation Congolaise, was detained on 8 April 2020 on embezzlement of about \$51.2 million, a charge he denies. The money was earmarked for the President's 100-day program. Despite jubilation from some CSOs that welcomed the arrest as a milestone in the fight against corruption, a section of the 16 National Assembly deputies drawn from Kamerhe's party decried the arrest and detention of their party leader.<sup>68</sup> This included his supporters holding protests over his allegedly politically motivated arrest

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63 UNSC. December 2019.

64 USAID, 2022, [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-05-13\\_USG\\_Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_Complex\\_Emergency\\_Fact\\_Sheet\\_3.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-05-13_USG_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_Complex_Emergency_Fact_Sheet_3.pdf)

65 World Bank, DRC Country overview Report. 2022, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview>

66 Congressional Research Service, 2022, Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10216.pdf> (Accessed on April 30, 2022)

67 UNSC. November 2019.

68 UNSC. June 2020., p. 2

and sentencing.<sup>69</sup> On June 20, 2020, Vital Kamerhe was sentenced to 20 years in prison with hard labour.<sup>70</sup> He however, appealed his sentence and on June 17 2021 it was reduced to 13 years.<sup>71</sup>

Moreover, there are concerns about increasing domestic violence due to confinement measures related to COVID-19. According to the Danish Refugee Council report on Covid-19, nearly 3000 incidents of protests, riots, violence against civilians and fighting related to Covid-19 were recorded in DRC in 2020 and this resulted in deaths of 500 people. Moreover, about 27% of youths lost their employment due to the pandemic.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, closure of schools due to covid-19 in DRC has resulted into increased number of boys being recruited by local armed groups to take part in conflict; young girls are being forced into teenage pregnancy and early marriages. Wider budget deficit and deterioration of balance of payment have also been experienced in DRC due to Covid-19 pandemic.<sup>73</sup>

Moreover, the human rights situation in the DRC remains of concern. For instance, a United Nations Security Council report on the DRC noted that “the security situation in the highlands worsened considerably and was characterized by tit-for-tat militia attacks against civilians.”<sup>74</sup> These incidences included deaths and injuries to civilians. In April 2022, Human Rights Watch also documented that the Congolese government was reverting on fundamental rights and freedoms under the pretext of martial law in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and; at the same time appealing to the country’s international partners to break their silence and publicly pressure the government to end its martial law-related crackdown in the east of the country.<sup>75</sup>

An existing border dispute between the DRC and Zambia flared up and has been ongoing since mid-March 2020 with a build-up of troops reported from both nations around

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69 J.P., Ging, “Vital Kamerhe appeal hearing against corruption charges postponed again,” Africa News, August 08, 2020, Accessed November 18, 2020, url: <https://www.africanews.com/2020/08/08/vital-kamerhe-appeal-hearing-against-corruption-charges-postponed-again/>

70 “Vital Kamerhe: DRC president’s chief of staff found guilty of corruption <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53121994>,” BBC, June 20, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53121994> (accessed August 21, 2021).

71 “DRC: Kinshasa court slashes Vital Kamerhe’s jail time to 13 years,” Africa News, June 17, 2021, <https://www.africanews.com/2021/06/17/drc-kinshasa-court-slashes-vital-kamerhe-s-jail-time-to-13-years/> (accessed August 21, 2021)

72 Danish Refugee Council Report 2020: <https://drc.ngo/media/y2wl33u0/drc-global-covid-19-appeal-2020-12-march-2021.pdf>

73 UNSC. June 2020.

74 UNSC. September 2020

75 Human Rights Watch (HRW): DR Congo “ Martial Law Brings Crackdown in East (7 April, 2022)

Moba territory. Several soldiers from DRC were killed in sporadic clashes with their Zambian counterparts. The two governments have displayed a willingness to address the dispute and defuse the tensions through diplomacy by calling upon the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to act as a mediator and agreeing to dispatch a technical team for the peaceful resolution of the dispute.<sup>76</sup>

After 60 years of independence, the Congolese remain uncertain regarding political and democratic stability.<sup>77</sup> Generally, the peaceful transition of power presented a ray of hope for sustainable peace, stability, and development in a country that has been marred by cyclic violence. The willingness by armed groups to demobilize presents an opportunity for the restoration of peace and security in the DRC. However, the implementation of the demobilization process has been delayed mainly due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Furthermore, between June and September 2020, in as much as most of the country has enjoyed relative reprieve from armed conflict, security in the Eastern region of the country remains worrying.<sup>78</sup> This is due to proliferation of armed groups that have continued to compete over territory and natural resources.<sup>79</sup> For example, the United Nations Security Council 2020 DRC country report for September 2020, notes that in North Kivu “The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) documented at least 107 incidents attributable to armed groups, in which 67 civilians were killed (34 men, 23 women, and 10 children) and 73 were injured (40 men, 20 women, and 13 children) across the province”<sup>80</sup> this indicates the extent to which the war has damaged both lives, property of the citizens. Moreover, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) has also been found struggling both organizationally and logistically and this has derailed their speed and effort in responding to retaliatory confrontation from armed groups. Therefore, strategies that could help in restoring peace in DRC could be strengthening MONUSCO’S ability to deter retaliatory attacks as well as considering reducing challenges associated with natural resources exploitation.<sup>81</sup> In December 2020, Mr. Tshisekedi announced a departure from his coalition with former president Joseph Kabila. The move aimed at, “ending the crisis caused by nearly two years of tension with his coalition partner, the Common Front for

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76 UNSC. June 2020.

77 Mulumba, 2020

78 UNSC, September 2020, p. 16

79 UNSC, Sept 2020, p. 3

80 UNSC, Sept 2020, p. 3

81 Akamo, J. O. (2021). The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Conflict Insights. <https://www.africportal.org/publications/democratic-republic-congo-drc-conflict-insights/> (Accessed on August 2021)

Congo (FCC) of former president Joseph Kabila.”<sup>82</sup> These political developments risk increasing tensions in the country and constitute a significant security threat to a country that is yet to successfully resolve conflict, especially in the Eastern region.

In 2021, while the COVID-19 pandemic continued to spread throughout the continent including DRC, violence continued within the Eastern region of the country, especially in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces. For instance, the UN Security Council reports between December, 2020 and March, 2021 revealed that ADF in (the North Kivu province) has conducted 44 attacks in Beni territory, resulting in the killing of 178 civilians, including 48 women and 2 boys.”<sup>83</sup> The security situation in the Northern region of the country has raised security concerns in the country and left citizens wary of the government’s ability to guarantee their security. Several security incidents demonstrate this:

In February 2021, armed groups continued with attacks in Ituri, North and South Kivu, leading to at least 88,000 people fleeing to safe zones to avoid armed groups. In addition to this killings and kidnappings were reported in the same regions.<sup>84</sup> Within the same month on February 22<sup>nd</sup> 2021, the Italian Ambassador to the DRC, another Italian official and Congolese World Food Program (WFP) worker were killed in an attack on a UN convoy near Goma. While more than 100 armed groups operate in the Eastern region of the country where the attack took place, many speculated that the attacks were carried out by the ADF.<sup>85</sup> Three months into the year, conflict erupted in the greater Kasai region between the Lendu and Kuba tribes leading to renewed violence killing at least 13 people injuring many more and leading to the displacement of at least 40, 00 people. As is often the case women and children bore the brunt of this conflict.<sup>86</sup>

In 2022, the UN recognized the local armed groups and others of foreign origin as one of the main drivers of instability in the eastern DRC, but it does not identify them for being at the very essence of the insecurity. Additionally, the means that the armed groups have used to finance their operations are the illicit exploitation and trade of the natural

82 R., Gras, and S.B., Tshiamala, “DRC: Félix Tshisekedi terminates coalition with Joseph Kabila,” The Africa Report, 7 December 2020, <https://www.theafricareport.com/53665/drc-felix-tshisekedi-terminates-coalition-with-joseph-kabila/> (accessed December 10, 2020)

83 UNSC, March 2021, p. 4.

84 Lisa Schlein, “UN Alarmed by Atrocities by Armed https://www.voanews.com/africa/un-alarmed-atrocities-armed-groups-eastern-drc (accessed September 14, 2021).Groups in Eastern DRC,” VOA News, February 20, 2021,

85 Margaret Besheer and Salem Solomon, “Italian Ambassador to Democratic Republic of Congo Killed in Ambush Monday,” VOA News, February 22, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/africa/italian-ambassador-democratic-republic-congo-killed-ambush-monday-0> (accessed September 14, 2021).

86 Lisa Schlein, “UN Fears Resurging Violence in DRC’s Kasai Region Will Spark Mass Displacement,” VOA News, April 17, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/africa/un-fears-resurging-violence-drcs-kasai-region-will-spark-mass-displacement> (accessed September 14, 2021).

resources from the eastern DRC and support from local and external actors, including the neighboring countries<sup>87</sup>.

Furthermore, it has been expected that the proliferation of armies and armed groups in the eastern DRC can worsen the conflict, pushing civilians to leave their homes and to be exposed to different kind sufferings. The Kivu Security Tracker, which monitors violence in the region, has mentioned that, with dozens of armed groups that exist in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, even difficult to know their exact numbers, the ADF has reportedly killed at least 2,238 people and abducted 896 people since April 2017.<sup>88</sup> This means that the proliferation of weapons continues to increase day by day in the country. Similarly, Ed Ram also pointed out that, some people were able to buy military-style outfits from the market places and made bows and arrows. Others, according to him, mostly used a catapult just to raid FARDC bases and steal their uniforms and weapons while the latter were drunk.<sup>89</sup>

President Felix Tshisekedi has made security in Eastern Congo one of his main concerns. To achieve this, he has tried different strategies such as negotiations with armed groups, a demobilization and disarmament program and the declaration of a state of siege in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri. According to the International Crisis Group, in 2019, the government has already begun a dialogue with CODECO, unfortunately civil society and prominent figures in Hema have advised the authorities to follow a normal process in parallel with justice.<sup>90</sup> In June 2019, it was recorded that military operations against the militias had been initiated, but these have shown limited results.

Even in February 2020, the militia intensified their attacks just after a peace agreement signed between the national government and the FRPI Lendu militia. In addition, after several years of negotiations, the FRPI militia – after been active in Irumu territory in southern Ituri for longtime – finally obtained the conditions that CODECO militiamen are now demanding amnesty and integration into the national army.<sup>91</sup> Unexpectedly, this agreement with the FRPI could complicate negotiations with members of CODECO and

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87 Umuhoza, V. I. (2022). Political Dialogue as Strategy to End Conflict in Eastern DRC, <https://www.theelephant.info/op-eds/2022/06/10/political-dialogue-as-strategy-to-end-conflict-in-eastern-drc/>

88 Ed Ram.,(2022) ‘Anything to stop the Massacres’ Peace still eludes DRC as Armed Groups Proliferate, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/11/massacres-peace-democratic-republic-congo-kivu-rebels-uganda> (Accessed on April, 2022)

89 Ibid.

90 International Crisis Group, 2020, DR Congo: Ending the Cycle of Violence in Ituri, <https://www.justice.gov/coir/page/file/1296641/download>, Africa Report N°292

91 Ibid.



other militias. As a result, the authorities have been less open to the idea of integrating the Iturian militias into an army with many of former rebels and militiamen.<sup>92</sup> Also, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme has been launched for their reintegration into civilian life, but this has not been successful. Because there was a lack of political commitment from the Congolese authorities and their inability to deal with the problems related to the violence. According to Internal Crisis Group, they were reluctant to commit public funds to these programs, and some politicians continue to support a certain rebel group, using them as auxiliary troops and deploying them on the ground.<sup>93</sup>

*Second*, one of the President Felix Tshisekedi's priorities on security issues has been always a regional approach to peace stability. Since 2019, he has begun to establish a plan with the aim of inviting Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda for military strategies in eastern Congo under the authority of the Congolese army. But, according to the International Crisis Group, his plan has not been successful. The hostility of Kampala and Kigali has contributed towards this.<sup>94</sup> In May 2021, President Felix Tshisekedi announced an "état de siège" where an effective martial law was applying especially in Ituri and North Kivu provinces.<sup>95</sup> Inviting Ugandan and Burundian troops to the DRC to support Congolese army operations shows that Tshisekedi really puts an emphasis on a military approach in the region. But until then, military action has failed to calm the situation in the east, as the history of cyclical warfare in the DRC shows.<sup>96</sup> Despite everything, violence continues to escalate in the east part of the country.<sup>97</sup>

In August 2021, President Tshisekedi announced that he had authorized US special forces to assist the FARDC to combat the ADF which has been responsible for much of the violence in the Eastern region. It has also been classified as a terrorist group by the USA. The operation was slated to last for several weeks and was specifically targeted at

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 International Crisis Group. (25 MAY) 2022), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/b181-easing-turmoil-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes> , BRIEFING 181 / AFRICA

95 Hailey, N., 2022: The failed 'State of Siege' in Eastern DRC should not be extended, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/5/1/the-failed-state-of-siege-in-eastern-drc-should-not-be-extended> (Accessed on June 5, 2022)

96 International Crisis Group. (25 MAY) 2022), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/b181-easing-turmoil-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes> , BRIEFING 181 / AFRICA

97 Hailey, N., (2022): The failed 'State of Siege' in Eastern DRC should not be extended, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/5/1/the-failed-state-of-siege-in-eastern-drc-should-not-be-extended> (Accessed on June 5, 2022)

combating the ADF.<sup>98</sup> According to the Catholic Church the group had been responsible for killing at least 6,000 civilians since 2013, while the Kivu Security tracker stated that from 2017, the group had killed more than 1200 civilians.<sup>99</sup>

In September 2021, a UNHCR reported that most of the attacks in Eastern DRC had been perpetuated by the ADF. The UNCHR thus recorded “more than 1,200 civilian deaths and 1,100 rapes in 2021 in the two most affected provinces of North Kivu and Ituri. The agency says ferocious attacks have driven more than one million Congolese in the eastern part of the country from their homes this year alone.”<sup>100</sup> The organization also reported that the viciousness and magnitude of the attacks by the ADF have reached a level not seen before.<sup>101</sup> These reports demonstrate that conflict in the Eastern region of the country continues unabated and has profoundly impacted citizens and the overall social fabric of the region. Between October and November 2021, Uganda experienced bomb attacks which the ADF claimed responsibility.<sup>102</sup> With the authority of the Congolese government the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) entered Eastern DRC in pursuit of the ADF. In January 2022, the UPDF tabled a budget of Ush89.7 billion (\$25.6 million), indicating an intended longer stay for the army in DRC.<sup>103</sup>

According to the March 2022 updates of war in DRC, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights report indicates that the human rights in DRC have not improved significantly due to the attacks by armed groups against civilians which has been persistently increasing in the Eastern province. On February 1<sup>st</sup> 2022 an attack in Mbudjonal in Ituri province which left 62 people killed and 39 more people reported injured by fighters from Coopérative de développement économique du Congo (CODECO) is a clear indication that the conflict is still on in DRC.<sup>104</sup> In April 2022 another fighting between the Congolese Army and M23 fighters resumed again in Rutshuru Town barely a

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98 Agence France-Presse, “DR Congo Accepts US Military Help against ADF Militia,” August 15, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/africa/dr-congo-accepts-us-military-help-against-adf-militia> (accessed September 09, 2021).

99 Ibid.

100 Lisa Schlein, “Violence against Civilians in Eastern DRC Reaching New Heights, UN Says,” VOA News, September 10, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/africa/violence-against-civilians-eastern-drc-reaching-new-heights-un-says> (accessed September 14, 2021).

101 Ibid.

102 Patience Atuhaire, “Why Ugandan troops have entered DR Congo – again,” The BBC, December 4, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59507543> (accessed February 4, 2022).

103 Julius Barigaba, “UPDF signals longer stay in DR Congo, tables one-year budget for operation,” The East African, January 26, 2022, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/updf-signals-longer-stay-in-drc-3694454> (accessed February 4, 2022).

104 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/west-and-central-africa-weekly-regional-humanitarian-snapshot-29-1>



few days after similar hostilities occurred.<sup>105</sup> The latest report of May 2022 shows that 14 people were killed in an overnight attack and people displaced in Ituri East DRC. The war was reported to be overrun by militants, army and civil society. As DRC still experiences threats by armed groups and persistent instability in the Eastern part, there is possibility of continued conflict and peace instability since political election are gearing up in 2023.<sup>106</sup>

In November, 2022, hostilities resumed in Eastern Congo, as a result, the governments of Rwanda and Congo blamed each other for the fighting. This has prompted regional countries like Kenya to deploy their troops to reinforce the Congolese forces in fighting the rebel group of M23. The first troop of Kenyan soldiers landed in Goma City on 12<sup>th</sup> November 2022 targeting mainly the M23 rebel group and other armed groups in the region in the disarmament and demobilization operation<sup>107</sup>. Kenya is expected to deploy 900 soldiers to Eastern DRC under the East Africa Community Regional Force (EACRF) and Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC) joint mission operation. The rebel group attacks intensify in Eastern DRC because they blame the government of DRC for failing to honor their pledge to integrate them into the government army. On the one hand, Rwanda says the Congolese army has launched rockets into its territory, injuring several civilians and damaging property.

On the other hand, Congo claimed that the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) were actively fighting alongside the M23.<sup>108</sup> As a result, Rwanda alleged that the Congolese army is collaborating with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a largely Rwandan Hutu armed group operating in Congo, some of whose members were fighters during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and attacked Rwandan forces and “abducted two of its soldiers during a patrol along the border. On May 29 of the same year, a Congolese army spokesman said it was holding two Rwandan soldiers “captured by the population.”<sup>109</sup>

On 6<sup>th</sup> December, 2022, many people were reported fleeing their homes in North Kivu province due to persisting armed conflict between non-state armed actor “M23” and the

105 OCHA, Update on DRC , 29 March, 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/update-democratic-republic-congo-29-march-2022> (Accessed on May 5, 2022)

106 Reuter: At least 14 dead in east Congo refugee Camp Attack, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/least-14-dead-east-congo-refugee-camp-attack-2022-05-10/> (Accessed on May 10, 2022)

107 ALJAZEERA News Update: Kenya deploys hundreds of troops to regional force in eastern DRC <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/2/kenya-deploys-hundreds-to-regional-force-in-eastern-congo>. (Accessed on 3 November, 2022)

108 Human Rights Watch., (2022) DR Congo: Civilians at Risk Amid Resurgence of M23 rebels, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/01/dr-congo-civilians-risk-amid-resurgence-m23-rebels> (Accessed on June 1, 2022)

109 Ibid.

Congolese army (FARDC). Moreover, approximately 390,000 Congolese people became internally displaced due to the on-going conflict in the region. A total 679,000 people are estimated to be in dire need of humanitarian assistance in Rutshuru, Lubero and Nyiragongo regions.<sup>110</sup> In December 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022 the European Union urged Rwanda to end supporting the M23 rebel group which has captured the North Kivu province of DRC and advice the M23 group to comply with the decision taken by the EAC at Angola Summit.<sup>111</sup> According to the BBC news, the voter registration started in December 2022, for the coming election in December, 2023 with approximately 12 million people have been registered since the exercise commenced.<sup>112</sup>

Based on the above, it should be noted that the DRC is not solely responsible for the conflicts in Eastern DRC. Other internal problems in neighboring countries have also contributed to fueling conflicts in the region: the presence of these foreign armed groups such as M23 in Eastern DRC whose intention is to overthrow the leaders of their country through force of the arms, while at the same time serving as proxies to the DRC's neighboring countries. This shows that without the commitment of its neighbors, peace will not prevail in the east of the DRC.<sup>113</sup>

In late April 2022, Kenya held a first round of peace dialogues between Congo and a number of armed groups in Nairobi. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta summoned Presidents Museveni, Ndayishimiye, Tshisekedi and the Rwandan Foreign Minister for talks during which they agreed to form a regional force, not only to fight the rebels in eastern DRC, but also to strengthen the military approach, and in part to facilitate peace talks with Congolese armed groups (ICG, 2022). As members of the East African Community, its member countries have also agreed to create a regional force to fight rebels in eastern Congo.<sup>114</sup> This dialogue for peace ended with the president calling on armed groups to “lay down their arms and work with President Felix Tshisekedi to foster peace and stability.” At least 30 delegations were present at the dialogue, the presidency added, what remains are challenges ahead given that there are about more than 120 armed groups operating in eastern Congo.<sup>115</sup> Hence, the main well-known rebel groups in the

110 <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-armed-conflict-north-kivu-dg-echo-un-ngos-echo-daily-flash-6-december-2022>

111 <https://www.voanews.com/a/eu-urges-rwanda-to-stop-supporting-m23-rebels-in-dr-congo-/6899260.html>

112 <https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cvenzmgylgwt/democratic-republic-of-congo>

113 Umuhoza, V. I., 2022, Political Dialogue as Strategy to End Conflict in Eastern DRC, <https://www.theelephant.info/op-eds/2022/06/10/political-dialogue-as-strategy-to-end-conflict-in-eastern-drc/> (Accessed on June 15, 2022)

114 Ibid.

115 Africa Research Bulletin., 2022, DR CONGO Militia Violence: The death toll

conflict in eastern DRC are: Gumino, Raia Mutomboki, FPDC, Twiraneho, UPSP and the three factions of the M23 group, which had previously signed a peace agreement with the government but now say that the agreement was never honored.<sup>116</sup>

Different military operations are being undertaken by various foreign military forces against armed groups in eastern Congo. According to Human Rights Watch, President Tshisekedi invited Ugandan forces to the northeast for joint military operations against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a well-known Islamist armed group led by Ugandans. Likewise, Burundian troops have engaged against the Burundian armed group called RED-Tabara (Resistance for the Rule of Law in Burundi/ Resistance to the Rule of Law in Burundi), which has been based in the region South Kivu. In addition, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) has offered its military support to Congolese government forces and its assistance to civilians in need of protection.<sup>117</sup>

As for the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), they have approved the new regional peace offer in Congo and appreciated the initiative begun in East Africa with the aim of bringing peace to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), more precisely the chances of finding a local solution to the conflict. Given these efforts by the East African Community, both AU and UN also offer their support for the East African Community's latest attempt to bring armed groups into dialogue with the Kinshasa government, including the formation of a regional force to counter rebel groups who refuse to negotiate a political solution. In the same vein, Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission, also supported the initiative of the East African Community for organizing a peace dialogue in Nairobi, in particular the decision to immediately deploy a regional force to restore peace and stability in the DRC.<sup>118</sup> Yet, he argued that “the continued commitment of the AU, to the full implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the DRC and the Region, as one of the guarantors of the Agreement”. To this end, Antonio Gutierrez, the UN Secretary-General, added that the UN “fully supports the initiative of East African countries to bring peace to the east of the DRC and neighboring countries”.<sup>119</sup>

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has soared during the first year of the “state of siege”, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2022.10499.x>, 23558 – Africa Research Bulletin

116 Mutambo, A., 2022, AU, UN endorse new regional peace bid in DR Congo, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/au-un-endorse-new-regional-peace-bid-in-dr-congo-3795014> (Accessed on May 20, 2022)

117 Human Rights Watch.,( 2022) DR Congo: Civilians at Risk Amid Resurgence of M23 rebels, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/01/dr-congo-civilians-risk-amid-resurgence-m23-rebels> (Accessed on June1, 2022)

118 Ibid

119 Ibid.

## HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) Report 2023

According to the HIPSIR CMT 2019 findings, the conflict in the DRC is attributed to the poor distribution of natural resources and corruption. The presence of these aspects is largely linked to complaints of economic hardships and high poverty levels in the country, which recorded a weighted mean of 2.04. Also, the acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors and the presence of demonstrations and riots were reported as dominant factors in DRC, with each indicator's mean ranked at 1.85. Conflict crisis in the country is indicated by displacements of citizens and the presence of deployed peacekeeping personnel (MONUSCO),<sup>120</sup> with weighted means of 1.95 and 1.91 respectively. On the other hand, CMT-2020 revealed that DRC had a conflict level of 1.04. This was lower than the conflict level in 2019. In 2020, respondents indicated that the biggest challenge to peace intervention efforts in the region was lack of political will. They also indicated that international interference by external actors was another significant challenge. In 2021, DRC had a conflict level of 2.45 which is higher compared to 1.04 level in 2020. However, in 2019 the conflict level was 1.834 as per the CRTP monitoring report of 2020. The turbulent nature of the conflict level for the three years can be attributed to factors such as sexual violence, failure of peace missions to integrate all the key actors in peace building, violation of human rights, attacks by the rebel groups as well as lack of confidence in Congolese judicial system due to absence of judicial freedom. Moreover, the armed groups in DRC have also contributed to the internal conflict crisis in that the crumbling of power as a result of Justin Ngudjolo's death in April 2020 by FARDC has brought violent confrontation between Lendu and Hemu soldiers.<sup>121</sup>

## Ethiopia

With a population of at least 112 million<sup>122</sup> people, Ethiopia is a large, landlocked country in the Eastern region of Africa and one of the most populous countries in Africa, second only to Nigeria. The country is also ethnically diverse: the 2017 Ethiopian census states that there are “more than 90 distinct ethnic groups in the country.”<sup>123</sup> The majority of the citizens are from the Amhara, Oromo, Tigray and Somali ethnic groups.<sup>124</sup> The Amhara

<sup>120</sup> United Nations. 2020. MONUSCO fact sheet

<sup>121</sup> Kleinfeld, P. and Flummerfelt, R. (2020). Rebel splits and failed peace talks drive new violence in Congo's Ituri. <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2020/05/05/>

<sup>122</sup> World Bank, Website, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ET> (accessed June 09, 2021).

<sup>123</sup> Minority Rights Group International, Ethiopia, website, <https://minorityrights.org/country/ethiopia/#:~:text=The%20Ethiopian%20census%20lists%20more,two%2Dthirds%20of%20the%20population.> (accessed May 25, 2021).

<sup>124</sup> Minority Rights Group International, Ethiopia, Website, <https://minorityrights.org/country/ethiopia/> (accessed May 24, 2021)

and Tigray consider themselves *Habesha*, “the self-proclaimed core of Ethiopia’s national identity.”<sup>125</sup> When one thinks of Ethiopia these are the peoples that come to mind. They have dominated Ethiopian politics<sup>126</sup> and while they both speak languages from the same Ethio-semitic language family, Amhara is the official working language of the country and the most widely spoken.<sup>127</sup> Together the two groups constitute 32% of the population and they are predominantly Orthodox Christians.

On the other hand the Oromo from the Cushite language family group are the most populous ethnic group in the country representing at least 40% of the population.<sup>128</sup> The Somali are the third largest ethnic group in Ethiopia after the Amhara while the Tigray are the fourth largest ethnic group.<sup>129</sup> Alongside these four major ethnic groups, the Southern region of Ethiopia is occupied by the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, represented by at least 70 different languages, these ethnic groups include, “Ethio-Semitic, Cushitic, Omotic and Nilotic speakers,”<sup>130</sup> and are distinctly different from the Northern and Eastern ethnic groups in terms of culture and way of life.

With regard to religion, Ethiopia, has long been a center for Islam and Christianity, the two major religions in the country. Within Christianity the majority belong to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC). Other significant religions practiced in the country are Judaism and traditional religions.<sup>131</sup> Over all, an estimated “44 percent of the population adheres to the EOTC, 34 percent are Sunni Muslim, and 19 percent belong to Christian evangelical and Pentecostal groups.”<sup>132</sup>

Abiy Ahmed is the current Prime Minister of Ethiopia. He comes from the Oromo community and is the first Oromo to hold the position of Prime Minister. His ascent to power ushered in a new era of governance in Ethiopia. He came to power after the 2018 elections that took place after Hailemariam Desalegn stepped down from power in the

125 Éloi Ficquet and Dereje Feyissa, “The Structure and Transformation of the Population,” in *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, Revolution and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi*, ed. Gerard Prunier and Éloi Ficquet (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2015), 17

126 Nations Encyclopedia, Ethiopia - Ethnic groups, Website, <https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Ethiopia-ETHNIC-GROUPS.html> (May 24, 2021).

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 Éloi Ficquet and Dereje Feyissa, “The Structure and Transformation of the Population,” in *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, Revolution and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi*, ed. Gerard Prunier and Éloi Ficquet (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2015), 36.

130 Ibid., 38.

131 Ethiopian Treasures, Website, <http://www.ethiopiantreasures.co.uk/pages/religion.htm> (June 09, 2021).

132 United States Department of State, Ethiopia 2019 International Religious Freedom Report, June 2020, Website, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ethiopia/> (June 09, 2021).

same year due to widespread protests by the Tigray people against the government due to the feeling that their people are not involve in government affairs.<sup>133</sup> Ahmed began his rule with sweeping reforms that many Ethiopians saw as a turn for the better. He spent his first 100 days as Prime Minister,

[l]ifting the country's state of emergency, granting amnesty to thousands of political prisoners, discontinuing media censorship, legalising outlawed opposition groups, dismissing military and civilian leaders who were suspected of corruption, and significantly increasing the influence of women in Ethiopian political and community life. He also pledged to strengthen democracy by holding free and fair elections.<sup>134</sup>

In all this, the hallmark of the prime minister's reforms was his historic meeting with the president of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, effecting a detente after a 20-year post war territorial stalemate between the two countries. He received international recognition for this and consequently he was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for "his efforts to achieve peace and international cooperation, and in particular for his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with neighboring Eritrea."<sup>135</sup> His reforms ignited hope in Ethiopians who had long been repressed by both the Derg and EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolution Democratic Front) regimes.

However, despite having had such a stellar start to his reign, three years into his rule Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has faced challenges that have questioned his leadership as head of government in Ethiopia. Rather than being hailed for opening the way for more democratic freedoms, his reforms met resistance, including from his own Oromo community.<sup>136</sup> From June 2018, the country began to experience heightened civil unrest in the wake of the reforms set in motion by the Prime Minister. As a result of these reforms, "Local leaders (took) advantage of the new freedoms to build ethnic power bases. Groups that (had) felt excluded in a system once dominated by Tigrayans (began) flexing their muscles."<sup>137</sup> In addition, "old state border disputes reignited (with) large ethnic groups that dominate in many regions demanding more territory and resources.

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133 "Ethiopia PM Hailemariam Desalegn in surprise resignation," BBC News, February 15, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43073285> (accessed June 17, 2021).

134 The Nobel Prize, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2019, Website, <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/press-release/> (June 02, 2021).

135 Ibid.

136 teleSUR, "Ethiopia: Ethnic violence between Somalis and Oromos kills 21," December 15, 2018, <https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Ethiopia-Ethnic-Violence-Between-Somalis-and-Oromos-Kills-21-20181215-0009.html> (June 02, 2021).

137 "Explainer: Ethiopia's ethnic militias in the spotlight after failed coup," Reuters, June 24, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-security-explainer-idUSKCN1TP2CI> (accessed June 17, 2021).



At the same time, smaller groups, tired of being sidelined, (were) pushing back,<sup>138</sup> thus resulting in increased violence in the country.

When Ethiopia started its political liberalization in 2018, the desires of their citizens were to move out of the autocratic leadership style to a democratic style. However, this was not realized as expected due to ethnic based violence among the communities.<sup>139</sup> The main root cause of conflict in Ethiopia can be attributed to the disagreement over the balance of power. Furthermore, the adoption of an ethnic-based federal system which provides territory authority to different ethnic groups has been the driving force behind the ethnic-based conflicts in Ethiopia<sup>140</sup>, because the kind of leadership systems practiced encourages ethnic-based sentiments that result in differences that can cause ethnic clashes.<sup>141</sup>

For example, in July 2019 a failed coup took place in the Amhara region leading to the assassination of the regional governor Ambachew Mekonnen.<sup>142</sup> This was followed by protests in October 2019, which spiraled into violence that led to the death of at least 679 civilians. There were also protests against Prime Minister Abiy, with claims that he had become a dictator propagating an authoritarian regime. These protests were instigated by popular activist Jawar Mohammed, who accused security forces of “trying to orchestrate an attack against him.”<sup>143</sup> In November 2019, 17 Amhara students were abducted from Dembi Dolo University in Western Oromia and have been missing since then”. The situation was only made worse by an internet and communication shutdown in Western Oromia instigated by the federal government.<sup>144</sup> Therefore families were not able to

138 Ibid.

139 Yusuf, S. (2019). What is driving Ethiopia’s ethnic conflicts? *ISS East Africa Report*, 2019(28), 1-16. <https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC-1fda629dc3>

140 Mengstie, M. M. (2022). Exploring indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms between the Awi and Gumuz ethnic communities in Zigem Woreda, Ethiopia. *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research Vol 14(3) pp 244-248*. [https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JACPR-05-2021-0603/full/html?skipTracking=true&utm\\_source=TrendMD&utm\\_medium=cpc&utm\\_campaign=Journal\\_of\\_Aggression%252C\\_Conflict\\_and\\_Peace\\_Research\\_TrendMD\\_1&WT.mc\\_id=Emerald\\_TrendMD\\_1](https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JACPR-05-2021-0603/full/html?skipTracking=true&utm_source=TrendMD&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=Journal_of_Aggression%252C_Conflict_and_Peace_Research_TrendMD_1&WT.mc_id=Emerald_TrendMD_1)

141 Baye, T.G. (2018), “Center-periphery relations, local governance and conflicts in Ethiopia: the experience of metekel province”, *Social Identities*, Vol. 24 No. 6, pp. 745-763

142 “Ethiopia army chief shot dead in ‘coup bid’ attacks,” BBC, June 23, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48734572> (accessed May 26, 2021).

143 Robbie Corey-Boulet, 67 killed in anti-Abiy protests, ethnic violence in Ethiopia: police,” Yahoo News, October 25, 2019, [https://www.yahoo.com/news/ethiopian-activist-floats-election-challenge-against-abiy-140448993.html?guccounter=1&guce\\_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuaHJ3Lm9yZy8&guce\\_referrer\\_sig=AQAAAla4TBtsoWgsOCbkQAQaCmqffmVajGx5GZu2t3O8bx2SE8aMy2v9ng8FDxJfWQa98GRW2OwZSUZDiNpMOEjPKCau5MU\\_ifbXgGXXbFQOOZEifv6JbiRStYFvVCO-BY YURkDgJseAJkRaYR8t5IBbXrfWQgxzK6xY8zAOgLDyAh](https://www.yahoo.com/news/ethiopian-activist-floats-election-challenge-against-abiy-140448993.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuaHJ3Lm9yZy8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAla4TBtsoWgsOCbkQAQaCmqffmVajGx5GZu2t3O8bx2SE8aMy2v9ng8FDxJfWQa98GRW2OwZSUZDiNpMOEjPKCau5MU_ifbXgGXXbFQOOZEifv6JbiRStYFvVCO-BY YURkDgJseAJkRaYR8t5IBbXrfWQgxzK6xY8zAOgLDyAh) (accessed May 25, 2021).

144 Amnesty International, “Ethiopia: Parents fear for missing Amhara students as universities close over Covid-19,” March 25, 2020, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/ethiopia-parents-fear-for-missing-amhara-students-as-universities-close-over-covid19/> (accessed May 25, 2021).

communicate with the kidnapped students. One of the students who got an opportunity to speak to a relative said that they had been abducted by Oromo youth.<sup>145</sup> In August 2020, protests erupted in Wolaita zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Regional State (SNNPR), over the arrest of more than 20 officials for allegedly holding a meeting that contravened COVID-19 social measures.

The protests were met by a harsh reprisal from security forces that led to the death of 16 people and scores injured.<sup>146</sup> In June 2020, a popular singer from the Oromo community, *Hachalu Hundessa* was assassinated. This led to protests and reprisals by heavy-handed security forces, leading to the death of at least 239 people.<sup>147</sup> Much of this conflict in the country is also the result of security dilemmas between ethnic groups. As Samir Yusuf explains:

A security dilemma occurs when one actor, fearing the potentially hostile behaviour of another, initiates a power build-up to maintain its security. When this is discovered, however, there is a reactive build-up of (military) power on the part of the other actor, fearing that it could be a target. This kicks off a series of militarization attempts on both sides, increasing the fear one has for the other, and potentially leading to an arms race.<sup>148</sup>

Currently the most violent conflict in the country is the Tigray conflict, being waged in the northern region of the country between the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) on one side and the Ethiopian National

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> Amnesty International, "Ethiopia: Stop the use of deadly force on," August 14, 2020, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/08/ethiopia-stop-the-use-of-deadly-force-on-protesters/> (accessed May 25, 2021).

<sup>147</sup> "Death toll in Ethiopia violence over singer's killing hits 239," Al Jazeera, July 8, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/death-toll-ethiopia-violence-singer-killing-hits-239-200708075014258.html> (accessed May 25, 2021).

<sup>148</sup> Semir Yusuf, What is driving Ethiopia's ethnic conflicts, p. 9



Defense Forces (ENDF) on the other side, who are being aided by defense groups

from Amhara and the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF).<sup>149</sup> Armed clashes between

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane and government forces continued in Oromia region with members of the OLF-Shane attacked the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) military camp in Kanteri kebele, Sululta woreda.<sup>150</sup> The weekly update report further showed that the rebels killed 16 and injured over 25 members of the ENDF on 19, May 2022.

The recent upswing of conflict in the country has raised alarm because there has been significant loss of lives, destruction of property, human rights abuses and massive displacement of people, not to mention destabilizing security. This unrest and conflict is indicative of a government that is struggling to assure citizens of security and provide the basic freedoms as expected of the state.

Of particular importance in understanding the surge of conflict in Ethiopia is the weakening of state institutions in particular the EPRDF which resulted in a breakdown in governance.<sup>151</sup> The current Tigray conflict exemplifies this weakening of the ruling party by internal wrangles.

Moreover, political instability in the region, violence between the communities (conflict-induced displacement), drought, seasonal floods (climate-induced drivers) and development projects (planned resettlement and relocation programs) have also resulted in instability.<sup>152</sup> Further review of past studies confirmed that government policies on relocation and resettlement as well as climate-induced factors are the main causes of displacement and conflict in Ethiopia<sup>153</sup>. According to the National Displacement Report (2021), climate shocks such as drought, floods and locusts, as well as conflict in Tigray region, were the primary causes of displacement of people in Ethiopia. The armed

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149 International Crisis Group, “Ethiopia’s Tigray War: A Deadly, Dangerous Stalemate, April 2, 2021, Website, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b171-ethiopia-tigray-war-deadly-dangerous-stalemate> (accessed June 09, 2021)

150 Ethiopia Peace Observatory Weekly Report, May 2022: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-peace-observatory-weekly-14-20-may-2022-enam> (Accessed on May 30, 2022)

151 Ibid., 5.

152 Tesfaw, T. A. (2022). Internal Displacement in Ethiopia: A Scoping Review of its Causes, Trends and Consequences. *Journal of Internal Displacement*, 12(1), 2-31. <https://www.journalofinternaldisplacement.org/index.php/JID/article/view/114>

153 Yigzaw, G. S., & Abitew, E. B. (2019). Causes and Impacts of Internal Displacement in Ethiopia. *African Journal of Social Work*, 9(2), 32–41. <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajsw/article/view/192193>

## HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) Report 2023

conflict in Tigray regional states to Amhara and Afar regions has resulted in tensions and volatility of the humanitarian situation. Ethiopia Crisis Response Plan 2022 shows that due to recent increase in conflict in Ethiopia, peace building and reconciliation efforts are needed for conflict resolution.<sup>154</sup>

The present Tigray conflict was triggered on November 4<sup>th</sup> 2020, when TPLF forces overrun a federal military base in the region, declaring that theirs was a pre-emptive act, as they knew that the federal government was preparing to attack the region.<sup>155</sup> Abiy responded by ordering the Ethiopian military to, “take action against the ruling party in Tigray, in retaliation for what he described as an attack by Tigray regional forces on a federal military base.”<sup>156</sup>

The conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia which begun on November 4<sup>th</sup> 2020 de-escalated after November 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2022 signed peace agreement between the government and the Tigray People liberation front (TPLF) leaders. To the point of signing the peace deal, reports indicate that the conflict has led to the death of at least 50, 000 civilians and resulted in gross human rights violations.<sup>157</sup> According to a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), the conflict since November 2020 has also led to civilian attacks from the Eritrean border. While the Ethiopian government had initially denied the presence of Eritrean troops in the Tigray region, in April 2021 the government finally acknowledged the involvement of Eritrean troops in the Tigray conflict.<sup>158</sup> The United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees Regional Update number 29 on the Ethiopia Emergency Situation indicated that armed conflicts are still reported in Barahle and Erebtu districts of Afar; many pastoralists are being displaced, with approximately 200,000 people in hard-to-reach areas, trapped in conflict areas with no access to humanitarian support and services. An estimated 200,000 Eritrean refugees into Tigray has also fueled conflict over limited basic needs such as food supplied by the World Food Program in Tigray.<sup>159</sup>

154 Ethiopian Crisis Response Plan 2022. [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2022\\_Ethiopia\\_Crisis\\_Response\\_Plan\\_2022.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2022_Ethiopia_Crisis_Response_Plan_2022.pdf)

155 Tamrat G. Gebremariam, “Ethiopia conflict: Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s problem from hell,” *Nation*, April 19, 2021, <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-conflict-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-s-problem-from-hell-3367772> (accessed May 25, 2021).

156 Human Rights Watch, “Ethiopia: Events of 2020,” <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/ethiopia> (accessed May 25, 2021).

157 Cara Anna, “Tigray Opposition parties assert 50,000 plus civilian deaths,” *LA Times*, February 02, 2021, <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-02-02/tigray-opposition-parties-assert-50-000-plus-civilian-deaths> (accessed May 25, 2021).

158 “Eritrea confirms its troops are fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray,” *Al Jazeera*, April 17, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/17/eritrea-confirms-its-troops-are-fighting-ethiopia-tigray> (accessed May 27, 2021).

159 UNHCR –Ethiopia Emergency Situation; Regional Update #29. 28 February, 2022. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91213>

The discussion of peace negotiations over the Ethiopia and Sudan Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).border conflict has however resumed.<sup>160</sup>

As a result of international pressure, the Ethiopian government promised that the troops would withdraw from the region.<sup>161</sup> The Eritrean armed forces have been reported to have massacred civilians in Axum in November 2020<sup>162</sup> and they also pillaged and destroyed property including healthcare facilities.<sup>163</sup> On November 29<sup>th</sup> 2020, three weeks after the onset of the conflict, Abiy announced that the federal government had been successful in the ‘law enforcement exercise’ in Tigray, after federal troops entered the capital Mekelle.<sup>164</sup> However, hostilities have continued, amounting to a humanitarian crisis. On 29<sup>th</sup> April 2021, for the first time in Ethiopia’s history, lawmakers in the country designated the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) as terrorist organizations.<sup>165</sup> The two groups were accused of carrying out civilian attacks on several parts of the country in the last few years.<sup>166</sup> The two groups were also said to have been “exploited by foreign forces seeking to weaken, disrupt and dismantle Ethiopia,” and “were politically motivated intending to disrupt and reverse a “reform/change strategy.”<sup>167</sup>

Ethiopia also leaned on Article 4(g) of the AU Constitution, which highlights, “non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.”<sup>168</sup> However, the AU also has the responsibility to protect citizens of member states through Article 4 (h),

by exercising the, “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes,

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160 <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/02/sudan-ethiopia-negotiate-over-border-conflict#ixzz7Xgb40M7s>

161 “No proof of Eritrean troops’ Tigray exit, crisis worsening: UN,” *Al Jazeera*, April 15, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/15/no-proof-of-eritrean-troops-tigray-exit-situation-worsening-un> (accessed May 27, 2021).

162 Human Rights Watch, “Ethiopia: Eritrean Forces Massacre Tigray Civilians: UN Should Urgently Investigate Atrocities by All Parties,” March 5, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/05/ethiopia-eritrean-forces-massacre-tigray-civilians> (accessed May 27, 2021).

163 Ibid.

164 Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Vows Final Offensive into Tigray, November 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/17/ethiopias-pm-abiy-vows-final-offensive-into-tigray> (June 10, 2021)

165 Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “Ethiopia designates Tigray’s former ruling party as terrorists,” *Nation*, May 07, 2021, <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-designates-tigray-s-former-ruling-party-as-terrorists-3390870> (accessed May 27, 2021).

166 Ibid.

167 Ibid.

168 Constitutive Act of The African Union, 7, [https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact\\_en.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf)

genocide and crimes against humanity.”<sup>169</sup> The kind of conflict being experienced in the Tigray region has already caused havoc, yet the AU has not succeeded in exercising its responsibility to intervene. Whenever the issue has been raised, for example during the AU summit held virtually in February 2021, Ethiopia managed to distract the meeting from discussing the Tigray conflict.<sup>170</sup> On the other hand when the chairman of IGAD attempted to raise the Tigray conflict as an agenda item during an IGAD meeting in December 2020, his attempts were frustrated by Ethiopia. The net result of these regional bodies’ unwillingness and lethargic responses to the conflict has been an increasing violation of human rights for the citizens of the region, including the internal displacement of over 222,000 people.<sup>171</sup> In addition, the Africa Union has played a leading role in mediation efforts to restore peace in the northern part of Ethiopia, while the United States have been fighting for the cessation of hostilities in the region. According to the ACLED data 2022, countries such as the United Arab Emirates, China, and Turkey have also joined the ongoing war in Ethiopia. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project 2022 report showed that:

There are new external dynamics at play as well, as the federal government increasingly deploys internationally sourced drones. These drones, provided by the United Arab Emirates, China, and Turkey (Reuters, 22 December 2021), highlight a new phase of international involvement in Ethiopia’s war. How these new partners continue to engage will have major

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169 [Ibid.](#)

170 Tamrat G. Gebremariam, “IGAD, African Union collateral damages for Tigray war,” *Nation*, May 07, 2021, <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/igad-african-union-collateral-damages-for-tigray-war-3392126> (accessed May 26, 2021).

171 United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, Daily Noon Briefing Highlights: Ethiopia - Niger – Yemen,” January 4, 2021, <https://www.unocha.org/story/daily-noon-briefing-highlights-ethiopia-niger-yemen> (accessed May 26, 2021)

repercussions on the trajectory of future conflict in Ethiopia<sup>172</sup>

In April 2022, the World Bank approved a \$300 million International Development

Association grant for the Response-Recovery-Resilience for Conflict-Affected Communities in Ethiopia project (World Bank Press Release No:22/065/AFE). The main purpose of the project is to help in rehabilitating infrastructure destroyed by the conflict, increase communities resilience to post-conflict effects, improve, access to basic services and in building climate-resilience infrastructure for the affected communities.<sup>173</sup> The World Bank Country Director for Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Sudan, Ousmane Dione explained that:

Survivors of gender-based violence suffer devastating effects to their physical and mental health. In conflict-affected areas, they are unable to get the support they need to recover from trauma and be able to move forward. This project will help to improve access to health, psychosocial support, and legal services for GBV survivors in conflict-affected regions where quality response services are limited.<sup>174</sup>

On 26<sup>th</sup> May 2022, the African Development Bank signed an \$ 830,000 technical assistance grant agreement for Ethiopia. The main purpose of the grant is to help in mainstreaming climate risk management, gender and resilience, economic planning and development in Ziway-Shallah.<sup>175</sup> Recently, China has also held a peace conference in Addis Ababa and offered to mediate between the warring factions. And at the said conference, his envoy to the Horn of Africa proposed to mediate in the civil war. Both the Ethiopian government and the TPLF have yet to respond to this offer.<sup>176</sup> The African Union is already leading such efforts.

Over the past two and a half years, the IMF reported that the Ethiopian economy has been exposed to multiple shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic, drought, conflict in the

<sup>172</sup> ACLED data Project, 2022: <https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/ethiopia/>

<sup>173</sup> World Bank Press release, April 2022: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/12/world-bank-supports-ethiopia-s-conflict-affected-communities-targets-over-five-million-people>

<sup>174</sup> World Bank Press release, April 2022: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/12/world-bank-supports-ethiopia-s-conflict-affected-communities-targets-over-five-million-people>

<sup>175</sup> Africa Development Bank, Press Release (May 27, 2022), <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/ethiopia-african-development-bank-signs-830000-grant-agreement-improve-climate-resilience-communities-and-ecosystems-51943>

<sup>176</sup> Wight, P. 23 June, 2022, Lasting peace remains elusive in Ethiopia despite progress towards peace talks to end the armed conflict, [https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/lasting-peace-remains-elusive-in-ethiopia-despite-progress-towards-peace-talks-to-end-the-armed-conflict/\(June 25, 2022\)](https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/lasting-peace-remains-elusive-in-ethiopia-despite-progress-towards-peace-talks-to-end-the-armed-conflict/(June%2025,%202022))

north of the country, and the impact of the current Russia-Ukraine war. This has created significant economic and humanitarian challenges in the country. Between 2021- 2022, IMF reported that growth has been projected to have fallen to 3.8 percent, resulting from the conflict in Northern Ethiopia. Accordingly, there is lower agricultural production and inflation has been high and rising, including due to rapidly increasing food prices and supply-side constraints. In addition to that, the budget deficit has been expected to widen, because of the supplementary budget that included an increase in military and humanitarian expenses, and with tax revenues significantly lower in the middle of the conflict.<sup>177</sup>

In March 2020, the Ethiopian government postponed the elections, citing COVID-19 restrictions.<sup>178</sup> The House of Federation (the Ethiopian equivalent of a Senate) had passed a resolution outlawing the unilateral conduct of elections as illegitimate, it being the only national electoral board with the mandate to conduct elections.<sup>179</sup> However, this was not received well by opposition parties including the TPLF which declared Prime Minister Abiy's government illegitimate<sup>180</sup> when the federal government passed their electoral mandate in October 2020. Consequently, the TPLF went ahead to conduct elections in the region of Tigray in September 2020 in defiance of the federal government's directive to postpone all elections.<sup>181</sup> As they conducted their regional elections in September 2020 the, "TPLF leaders declared their intention not to recognize the federal government, parliament, the House of Federation and other regional states as legitimate bodies to conduct the country's affairs."<sup>182</sup> This was not received well by the federal government who declared the regional elections null and void.<sup>183</sup> The first national general election since the departure of Prime Minister Dasalegn was held in June 2021 with Abiy Ahmed being elected as the Prime Minister under the Prosperity Party. The dissolution of the

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177 IMF, 21 June 2022, <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/06/21/pr22216-ethiopia-imf-staff-visit-discusses-reform-plans-and-economic-developments-in-ethiopia> (June 29, 2022)

178 Zecharias Zelalem, "Ethiopia's decision to delay its election for COVID will have consequences for its democratic goals," *Quartz Africa*, June 18, 2020, <https://qz.com/africa/1870457/ethiopias-abiy-election-delay-infuriates-opposition-on-democracy/> (accessed May 26, 2021)

179 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2021: Ethiopia," <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-world/2021> (accessed June 09, 2021)

180 Aggrey Mutambo, "Ethiopia launches crackdown on TPLF fighters," *Nation*, November 06, 2020, <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-launches-crackdown-on-tplf-fighters-2732962> (accessed May 26, 2021)

181 Human Rights Watch, "Ethiopia: Events of 2020," <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/ethiopia> (accessed May 25, 2021)

182 Tamrat G. Gebremariam, "Ethiopia conflict: Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's problem from hell," *Nation*, April 19, 2021, <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-conflict-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-s-problem-from-hell-3367772> (accessed May 25, 2021).

183 Ibid.



EPRDF party by the Abiy administration has in theory created space for non-ethnic-based politics in Ethiopia.

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), former Ethiopian political party, paramilitary group and former ruling party, was also against Dr. Abiy's government over his decision to dissolve the EPRDF (Ethiopia People's Revolution Democratic Front) and constitute the Prosperity Party.<sup>184, 185</sup> Leaders of the TPLF were disgruntled with this decision as they felt they had been sidelined, having been used to power as the most dominant group in the EPRDF over its 30 year rule. Consequently, the group decided to go solo and not join the Prosperity Party. In addition to this the TPLF was also suspicious of agreements signed between Abiy and his counterpart in Eritrea, which helped normalize relations between the two countries. These events were important to the TPLF as they shared the longest border with Eritrea among Ethiopia's states.<sup>186</sup>

Some commentators blame Abiy and his government for the conflict in the Tigray region.<sup>187</sup> Tamrat Gebremariam, for example, is of the opinion that Prime Minister Abiy was too simplistic and reductionist in his grand political goal of "undoing what he sees as a federal system based on linguistic-cultural fault lines but fragmenting Ethiopia."<sup>188</sup> He believes that Prime Minister Abiy was too confident in his ability to rid Ethiopia of these fault lines, and consequently he has not been successful and has resorted to authoritarian rule to accomplish his goals in an increasingly polarized country. Contrary to these opinions, others place fault squarely at the feet of the TPLF. For example, Yohannes Gedamu argues that if the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) national army had not subdued the TPLF in the Tigray region, it "could have triggered an endless, bloody civil war across Ethiopia and marked the beginning of the country's disintegration. The federal government and neighboring regional states had no option other than to do everything they could to stop the TPLF's aggression in Tigray before it spilled over to other parts of the country."<sup>189</sup> He argues that other ethnic groups such as the Oromia and especially

184 Aggrey Mutambo, "Ethiopia launches crackdown on TPLF fighters," *Nation*, November 06, 2020, <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-launches-crackdown-on-tplf-fighters-2732962> (accessed May 26, 2021).

185 The TPLF a leftist group that was involved in toppling Mengistu Hailemariam's government in the early 1990s, later morphed into a ruling coalition under the EPRDF, where its influence continued until Abiy came into power in 2018.

186 Tamrat G. Gebremariam, "Ethiopia conflict: Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's problem from hell," *Nation*, April 19, 2021, <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-conflict-prime-minister-abiy-ahmed-s-problem-from-hell-3367772> (accessed May 25, 2021).

187 Ibid.

188 Ibid.

189 Yohannes Gedamu, What Ethiopia needs is less, not more, ethno-nationalism, *Al Jazeera*, May 10, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/5/10/what-ethiopia-needs-is-less-not-more-ethno-nationalism> (accessed June 06, 2021)

the Amhara have suffered at the hands of the TPLF when it was in power and that the rebellion in Tigray required the attention of the federal government. He further argues that, “the ongoing conflict in the country is not the result of differing visions of Ethiopia’s future, as some claim, but a direct consequence of groups like the TPLF stoking ethno-nationalist tensions and rekindling historic animosities to divide Ethiopia.”<sup>190</sup> He states that, while the Abiy government is not perfect, Ahmed Abiy has tried to unite Ethiopians. Consequently, while Ethiopia during the EPRDF regime strove to project an image of a singular Ethiopian identity, through the suppression of ethnic-mobilizations, the reality beneath the surface was that ethnic differences were very much alive and only required the opportune moment to erupt.

The international community has also tried to help in Ethiopian civil war, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Thus, to face the threats of the rebels in the Tigris region, Abiy prefers to make new allies elsewhere than collaborating with the United States (US) and European Union (EU). On October 25<sup>th</sup> 2021, the BBC reported that relations between the Ethiopian government and the US and the EU are at an all-time low. Accordingly, both the US and EU have threatened sanctions against the government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), in an effort to push them to end the conflict. On the other hand, the Ethiopian government replied by saying that they can also get help in terms of armaments from other countries like Iran, Turkey and China, concessional loans from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and political protection from Russia and China than relying on the West.<sup>191</sup>

However, conflict in Ethiopia is also not only as a result of ethnic divisions but also due to power struggles within regions. In Ethiopia, regions by law have significant autonomy to the point of being allowed to vote for secession. Consequently, political actors with the region compete for power often pitting citizens against one another. The foiled coup in the Amhara region led by the chief of army in Amhara is an example of power struggles within regions that also fuel conflict in the country.<sup>192</sup>

Moreover, the conflict between the federal government in Addis Ababa and the Tigray region and its ruling party, well-known as TPLF, appears to be at an impasse.<sup>193</sup> Yet,

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> Farouk Chothia, F. (2021). Tigray crisis: How the West has fallen out with Ethiopia’s PM, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58967302>

<sup>192</sup> “Explainer: Ethiopia’s ethnic militias in the spotlight after failed coup,” *Reuters*, June 24, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-security-explainer-idUSKCN1TP2CI> (accessed June 17, 2021).

<sup>193</sup> Alex de Waal, 22 June, 2022, A peace process is possible in Ethiopia, but obstacles remain, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/06/22/a-peace-process-is-possible-in-ethiopia-but->



fighting and confrontations still recorded in some regions. On 14<sup>th</sup> May 2022, during an inter-community mediation meeting in Chekorsi Kebele in Bati Woreda, an area of Oromia in Amhara region, an attack was launched against local officials and community leaders of Bati Woreda in Amhara region and Adaar Woreda in Afar region by an unidentified armed group. On 15<sup>th</sup> of May, Ethiopia National Defence Forces (ENDF) members shot dead a man in Gipho Kebele in Debati a Metekel Woreda, after accusing him of being a member of OLF-Shane. The next day, NDF soldiers shot dead another man, a food delivers in Kebele nearby IDP camp. The reason for this attack is unknown. In addition, the ENDF, the Federal Police and the SNNP's regional Special Forces arrested more than 330 people, including religious leaders, who were charged with involvement in the recent armed unrest and clashes in Woreda and Derashe.<sup>194</sup>

On June 6, 2022, according to the OCHA report, the Fano militias clashed with the federal police forces in an unspecified location and this caused an unknown number of deaths, including some members of the federal police. As a result, an unknown number of farmers in the Samo Ilamu, Cidhati and Jamo Doba regions in the Horo Guduru Wollega areas were attacked and killed by Fano militias. On the other hand, attacks on civilians by government forces have also intensified in the region. On June 14, 2022, fighting broke out in the towns of Gambela, Gimbi and Dembi Dolo. According to the regional governments of Oromia and Gambela, these attacks were coordinated by the OLF-Shane and GLF.<sup>195</sup> Furthermore, conflicts over land and resources are also evidenced within the political based conflict and are pushed by authorities who use Ethiopia's ethno-federalist system of governance to compete for contested territory and governance rights.<sup>196</sup> This placed Ethiopia in the conflict curve F where, there is core conflict with smaller (sub) conflicts occurring alongside it, each of these sub conflicts would have its conflict cycles.<sup>197</sup>

On the same June 14<sup>th</sup>, Abiy addressed parliament, saying that he wanted peace and that he was forming a committee to investigate the possibility of peace with the Tigray people.<sup>198</sup> A few days later, clashes at the border had renewed between Sudan and Ethiopia, including Egypt which denounces the newly activated Ethiopian Renaissance Great Dam on the obstacles-remain/

194 OCHA. (14 -15 May) 2022, Ethiopia Peace Observatory Weekly <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-peace-observatory-weekly-14-20-may-2022-enam> (Accessed on May 23, 2022)

195 OCHA. (15 June) 2022, Ethiopia Peace Observatory Weekly: 4-10 June, 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-peace-observatory-weekly-4-10-june-2022-enam>

196 ACLED data Project, 2022: <https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/ethiopia/>

197 Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann, p. 17.

198 Alex de Waal, 22 June, 2022, A peace process is possible in Ethiopia, but obstacles remain, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/06/22/a-peace-process-is-possible-in-ethiopia-but-obstacles-remain/> (Accessed on June 25, 2022)

Blue Nile<sup>199</sup>. According to an Aljazeera report of 27<sup>th</sup> June 2022, Khartoum had accused Addis Ababa of executing seven of its soldiers. But Ethiopia's foreign ministry replied that the facts of the incident were misrepresented.<sup>200</sup> On 29 June 2022, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, appealed to both parties to completely stop any military action and called for dialogue between the two countries to resolve their dispute. Accordingly, he went on to say that these recent border clashes should not scuttle the diplomatic solutions to resolve the ongoing internal problems in the two Member States and urged the parties to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the border dispute under the auspices of the AU Border Programme.<sup>201</sup>

However, after unsuccessful earlier attempts to resolve the conflict and bring about a resolution by regional and international bodies, the door has finally opened for the possibility of the peace talk between the Ethiopian federal government and the leaders of the Tigray region. But there are still tensions, both parties continuously accusing each other of the abovementioned atrocities. Since there is will from both parties for a peace talk, it is obvious for them to agree on the common ground. According to June 28 2022 report by Tesfa-Alem Tekle, the TPLF Leader, Debretsion addressed the regional and international peace partners in an open letter:

“The Government and people of Kenya have demonstrated, over the years, their impartiality, honesty and solidarity with Ethiopia, as well as their commitment to the norms and principles of the African Union. On that basis, we firmly maintain the existing agreement between the parties to meet in Nairobi for negotiations hosted and facilitated by the President of Kenya.”<sup>202</sup>

On other hand, the Ethiopian government has announced its team composed of seven negotiators. According to State-run Ethiopian Press Agency:

“The team would be chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen. The other members are Minister of Justice Gedion Timothewos, Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Service Temesgen Tiruneh, Ambassador Redwan Hussine, security adviser of the Prime

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199 Tronvoll, K.,2022, The Anatomy of Ethiopia's Civil War, <https://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article/121/835/163/124577/The-Anatomy-of-Ethiopia-s-Civil-War>

200 Al-Jazeera. (27, June), 2022, Sudan recalls envoy to Ethiopia after execution of seven soldiers, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/27/sudan-recalls-envoy-to-ethiopia-after-execution-of-seven-soldiers>

201 Africa Union Commission calls for restraint, calm and dialogue over Ethiopia/Sudan border dispute, 29 June 2022. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220629/chairperson-auc-calls-restraint-calm-dialogue-over-ethiopia-sudan>

202 Tekle, T. A., June 28 2022, Addis names team for Nairobi peace talks with Tigray leaders, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/addis-names-team-for-nairobi-peace-talks-with-tigray-leaders-3862268>

The Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, has acknowledged this commitment on the part of the parties seeking for a peaceful settlement through important confidence-building measures taken, including the lifting of the national state of emergency, the release of detainees and prisoners of war, the establishment of the National Dialogue Commission, the humanitarian truce and the declaration of a ceasefire, and the withdrawal of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) from the Afar region.<sup>204</sup>

Also, following up his meeting with President Joe Biden in October 2021, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta took the initiative to mediate conflict in Ethiopia. In other words, as a neighboring country, Kenya also shows concerns for a possible credible peace.<sup>205</sup>

The Ethiopian federal government system has also fueled conflict as regions seek to expand their borders. For example, the conflict in the Tigray region has also embedded within it border disputes between the Amhara and the Tigray. The Amhara claim that "land (almost a quarter of the Tigray region) was taken from them 30 years ago."<sup>206</sup> Therefore Tigreans in this disputed areas have been forcibly displaced in high numbers. While the EPDRF's authoritarian rule had managed to suppress this dispute, when TPLF was essentially in power. Now as a result of the weakened state institutions and ruling party, these border disputes have come to the light and are being settled. According June 2022 situation report by ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event data):

'Violence against civilians has also continued in the region. On 22 May 2022, members of the ENDF shot and killed one person in Dengore Chelle kebele in Boset woreda in East Shewa zone after accusing him of being a member of the OLF-Shane. The victim had been arrested a few days earlier at Delbo Meskele. The next day, members of the ENDF and Oromia regional Special Forces shot and killed two relatives in Bako Ano kebele in Illu Galan woreda in West Shewa zone after accusing them and their parents of being OLF-Shane members. A few days later, on 27 May, residents of Jeldu woreda gathered in Shikute town in West Shewa zone and rallied against the OLF-Shane. In Gambela region, on 21 May, an unidentified armed group attacked the Ukugo

203

Ibid.

204 Huaxia, 17 June 2022, AU welcomes "confidence-building measures" toward peaceful resolution of conflict in Ethiopia, <https://english.news.cn/africa/20220617/3f8bbc66770c44dc8e28bb4b0373da80/c.html>

205 Alex de Waal, 22 June, 2022, A peace process is possible in Ethiopia, but obstacles remain, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/06/22/a-peace-process-is-possible-in-ethiopia-but-obstacles-remain/>

206 "Land dispute drives new exodus in Ethiopia's Tigray," *Al Jazeera*, March 31, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/3/31/land-dispute-drives-new-exodus-in-ethiopia-tigray> (accessed June 16, 2021).

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refugee camp and opened gunfire on refugees living in the camp near Dimma town in Agnewak zone and killed four people (*see map below*). Similarly, on the same day, an unidentified armed group attacked civilians in Merkes kebele and shot and killed two people. It is not clear whether the attackers were the same armed group”<sup>207</sup>

Political instability in the region, communal violence (conflict-induced displacement), drought, seasonal floods (climate-induced drivers) and development projects (planned resettlement and relocation programs) have also resulted in peace instability.<sup>208</sup> Further review of past studies confirmed that government policies on relocation and resettlement as well as climate-induced factors are the main causes of displacement and conflict in Ethiopia<sup>209 210</sup>. According to the National Displacement Report (2021), climate shocks such as drought, floods and locust as well as conflict in Tigray region were the primary causes of displacement of people in Ethiopia. The armed conflict in Tigray regional states to Amhara and Afar regions has resulted into tensions and volatility of humanitarian situation. Ethiopia crisis response plan 2022 shows that due to recent increase in conflict in Ethiopia, peace building and reconciliation efforts are in need for conflict resolution.<sup>211</sup>

The United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees regional update report 2022, number 29, on the Ethiopia Emergency Situation indicated that armed conflict are still reported in Barahle and Erebtu districts of Afar as many of pastoralists are being displaced with approximately 200,000 people are in hard-to-reach areas since they are trapped in conflict lines with no access to humanitarian support and services.<sup>212</sup>

Socio-economic factors are also a source of conflict in the country. The distribution of resources by the federal government to the regions has not been fair and equitable. With the dominance of the TPLF during the EPRDF regime, resources were disproportionately channeled to the Tigray region at the expense of other regions<sup>213</sup> giving rise to economic

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207 ACLED ,2022: Ethiopia Peace Observatory Weekly 21-27 May 2022: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-peace-observatory-weekly-21-27-may-2022-enam>

208 Tesfaw, T. A. (2022). Internal Displacement in Ethiopia: A Scoping Review of its Causes, Trends and Consequences. *Journal of Internal Displacement*, 12(1), 2-31. <https://www.journalofinternaldisplacement.org/index.php/JID/article/view/114>

209 Yigzaw, G. S., & Abitew, E. B. (2019). Causes and Impacts of Internal Displacement in Ethiopia. *African Journal of Social Work*, 9(2), 32–41. <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajsw/article/view/192193>

210 Sac key, R. E.-N. (2020). *A Step Towards Resilience: Response to the Conflict-Induced Displacement in the West-Guji and Gedeo Zones of Ethiopia 2018*. The Arctic University of Norway, Center for Peace Studies. <https://hdl.handle.net/10037/18826>

211 Ethiopian Crisis Response Plan 2022. [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2022\\_Ethiopia\\_Crisis\\_Response\\_Plan\\_2022.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2022_Ethiopia_Crisis_Response_Plan_2022.pdf)

212 UNHCR –Ethiopia Emergence Situation; Regional Update #29. 28 February, 2022. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91213>

213 Bekalu Atnafu Taye, “Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia,” ACCORD, February, 2017, <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-federalism-conflict-ethiopia/> (accessed June 15, 2021).

inequalities that are now more noticeable. This unfair distribution of resources across region is yet another cause of the Tigray conflict as the Tigray region is now out of power and inaccessible to state resources.<sup>214</sup> Bekalu Atnafu Taye explains this disparity by giving the example of the Sidama ethnic groups in Ethiopia, having three million people and failing to get the status of a regional state, whereas the Harari whose overall population is 185 000 has been accorded a regional state. In the 2006–07 Ethiopian fiscal years, the Harari region received approximately 90 million Ethiopian birr (ETB) but the Sidama Regional Zone got less since it did not have regional status.<sup>215</sup>

Coupled with on-going war in Tigray region, Covid-19 has been reported to negatively affect employment as many people lost their jobs, resulting in reduced level income and food insecurity. The Covid-19 was also found to have contributed to mental health problems such as high stress, anxiety and depression as well as decline in economic growth.<sup>216</sup> Study by Aragie et al. (2020) on the short-term impact of Covid-19 on the Ethiopian economy revealed that lockdown restrictions imposed as containment measures of Covid-19 showed that Ethiopian GDP dropped by 14% due to international trade restrictions.

In addition to this, despite Ethiopia having impressive GDP growth, the country continues to be mired in poverty. Burgeoning youth unemployment has created frustrated youth populations who have been easily co-opted into conflicts.<sup>217</sup> According to African Economic Outlook 2022, the Ethiopian economy has decreased to 5.6% in 2021 from 6.1% in 2020 due to the effect of the war and Covid-19.<sup>218</sup> However, the report projected that GDP growth will fall to 4.8% in 2022 but pickup to 5.7% in 2023, due to industrial investment private consumption. Moreover, due to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, higher global food and oil prices are expected to increase inflation to 32.6% and 24.9% in 2022 and 2023 respectively. The fiscal deficit is anticipated to remain stable at 2.6% in 2022 and 2023 due to implementation of the fiscal consolidation strategy and improvement in

214 Kassahun Melesse, “Tigray’s War Against Ethiopia Isn’t About Autonomy. It’s About Economic Power,” *Foreign Policy*, November 19, 2020. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/19/tigray-tplf-war-against-ethiopia-abi-ahmed-isnt-about-autonomy-its-about-economic-power/> (accessed June 16, 2021).

215 Bekalu Atnafu Taye, “Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia,” *ACCORD*, February, 2017, <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-federalism-conflict-ethiopia/> (accessed June 15, 2021).

216 Harris, D., Baird, S., Ford, K., Hirvonen, K., Jones, N., Kassa, M., & Woldehanna, T. (2021). The Impact of COVID-19 in Ethiopia: PolicBrief.

217 Yusuf, Semir, “Drivers of Ethnic Conflict in Contemporary Ethiopia,” Institute for Security Studies, 24, <https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/drivers-of-ethnic-conflict-in-contemporary-ethiopia> (accessed June 04, 2021).

218 Africa Economic outlook 2022: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-economic-outlook>

tax revenue mobilization.<sup>219</sup> According to the Global Economy 2022 statistics, the youth unemployment rate in Ethiopia stands at 3.69% as per the year 2020.<sup>220</sup>

The periodic war updated reports show that the war continues, with thousands of people being displaced. For, instance, the war in Afar region has been reported to increase and this has affected the peace talk plans between the conflict parties.<sup>221</sup> The effort by the Ethiopian government to launch national dialogues to stop people from going to war has not yielded fruit but only deepens the war between the government and TPLF group<sup>222</sup>. Another update on the conflict status in Ethiopia showed that the conflict in Oromia region is also worsening as cessation agreement between the government and rebel forces in Tigray is also anticipated to pose more threats to the government.<sup>223</sup> The April 29<sup>th</sup> 2022 news update by U.S State Department on building steps to end the conflict in Ethiopia, revealed that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has taken actions such as lifting the state of emergency, freeing the political prisoners and detainees as well as declaring an effective cessation of hostilities in parallel with Tigray authority.<sup>224</sup>

The Ethiopian government and rival Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) signed a peace agreement of "permanent cessation of hostilities" on 3<sup>rd</sup> November, 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa. Speaking to the media in Pretoria after a peace deal was signed between the Ethiopian government and Tigray rebels, President Uhuru (former president of Kenya) said that 'the lasting solution can only come through political dialogue. People should sit and engage, agree that they have differences because they do, and agree that the lasting solution can be through political engagement and dialogue'. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the African Union mediator, said that 'the agreement signed on Wednesday in South Africa marked a new "dawn" for Ethiopia'<sup>225</sup> The signing of the peace deal came as a result of face-to-face negotiations mediated by an African

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219 Africa Economic outlook 2022: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-economic-outlook>

220 The Global Economy Statistics, 2022: [https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Ethiopia/youth\\_unemployment/](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Ethiopia/youth_unemployment/)

221 [Paravicini G. \(2022\): New front in Ethiopian war displaces thousands, hits hopes of peace talks: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/new-front-ethiopian-war-displaces-thousands-hits-hopes-peace-talks-2022-03-30/](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/new-front-ethiopian-war-displaces-thousands-hits-hopes-peace-talks-2022-03-30/)

222 [REUTERS, 2022: Ethiopia launches a national dialogue, but divisions run deep: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/04/18/ethiopia-launches-national-dialogue-divisions-run-deep](https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/04/18/ethiopia-launches-national-dialogue-divisions-run-deep)

223 OCHA, Ethiopia Situation Report (December, 2022), <https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia>

224 Blinken J. A : Building on steps to End the Conflict in Ethiopia , April, 2022: <https://www.state.gov/building-on-steps-to-end-the-conflict-in-ethiopia/>

225 ALJAZEERA, Ethiopia peace deal hailed as a 'new dawn' (November, 2022), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/3/how-did-the-world-react-to-the-ethiopia-peace-deal>



Union (AU) delegation in Pretoria, South Africa for 10 days.

According to the December 6<sup>th</sup>, 2022 situation report by *reliefweb*, humanitarian access into Tigray region has improve since the signing of the peace agreement and there is scaling up of rehabilitation work in conflict-affected areas in Afar and Amhara<sup>226</sup>. Moreover, in eastern and southern Ethiopia, communities continue to suffer from the devastating drought affecting the Horn of Africa with the October- December 2022 rains underperforming. The drought situation was anticipated to continue driving high humanitarian needs up to 2023, with a high likelihood of a sixth failed season in March-May 2023. In December 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2022, the African Union Commission convenes the second meeting of the Senior Commanders of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Nairobi, Kenya to follow-up on the implementation of the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). The team also discussed the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process to ensure full peace stability in Ethiopia.<sup>227</sup>

## Kenya

Today, the world and especially Africa grapples with intra-state conflict as the major type of conflict. Since independence Kenya has not experienced a large-scale civil war similar to that of most of its East African neighbors. However, Kenya has overlapping conflicts ranging from cycles of election-related violence, sexual and gender-based violence, communal violence, to terrorist attacks.<sup>228</sup> Most conflicts in Kenya are catalyzed by environmental, political, economic, competition over natural resources, ethnic identity struggles, and the proliferation of small arms, poverty, and marginalization.<sup>229</sup>

Since independence Kenya has experienced several violent inter-communal clashes. These localized ethnic conflicts are often linked to competition over land ownership and land use, often triggered by the search for water and pasture, the proliferation of small arms, and insecurity<sup>230</sup> perpetrated by identity-based communal militias. For example, Mount Elgon located in the western region of Kenya experienced conflict between local communities over land<sup>231</sup> while Tana River County located in Eastern Kenya witnessed

226 Ethiopia situation Report of December 15<sup>th</sup>, 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-situation-report-15-dec-2022>

227 <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-commission-convenes-2nd-senior-commanders-meeting-between-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-fdre-and-the-tigray-people-s-liberation-front-on-the-implementation-of-the-permanent-cessation-of-hostilities-agreement-coha>

228 Rohwerder, B. (2015)

229 Elfversson, E. (2019); Rohwerder, B. (2015)

230 TSA, 2014, p. 34; KNCHR, 2012, p. vii, Okumu, 2013, p. 1; Mbugua, 2013, p. 13

231 Lynch, 2011

two waves of ethnic-instigated violence in 2001 and 2012 between the Pokomo and Orma and Wardei.<sup>232</sup> Moreover, a study by Maelo and Harris (2021)<sup>233</sup> indicated that the major causes of armed conflict in Isiolo County include power struggles among the elite, weak social agreements, marginalization and exclusion, resources and climate change factors such as drought and floods. The researchers suggested strategies such as control of the illegal firearm trade, empowering citizens in the region economically, as well as reconciliation programs among the communities to promote peaceful co-existence.

For decades, the relations between the Pokot and the Marakwet, Turgen, and Turkana communities in Rift Valley have been marred by perennial disputes culminating in series of attacks and counter-attacks over agricultural land, livestock, and resources at the Pokot-Marakwet border. The clashes between 2016 and 2019 led to over 120 deaths, dozens maimed and injured, thousands internally displaced, property destroyed, and the closure of over 20 schools along the border.<sup>234</sup> Following a series of peace dialogues, the two communities signed a peace pact in July 2019.

Apart from the West Pokot-Marakwet dispute, West Pokot is embroiled in another dispute with Turkana in Kainuk and in Baringo South along a shared border between the counties over livestock theft<sup>235</sup> and land encroachment.<sup>236</sup> Subsequent violence has led to the disruption of movement between the Lodwar and Kitale highway, the loss of lives, and the destruction of property.<sup>237</sup> Perennial violent inter-communal clashes have also been reported between the Turkana and Samburu communities along the Turkana and Samburu County borders, between Borana and Meru communities along the Meru-Isiolo common border, between the Samburu and Maasai communities living on the border of Laikipia and Isiolo Counties, between the Borana and Gabbra communities in Marsabit County, and between the Pokomo and Somali communities living along the

232 Kirchner 2013, Martin 2012

233 Maelo, Frederick, and Geoffrey Harris. "CONFLICT POLICING IN THE PASTORAL COMMUNITIES IN ISIOLO COUNTY." *Journal of Conflict Management* 2.1 (2021): 1-13. <https://iprbj.org/journals/index.php/JCM/article/view/1431>

234 Xinhua (August, 2019). Calm returns to Kenya's troubled region after leaders ink peace pact. [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/01/c\\_138276060.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/01/c_138276060.htm). (Accessed 20 July 2020); Shanzu, I. (June 2019). Survivors' tales of pain due to cattle raids. <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/rift-valley/article/2001328332/survivors-of-cattle-raids-tell-of-anguish#> (Accessed 20 July 2020); Marakwet-Pokot clashes worrying, 116 houses torched - Red Cross. <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018-02-04-marakwet-pokot-clashes-worrying-116-houses-torched-red-cross/> (Accessed 20 October 2020)

235 Omondi, I. (February 2019). Boinnet orders Rift Valley police to end Turkana-West Pokot border clashes. <https://citizentv.co.ke/news/boinnet-orders-rift-valley-police-to-end-turkana-west-pokot-border-clashes-231990/>. (Accessed 20 July 2020)

236 Turkana County. (2019). Governor Nanok calls for immediate security intervention to end Turkana South attacks. <https://www.turkana.go.ke/index.php/2019/02/14/governor-nanok-calls-immediate-security-intervention-end-turkana-south-attacks/> (Accessed 20 July 2020)

237 Ibid, 8



Tana River and Garissa County border.<sup>238</sup> The politics of anticipation and possible fear, tension and conflict in relation to Kenya's Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project is projected to cause conflict.<sup>239</sup> The Isiolo-Meru County boundary has been identified as a source of conflict at political and community level between Meru farmers and Isiolo-based pastoralists (Borana and Turkana) as a result of land disputes. The conflicts arise as a result of livestock theft, killings and displacement among the communities.

The main drivers of conflict in Kenya are electoral politics, cattle raiding, and local fighting over resources and boundaries. For instance, the frequent conflicts between the Turkana and Pokot have been attributed to fighting over pasture and water (grazing field) and border disputes. The prolonged droughts in the northern parts of the country due to climate change has resulted into scarcity of water and animal feeds. This makes the affected communities to encroach the neighborhood lands resulting into conflict among the communities. Furthermore, as a result of drought due to climate change, coupled with poverty, conflict between communities in West Pokot and Marsabit has increased in the recent past.<sup>240</sup> The conflict in Marsabit County has been between Borana and Gabra along the border of Saku and North Horr Constituency. The conflict is mainly as a result of competition over resource use, territorial claims and control over Marsabit politics.<sup>241</sup> According to Minority Right Group (MRG) partners report 2021, several peace efforts have been put in place but little has been achieved.

In April, 2022, 12 people including 2 chiefs were reported killed in community conflict in Marsabit County. This led the government to deploy Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) and General Service Unit (GSU) officers to disarm all the people owning illegal arms and deadly weapons. The MRG report further revealed that the ease of access of arms and deadly weapons in Marsabit is attributed to the proximity of the County to Somalia, South Sudan and Ethiopia where weapons flow easily into the country. In addition, absence of local institutions like Deeping Democracy Programme (DPP). Which supports joint

238 NCIC. (2018) Briefing Memo. [https://www.cohesion.or.ke/images/docs/downloads/NCIC\\_BriefingMemo\\_2018.pdf](https://www.cohesion.or.ke/images/docs/downloads/NCIC_BriefingMemo_2018.pdf) (Accessed 20 July 2020)

239 Mkutu Kennedy, Marie Müller-Koné & Evelyne Atieno Owino (2021) Future visions, present conflicts: the ethnicized politics of anticipation surrounding an infrastructure corridor in northern Kenya, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 15:4, 707-727, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2021.1987700. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2021.1987700>

240 Muigua, K. (2021). Towards Effective Peace-building and Conflict Management in Kenya. <http://kmco.co.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Towards-Peacebuilding-and-Conflict-Management-in-Kenya.docx-Kariuki-Muigua-MAY-2021x.pdf>

241 Mokku J. and Prech D. (2020): Information Brief: Beyond Intractability Facilitating Inter-communal Cohesion and Reconciliation in Marsabitt County. <https://www.dlci-hoa.org/assets/upload/briefs-and-leaflets/20201102120834336.pdf>

operations and command center for conflicts has made countries like Isiolo and Marsabit difficult areas for peace builders and conflict management stakeholders to coordinate effectively.<sup>242</sup>

Conflicts in the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya take the form of cattle rustling, displacements, and cycles of revenge attacks. Cattle raids are carried out for bride price purposes, prestige and financial gains, and to replenish livestock reserves. In most cases, cattle raiding conducted for financial benefits involve excessive violence exacerbated by the proliferation of arms.<sup>243</sup> Kimani et al. (2021) analyzed trends of armed conflict in Kenya from 1997 to 2021. They found that in Kenya, armed conflict is more likely to increase towards, during and after election years: previous peaks in armed conflicts were in 2007, 2013 and 2017. The commonly noted form of conflict during the election period includes violence against civilians (VAC), riots and protests. Competition over natural resources such as water, pasture and land, poverty, illiteracy and Al-Shabaab infiltration are the main causes of conflict between the clans in Garissa County.<sup>244</sup> They suggest that to improve peace and security, a peace committee which is inclusive of different peace-building stakeholders and collaboration between community and security agencies should be considered. This should bring together peace actors such as County peace committees, Nyumba Kumi, County Policing Authority, National Police reservists among other key players in the conflict management and peace-building process.

Since the colonial period, the peripheral (frontier) regions in Kenya have been marginalized in terms of development, resulting in grievances founded on group-based exclusion and ethnic divisions. Even though the devolved system of government was aimed at addressing these structural conflict factors it is also argued to exacerbate others. Devolution of power and resources has contributed to conflicts between or among clans,<sup>245</sup> widespread corruption, and heightened politicization of ethnicity.<sup>246</sup> For example, in Mandera County there exists a long history of conflict and clashes between two Somali sub-clans - the Garee and Murale - over pasture and water as well as local power.<sup>247</sup> Moreover, Fisher et al. (2019) found that in Mandera County, the choice of leaders in ethnic conflict-prone areas has fuelled conflict due to an increased dissatisfaction among the people. This is because

<sup>242</sup> Minority Rights Group (MRG) international (2021): PEACE OR INTO PIECES; *Conflict Analysis and Marginalization for Isiolo and Marsabit County*. <https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Peace-or-into-pieces.pdf>

<sup>243</sup> Okumu, W. (2013). *Trans-local Peace Building among Pastoralist Communities in Kenya. The Case of Laikipi Peace Caravan* (Doctoral dissertation, Universität zu Köln).

<sup>244</sup> Rotich .S. K., Ahmed W. O.: Drivers of Clan Conflicts: A Perspective of the Role of Al-Shabaab in Garissa County, Kenya. <https://www.siasatjournal.com/index.php/siasat/article/view/65>

<sup>245</sup> World Bank 2020

<sup>246</sup> Mkutu, Marani,& Ruteere, 2014

<sup>247</sup> Menkhaus, 2015; Elfversson, 2019

weak leadership gives an avenue to corruption, misappropriation and embezzlement of public resources which denies other communities the rights and privilege to use the resources.

The Second Kenya National Action Plan for the advancement of United Nation Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2020-2024 (KNAP II) was started to enhance, empower and motivate participation of women in peace, security and conflict management. The KNAP II aimed at mainstreaming UN Security Council Resolution 1325 into national conflict resolution, and promotion, peace-building and promotion strategies. Goetz (2015) argued that inclusion of women in peace-building process helps to prevent conflict, create peace and sustain security after the end of the war.

However, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) which is a recurring aspect in Kenya largely happens as a result of harmful traditional and cultural practices, poverty, a patriarchal society, and a breakdown of rule of law.<sup>248</sup> Sexual violence has been prevalent during elections in Kenya since the 1990s. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) in 2007/08 documented 900 cases of electoral-related sexual violence against girls, women, boys, and men, perpetrated by militia groups, security personnel, and civilians.<sup>249</sup> During the 2017 elections at least 201 cases were documented in 11 of the 47 counties by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights monitors.<sup>250</sup> This election-related sexual violence is often used as a weapon to “punish, terrorize or dehumanize communities and individuals, and to influence voting conduct and the outcomes of elections, including by displacing people so that they do not vote.”<sup>251</sup> SGBV during the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly spiked since the end of March 2020.<sup>252</sup> Although youths and women plays key role in conflict alleviation and resolution, their views and contribution towards peace-building have been neglected (Ali et al., 2021)<sup>253</sup>. Therefore, peace-builders should consider incorporating the opinions of women who are more vulnerable to conflict and youths who are in most cases used as inciters and perpetrators of violence in conflict management and peace-building process.

248 Shako, K., & Kalsi, M. (2019). Forensic observations and recommendations on sexual and gender based violence in Kenya. *Forensic science international: Synergy*, 1, 185-203.

249 Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (2008), pp. 237-268

250 KNCHR. (2018), pp. 42-50

251 OHCHR. (2019)

252 Human Rights Watch. (April, 2020).

253 Ali Bitenga Alexandre, Kitoka Moke Mutondo, Juvenal Bazilashe Balegamire, Amini Emile & Denis Mukwege (2021) Motivations for sexual violence in armed conflicts: voices from combatants in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, 37:1, 15-33, DOI: 10.1080/13623699.2021.1882365.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13623699.2021.1882365>

Elections-related violence in Kenya can be traced to the onset/inception of multi-party politics in the country in 1992 to date, with the 2007/08 election described as the one with the “severest bloodshed”<sup>254</sup> and deadliest in the history of the country. The 2007/8 post-election violence led to more than 1100 deaths, 650,000 internal displacements, and a deeply divided country.<sup>255</sup> Electoral violence in Kenya often manifests itself through political assassinations, threatened or attempted murder, physical harm, hate speech and intimidation, vandalism, and voter bribery.<sup>256</sup> Risks of election violence in Kenya have contributed to heightened tensions and an atmosphere of anxiety around political campaigns and the voting period.<sup>257</sup> The country’s history of electoral violence is attributed to numerous underlying conflict drivers, such as the perception of historic marginalization and inequality by certain ethnic groups, high levels of youth unemployment, political power centered on the executive, a culture of impunity,<sup>258</sup> claims of election rigging, perceptions of Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) bias,<sup>259</sup> and highly centralized ethno-politics.<sup>260</sup>

Following relatively peaceful elections in 2013, in August 2017 the presidential election was declared null and void by the Supreme Court. This led to a re-run of the election in October 2017, which was boycotted by the opposition. In this election, President Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the winner, with Raila Odinga disputing the outcome. Following the nullification of the August presidential election by the Supreme Court, the judiciary faced threats and intimidation by Kenyatta and other senior government officials.<sup>261</sup> In November 2017, President Kenyatta was inaugurated for a second term in office, while Raila Odinga organized a parallel inauguration ceremony for himself on 30<sup>th</sup> January 2018, where he took an oath as the “People’s President” in an unofficial swearing-in ceremony. The struggle for power and legitimacy between the two protagonists plunged the country into a period of uncertainty and government-induced repression. For instance, private media stations that had covered Raila’s inauguration ceremony were shut down for two weeks and some journalists and bloggers were threatened, arrested, or detained.<sup>262</sup> Tom Kajwang, the lawyer who administered the oath was prosecuted (among other opposition politicians) and Miguna Miguna (a then close ally of Raila) was arrested and deported to

254 Ombeck, R., Okoth, P., Matanga, F. (2019), p. 80

255 Dialogue Africa Foundation (2009), pp. 53, 56

256 Elder, C., Stigant, S., Claes, J. (2014)

257 Taylor, C. (2018), pp. 35 - 47

258 Seong Yeon Cho, Erin Connors, Faizaa Fatima and Utku Yalim (2015)

259 Ibid, 18

260 Ibid, 18

261 Human Rights Watch. (2018)’ Foresight Africa viewpoint – Elections in Africa in 2018: Lessons from Kenya’s 2017 electoral experiences:

262 Ibid, 261

Canada. In the turbulent aftermath, excessive use of force by security agents, especially the police against protesters in opposition strongholds, were documented.<sup>263</sup>

Incidences of unlawful killings and beatings by police were reported during election protests in late 2017 and early 2018 where police and other security agencies were responsible for the loss of lives of more than 100 opposition supporters in Nairobi and Western Kenya.<sup>264</sup> Within two month (1<sup>st</sup> September 2017 and 25<sup>th</sup> October 2017), the KNCHR documented 25 deaths and over 111 cases of police instigated injuries. It was reported that between August 2017 and March 2018 police officers and other government agencies targeted at least 15 human rights activists and victims of police brutality, who faced arrest threats for revealing human rights violations during the election period.<sup>265</sup> Even though excessive use of police force was prevalent throughout the election period, incidences of police brutality and abuses by security agents are widespread across the country. For example, to preserve the Mau water catchment areas in Embobut Forest, the Kenya Forest Service officers were reported to have used excessive force against the Sengwer community.<sup>266</sup>

Following a meeting at the President’s office in Harambee House in Nairobi, President Kenyatta and Odinga entered into a political deal, manifested in them shaking hands and agreeing to a truce in March 2018 to ease political tensions that were building up. In the deal, President Kenyatta’s deputy William Ruto was conspicuously left out, an aspect that sets an interesting political dynamic in Kenya’s political sphere where alliances based on ethnic identities are the norm.<sup>267</sup> The aftermath of the Kenyatta-Odinga agreement was the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) aimed at improving Kenya’s democracy, building bipartisanship, and unity.<sup>268</sup> The BBI task force released a report in November 2019 after holding public participation fora across the 47 counties to collect views of more than 7000 citizens based on nine core agenda points. The report was disseminated to the public for further discussion which the task force was to take into consideration before presenting the final report. The BBI report was officially launched on 26<sup>th</sup> October 2020, with a call for Kenyans to read the document for themselves to make an informed decision about it. The BBI report sought to address nine identified areas affecting Kenyans. These are corruption, lack of ethos (negative politics), divisive politics, divisive elections,

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263 Amnesty International. (2017)

264 Ibid, 23

265 Ibid, 23

266 Ibid, 23

267 Hattem, J. (April, 2019)

268 BBI Task Force. (2019)

safety and security, responsibility and rights, inclusivity, shared prosperity, and ethnic antagonism and competition. The report left the country embroiled in a debate concerning proposals made in it. Some of the most contentious proposals of the report under debate were constitutional changes particularly on the creation of a parliamentary system of governance with a prime minister and two deputy prime ministers. However, the BBI was declared unconstitutional by the court and it was thrown away.

At the end of September 2020, economist Dr. David Ndi together with Jerotich Seii, James Ngondi, Wanjiru Gikonyo and Ikal Angelei filed a petition with the High Court asking for a ruling on three important issues on Constitution Amendment Bill 2020 (BBI Bill), including whether the basic framework of the constitution may be changed.<sup>269</sup> Okiya Omtata, a public defender, was also one among the petitioners. “The petitioners’ lead argument was that the legal and judicial doctrines and theory of the basic structure of a constitution, the doctrine of constitutional entrenchment clauses, constitutional provisions which are not amendable, the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments, , essential features, supra-constitutional laws in a constitution and the implied limitations of the amendment power in the constitution are applicable in Kenya to substantively limit the ability to amend the Constitution under Articles 255-257 of the Constitution.”<sup>270</sup> On 13<sup>th</sup> May, 2021, in a five-judge panel led by Justice Odunga and including Jairus Ngaah, Teresia Matheka, and Chacha Mwita, the judges unanimously ruled that the BBI Process was irregular, unlawful, and unconstitutional by the Constitution and Human Rights division of the High Court of Kenya.<sup>271</sup> Seventeen topics were examined by the justices, who ruled that President Kenyatta breached the constitution by initiating the BBI Constitution Amendment Bill. The court ruled that the bill procedure should have been initiated by ordinary Kenyans.<sup>272</sup> The court also declared that BBI’s constitutional committee was unconstitutional. After the appeal by the BBI steering committee, the court of appeal upheld the high court ruling and declared the BBI Constitutional Amendment 2020 unconstitutional. Indeed, the ruling nullifying the constitutional amendment through the BBI bill 2020 has altered the course of Kenyan politics since the handshake in 2018.

However, the Deputy President was largely seen as being partly opposed to the handshake and the BBI, with the relationship between the two marked with accusations and counter-accusations.<sup>273</sup> On his part, President Kenyatta largely accused his deputy of focusing on the 2022 election at the expense of concentrating on building their legacy of the big four

269 Mbaku, M.J. (2021)

270 Ibid

271 Wanambisi, Laban (2021-05-13).

272 BBC News. 2021-05-14

273 The Africa Report, June 2020.



agenda of enhancing manufacturing, Food security and nutrition, Universal health care, and affordable housing. On the other hand, the deputy president accused the president of curtailing his political ambitions to succeed him. President Kenyatta had since built new alliances around his deputy's political opponents: the Orange Democratic Movement, KANU, Chama cha Mashinani, Wiper Democratic Movement, and Amani National Coalition.<sup>274</sup> These political shifts have heightened the political uncertainty reigning in the country with the situation made more complex by the economic and social uncertainty following the COVID-19 pandemic, locust invasion<sup>275</sup>, and flooding in some parts of the country. Furthermore, as Kenya prepares for the August 2022 elections, there are signs of ethnicized political tension arising among the citizens. For instance, in March 2022, Raila Odinga's (presidential aspirant) helicopter was stoned by youths in Uasin Gishu when he attended a burial. This clearly shows tensions in ethnic-based politics in Kenya. Horn Institute Research News update indicated that should election credibility, impunity and legitimacy of the Kenya 2022 election not hold, there is the possibility that the country will experience peace instability.<sup>276</sup>

Since the onset of the COVID - 19 pandemic in Kenya in March 2020, the education sector has been affected due to the closure of schools and institutions of higher learning. The closure led to the commencement of e-learning modules, as well as lessons delivered through radio and television to promote continuous learning. However, this has not trickled down to all the regions in the country, particularly to those living in marginalized areas where they cannot afford internet services or other such mediums of communication. The pandemic has also affected labor and social security since numerous employees in formal and informal employment have lost their jobs and livelihood. Reduced earnings and job cuts have led to some Kenyans, especially those who rely on casual work, finding it difficult to cater to their basic needs – including rent. To contain the virus, the government instituted a curfew and lockdown measures with the police responsible for enforcement.<sup>277</sup> The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) reported that police officers were responsible for 117 cases of inhuman and degrading treatment and torture and 10 deaths between March 2020 and June 2020.<sup>278</sup>

274 Ibid, 30

275 S., Mbugua “Locusts plague destroys livelihoods in Kenya but ‘biggest threat yet to come’”, Climate Change News, February 14, 2020, Accessed November 18, 2020, url: <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/02/14/locusts-plague-destroys-livelihoods-kenya-biggest-threat-yet-come/>

276 Pamba E.J.(February, 2022): The 2022 Conflict Flashpoints to Watch in the Horn of Africa: <https://horninstitute.org/the-2022-conflict-flashpoints-to-watch-in-the-horn-of-africa/>

277 Kevin Okoth Ouko, Robert Ouko Gwada Gertrude Alworah and Zephaniah Ongaga Mayaka, “Effects of COVID-19 pandemic on Food Security and Household Livelihoods in Kenya,” *Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics* 23, 2(2020):72-80.

278 KNCHR (June 2020). Pain and Pandemic: Unmasking the State of Human Rights in Kenya in

Similar to many countries globally, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a socio-economic impact on Kenya which further complicates efforts to address political and developmental challenges. COVID-19 has also been reported to have contributed to domestic violence, increase in incidences of sexual and gender based violence. Moreover, community based peace initiatives intended to improve peace and cohesion were also affected by Covid-19 containment restrictions. Reduced household income, job losses as well as reduced business turnover has also been affected by the pandemic. During the enforcement of Covid-19 containment measure, police brutality and extra-judicial killings were also experienced as the side effect of the pandemic. Covid-19 also put pressure on the health systems resulting in difficulty of accessing health services by poor households<sup>279</sup>.

Peace education programs were introduced in primary and secondary schools, to promote peaceful coexistence between members in the community, to prepare learners to be good ambassadors of peace in the community. The intended goal of the program has not been realized. In order to obtain lasting and sustainable peace among communities, a joint and participatory effort in peace-building and conflict management is required. For instance, elders in the communities still play a vital role in peace restoration and conflict resolution. Thus in an effort to restore peace in conflict-prone areas, the government should closely use elected community elders (and religious leaders) as agent of peace and conflict management (Muigua, 2021).

According to the HIPSIR CMT 2019 study,<sup>280</sup> inequitable distribution of resources and high levels of graft with a weighted mean of 2.14, contributes to a large extent to conflicts and high poverty levels in Kenya. There is a marked deterioration of government functions (weighted mean of 1.99) and weakened government functions (weighted mean of 2.00) as illustrated by increased reports of criminal activity and attacks, rampant police brutality, and conflict-related sexual violence. Even though the study indicated that Kenya has a high risk of conflict based on pre-conflict findings, the country was ranked as the most peaceful compared to South Sudan and the DRC.

### **South Sudan**

For several decades, the people of South Sudan united to fight for their freedom. They  
Containment of the COVID -19 Pandemic.

279 Pinchoff et al (2021): Gendered economic, social and health effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and mitigation policies in Kenya: evidence from a prospective cohort survey in Nairobi informal settlements

280 Opongo, E., Kawuondi, L., Raichenah, J. G., & Kibet, N. (2020). Conflict Monitoring in Africa for Strategic Intervention. Available at SSRN 4003304



had been exploited, subjected to slavery, abused, and discriminated against, not only on racial but also on religious grounds.<sup>281</sup> Before secession, South Sudan marginalized and development indicators, such as health, infant mortality, maternal mortality, drinking water, sanitation, or food security, were among the worst in the world.<sup>282</sup> Hence, South Sudan's clamor for change could not be suppressed or ignored. With different rebel groups engaged in guerrilla warfare with the government based in Khartoum, South Sudan demanded autonomy and self-determination. This rebellion was considered the only way to confront the oppressive and dictatorial leadership based in Khartoum. Consequently, Sudan suffered an intra-state protracted conflict that had diverse effects on the human population and the economy of the country. Between 1983 and 2005, about two million people lost their lives, over four million were internally displaced (IDPs), and over eight hundred thousand were displaced as refugees.<sup>283</sup> Through struggle and persistence in the pursuit of independence, the South Sudanese remained firm in adopting the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Their dream was actualized on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011 when South Sudan became the world's newest country through its secession from Sudan.<sup>284</sup> Basic changes were embodied in the terms of separation. Fundamental interests like border demarcation, control of oil extraction, and the tariffs for use in the Sudanese pipeline, transitional financial arrangements, citizenship, currency, and other issues had to be addressed.<sup>285</sup> Additionally, the international community helped and coordinated various programs of the CPA to help in building the state of South Sudan.<sup>286</sup>

The adverse effects of the civil war attracted the attention of the international community. As a result, there were different attempts to end the violence through dialogue and negotiation in a mediation process spearheaded by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and funded by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway (the Troika Nations). It is through such mediation that a peace agreement was reached leading to "the referendum on unity versus separation."<sup>287</sup> However, the government of Khartoum was not committed to fully implementing the reforms which they had agreed upon. Due to pressure from the United States and the international community, there was

281 F.H., Johnson, *South Sudan: The Untold Story From Independence to Civil War*, p. xiii

282 Ibid., p. 18.

283 Arnold, M., & LeRiche, M. (2013). *South Sudan: from revolution to independence*. Oxford University Press, USA.

284 Ibid., p. 1.

285 Ibid., p. 15.

286 Okoye, E (2021). Exploring the Underlying Causes of the Conflict in South-Sudan. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Emeka-Okoye/publication/350923734\\_EXPLORING\\_THE\\_UNDERLYING\\_CAUSES\\_OF\\_THE\\_CONFLICT\\_IN\\_SOUTH-SUDAN/links/607a125e881fa114b409ff69/EXPLORING-THE-UNDERLYING-CAUSES-OF-THE-CONFLICT-IN-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Emeka-Okoye/publication/350923734_EXPLORING_THE_UNDERLYING_CAUSES_OF_THE_CONFLICT_IN_SOUTH-SUDAN/links/607a125e881fa114b409ff69/EXPLORING-THE-UNDERLYING-CAUSES-OF-THE-CONFLICT-IN-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf)

287 F.H., Johnson, *South Sudan: The Untold Story From Independence to Civil War*, p. 13.

a referendum that saw over ninety percent of the southerners vote in favor of secession. The 2011 independence referendum and 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was thought to be the solution for South Sudan after obtaining independence from Sudan. However, the power struggle between Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups has rendered the nation a peace insecure region. The main drivers of war between the two groups have been fragile state structure, oil revenue control by powerful countries like the USA and unprofessionalism in the country's army. The fragility of the South Sudan as a state is characterized by food insecurity, political instability, inter-border conflicts, and violence between communities as well as weak systems of governance.

The people of South Sudan were relieved of a long period of oppression and denial of development. They were optimistic that their independence, the constitution, and cooperation between their new leaders would set a precedent for unity, peace, and prosperity. This hope was short-lived when violence broke out in South Sudan in 2013. As a result, it is estimated that over fifty thousand people have been killed and possibly as many as 383,000, according to recent estimates, and nearly four million people were internally displaced or fled to neighboring countries.<sup>288</sup> There have been various peace initiatives and interventions by the local, regional, and international community to address this conflict. However, a peace agreement signed in August 2015 failed to offer a resolution to the conflict. In 2016, immediately after signing a peace agreement (Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan) another factor that fueled conflict in South Sudan was failure of initial peace efforts. Although a new agreement was signed in September 2018 with the goal of creating conducive environment for offering humanitarian assistance as well as permanent ceasefire reinforcement, sub-national conflicts still persist across the country<sup>289</sup>. This has disrupted economic growth and development through labor markets, investments and spillover effects on both intra and international trade.

According to Conflict Research Programme (CRP) report by McCrone, gubernatorial conflict (i.e allocation of certain states to the military parties and how governors are appointed) has also triggered conflict in South Sudan<sup>290</sup>. Moreover, South Sudan's ten-

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288 Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed June 7, 2019, url: <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>.

289 Mawejje, J., & McSharry, P. (2021). The economic cost of conflict: Evidence from South Sudan. *Review of Development Economics*, 25(4), 1969-1990. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rode.12792>

290 McCrone, F. (2021). The war (s) in South Sudan: local dimensions of conflict, governance and the political marketplace. [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/108888/1/McCrone\\_the\\_wars\\_in\\_South\\_Sudan\\_published.pdf](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/108888/1/McCrone_the_wars_in_South_Sudan_published.pdf) (accessed on May 2, 2022)

state system under decentralized governance is another factor that has made the country peace insecure. On February 22, 2020, President Salva Kiir and his former deputy turned foe, Riek Machar, signed an agreement to form a coalition government, raising hopes for peace in this troubled country. On 16<sup>th</sup> January 2022, President Salva Kiir entered into another a pair of agreements with two powerful opposition commanders who had broken away from Riek Machar. The main deal was to unify the armies from the two sides, with the parties agreeing that the national army would absorb fighters loyal to the two commanders within 3 months<sup>291</sup>. However, the exclusion of Riek Machar from the deal laid the ground work for bitter inter-communal fighting between forces loyal to Salva Kiir's deal and Riek Machar's men.

According to Dowd and Kumalo (2022), failure to establish links between peace-building initiatives have significantly undermined their sustainability and impact in peace restoration. The delay in implementation of the R-ARCSS has also increased sub-national and inter-communal violence related to national political actors. Challenges such as climate change and food security, cattle raiding, revenge killings, as well as harassment of humanitarian workers have delayed the peace restoration process. Humanitarian Crisis Analysis Report 2022 further revealed that intensified sub-national conflict, violence, consecutive years of major flooding, corruption, and the impact of Covid-19 are major challenges facing South Sudan.<sup>292</sup> The report further revealed that due to recurring gender-based violence, the humanitarian sector has faced an increase in the unmet needs of gender-based violence survivors. According to Human Rights Council report February-April, 2022, conflict related to sexual violence against woman and girls in South Sudan is wide-spreading and systematically increasing due to lack of accountability for sexual and gender based violence.<sup>293</sup> Moreover, lack of progress by South Sudan's government in implementing key aspects of the 2018-Revitalized Peace Agreement is also one of the factors fueling conflict-related sexual violence.

Youth play a key role in the conflict management and peace building process. The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARGSS) was signed in 2018 following the collapse of the 2015 peace agreement. However, despite its mandate to restore peace, youth have been marginalized from participating in peace-building process.<sup>294</sup> According to the World Bank Report (2019), more than 70% of South

291 Global conflict tracker 2022- <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>

292 Humanitarian Crisis Analysis, 2022: <https://cdn.sida.se/app/uploads/2020/10/04142048/HCA-South-Sudan-crisis-2022.pdf> (Accessed on June 15, 2022 )

293 Human Rights Council Report (2022) : [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A\\_HRC\\_49\\_CRP\\_4.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A_HRC_49_CRP_4.pdf) (accessed on April 25, 2022)

294 Youth situation in South Sudan: <https://riftvalley.net/sites/default/files/publication-documents/>

Sudan is under the age of 15-35 years. Despite their large number, the youth are faced with limited opportunities to effectively contribute to the economic development and political stability of the country.

Some international NGOs such as Search for Common Grounds (SFCG), Oxfam and Norwegian People Aid (NPA) have created spaces for youth participation through provision of training and access to information as well as funding youth groups to build capacity for effective engagement in the peace-building processes<sup>295</sup>. Moreover, regional and international platforms like UN, AU and IGAD also advocated for an increased space for youth participation in the peace process. Challenges such as negative social and cultural norms, limited civic and political opportunities, leadership incapacity, violent incidents at the subnational level and persistent security threats resulting from the road ambushes, cattle raiding, inter-communal violence, and revenge killings across the country affects youth participation in peace-building process. In addition, inadequate funding and technical support for youth in advocacy also affect their participation in monitoring and implementation of the peace agreement.

Long-delayed elections have also been identified as another trigger of war in South Sudan. The current conflict situation in South Sudan is decisively localized and this has intensified the violence between citizens due the ease of accessibility of deadly weapons by citizens, fighting over the limited resources as well as grievances among the ethnic groups<sup>296</sup>. Therefore, protecting civilians and peace maintenance in South Sudan requires the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to invest more in peace-building and restoration among the local citizens. In addition, to achieve long-term peace-building among the citizens of South Sudan, missions such the UNMISS should greatly invest in rigorous local-level analysis by enabling national staff and community liaison assistant through structured deliberation to know the actors to engage and the method of engagement for successful community level conflict resolution.

Questions have been raised on which conflict resolution approach would be best applied to change the South Sudan situation. Strategies so far applied by the UN and Africa Union military interventions present in South Sudan have influenced the methods of intervention of various regional countries. From the onset of the South Sudan civil war in

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RVI%202021.06.15%20South%20Sudan%20Youth%20Violence%20Livelihoods\_Report.pdf

295 Herseth S.K (2021), No peace without youth: Continued calls for change in South Sudan: <https://www.cmi.no/publications/7973-no-peace-without-youth-continued-calls-for-change-in-south-sudan>

296 Donais T. and Solomon A. (2022) Protection through peace-building in South Sudan, *African Security Review*, 31:1, 51-65, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2021.1968916. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2021.1968916>

December 2013, IGAD chaired by Ethiopia took up the role of mediation to help strike a peace deal between the two main belligerent parties. These talks have however proved to be difficult because IGAD member states Sudan and Uganda were backing different sides in the war, Machar and President Salva Kiir, respectively.<sup>297</sup> For instance, Ugandan forces were reported to be on the ground in Juba helping Salva Kiir's government fight Riek Machar. Hence, Kiir took a hardline position while negotiating since he was assured of protection by the Ugandan government.

Moreover, Sudan has also played a significant role in offering space to host both Gatwec and Olony communities both of which it has historically armed as proxies in the decades-long fighting on both sides of the Sudan-South Sudan border. Sudan for a long time had been exporting oil that came from the fields in South Sudan. They still wanted to control the new regime and continue benefitting from the oil. Ethiopia and Kenya are contributing to peace stability in South Sudan through the peace talks while Uganda has contributed through deployment of military in Juba. The International Crisis Group Report 2022 suggested that the South Sudan elite need to drop their predatory approach to politics in favor of peace, stability and economic development.<sup>298</sup> According to Global Conflict Tracker (2022), regional bodies such as AU, UN, IGAD and EAC have played significant role in peace-building in South Sudan. For instance, IGAD has helped South Sudan in several records of peace negotiation which has seen Kiir signing peace agreements with Machar.

The United Nations (UN) has helped in security back up, for instance, thousands of UN soldiers have been deployed in South Sudan for the peace keeping mission. In a statement by the U.N. Secretary General's Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, the UN emphasized that its main responsibility is to protect civilians and assist in the process of ending the war. He urged the South Sudan government to cooperate with UNMISS, to allow the men and women in the blue helmets to discharge U.N. Security Council resolution 2327 (2016) that calls on the warring parties to return to the peace process and empowers UNMISS to use the necessary tools to protect civilians.<sup>299</sup> Nonetheless, this cannot rule out the fact that regional self-interests have led to the methods of intervention that in turn have influenced the prolonged conflict. As such, the

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297 Crisis Group, Salvaging South Sudan Fragile Peace, Accessed June 9, 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/270-salvaging-south-sudans-fragile-peace-deal>.

298 International Crisis Group Report (February, 2022): South Sudan's Splintered Opposition: Preventing More Conflict: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-s-splintered-opposition-preventing-more-conflict> (Accessed on June 9, 2022)

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fatality rate has increased over the years and many people have been displaced due to the civil war. For instance, the UNSC September 2020 report on South Sudan notes that inter-communal conflict increased throughout the country, especially in greater Jonglei, Lakes, Unity, Warrap, and Western Bahr el-Ghazal.<sup>300</sup> Thus, it is important to look at the statistical enumeration that rates the level of conflict.

Moreover, East African Community (EAC) countries such as Kenya have engaged in talks seeking stability in South Sudan. USA has been participating in addressing humanitarian crisis caused by the war through provision of financial assistance. In March 2022, South Sudan signed a grant of \$120 million with the World Bank's international grant development association for strengthening service delivery, community institution and resilience to floods<sup>301</sup>. The African Development Bank (AfDB) and World Health Organization (WHO) have also played a crucial role in strengthening South Sudan's capacity to reduce, mitigate and manage the impacts of Covid-19. In February, 2022 AfDB in conjunction with WHO handed over a Public Health Emergency Operation Center which was part of a \$ 4.2million African Development Bank grant financed Covid-19 response project.<sup>302</sup> Moreover, US, UK and Norway have long spearheaded international diplomacy on the South Sudan peace-building process.

According to a report by UNMISS, the fight against impunity remains minimal thus making peace-building efforts in South Sudan difficult. UNMISS reports that 585 people were killed while 305 others injured and thousands forcibly displaced throughout South Sudan as a result of the ongoing conflict in Jonglei and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area between the months of March 2021 and July 2021.<sup>303</sup> Ms Yasmin Sooka, the chairperson of the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan, while reporting to the Human Rights Council in Geneva underlined that the human rights situation in South Sudan had considerably deteriorated as from March of 2021 with an increase in the cases of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, as well as rape and conflict related sexual violence.<sup>304</sup> Ms. Sooka further stated that between June and August of 2021,

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300 UNSC, September 2020, p. 5

301 World Bank (March, 2015): South Sudan Receives \$120 million to Continue Strengthening Service Delivery, Community Institutions, and Resilience to Floods:<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/03/15/south-sudan-receives-120-million-to-continue-strengthening-service-delivery-community-institutions-and-resilience-to-flo>

302 AfDB (February 2022): African Development Bank and WHO strengthen South Sudan's emergency response with phase two of public health center. <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-development-bank-and-who-strengthen-south-sudans-emergency-response-phase-two-public-health-center-49065> (Accessed on April 30, 2022)

303 United Nations, South Sudan plagued by violence and corruption, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100932>, 2021.

304 Ibid



more than 100 civilians were killed in ethnic conflict in Tambura in Western Equatoria with an additional 80,000 to about 120,000 people reportedly displaced by the conflict.<sup>305</sup> The Chairperson also cautioned that the humanitarian community in South Sudan is being attacked more and more in recent years, particularly from the period of March 2020, and humanitarian assistance is being suspended and assistance workers relocated.<sup>306</sup> In Upper Nile of the Unity States, political and security tension has been reported to escalate in March 2022 as a result of clashes between South Sudan Peoples' Defense Force (SSPDF) and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO)<sup>307</sup>.

According to Security Council Report 2022, patrols in Leer, Unity State, have been increased by UNMISS in response to a surge in inter-communal violence, such as sexual violence, looting and destruction of property that resulted in the displacement of thousands of people. United Nations' News Report on peace and security 2022, showed that from 17<sup>th</sup> February to 7<sup>th</sup> April, 2022, a total of 72 civilians have been killed in South Sudan, and 11 injured, as well as 64 cases of sexual violence reported.<sup>308</sup> According to the meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in South Sudan in October, 2022, there is need to renew the implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement. Members of UNHR together with the AU, IGAD, UN representatives, and civil societies present in the meeting suggested that there is need to establish a Hybrid Court, Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) and reparation processes to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement. They further call for a clear plan to prepare and adopt a permanent constitution to enable South Sudanese to define their own future and provide the basis for conducting election to conclude the power transition<sup>309</sup>.

Despite the dire security situation in the country, progress has been made in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed in 2018. On 21<sup>st</sup> February 2020, President Salva Kiir dissolved the Transitional Government of National Unity with the appointment of Riek Machar as First Vice -President and Taban Deng Gai, James Wani Igga, and Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior as Vice - Presidents. The pre-transitional period came to

305 Ibid

306 Ibid

307 Security Council Report (2022): South Sudan slams UN over renewed arms embargo, sanctions <https://www.theeastafican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/south-sudan-against-arms-embargo-sanctions-3829632> (Accessed on June 10, 2022)

308 United Nation Report (April, 2022): UN condemns 'horrific' surge of violence in South Sudan <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1116862> (Accessed on May 5, 2022)

309 United Nations Report (October, 2022). Urgent Action Needed on Peace Agreement for South Sudan:

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/10/urgent-action-needed-peace-agreement-south-sudan>



an end following the inauguration of the new presidency of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity on 22 February 2020.<sup>310</sup> In June 2020, President Salva Kiir and First Vice- President Riek Machar reached an agreement on the distribution of state governorship between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG) and the SPLM in Opposition.<sup>311</sup>

Between the period of 1<sup>st</sup> January 2021 and 31<sup>st</sup> of March 2021, President Salva Kiir completed the appointments of all governors and deputy governors of all the ten states and also appointed state ministers, advisors, independent commissioners and County commissioners.<sup>312</sup> The appointments of state governments in three administrative areas of Abyei, Ruweng and the Greater Pibor remain pending. On 16<sup>th</sup> January, 2022 South Sudan’s president Salva Kiir entered into another pair of agreements with 2 powerful opposition commanders who had broken away from Riek Machar. The main deal was to unify the armies from the two sides with the parties agreeing that the national army would absorb fighters loyal to the two commanders within 3 months. However, the exclusion of Riek Machar from the deal laid ground work for bitter inter-communal fighting between forces loyal to the Salva Kiir’s deal and Riek Machar’s men.

Although there is notable progress in the implementation of R-ARCSS, there remain setbacks that are worth noting. The R-ARCSS has remained behind schedule in regard to security arrangements, the constitutional process and transitional<sup>313</sup>. The risk of escalation of widespread violence in South Sudan is attributed to economic downturn, military factions’ competition and subnational sources of conflict tensions. The recent agreement of the military group to restore the ten-state systems rather than considering sub-dividing them into more states could be a way to restore peace among the citizens. Thus, the Conflict Research Program report postulated that if local electoral politics is introduced under Revitalized-Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (2018), more conflict may arise. Furthermore, the degradation of public authority and legality of chiefs and other local actors in South Sudan, may spur up conflict among the citizens.<sup>314</sup> Therefore, engaging other stakeholders such as teachers and journalists as peace partners could be a better strategy for peace and conflict resolution.

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<sup>310</sup> UNSC, 15 June 2020

<sup>311</sup> UNSC. June 2020b

<sup>312</sup> UNSC. June 2020b

<sup>313</sup> Human Rights Council Report (2022): Conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls in South Sudan

[https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A\\_HRC\\_49\\_CRP\\_4.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A_HRC_49_CRP_4.pdf). (Accessed on April 7, 2022)

<sup>314</sup> Donais T. and Solomon A. (2022) Protection through peace-building in South Sudan, *African Security Review*, 31:1, 51-65, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2021.1968916. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2021.1968916>

There is increased fragmentation among the opposition parties such as within South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), SPLM/A-IO as well as within the Office of the President (OP). President Salva Kiir has been accused of encouraging and facilitating defections and desertions within the SPLM/A-IO whereas some members of the OP accuse the president of failing to consult in key decision-making issues.<sup>315</sup> The internal discord within SPLM/A-IO caused by internal leadership tensions and the perception of marginalization along ethnic identity continues to instigate instability.<sup>316</sup> The opposition National Salvation Front (NAS) in South Sudan failed to sign the 2018 peace agreement and they have continued to cause violence against children (Humanitarian Crisis Analysis, 2022). Moreover, the boundary conflict between Padang Dinka and Shilluk in the city of Malaka in Upper Nile State continues. International Crisis Africa briefing in February, 2022 reported that:

The second major bloc was the ethnic Shilluk Agwelek militia led by warlord Johnson Olony, who demanded a reversal of wartime gerrymandering that had altered state lines and placed Malakal, previously the bustling capital of Upper Nile state, outside Shilluk-administered territory. The Shilluk, a major ethnic group that lives on both banks of the White Nile, claim Malakal and other nearby areas along the eastern bank of the river as part of the ancient Shilluk kingdom. The Padang Dinka refute this claim, insisting that they arrived first in the area and that Shilluk territory ends at the western bank of the White Nile.

South Sudan faces the threat of COVID-19 and escalating violence that jeopardizes the country's ceasefire reign.<sup>317</sup> South Sudan Country Report 2022 indicated that security challenges coupled with Covid-19 were the major hindrance of country election that was planned in 2021.<sup>318</sup> This has put at risk the peace agreement signed in 2018 due to subnational and inter-communal violence, crime and impunity resulting in peace instability. Report by Humanitarian Response Plan 2020 showed that humanitarian access to COVID-19 and war affected regions was much constrained by armed violence, operational interference and violence and threats against humanitarian personnel.<sup>319</sup> Moreover, increasing inter-communal violence and attacks possess greater threat to peace stability and efficient support delivery by humanitarian assistance. Armed insurgency being led by Thomas Cirillo (leader of National Salvation Front) further threatens the peace process in South Sudan.<sup>320</sup>

315 UNSC, 15 June 2020, p. 3

316 UNSC, 15 June 2020

317 UNSC. June 2020b

318 South Sudan County Report, 2022: <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/SSD>

319 Humanitarian response plan, 2022. [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hrp\\_ssd\\_2022\\_30mar\\_2022.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/hrp_ssd_2022_30mar_2022.pdf)

320 Global Conflict Tracker (2022): Civil War in South Sudan <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>

## HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) Report 2023

The FAO Report (2022) further revealed that due to the negative impact of Covid-19 on oil production, disruption of the supply chain and international trade interference, the living standards of most South Sudanese has been affected. This is because disruption in the global and regional supply chain has affected food markets leading to high food prices and an increase in food insecurity.<sup>321</sup> The humanitarian situation in South Sudan in December 2022 was reported worsening as people's humanitarian needs continue to rise, driven by compounding effects of inter-communal and sub-national violence, food insecurity, and climate change crisis as well as public health challenges. As of 10 December 2022, more than 1 million people have been verified as affected by severe flooding in 39 counties across South Sudan and in the southern part of the Abyei Administrative Area.<sup>322</sup> According to reliefweb November, 2022 update, conflict erupted between armed forces in Fashoda County, Upper Nile State, resulting into displacement of thousands of civilians in the region. Further, the OCHA report further indicated that the conflict expanded to Manyo County on 2 December, displacing approximately 5,000 people to Melut County. On 5 December, the armed elements reportedly raided cattle from areas around Kodok town and some tukuls were burned.<sup>323</sup>

The FEWSNET report showed that in mid-December 2023, conflict confrontations have shifted back towards eastern Upper Nile and northern Jonglei, with clashes reported occurring between the white army, Agwelek, and the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF) and between the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)-Kitwang forces and Gawaar civilians. The increase in insecurity as a result of the clashes have hindered the supply of food assistance and humanitarian supports resulting into food insecurity among the affected people. The attacks in these regions mainly involve the use of sexual and gender-based violence, looting of cattle, and pillaging of crop harvests. This has caused deaths and displacement of civilians, and relocation of humanitarians. However, increase in intensity of the violence in Upper Nile and northern Jonglei have presented bigger challenge in implementation of the peace process. Thus, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) has warned that continued clashes in Upper Nile and northern Jonglei areas, as well as further joint SSPDF-Agwelek operations against the white army forces and their mobilization towards Fangak and Canal/Pigi, could interfere with the implementation of the peace agreement

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321 FAO report (2022): National agrifood systems and COVID-19 in South Sudan: Effects, policy responses and long-term implications, <https://www.fao.org/3/cb8613en/cb8613en.pdf>

322 <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-december-2022>

323 OCHA Report 2022, Upper Nile Flash Update No. 1 as at 10<sup>th</sup>, Dec, 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-upper-nile-flash-update-no-1-10-december-2022>

in South Sudan.<sup>324</sup>

In 2021, South Sudan had a conflict level of 2.62 which is higher than 2020 rank of 0.9 which classified the conflict at latent phase.<sup>325</sup> The 2021 rank placed South Sudan in crisis phase as it was in 2019 with conflict level of 2.84. This shows the unpredictable nature of conflict, since 2019 to 2021 when the war has moved from crisis phase to latent phase and back to crisis phase. Moreover, there are also frequent occurrence of inter-communal conflicts that renders South Sudan insecure. The nature of the conflict curve in South Sudan can be attributed to factors such as unresolved historical grievances, failure of peace agreements and revenge killings among the communities.

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<sup>324</sup> FEWSNET, Food Security Outlook Update (Dec. 2022) Surge in conflict in western Upper Nile displaces thousands, driving Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcome :<https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/food-security-outlook-update/december-2022>

<sup>325</sup> <http://www.conflictmonitoring.com/>

## **METHODOLOGY**

## Research Design

This study applied a cross-sectional research design by comparing diverse perceptions and analyses from different contexts. The design was important in understanding the actual context of conflicts, their multi-level perspectives, as well as the cultural influences involved. The research also applied a mixed-method approach, which accommodated quantitative as well as qualitative methods of data collection that helped in formulating the CMT using a holistic approach of interpretation.<sup>326</sup> The mixed-method approach was also important in the rigorous use of quantitative research that helped in examining the magnitude of conflict and the frequency in which the conflict indicators were observed.

## Target Population

The target population was mainly individuals with informed levels of knowledge of the prevailing security situation from the general public, civil society organizations, NGOs, and key informants from the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. Examples of professions represented by respondents included peace practitioner, political/community leaders, security personnel, media practitioners, teachers, the business sector, and religious leaders. The population also included people involved in peace processes within the targeted four countries. The research only included participants over the age of 18 years who gave their verbal informed consent to participate in the study. The age brackets considered under this study were 18-26 years, 27-35 years, 36-50 years and above 50 years.

## Sampling Procedure

Convenience and purposive methods of non-probability sampling were used. First, four countries (Ethiopia, DRC, South Sudan and Kenya) were selected purposively to represent countries with various conflict situations in Eastern Africa. Secondly, the participants were selected based on their availability and willingness to take part in the study. Inclusion criteria were used to ensure that only those people who had the desired attributes and experience participated in the study. The minimum targeted sample size for each country was 100 respondents totaling to 400 respondents for the four countries.

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<sup>326</sup> University of Southern California, "Research guides," <https://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/researchdesigns>

### Data Collection Tool

A questionnaire was designed based on the objectives of the study as well as the findings of the literature review. The questionnaire included both the open-ended and closed-ended questions designed for measuring conflict levels. To test the validity and reliability of the tools, the questionnaire was pre-tested before the actual data collection. This was done to test the relevancy of the questions and validity of the questionnaire in achieving the research objectives. From the pre-test, different indicators were validated as appropriate for measuring different stages of conflict in a given country. A final draft questionnaire was developed and translated from English to French for DRC, and from English to Amharic for the case of Ethiopia to ensure easier data collection in DRC and Ethiopia respectively.

### Data Collection Procedure

A total of 517 questionnaire copies were filled returned across the four countries (DRC-120 copies, South Sudan-120 copies. Ethiopia-85 copies and Kenya-192 copies). In DRC and South Sudan, data was collected using hard copies due to limited internet connectivity and the response rate was 100%. In Ethiopia both online questionnaires and hard copies were administered, while in Kenya all the data was collected online. Data collection for this research was conducted between June and August 2022. For the data collection we used conflict monitors (a person contracted on the ground to assist in data collection, conflict situation updates, and mobilization of FGDs and KIIs participants) in each of the 4 countries. These conflict monitors were informed on conflict scenarios in each country and could therefore select and mobilize our target respondents. In addition to questionnaires, we also collected in depth data on conflict in Ethiopia and South Sudan through Focus Discussion Groups (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). In the 2 countries (Ethiopia and South Sudan) we conducted at least one FGD and a minimum of six KIIs with our target respondents.

### Limitations of the Research

The CMT in 2022, encountered a least two limitations. The first, one has been a limitation since the onset of the research on 2019, which is the question of how many indicators could be included per conflict level, and how to ensure that the indicators included were representative of a specific conflict level. These challenges were addressed in this year study by adding more indicators that cut across the four countries and are within the scope



of the study. From the literature reviewed, indicators selected were those considered to be representative of conflict level, and also were deemed to be universal across the four countries to ensure reliability of the questionnaire.

In Kenya, data was collected from 22 counties to represent the country. Data analysis was done for Nairobi, Kilifi, Kisumu, Nakuru and Turkana counties because the regions were considered prone to conflict and were deemed to be the hotspot for conflicts and cattle rustling in the country. Moreover, the regions registered the highest number of response rate compared to other regions.

## **DATA ANALYSIS**

## Application of Conflict Monitoring Tool and Data Analysis

Below is a summary of the data analysis procedure and report for the four countries. Data analysis for Kenya was undertaken as per regions within the country, while the data analysis for DRC, Ethiopia and South Sudan was analyzed as a country. For DRC data collection only took place in the Eastern part of the country where the conflict is more concentrated.

Data analysis was conducted using both qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods. Content analysis was applied for open-ended questions while statistical descriptive analysis was applied to close-ended questions. Below is the specific procedure for analyzing the level of conflict.

### *Step 1: Identification of Indicators of Conflict*

Fifty-five (55) indicators were used to calculate the statistical rating of the severity of the conflicts. Each level had a unique group of indicators. A full list of the indicators under each of the six levels of conflict is listed in the Appendix section.

### *Step 2: Rating Participants' Responses*

The indicators were presented to the participants of the study who rated them using a four-point Likert scale. The Likert scale measured whether these indicators were observed and if so, the frequency of their occurrence. In this case, the ratings of the scale were 'Not observed', 'Rarely Observed', 'Sometimes Observed', and 'Consistently Observed'.

### *Step 3: Summarizing Participants' Responses*

The primary data from each country were summarized using frequencies for each indicator under the four choices of the Likert scale. The more such indicators for category one [levels zero (0), negative two (-2), and a negative one (-1)] are observed, the higher the chances that the region or country is either enjoying relative peace or moving towards the realization of peace. On the contrary, the more consistent indicators for category two [levels one (1), two (2), and three (3)] are observed, the higher the chance that the conflict situation is escalating.

### *Step 4: Weighting the Responses*

Weights were introduced for the four categories of the Likert Scale because a 'Not observed' case of an indicator contributes differently in determining the conflict level compared to another case of 'Consistently observed' response of the same indicator. However, the weighting for the responses for indicators levels zero (0), negative two (-2),

and a negative one (-1) and those for levels one (1), two (2), and three (3) were rated in reverse order. This was meant to maintain consistency in calculating the conflict levels. In other words, the weighting of the ‘**Not observed**’ indicators in category one was meant to mirror the ‘**Consistently observed**’ category two indicators and vice versa.

Example:

The first indicator in conflict Level zero ( $L_0I_1$ ) states:

**[ $L_1I_1$ ]:** There is increase of access of light weapons by ordinary citizens  
(The consistent observation of this indicator means that the conflict situation is escalating.)

The first indicator in conflict Level one ( $L_1I_1$ ) states:

**[ $L_0I_1$ ]:** There is reduced number of conflicts resolved through community elders/court system  
(The consistent observation of this indicator means that the country is experiencing peace.)

In this example, a ‘**Consistently Observed**’ response for  $L_0I_1$  implies a ‘**Not Observed**’ response for  $L_1I_1$ . Theory indicates that it is less likely that a reduced number of conflicts resolved envisioned in  $L_0I_1$  will be accompanied by consistently observed increase of access of light weapons by ordinary citizens as stated in  $L_1I_1$ . Therefore, the weighting of the responses for the two categories of indicators was based on the following interpretations.

- (i) An increase in the frequency in which category one indicators are observed means that the conflict is de-escalating and vice versa.
- (ii) An increase in the frequency in which category two indicators are observed means that the conflict is escalating and vice versa.

Table 4 below shows the weights that were assigned for the responses for each conflict level.

**Table 4: Weighting of Participants’ Responses**

Level	N o t observed	R a r e l y observed	S o m e t i m e s observed	C o n s i s t e n t l y observed
-------	-------------------	-------------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------------------------

Level 0	3	2	1	0.01
Level 1	0.01	1	2	3
Level 2	0.01	1	2	3
Level 3	0.01	1	2	3
Level -2	3	2	1	0.01
Level -1	3	2	1	0.01

(Source: CRTP Research)

Table 5 presents a summary of country-weighted means per each of the 55 indicators. In this case, the interpretation is that a greater weighted mean depicts a case of a higher conflict level. To build lasting peace, actors should seek to ensure that these weighted means are as close to zero as possible. In this case, zero is the ideal weighted mean where the region or country enjoys absolute peace. For example, all indicators in level zero, negative two, and negative one should be consistently observed for the region to have absolute peace. On the contrary, none of the indicators in levels one, two, and three of the CMT should be observed in an ideal situation of absolute peace. Since the utopian situation of absolute peace cannot be practically achieved, the levels of conflict under the CMT are expected to oscillate between negative two and positive three.

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Conflict level	Indicator	S. SUDAN	DRC	KENYA	ETHIOPIA
Level 0	There is reduced number of conflicts resolved through community elders/ court system	1.60	1.36	1.22	1.98
	There is increased inter-ethnic peaceful coexistence and marriage	1.61	0.90	1.15	1.85
	There is reduced revenge killings and crime activities (e.g. cattle raiding and theft)	1.80	1.04	1.70	1.91
	There is an observed increase in youth and women employment	1.84	1.76	1.87	2.28
	There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to prevail without interruption	2.29	1.81	1.43	2.33
	There is perceived equitable resource distribution and services by the government	2.56	2.06	1.81	2.53
	There is perceived low level of corruption	2.62	2.00	2.25	2.48
	<b>Level total</b>	<b>2.05</b>	<b>1.56</b>	<b>1.63</b>	<b>2.20</b>

Level 1	There is increase of access of light weapons by ordinary citizens	2.48	1.62	1.35	1.68
	There is increase in political based hate speeches	2.53	1.75	2.03	2.48
	There is rise in the level of criminal activities/gang groups e.g. cattle raiding	2.61	1.90	1.97	2.23
	There are cases of ethnic discrimination by government authorities	2.20	1.92	1.66	2.13
	Poor governance (regional and national)	2.41	2.28	1.98	2.38
	Lack of gender inclusion and social groups (women, youth, labour/workers association) in conflict management process	2.35	2.03	1.94	2.22
	Disappearance of men and young people in the community	1.74	1.89	1.44	1.83
	Unresolved historical grievances and failure of peace agreements	2.30	1.91	1.91	2.31
	There is an increased complaints of economic hardships e.g. High cost of living	2.67	2.08	2.56	2.34
		<b>Level total</b>	<b>2.37</b>	<b>1.93</b>	<b>1.87</b>

Level 2	There are occasional low key armed conflict in the country (between different armed groups/government forces, etc.)	1.65	2.03	1.40	2.10
	There is frequent acquisition of small arms and light weapons by residences.	2.38	1.72	1.27	1.87
	There are reported cases of police brutality in the process of enforcement of COVID 19 protocols	1.56	2.00	1.99	2.34
	There are community demonstrations/riots against insecurity in the country	1.468	2.17	1.81	1.24
	There is an increased movement of people displaced by conflict	2.551	2.22	1.50	2.27
	There were observed cases of criminal activities (theft and robbery) due to COVID 19 stress on economic situation of the citizens	1.83	1.70	2.02	2.26
	There is an increased political incitement /negative propaganda that tend to generate violence	2.32	1.86	2.00	2.24
	There is existence of inter-ethnic/clan mobilization or groupings for violence	2.51	1.83	1.69	2.65
	There are cases of people being pushed out of their homes for political reasons (e.g. 'ethnic cleansing')	2.21	1.78	1.22	2.28
	There is increased reports on violation of human rights e.g. armed robbery, gender and sexual based violence, police brutality	2.72	2.23	1.94	2.466
	There is disruption of economic activities due to conflicts/violence (such as trading, food supply, market activities etc.)	2.38	2.09	1.76	2.37
<b>Level total</b>	<b>2.14</b>	<b>1.97</b>	<b>1.69</b>	<b>1.66</b>	



## HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) Report 2023

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	There is disruption of economic activities due to conflicts/violence (such as trading, food supply, market activities etc.)	2.38	2.09	1.76	2.37
<b>Level total</b>	<b>2.14</b>	<b>1.97</b>	<b>1.69</b>	<b>1.66</b>	

Level 3	There is increased deployment of government armed security officers on the ground	1.79	2.00	1.49	2.12
	There are increased cases of armed conflicts in certain section of the country	2.46	2.29	1.86	2.20
	There is rise in violence and killing of innocent citizens	2.63	2.36	1.87	2.27
	There is increased inter-communal conflict (ethnic, religious or political)	2.23	2.13	1.79	1.79
	There is media information blackout	2.15	1.75	1.14	2.12
	There is displacement of communities and refugees influx into neighboring communities	2.51	1.56	1.18	1.85
	There is inter-border movement restriction in conflict affected areas	1.85	1.88	1.12	0.99
	There is presence of international peace keeping bodies such as UN, AU & EU in the affected regions	2.17	1.69	1.03	1.87
<b>Level Total</b>		<b>2.23</b>	<b>1.96</b>	<b>1.44</b>	<b>1.54</b>

Conflict level	Indicator	S. SUDAN	DRC	KENYA	ETHIOPIA
Level 0	There is reduced number of conflicts resolved through community elders/ court system	1.60	1.36	1.22	1.98
	There is increased inter-ethnic peaceful coexistence and marriage	1.61	0.90	1.15	1.85
	There is reduced revenge killings and crime activities (e.g. cattle raiding and theft)	1.80	1.04	1.70	1.91
	There is an observed increase in youth and women employment	1.84	1.76	1.87	2.28
	There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to prevail without interruption	2.29	1.81	1.43	2.33
	There is perceived equitable resource distribution and services by the government	2.56	2.06	1.81	2.53
	There is perceived low level of corruption	2.62	2.00	2.25	2.48
<b>Level total</b>		<b>2.05</b>	<b>1.56</b>	<b>1.63</b>	<b>2.20</b>

<b>Level -1</b>	There is evidenced full resumption of daily activities by the residence	1.82	0.88	1.12	1.65
	The parties to the conflict have agreed to demobilize their forces	1.43	0.85	1.70	2.72
	There is a wider inclusion in the peace-building process/activities (includes women, youth, different ethnic groups, religious group)	1.35	0.94		
	There is reduced tension and fear between different ethnic/religious/armed groups	1.69	1.15	1.20	2.14
	The refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are returning to their homes	1.83	0.93	1.85	2.20
	There is an improved security in the region with more police posts and security camps established	1.96	1.12	1.19	1.83
	There is reduced number of COVID-19 reported cases	1.20	0.84	1.16	1.23
	There is improved economic situation for citizens (resumption of economic activities, opening of markets/shops)	1.54	1.04	1.55	2.04
	The causes of conflict are currently being addressed	1.97	0.94	1.35	2.31
	Government justice processes have been initiated to address conflict crime	1.55	1.21	1.50	1.83
	<b>Level Total</b>	<b>1.63</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>1.38</b>	<b>2.03</b>
	<b>CONFLICT LEVELS</b>	<b>2.78</b>	<b>2.41</b>	<b>2.31</b>	<b>3.02</b>

<b>Level -2</b>	There are increased conflict intervention activities to end the conflict (mediation, negotiation, peace talks, sanctions)	0.95	0.75	1.22	1.98
	There is evidence of reduced conflict in the country due to conflict resolution efforts	1.20	1.00	1.21	2.02
	The active participants of the conflict have agreed to have peace talks	0.28	0.59	1.42	1.28
	People are seen as slowly taking on normal daily activities	1.12	0.97	1.06	1.70
	Reconciliation and peace building programs have been initiated	1.08	0.7	0.98	1.70
	There is ceasefire (the parties from both sides have agreed to suspend their aggressive actions)	0.83	0.84	1.55	2.70
	The protagonist have agreed to sign a peace agreement	0.53	0.73	1.81	1.97
	The key actors in the conflict are involved in the peace-building process	0.46	0.78	1.55	2.34
	The citizens holding arms illegally are surrendering their arms to the government in a demilitarization program	1.54	0.9	1.76	2.26
	There is presence of international peace keeping bodies such as UN, AU & EU in the affected regions	0.58	1.49	1.82	1.95
<b>Level Total</b>	<b>0.86</b>	<b>0.86</b>	<b>1.44</b>	<b>1.66</b>	

**Table 5: Conflict Level Constants in DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan**

*Step 5: Introduction of Constants*

Constants were then introduced in each conflict level. The aim of introducing the constant was to uniquely identify the conflict levels on a scale between negative two (-2) and

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positive three (+3) as earlier stated. The constants for levels 0, 1, 2, 3, -2, and -1 were 0, 1, 2, 3, -2, and -1 respectively. In other words, all the values in the data summary were multiplied by constants respective to their conflict level. Also, the total frequencies were also multiplied by the constants.

#### *Step 6: computation of the Conflict Level*

From the results from step 5, the level of conflict was calculated using the following formula.

$$Cl = \frac{\sum c_{ij}[(f_{ij})w_{ij}]}{\sum(c_{ij}f_{ij})}$$

Where

Cl = the conflict level

$c_{ij}$  = the constant of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  row in the  $j^{\text{th}}$  column

$f_{ij}$  = the frequency for the  $i^{\text{th}}$  row under the  $j^{\text{th}}$  column

$w_{ij}$  = the weighting for the  $i^{\text{th}}$  row under the  $j^{\text{th}}$  column

$i$  = the indicator number listed from level 0 to level -1 and appearing as rows.

$j$  = Likert scale options that are listed in four columns as 'Not observed', 'Rarely observed', 'Sometimes observed', and 'Consistently observed.'

(Source: HIPSIR Research)


The findings of the HIPSIR CMT (2022) are in the following section.

## **DATA ANALYSIS REPORTS**



**SOUTH SUDAN**

South Sudan have been experiencing conflict dated back to December 2013 and later escalated in July 2016. As a result of long periods of conflict, the country has lagged in development and consequently this has led to a severe humanitarian crisis in the country. While the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan in 2018 brought an end to the widespread violent conflict in the country, the peace has not been restored fully due to failure in implementing the peace agreement as well as inter-communal conflicts. The figure below shows the map of South Sudan.



Source: Creative Commons

**Data Collection**

Data collection was done in Juba, South Sudan from 1<sup>st</sup> to 30<sup>th</sup> June, 2022. A total of 120 questionnaires were administered physically by the conflict monitor to the respondents. A response rate of 100% was recorded since all the 120 distributed questionnaires were all collected. In addition, to get in-depth information on the study subject, one Focus Group Discussion (12 participants) and Key Informant Interview (6 participants) were done.

**Respondents' Profile**



## **Age, Gender, Profession, Years of experience**

The age of the respondents determines the quality of information given in terms of its vastness in the depth of knowledge on the subject matter under investigation. Out of the total number of respondents interviewed, majority (44%) were in the age bracket of 36-50 years followed by age bracket of 27-35 years representing 37%. This shows that both youths as well as elders participated in the survey to share their experience with the on-going conflict in the country.

Moreover, the survey results showed that majority of the respondent were male (69%) compared to female (31%). This can be attributed to the reason that in South Sudan men actively participate in war and have more information on the on-going conflict.

Further analysis, indicates that majority (38 of the respondents) were private business owners, followed by journalists (22 respondents) and 20 respondents were peace practitioners. Other professionals that took part in the survey were teachers, security officers and local administrators like chiefs and clan elders. This shows that the respondents interviewed represented a diverse group with different experience of conflict scenarios in the country. Similarly, during the research findings validation workshop, one of the participants argued that because conflict disrupts the normal daily business operations, they concur with the study results that majority of those participated in the survey were private business owners. He stated that:

Yes I agreed with the research findings because you find that the first sector to be affected by the conflict most is the business sector. For instance in 2016 when the South Sudan conflict was intense, many private businesses were vandalized, looted and many properties destroyed leading to shutting down of many shops.

In analyzing respondents' years of experience 40% had 3-4 years of experience while 38% of the respondents had above 5 years of work experience within South Sudan. Cumulatively, 78% of the total respondents interviewed had 3 years and above of experience in their profession. This confirms that with experience in various field, the respondents can effectively comment on how the past and on-going conflict have affected them

## **Types of conflict and Human rights violations in Juba South Sudan**


The survey revealed that 98% of the total respondents interviewed were aware of the on-going conflict in South Sudan. Results in Figure 10 shows that the highly prevalent type

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of conflicts and human rights violation in South Sudan are cattle rustling (74%), domestic violence (68%), armed robbery and Theft (66%), illegal settlement, IDPs (63%), gender and sexual violence (57%), political violence (53%) and border violence (52%). During the validation meeting fighting over resources such as grazing field and water points and stealing of cows were mentioned as the main causes of cattle rustling in South Sudan. One of the participant said that

You know here in South Sudan, we value cows so much because we use cows for marrying, and you can't marry someone's daughter if you don't have a good number of cattle. Moreover, most of the communal conflict in South Sudan are caused by cattle rustling and I can say that the percentage of cattle rustling should have been even more than 90%

Despite South Sudan political leaders signing the RA-RCSS in 2018, to bring to an end the conflict that had raged since 2013, conflict in South Sudan still exists, with majority of the FGD participants having similar opinion that the agreement is a short-term solution that has not addressed the deep-seated roots of the conflict.



**Figure 10: Conflict and Human Rights Violations**

Source: CRTP Research

Based on the FGD, one of the participants reported that the trends in conflict indicator were caused by lack of freedom of movement to some parts of the country, lack of inclusivity among the communities, as well as tensions among communities due to resource competition. Another youth participant affirmed that: *'Yes the conflict can be*

*solved if democracy is practiced during election, and the ruling of South Sudan is based on constitutionalism and rule of law through these I can assure you that the country will be at peace*'. He further suggested that the government can solve the on-going conflict through strict adherence to the rule of law, service delivery to the citizens that is the government should merge its interest with the interest of the people. The government need also to be transparent and accountable as well as proper enforcement of laws through the judiciary.

Furthermore, one of the participants in the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) from a peace movement organization confirmed that South Sudan have been experiencing conflicts ranging from political, inter-communal, cattle rustling and revenge killings to sexual and gender-based violence. The revenge killings are much evidenced in Central Equatorial, Jonglei, Unity States and Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap States. Another participant interviewee representing media categorically stated that:

The conflict I have witnessed in the recent past is cattle rustling in Bar el Gazarl region, Unity state, between the Bor and Nuer. Minor cases such as road ambush and isolated cases of rape have been reported. These conflicts have resulted into spirit of hatred among the communities, increase in tribalism, gender based violence, displacement of people and food insecurity.

In addition, a youth representative interviewee further stated that:

Conflict incidences that have been witnessed in the last 6 months in South Sudan is the inter-community conflict due to political landscape at the national level. This is because of the power wrangling issues between the communities mainly the Dinka and Nuer. Cattle rustling have also been reported in Equatoria State between the farmers in the region and pastoralist from neighboring states.

The incidences of conflicts monitored are political and social conflicts which are dated back from 2013-2016, the social conflicts such as are gender based conflicts as well as social exclusion in resource allocation which is much evidenced in Upper Nile state, equatorial state and Bar el Gazel States. Further, the youth interviewee stated that:

Although the conflict has been for the past nine years, I can say that, the political conflict has been declining since the key actors (Kiir and Machar) is under one umbrella. This is after signing peace unity agreement. Yah, they have started agreeing on some issues pertaining to the country peace restoration. However, despite the fact that political conflict is declining, inter-communal conflict have been reported to be on rise.

Based on these findings, it is evidenced that inter-ethnic violence, cattle rustling, increased complaints of economic hardships, gender and sexual based violence as well as domestic violence are increasing in South Sudan which is currently experiencing

confrontational level of conflict. According to Human Rights Council report February-April, 2022, conflict related to sexual violence against woman and girls in South Sudan is wide-spreading and systematically increasing due to lack of accountability for sexual and gender-based violence. Moreover, lack of progress by South Sudan’s government in implementing key aspects of the 2018-Revitalized Peace Agreement is also one of the factors fueling conflict-related to sexual violence.<sup>327</sup> Therefore, if no intervening mechanisms are undertaken, then the situation could possibly worsen and escalate to open conflict.

### Conflict Actors in Juba, South Sudan

In identifying the actors of the conflict, 83% of the respondents rated political leaders as the most prominent conflict actor followed by armed militia groups (59%), neighboring and international states (47%) as indicate in Table 6. During the FGDs, most of the participant agreed that the key actors to the conflicts are followers of politicians, politicians themselves, and the youth.

**Table 6: Actors responsible for conflict in South Sudan**

Actors	Most Responsible	Moderately Responsible	Less Responsible	Not Responsible	Unsure
Political leaders	83%	17%	0%	0%	0%
Government	34%	59%	4%	3%	0%
security forces					
Armed militia groups	59%	6%	33%	2%	0%
Religious leaders	3%	9%	12%	72%	4%
Community Leaders	8%	15%	41%	15%	21%
Social groups	11%	12%	5%	47%	23%
Neighboring and international states	47%	13%	24%	16%	0%
Multinational corporation	8%	4%	15%	70%	3%

Source: CRTP Research

Politics of identity was also mentioned as a major cause of conflict in South Sudan, this because *‘if you are from a certain community, you not are supposed to be given any political post in the government. This brings hatred among the communities resulting into inter-communal conflicts.* Some of the respondents shared same sentiments that armed groups/political militia groups are the most responsible actors of conflict in South Sudan

327 Human Rights Council Report (2022): Conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls in South Sudan: [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A\\_HRC\\_49\\_CRP\\_4.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A_HRC_49_CRP_4.pdf)

pointing to the availability and ease of access of small arms and light weapons, which have been used especially in cattle rustling. Same sentiments were echoed during the validation workshop where one of participants confirmed that political leaders and armed militia groups are the key actors of conflict in the region. *‘I agreed with the study findings because you find that these people (political leaders) are the ones giving out illicit guns.*

Another participant of FGD held in Juba concurred, stating that:

The inter-communal conflicts are mainly fueled by proliferation and ease of access to firearms by the local citizens. These fire arms were given out by some politicians who want to retain power for a longer period, and the soldiers who sell fire arms to local citizens due to low government salaries. Here in South Sudan almost all people have access to fire arms or have it in their homes. Therefore, to boost security of the citizens, he suggested that the government should disarm all the civilians in possession of illegal fire arms. Further, there is need to deploy soldiers at the country borders to prevent proliferation of arms.

Moreover, one of the key informants (political scientist) interviewed shared similar thoughts that:

The key actors to the on-going conflict in South Sudan are politicians who are in power as well as those who are not in power but use the local community to either retain or gain it. Youths are also the key players since they are mainly used as conflict tool to protect power e.g. the white army. He further argued that the conflict in South Sudan can be solved only if the key political principals (Kiir and Riek) can give room for other leader to rule/lead South Sudan. However, the conflict cannot be solved if the status quo between the two prevails. This is because members of the ruling parties, ethnic groups Dinka and Nuer, youths and women in politics are active players in the on-going conflicts in South Sudan.


## Drivers of conflict in South Sudan

The study further evaluated the key drivers of conflict in South Sudan. The findings indicated that the most prominent drivers of conflict in South Sudan were undressed historical grievances and revenge killing (91%), proliferation of small arms and light weapons (82%), failure of peace agreements (77%), high levels of youth unemployment rated at 75%, and competition over natural resources (75%) as indicated in Figure 11. Moreover, according to Conflict Research Programme (CRP) report by McCrone, gubernatorial conflict (i.e allocation of certain states to the military parties and how governors are appointed) has also triggered conflict in South Sudan<sup>328</sup>.

328 McCrone, F. (2021). The war (s) in South Sudan: local dimensions of conflict, governance and the political marketplace. [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/108888/1/McCrone\\_the\\_wars\\_in\\_South\\_Sudan\\_published.pdf](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/108888/1/McCrone_the_wars_in_South_Sudan_published.pdf)

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The Human Rights Council report of February-April, 2022 further indicated that conflict related to sexual violence against woman and girls in South Sudan is wide-spreading and systematically increasing due to lack of accountability for sexual and gender-based violence. Moreover, lack of progress by South Sudan's government in implementing key aspects of the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement is also one of the factors fueling conflict-related sexual violence.<sup>329</sup> Other prominent drivers mentioned by the participants of the FGD were adultery, leadership wrangling, tribal discrimination, corruption, child abduction and raping.



**Figure 11: Conflict drivers in South Sudan**

Source: CRTP Research

The Focus Group Discussions held in Juba further revealed that revenge killings, cattle raiding, delayed elections, lack of inclusion of people at the community level in the peace mediation process, resource competition, economic hardships, and poverty as well as hate speeches as key drivers of conflict in South Sudan. One of the FGDs participant explained that, *‘For instance, most of the peace forums and conferences are held in the city, and people from the village are not invited but they are most affected people with*

329 Human Rights Council Report (2022) : [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A\\_HRC\\_49\\_CRP\\_4.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/A_HRC_49_CRP_4.pdf)

*conflict.* Further the inter-communal conflicts were mainly fueled by proliferation and ease of access to firearms by the local citizens. These fire arms were given out by some politicians who want to retain power for so long, and the soldiers who sell fire arms to local citizens due to low salaries they receive from the government.

A youth participant in the FGD meeting further echoed that,

Here in South Sudan almost all people have access to fire arms or have it in their homes. Therefore, to boost security of the citizens, the government should disarm all the civilians in possession of illegal fire arms. Again there is need to deploy soldiers at the country borders to prevent proliferation of the arms to the country.

One of the Key informant interviewee emphasized the main conflict drivers in South Sudan are competition over the resources due to high poverty level, misuse of power by political leaders to grab public resources- *‘these political leaders once they acquire the power, their main motive is to acquire wealth, you found that they start turning the public in their names’*. Additionally, unemployment among youths was also mentioned by the participant as another conflict driver in South Sudan –*‘youths lack skills needed in the job market due to lack of access to technical and vocational trainings, we don’t have technical and vocational training here in South Sudan as you people have in Kenya’*.

One of the FGD participants further mentioned that

Lack of identity in South Sudan; unequal distribution of resources among the people, historical injustices, distribution of political position and meritocracy (using merit as source of recruitment) will ignite new conflict or escalate the ongoing conflicts in South Sudan if not well addressed. Again, I can say that possibly the next war in South Sudan in the near future will be between elites and unlearned as well as the poor against the rich.

Further, delayed elections were also reported to be one of the factors triggers conflict in South Sudan and which if not addressed will ignite another conflict in South Sudan. One of the FGD participants stressed that *‘In my opinion, early election hopefully next year (2023) would reduce tension among the citizens’*. This implies that to reduce the political tension in South Sudan, the government should prepare the country for election.

### **Countries that have joined South Sudan in the on-going conflict**


The survey revealed that USA, Kenya, Uganda, UK, Ethiopia, Sudan were the main foreign countries that have joined South Sudan in the on-going conflict. For instance countries like Sudan and Uganda have joined through sponsoring rebel groups and in offering home to our refugees respectively, while Kenya and Ethiopia have joined through engagement in peace talks. Moreover, USA and UK have offered humanitarian



support to the country during the period of war. One of the key informant interviewees (a former Member of Parliament in charge of East Africa Community) confirmed that: *‘East African Community countries such as Uganda, Kenya and Sudan were reported to have played key role in South Sudan peace process. For instance, Uganda has been home to our IDPs while Kenya has been involve in peace talks to ensure our country at peace’*

### Peace Actors’ Stakeholder group in South Sudan

Results in Figure 12 revealed that out of the total number of respondents interviewed, majority (37 respondents) represented community member followed by youth group (34 respondents) and women group (22 respondents). This shows that community members, youths and women are playing vital role in the peace-building process. However, the contribution of women, youths and men at the grass root levels in peace talks, and in signing of peace agreements has been ignored in South Sudan. Based on the Focus Group Discussion held in Juba, one of the female participant confirmed that although female gender is represented in peace forums, their voices are not heard when it comes to decision making and peace mediation process. She further echoed that: *‘most of the time when we are in the meeting, these men are not willing to gives us opportunity to contribute. Even if you are given the opportunity to talk, your points and contributions are not taken seriously and are not even implemented’*.




**Figure 12: Peace Actors’ Stakeholder group**

**Source: CRTP Research**

### Effectiveness of institutions in conflict resolution

Institutions/organizations play key roles in peace advocacy and conflict management. Results in Figure 13 show that religious organizations (70%) were rated by the respondents

as very effective in conflict resolution followed by government (court system) at 47%. Moreover, traditional peace committee (52%) and women groups (54%) were also found to be effective in conflict resolution as mentioned by respondents which participated in this research. This shows that faith-based organizations should be properly funded by the governments, donors, and international NGOs to help them achieve their goal of improving peace stability across different counties.



**Figure 13: Effectiveness of institutions on conflict resolution**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

Moreover, there is need to support training of women groups and traditional peace committee on the peace-building and conflict management process. However, youth organization was rated not be effective in peace-building process. This could be attributed to reasons such as youth are faced with limited opportunities to effectively contribute to the economic development and political stability of the country.

Similarly, a study in South Sudan found the non-political networks such as the Youth Organizations Coalition (YOC), South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SSCSF), National Youth Union (NYU), higher learning institutions and Churches provides platforms for the youth to advance their voices as well as technical support for the youth to gain access to the peace-building process<sup>330</sup>. For instance, some international NGOs such as Search

330 Edmond J. Pamba, E. J. (2022). The 2022 Conflict Flashpoints to Watch in the Horn of Africa, <https://hornsinstitute.org/the-2022-conflict-flashpoints-to-watch-in-the-horn-of-africa/>

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for Common Grounds (SFCG), Oxfam and Norwegian People Aid (NPA) have created spaces for youth participation through provision of training and access to information as well as funding youth groups to build capacity for effective engagement in the peace-building processes.

The views of the participants raised during FGDs showed that the Non-Governmental Organization such as World Vision, Food Agriculture Organization (FAO) were reported to play key role in peace restoration and humanitarian support. Youth organizations such as Young Farmers Association have also been in the front line for peace advocacy. For instance, a youth in the FGD meeting affirmed that:

I know a youth group called ANTABAN that promotes peace through arts and music, they dance and presents music in occasions and concerts that advocates for peaceful coexistence among the citizens. Again, KWERKU peace forum was started as a voluntary peace campaign among cattle keepers purposely to promote cultural dance for peace. There is also South Sudan peace building opportunity fund in Equatorial and Upper Nile states was set aside to promote activities pertaining to peace restoration.

### **Conflict level trends in South Sudan**

The CMT 2022 findings revealed that South Sudan conflict level is 2.78. This shows that the country is at confrontational level. The result showed that the conflict is not escalating compared to conflict level of 2.6 reported by CMT 2021 which placed the country at confrontation level. Although open conflict is not much evidenced, violence between communities has been frequently reported in some regions partly because of differences in political ideologies, disputes and rivalry over resources such as land, livestock and grazing land. This has led to deaths and displacement of thousands of people.

### **Challenges to peace restoration in South Sudan**

The study further evaluated the challenges to achieving peace stability in South Sudan, the results indicate that most of the respondents affirmed that unresolved historical grievances (95%), lack of reformed judicial system (93%), corruption (91%), availability and ease of access to small arms and light weapons (85%), and poor economic development (91%) are main challenges hindering the people of South Sudan from peace stability status. Moreover, political incitement and hate speeches (76%), lack of government policies on peace-building (73%), lack of consensus between peace actors (69%), and fragile government (68%) were also ranked by the participants in this research as very challenging factors to peace restoration. One of the participant during the validation echoed that *'our judicial system need a lot of improvement and transparency, many people who have*

*committed serious crimes are just walking out here freely'*

The participants' opinion during the FGD session held in Juba further revealed that to maintain peace stability in South Sudan, the government should implement the rule of law, strengthen parliamentary system, end corruption, stop nepotism and creation of employment. Another FGD participant elaborated that:

In concurring with the point of nepotism and employment, we have greater challenge in these areas. This is because you find that most of the people holding big positions in government offices are just recruiting their relatives and close friends, or the jobs are given based on your tribe. How I wish and pray that the jobs could be awarded based on qualification, experience, skills, expertise and merit.

Another female participant of the FGDs voiced her concern on gender issues sharing that:

Although women are represented, our voices are not heard when it comes to decision making and peace mediation process. 'Most of the time when we are in the meeting, these men are not willing to give us opportunity to contribute. Even if you are given the opportunity to talk, your points and contributions are not taken seriously and are not even implemented'. This is because we face challenges such as lack of funds to support women organizations, lack of opportunity to participate in decision making process pertaining to peace issues.

Moreover, the in-depth key interview with youth representative further showed that lack of finance and trust to fund peace building programs are some of the challenges affecting conflict management in South Sudan. However, he had the opinion that, *'the government should implement the signed agreement fully, respect rule of law, and deliver services to the citizens through job creation, infrastructural development, provision of clean water and good health services.'*

## **Recommendations on the best strategies to peace stability in South Sudan**

### ***Need for General Election***

There is need to prepare the country for elections to reduce political tensions which has been reported as one of the drivers of conflict in South Sudan.

### ***Economic revival***

The economy of South Sudan has not recovered fully since the country got into war. Poor economic development, has resulted into youth unemployment. Unemployment has been rated as one of the key drivers of conflict along political interests. The country should establish youth enterprise fund to improve youth employment. Therefore, to ensure peace stability, the government should allow private investors to run business in the country to

boost the economy.

### *National disarmament*

To maintain and restore security in the country national disarmament operation need to be done. This includes recovering all firearms and crude weapons owned illegally by the civilians. There is also need to reform the army which would involve recruiting and training of soldiers based on merit and professionalism.

### *Constitution and rule of law*

The government should respect rule of law, and fight corruption. There is a need to strengthen law and order in the country to manage the conflict. To achieve this, all laws should be enforced equally not favoring some people. There is also need for improving judicial system of the country.

### *Peace Initiatives*

Respondents highlighted several aspects of peace initiatives that would help address the conflict in South Sudan. Most of the respondents underscored the need for a national dialogue that begins from the grassroots. Full implementation of the peace agreements was also recommended.


The study further evaluated the impact on Covid-19 on the livelihood of the citizens. This was necessitated by the fact that the pandemic is one of the factors that caused domestic violence and other human rights violations. Therefore the study assessed the severity of the pandemic on the lives of the citizens as well as its impact on the economy.

### **Severity of impact of Covid-19 on livelihoods of the citizens**

Humanitarian Crisis Analysis Report 2022 revealed that intensified sub-national conflict, violence, consecutive years of major flooding, corruption, and the impact of Covid-19 are major challenges facing South Sudan.<sup>331</sup> In evaluating the severity of Covid-19 impact on the living standards of the people, most of the respondents interviewed (41 respondents) rated the impact Covid-19 as moderately severe with 27 respondents rating it as more severe (Figure 14). This shows that although most of the respondent reported that they

<sup>331</sup> Humanitarian Crisis Analysis, 2022: South Sudan Crisis, <https://cdn.sida.se/app/uploads/2020/10/04142048/HCA-South-Sudan-crisis-2022.pdf>

don't believe that covid-19 is real as echoed during the FGDs and KIIs meetings, the severity of it impacts can still be felt by the citizens. One interviewee (political scientist) from the University of Juba said that *'we do not believe COVID-19 is real but we believe it is used as a political tool. However, due to COVID-19 containment measures in 2020-2021 it had severe impact on the economy, productivity of the people as well food security'*




**Figure 14: Severity of Covid-19 impact**

Source: CRTP Research

### Impact of Covid-19 on Security

The containment measures and protocol initiated as a result of outbreak of Covid-19 in 2020 across the globe had profound effect on security and economy. Results in Figure 15 showed that indeed Covid-19 has increased robbery with violence (Strongly agree-64%, Agree-28%), increased incidences of theft and looting (Strongly agree-59%), loss of lives of the security officers (Strongly agree-15%, Agree-66%), and incidences of police brutality and extra-judicial killings (Strongly agree-12%, Agree-53%). Contrary, one of the key informant participant interviewed however reported that due to lockdowns and restriction in movement at night, it has improve security on the other hand, *'I can say that during the lockdown measures covid-19 improves security since movement of people were restricted'*. Another key informant journalist interviewed held contrary opinion that Covid-19 has affected security negatively, *'For instance, the lockdown affected the security from the funding point of view where the UN were not able to fund the security agencies during the Covid-19 period'*.



**Figure 15: Impact of Covid-19 on Security**


Source: CRTP Research

### Impact of Covid-19 on Economy

The study further evaluated the impact of Covid-19 on the economy of South Sudan. Figure 16 results indicated that Covid-19 have highly contributed to decline in country’s GDP (88%), loss of jobs( 37%), reduced household level of income (63%), increased cost of living (74%), reduced business turnover (46%), international trade distortion (74%) and food insecurity (78%). The severe impact of the covid-19 was attributed to the lock down and restrictions measures that affected the movement of people and normal functioning of different institutions/organizations. One of the Focus Group Discussion participants said that:

Here we don’t take Covid-19 seriously like in other countries and you confirm this because when you arrived here in Juba, you saw people are not wearing face mask as you do. But I can say that due to restriction measures that were put in place by the government, it had a greater impact on the economy of South Sudan, more so on imports. Again the private sector investments were also disrupted by the pandemic





**Figure 16: Impact of Covid-19 on Economy**

Source: CRTP Research

## ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia conducted elections on June 21, 2021, the first since 2005. Although some parties (such as the Oromo Liberation Front) boycotted the elections with claims that the elections were biased, the elections were largely conducted peacefully with a majority of the citizens stating that these were the most democratic elections that the country had conducted. However, the elections were overshadowed by ongoing conflict in the Tigray region of the country as well as ethnic violence and the displacements of millions.<sup>332</sup> Conflict in Ethiopia has escalated in the recent past leading to the deaths and the displacement of millions.<sup>333</sup> The figure below shows the map of the study area:

<sup>332</sup> “Ethiopia: Abiy’s Prosperity Party wins landslide election victory,” Al Jazeera, July 10, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/10/ethiopias-ruling-party-wins-national-election-in-landslide> (accessed August 13, 2021).

<sup>333</sup> International Organization for Migration, “Over 1.7 Million People Displaced Due to Conflict Need Urgent Assistance in Northern Ethiopia: IOM,” May 05 2021, [https://www.iom.int/news/over-17-million-people-displaced-due-conflict-need-urgent-assistance-northern-ethiopia-iom#:~:text=Addis%20Ababa%20%E2%80%93%20Over%201.7%20million,Displacement%20Tracking%20Matrix%20\(DTM\)](https://www.iom.int/news/over-17-million-people-displaced-due-conflict-need-urgent-assistance-northern-ethiopia-iom#:~:text=Addis%20Ababa%20%E2%80%93%20Over%201.7%20million,Displacement%20Tracking%20Matrix%20(DTM)) (accessed August, 03, 2021)



Source: Creative commons

### Data Collected

Data was collected in Addis Ababa using both online survey and physical administration of questionnaires. A total of 120 questionnaires were distributed out to the respondents but only 71 questionnaire copies were filled and physically collected while 14 questionnaire copies were filled online totaling to 85 responses. In addition, one Focus Group Discussion (10 participants) and Key Informant Interview (6 participants) were done.

### Respondents' Profile

#### Age, Gender, Year of experience and Profession

Out of the total number of respondents interviewed and those responded to the survey questionnaire online, 42% were above 50 years. This was followed by youth between the ages of 18-26 years representing 34%. This shows that the respondents from Ethiopia were well presented across the age groups with 17% representing the age bracket of 36-50 years.

Further the survey indicates that majority (58%) of the respondents interviewed were male while 42% were female respondents. This shows that although many male responded to the survey, the female gender also actively participated, a clear indication of gender inclusivity. This was further confirmed by 7 female participants out of 10 participants


who attended the Focus Group Discussions.

Moreover, the study revealed that profession-wise, civil society (52%) represented the majority of respondents who participated in the survey while private business owners (27%). This could be attributed to the significant role of civil societies in peace-building process. Moreover, due the adverse effect conflict on business operations, owners of private businesses actively participate in the survey to share their views. Other profession that participated in the survey included youth leaders, community elder, sales and marketing as well as NGOs.

Additionally, 45% of the respondents had over 5 years' experience while 32% had 3-4 years' experience in their profession. This shows that the respondents who participated in the research were adequately experienced and knowledgeable on conflict and security issues in the country thus contributing to the meaningful understanding of conflict situation in Ethiopia.

### **Types of conflict and Human rights violation in Ethiopia**

The survey results showed that 99% of the respondents were aware of the on-going conflict in Ethiopia. Results in Figure 17 shows that the highly prevalent types of conflict and human rights violation in Ethiopia are domestic violence (68%), political violence (59%), gender and sexual violence (56%), illegal settlement, IDPs (53%), and police brutality (50%). One of the KII participants (peace builder) stated that, most of the conflicts are related to power struggle for example the one between the Federal Government and TPLF, ethnicity, economic issues and religious issues. *“In different areas there are a lot of issues for example issues related to ethnicity. In Wollega people have died due to ethnic conflicts”*.



**Figure 17: Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia**

Source: CRTP Research

Moreover, a KII Participant working at the Inter-Religious Council of Ethiopia noted that,

While the situation in Addis may present a picture like everything is going on well, this is not the same case in the rural areas as there have been some conflicts. As the Interreligious Council, we have been receiving reports on the conflicts and tensions that are ongoing in different rural areas. For example just last week we lost many civilians due to ethnic clashes.


Similarly, another key informant interviewee confirmed that: *Conflict has become a dominant trend not only in the last 6 months but also for the last 3 – 4 years more so among the local communities. There has also been massive destruction of property and killing of innocent people’.*

### Conflict Actors in Ethiopia

In assessing the key actors of the conflict in Ethiopia, 75% of the respondents identified political leaders as the most prominent conflict actor followed by armed militia groups (72%) and government security (70%) as indicate in Figure 18. In consistent, participants of the FGD held in Addis Ababa, confirmed that politicians, external or international actors and religious leaders (they had failed carrying out their role of

mediating between the warring parties and has instead taken sides in the conflict) as the key conflict actors.

Government and the guerilla fighters, unemployed youths, armed groups and *Tigray People’s Liberation Forces* were also mentioned as the key conflict actors during the Focus Group Discussion meeting.




**Figure 18: Conflict Actors in Ethiopia**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

**Conflict drivers in Ethiopia**

Political instability in the region, violence between the communities (conflict-induced displacement), drought, seasonal floods (climate-induced drivers) and development projects (planned resettlement and relocation programs) have also resulted in peace instability in Ethiopia<sup>334</sup>. Results on Figure 19 shows that the most prominent drivers of conflict in Ethiopia were high levels of youth unemployment (86%), failure of peace agreements (74%), ethnicized politics (67%) unresolved historical grievances and revenge killing (67%), failure of judicial system (56%), political and economic marginalization (55%).

<sup>334</sup> Tesfaw, T. A. (2022). Internal Displacement in Ethiopia: A Scoping Review of its Causes, Trends and Consequences. *Journal of Internal Displacement*, 12(1), 2-31. <https://www.journalofinternaldisplacement.org/index.php/JID/article/view/114>

main causes of conflict are historical injustices, personal and group interests, conflict over resources, lack of good governance, poverty and high illiterate levels among the citizens.



**Figure 19: Conflict drivers in Ethiopia**

Source: CRTP Research

One of the key informant interviewed (government official) stated that “*There have been some underlying factors such as ethnicity, economic discrepancies in some areas. I can say for sure however that ethnicity and the lack of national dialogue and reconciliation are the main drivers*”. In addition factors highlighted by the respondent that if not well tackled could easily ignite conflict in the future include poverty, ethnicity, and alienation of some social groups from different political systems and the curtailment of the freedom of the media.

Politics and ethnicity were also mentioned during the key informant interview with a business person as the main drivers of conflict coupled with, religion, poverty and lack of good governance. As to how lack of good governance contributes to violence the respondent opined that, “*the Federal Government gives promises which give people hope but when they come to power their promises are never fulfilled*”. On the other hand, the government official interviewed said that, the Prime Minister and other Senior

Government officials are Protestants, “*this has been seen to break the old tradition that Ethiopia is majorly an Orthodox country*”.

According to the National Displacement Report (2021), climate shocks such as drought, floods and locust as well as conflict in Tigray region are the primary causes of displacement of people in Ethiopia. The armed conflict in Tigray regional states to Amhara and Afar regions has resulted into tensions and volatility of humanitarian situation. Ethiopia crisis response plan 2022 shows that due to recent rise in conflict situation in Ethiopia, there is need for conflict resolution.<sup>335</sup> Moreover, one of the main issue that could ignite conflict if not addressed is youth unemployment.

### **Conflict level trends in Ethiopia**

The conflict level of 3.02 (HIPSIR CMT 2022) shows that Ethiopia is in open conflict level of conflict compared to 2.56 conflict level reported by HIPSIR CMT 2021 study which placed the country at the confrontational level. The 2022 findings revealed that within the span of a year the Ethiopian conflict have escalated to crisis level by the time the study was carried out in July to August 2022 just before the signing of the November, 2022 peace agreement. The agreement was signed between the Ethiopian Government and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Pretoria South Africa to end the hostilities.

### **Countries that have joined the on-going conflict in Ethiopia**

The study also asked the respondents to name countries that have joined Ethiopia in on-going conflict, majority of the respondents mentioned USA, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Kenya. Somalia, Sudan and Egypt have joined through sponsoring rebel groups and security reinforcement while USA and Eritrea have joined through security reinforcement (military support). One of the key informant interviewed stated that:

From the eyes of the Government, some of the neighboring countries have been both directly and indirectly contributed to the Ethiopian conflict. Some of these countries as per the Government are Sudan and Egypt. This is because it has been alleged that the two have interests in the instability of the country. However international actors including international organizations such as the United Nations have offered people humanitarian assistance.

In the Focus Group Discussion most of the respondents affirmed that: Kenya, Sudan, Egypt, African Union, United Nations, and World Vision have joined the on-going conflict in Ethiopia. A social worker present in the discussion stated that, “*There are those (regional and international actors i.e. World Vision, AU and UN) that are contributing positively to the conflict through humanitarian support while Kenya have joined for the purposes of*

<sup>335</sup> Ethiopian Crisis Response Plan 2022. [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2022\\_Ethiopia\\_Crisis\\_Response\\_Plan\\_2022.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2022_Ethiopia_Crisis_Response_Plan_2022.pdf)



peace mediation. Another respondent, a youth leader reported that, “The Prime Minister has in one or two occasions though not directly mentioning the names of the countries stated that there are neighboring countries supporting the rebels by supplying them with weapons” . On the other hand, humanitarian organizations have had a positive impact trying to either mediate in the conflict or offer assistance to those affected. As pointed out by one of the KII interviewee (government official), “We have seen organizations such as the UN and World Vision give humanitarian assistance to those affected by conflict in the different regions”.

### Peace Actors’ Stakeholder group in Ethiopia

Results in Figure 20 revealed that out of the total number of respondents interviewed, a majority (23 respondents) represented community members, Non-governmental organizations (18 respondents) and Religious group (22 respondents). This shows that community members, NGOs and religious are in forefront in fighting for peace in Ethiopia. However, the results showed that women and youth groups were the least represented category, implying that there is need to support both the youth and women groups to improve social groups as well as gender inclusion in the peace building and advocacy process.




**Figure 20: Peace Actors’ Stakeholder group**

Source: CRTP Research

processes, one of the Key Informant interviewees, a peace builder expert working with World Vision, stated that, *“there has been some changes compared to the previous years. For instance, progress in the inclusion of other social groups in the peace processes has been witnessed. However, the progress is not that much”*. While women suffer most during conflict situations, they have not been include in peace building process, on the other hand the youths have been either directly or indirectly being involved in the conflict(s). In the words a government official in the Focus Group Discussion sessions held in Addis Ababa affirmed that, *“Their inclusion (women and youths) is very important since in most cases it is the men and to some extent the youth who are the main contributors of violence and conflicts”*.

### **Effectiveness of institutions in conflict resolution /peace restoration**

Figure 21 results indicate that religious organizations are very effective (32%) in peace restoration process followed by traditional peace committee at 21%. Moreover, men organizations (44%), women groups (39%) and youth groups (39%) were rated to be effective in the peace restoration process. This shows that faith-based institutions has been in the forefront in ensuring peace stability. This calls for more funding and support to these institutions to realize their mission of peace restoration. The role of traditional committee in conflict resolution was also echoed during the FGD meeting where women empowerment worker representative affirmed that *“We still have elders who have been able to resolve and avert conflicts thus the current generation needs to borrow from their wisdom.”*



**Figure 21: Effectiveness of institutions on conflict resolution in Ethiopia**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

Furthermore, the inclusion of the different social groups including women, youth and religious leaders are not actually meant for the purpose for which they were formed, as pinpointed by a key informant interviewee. They are included simply to comply with international standards of having these social groups in the processes. In line with this, a peace practitioner interviewed during the key informant interviews affirmed that *“their participation is minimal and in initiatives that are either led or driven by some of these social groups are faced with the challenges such as lack of finances, capacity and the skills necessary in peace building processes”*.

### Challenges to peace restoration in Ethiopia

Although peace actors have been in the forefront in ensuring that peace prevail in conflict inflicted regions, majority of them have been facing different challenges in executing their roles. Results on Table 7 shows the challenges faced by peace actors in fighting for peace stability in Ethiopia. The survey findings revealed that 82% of the respondents perceived corruption, political goodwill (73%), poor economic development (71%), failure of peace agreements (66%), COVID-19 pandemic (62%) and lack of reformed judicial system (60%) as the most challenging factors to conflict management and peace

building in Ethiopia.

Moreover, during the FGDs session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia one of the participants (youth representative) stated that *‘The older generation has set a bad example for the younger generation on how to illegally acquire power’*. On the other hand it was also noted that there has been a passive reaction to conflict resolution due to the cultural setting of the country. As noted by one of the respondent, *“we rarely confront or talk about issues that affect us as a society – we talk behind the curtains.”*

**Table 7: Challenges to peace restoration in Ethiopia**

Peace restoration challenges	Very challenging	Moderately challenging	Not challenging	Not sure
Lack of consensus between peace actors	59%	35%	0%	6%
Lack of reformed judicial system	60%	20%	0%	20%
Evidence of climate change	39%	39%	10%	12%
Weak social agreement between peace Actors	47%	42%	1%	10%
Corruption	82%	17%	1%	0%
Lack of government policies on peace-building	54%	29%	17%	0%
Political incitement and hate speeches	54%	44%	0%	2%
Unresolved historical grievances	57%	31%	7%	5%
Failure of signed peace agreements	66%	32%	2%	0%
Availability and ease of access to small arms and light weapons	45%	30%	24%	1%
Breakdown of peace talks	55%	32%	5%	10%
Political goodwill	73%	9%	12%	0%
Fragile government	59%	28%	2%	11%
Covid-19 pandemic	62%	24%	2%	12%
International interference by external Actors	49%	30%	12%	9%
Poor economic development	71%	26%	3%	0%

Source: CRTP Research

Other challenges stressed on by different participants in the FGD meeting are: strict government policies on conflict resolution matters, use of traditional dispute resolution methods as oppose to modern ways of resolving conflict and lack of moral values in

children from their early stages of development.

Another key informant mentioned that some of the challenges that have prevented the conflict from being resolved in the country include: lack of commitment from actors and collaborators, external forces, interference and lack of livelihood opportunities for the youth. Furthermore, the unwillingness by the Government to engage the leaders of TPLF, biasness among the religious leaders and failure to address the root causes of the conflicts were also affirmed by a key informant as the main challenges to peace restoration in Ethiopia.

### **Social-ethnic exclusion as a challenge to conflict resolution**

In assessing the effect of the socio-ethnic exclusion in peace restoration process, most of the responses from respondents confirmed that it causes conflict, marginalization, socio economic imbalances, unfair resource settlement, anger and resentment, political unrest, gender and race inequality. Being a multi – ethnic country, the perception of the exclusion of some of ethnicities is likely to result to the continuance of the inter-tribal conflicts in different region. A key informant who is a worker at the peace building department of World vision stated, “*Ethnic and social minorities are treated as second class citizens thus likely to further conflicts*”. He further alluded to the fact that, “*during violence or conflicts, the excluded ethnic and social groups become easy targets and in some cases they participate in the conflicts so as to defend themselves*”.

In the Focus Group Discussion held in Addis Ababa, most of the respondents had similar sentiment that the social groups in the society had been excluded from peace restoration process. For example, as per one of the respondent who works under women empowerment umbrella said that, “*Women are mostly disregarded in these processes yet they are the fabric of the society*”. In scenarios where some of the social groups are engaged or involved, a youth leader echoed that “*We lack meaningful engagement/ representation of the different social groups hence curtailing their concerns in the peace building processes*”.

In consistent with the CMT study findings, political instability, violence between the communities (conflict-induced displacement), drought, seasonal floods (climate-induced drivers) and development projects (planned resettlement and relocation programs) have also remained major challenges to peace stability in Ethiopia<sup>336</sup>. In addition, high influx of Eritrea refugees into Tigray further poses a challenge to the on-going conflict due to

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336 Tesfaw, T. A. (2022). Internal Displacement in Ethiopia: A Scoping Review of its Causes, Trends and Consequences. *Journal of Internal Displacement*, 12(1), 2-31. <https://www.journalofinternaldisplacement.org/index.php/JID/article/view/114>

fighting over limited basic needs such as food supplied by the World Food Program in Tigray.<sup>337</sup>

## **Strategies recommended for peace stability/ Conflict resolution in Ethiopia**

Based on the focus group discussions held in Addis Ababa, participant recommended several peace restoration strategies that need to be implemented to address the on-going conflict.

### **Media Information flow control**

Information delivery mode can either escalate or de-escalate the conflict. Media can play role in peacebuilding through peace advocacy as well as awareness creation. However, how the information is delivered and processed by the public can cause conflict or peace. One of the participant in FGD meeting stated that, *“There is need to control some media which propagate corruptive narrative which end up fueling conflicts in the country. Moreover, there is also a need to control the wrong media narrative that has persisted for a while and activists that incite conflicts should be brought to justice and charged.”*

### **Introduce Peace education in schools**

There is need to include peace education in the school curriculum to train the children morals and ethics of peace in the early stages of their lives.

One of the FGD participant (teacher) stated that:

Whereas we cannot regulate morality and ethics, there is need to incorporate ethics and morality in the school curriculum. This will go a long ensuring that the children are able to amicably resolve issues either as children and when they grow up.

### **Involvement of community leaders and all stakeholder in peacebuilding process**

Community and stakeholder involvement in conflict resolution processes is highly recommended. This will aid in strengthening of the country’s social values and negotiation from the grass root level. There was need also to engage the Federal Government and the TPLF in peacebuilding process of the country.

### **National dialogue**

An inclusive national dialogue that could go down to grassroots level to include the youth, children, vulnerable groups, elderly, political actors and NGOs should be given a

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337 UNHCR –Ethiopia Emergence Situation; Regional Update #29. 28 February, 2022. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91213>

second thought. This will result into a call for a ceasefire by all the parties involved in the conflicts, as well as having honest and real political discussion. The dialogue on how to conduct a peaceful and democratic elections was also recommended.

Moreover, use of traditional peace resolution mechanisms, constitution amendment, cease fire, revision of the federal government system, and adherence to the rule of law were also the best strategies recommended to resolve the on-going conflict in Ethiopia.

The study also assessed the Covid-19 and its effect on economy and security because the pandemic was also a conflict many countries fight across the globe and it disrupted all the spheres of human life.


### **Severity of effect of Covid-19 on the cost of living**

In evaluating the severity of Covid-19 impact on the living standards of the people in Ethiopia, majority (56 respondents) rated the impact Covid-19 as more severe with 19 respondents rating it as moderately severe. This indicates that indeed Covid-19 has indeed had a negative impact on the life of the people.

### **Impact of Covid-19 on security**

Results in Figure 22 shows that most of the respondent confirmed that Covid-19 has increased robbery with violence (Strongly agree-64%, Agree-28%), increased incidences of theft and looting (Strongly agree-39%, Agree-50%), loss of lives of the security officers (Strongly agree-16%, Agree-40%), and incidences of police brutality and extra-judicial killings (Strongly agree-29%, Agree-42%). On contrary, a counselor one of the key informant interviewed responded that “*In general COVID -19 did not bring or contribute to any security challenges in the country*”. On the hand he believed to some extent that, the economy was indeed impacted by the pandemic. “*I may not have the actual figures as to how the economy was affected but on the daily I would see some businesses shut down during the COVID – 19 period. There was inflation of the basic commodities which in one way or the other affected the economy*”.





**Figure 22: Impact of Covid-19 on Security**


**Source: CRTP Research**

However, another KII participant (Private lawyer) confirmed that Covid-19 has indeed negatively contributed to the insecurity of the country with key culprits of insecurity being security officers. He stated that:

When the pandemic came, it was not really as bad as we heard in other foreign countries but after it has been declared a State of Emergency issue, the security forces took advantage of the situation. Moreover, the lock down created a lot of problems such as rape.

**Impact of Covid-19 on Economy**

Further investigation of the effect of COVID-19 on the economy indicated that Covid-19 contributed to food insecurity at 76%, increased cost of living (72%), reduced business turnover (67%), decline in country’s GDP (66%), loss of jobs( 64%), reduced household level of income (60%), and international trade distortion (49%) as shown in Figure 23.



**Figure 23: Impact of Covid-19 on Economy**

**Source: CRTP Research**

The focus group discussion responses concurred with these findings that as a result of the lockdown measures to contain the spread of the pandemic, increased incidents of theft and breaking into people’s homes and shops especially during the state of emergency. The country’s economy was worst hit by the pandemic as stated by the respondents due to closure of businesses, reduced exports, reduced taxes collected by the Government and price inflation of basic goods.

Furthermore, one of the KII participants (Private lawyer) reiterated that: not only was the security situation in the country affected by the pandemic but the economy as well. *“Because of the COVID -19 the past 2 years have been tough. Inflation of prices of the goods led to people being exposed to unfair prices as well. There is however a better atmosphere for the last six months as the COVID – 19 has gone down as well”*

This was further supported by a businessman interviewed who confirmed that:

Since the outbreak of the global pandemic, many businesses were forced to close leading to unemployment. This made some people to resort to other means of feeding their families even resorting to petty crimes and robberies. Some people that claimed to be distributing health apparatus to people in their homes would in turn rob and steal from the same people they were going to assist. The demand for illegal firearms increased which led to more armed robbery during this period

The Covid-19 was also found to have contributed to mental health problems such as high stress, anxiety and depression as well as decline in economic growth (Haris et al., 2021). Study by Aragie on the short-term impact of Covid-19 on the Ethiopian economy revealed that lockdown restrictions imposed as containment measures led to a drop of 14% in its GDP due to international trade restrictions.<sup>338</sup> According to African Economic Outlook 2022, the Ethiopian economy decreased to 5.6% in 2021 from 6.1% in 2020 due to the effect of the war and Covid-19<sup>339</sup>


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338 Aragie et al. (2020): The Short-term Impact of COVID-19 on Ethiopia's Economy through External Sector Channels. An economy wide multiplier model analysis. <https://includeplatform.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/The-Short-term-Impact-of-COVID-19-on-Ethiopia's-Economy-through-External-Sector-Channels.pdf>

339 Africa Economic outlook 2022: Recent macroeconomic and financial developments <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-economic-outlook>

## DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

DRC represents African states that have been experiencing protracted conflicts especially with regard to the competition for natural resources, inter-ethnic conflicts, national boundaries, poor governance, and the multiplication of militia groups. The data was mainly collected in North Kivu, Sake and Masisi areas in Goma, while in Bukavu data was collected in Nyiragongo because of the prevalence of the ongoing conflict in Eastern DRC



Source: Creative Commons

### Data Collection

Data collection was conducted in the Eastern region of the country between June and July 2022. Due to limited Internet connectivity in the region, the use of an online questionnaire was not effective; therefore, data were collected using physical questionnaires from 120 respondents. The questionnaire was also translated into French to facilitate the data collection process.

### Geographical location

The geographical location was the Eastern part of the DRC which has known several decades of conflicts. In North Kivu, data was collected in Goma, Sake and Masisi areas,

while in Bukavu data was collected in Nyiragongo. Cumulatively, in the region, 40% of the respondents were from Bukavu, while 38% of the respondents were from Goma, with 22% of the respondents representing North Kivu. The Eastern region of DRC was chosen for the research because of its perennial and protracted conflicts. In addition it is where Laurent Kabila with the support of Rwanda and Uganda governments launched the military offensive in 1996 that saw him march all the way to the capital Kinshasa. Unfortunately for the people of the eastern region conflict did not end with Kabila getting power in the capital and has remained to the present.

## **Respondents' Profile**

### **Age, Gender, Profession and Years of experience**

The survey findings indicate that out of the total number of respondents surveyed, the majority (50%) were in the 27-35 age groups, followed by the 36-50 age group (24%) and the 18-26 age group were 23%. This shows that youths, adults as well as elders participated in the survey to share their experience of the ongoing conflict in the country.

In terms of gender, the results showed that the majority of respondents were male at 57% compared to 43% female. This shows that when it comes to conflict in the DRC, men are the loudest in terms of participation and provide more information about the ongoing conflict in the country. However, during the validation meeting, one of the participants (woman) stated that: *'peace begins first with the family. And it is we women who must participate actively in this research. To me I can say that 43% is not enough for us because there are many women doing great things in NGOs as well as politics.*

Furthermore, from the analysis, the majority of the respondents in the Eastern region of DRC were peace practitioners (34%), private businesses at 30%. While, others like the civil societies, local NGOs, student, drivers, farmers, nurses, teachers and carpenters combined were at 26%. Consequently, this data showed a relatively even distribution of professions across the respondents, representing various perspectives in the peace and conflict field in the region.


In addition, the result point out that overall, 74% of the respondents had more than 5 years of experience in their profession while 24% had 3-4 years of experience in the region. This gives an indication that respondents had adequate experience in their areas of profession to comment on peace and security issues in the country.

### **Types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Eastern DRC**

In evaluating the level of awareness of conflict in DRC, majority 96% of respondents

are aware of the ongoing conflict in the DRC and types of conflict mentioned by the respondents was primarily a socio-political, ethnic or tribal conflict. Results in Figure 24 indicate that, the highly prevalent types of conflict and human rights violations were: sexual and gender-based violence (57%), political and border violence (53%), armed robbery and theft (41%) and domestic violence (39%). These findings were validated by the participants during the validation workshop as the true representation of the conflict situation in DRC. However, one of the participants during validation workshop stated that: *‘I think the percentages should be reversed. Political and border violence to be 57% and sexual and gender-based violence to be 53%. Which is the true nature of DRC’*. This suggests that with the latest attack by the rebel groups, political and border violence remains the most prevalent type of conflict in the country.

The border violence and armed robbery can be attributed to the rise of attack by the rebel and armed groups in the Goma region. Similarly, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2022 report shows that the M23 armed group in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has summarily killed at least 29 civilians, including teenagers, since mid-June 2022 in areas under its control<sup>340</sup>. Between July 30 and August 11, at least 60 civilians were killed in armed attacks across the province, according to humanitarian partners.<sup>341</sup>



**Figure 24: Conflict and Human Rights Violations**

Source: CRTP Research

Moreover, gender based and sexual violence (57%), political violence (51%) and police

<sup>340</sup> HRW. (2022). DR Congo: Resurgent M23 Rebels Target Civilians, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/25/dr-congo-resurgent-m23-rebels-target-civilians>

<sup>341</sup> OCHA. (2022). <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/republique-democratique-du-congo-note-dinformations-humanitaires-pour-la-province-de-lituri-12-aout-2-2022>


brutality (48%) were reported to be moderately prevalent. During the validation meeting in Goma, one of the participants said that:

Most of these sexual violence comes from armed groups such as the Mushaki, Uthuru and Masisi. These armed group people are foreigners from elsewhere who disguise themselves as natural Congolese. They are Rwandan refugees. Given the context of insecurity, the percentage can reach 80%.

Previous reports have revealed that dozens of women and girls were raped and forcibly recruited hundreds of men and boys, becoming among the worst perpetrators of human rights violations in the country<sup>342</sup>. Also, due to food shortages, violence has increased in the area and people are afraid to work alone in the fields.

### Drivers of conflict in the Eastern DRC

There are several key drivers of the protracted conflict in DRC. From the study findings illustrated in Figure 25, the respondents highlighted the existence of many armed and different rebel groups at 63% as the main key driver of conflict followed by high levels of unemployment at 62%. This shows that the DRC has been unable to contain or even manage the conflict especially in Eastern DRC.



**Figure 25: Drivers of conflict in the Eastern DRC**

Source: CRTP Research

Several peace building initiatives have ended up not being effectively implemented. The

342 Al Jazeera. (2022). Civilians in peril as tensions in DR Congo escalate: HRW: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/3/civilians-in-peril-as-tensions-in-drc-escalate-hrw>



failure to implement the peace agreements from the research stood at 51% as contributing towards the ongoing conflict in DRC. Thus, there is need to design and implement a coherent national peace building aimed at establishing a people-to-people interaction and a people-to-state interaction as foundations for the development of the state. The groups involved in conflict have to agree on having open dialogue be it at the local or the national levels on fundamental issues that have been considered as the root cause of the conflict.

In general unemployment in any country is a cause of concern as it has impacts on economic growth and development. In the case of DRC, high rates of unemployment, especially youth unemployment, often have an impact on conflict as well. Specifically, youth who do not have gainful employment will resort to joining armed groups for financial gain or even in pursuit of purpose. On other hand, when judicial systems fail, laws and lawyers become instruments of injustice and oppression rather than swords and shields fighting for justice and equality. This result was affirmed during the validation workshop by one of the participant (woman) who echoed that:

Our judicial system is still inefficient and corrupted. For instance, recently I was in a court, witnessing a rape case which we were very sure we were going to win but at the end the judge reversed the case. All these happen because of money (corruption).

Consequently, the weakest members of society, minorities, the vulnerable, are the first to suffer the consequences. Furthermore, in cases where human rights are violated, the protection of the natural environment usually fares even worse<sup>343</sup>.

### **Conflict actors in Eastern DRC**

According to results in Table 8, political leaders at 72% was reported by the respondents as the key drivers to conflict in DRC followed by the involvement from the neighboring states and international organizations coming in at 70% and the multinational corporations at 64%. Political leaders being the key actor of conflict in DRC can be attributed to their interest in the rich resources in the country as they try to protect for their economic gains. Moreover, neighboring states like Rwanda has been accused of supporting the rebel group (M23).

During the validation meeting in Goma, it was evidenced that neighboring states and international organizations have greatly contributed to the ongoing conflict in DRC. One of the participants stated that: *'US, Great Britain and France have done the DRC a disservice. They are the external actors that creating space to war to be. They do not*

<sup>343</sup> Emmert, F. (219). Global Failure of Justice Systems – Causes and Consequences, <file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/GlobalFailureofJusticeSystems-CausesandConsequences-for25thannived.pdf>

want this conflict to come to an end. Because of the natural resources of the DRC. They do illegal exploitation in the miner zone’.

**Table 8: Actors responsible for conflict in Eastern DRC**

Actors	Most responsible	Moderately responsible	Less responsible	Not responsible	Unsure
Political leaders	72%	19%	5%	3%	1%
Government security forces	39%	25%	14%	13%	9%
Armed militia groups	35%	26%	18%	14%	7%
Religious leaders	20%	9%	28%	23%	20%
Community leaders	20%	16%	34%	17%	13%
Social groups	18%	9%	27%	25%	21%
Neighboring states and International state actors	70%	16%	3%	6%	5%
Multinational corporation	64%	19%	4%	8%	5%

Source: CRTP Research

In 1995 Kabila, helped by Rwanda and Uganda, overthrew the Mobutu regime but failed to keep his side of the bargain to serve his country at the silent directive of Rwanda and Uganda, and had quickly distanced himself from his former allies soon after he gained power. This is a clear indication of how the neighboring states have been contributing to the prolonging of the conflict. Rwanda instigated the Second Congo War, involving Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, DRC, and Uganda. After renewed violence and a re-election, Kabila won and was sworn in. What ensued was, however, not the peace that was hoped for, but rather a disintegrated state with at least 120 armed groups operating in Eastern DRC alone (ACAPS, 2018).

### Conflict Level trends in DRC

The 2022 CMT revealed that the conflict level of DRC is 2.41. This shows that the country is at a confrontational level of conflict. This stage of conflict is characterized by incidences of open conflict, with increased intolerances by rival actors. In November, 2022, the rebel group M23 were reported to attack Congolese Army (FARDC) and people in North Kivu province in Goma region. The attack has led to massive displacement of over 262,000 people from their homes since March 2022 with the recent attack displacing

over 82000 citizens.<sup>344</sup>This has facilitated the deployment of Kenyan soldiers in Goma for security reinforcement under the umbrella of East Africa Community regional force. Therefore, if no interventions take place there is the likelihood of widespread escalating open conflict. In 2021, the conflict level was 2.45 as reported by HIPSIR CMT research which placed DRC in the confrontation stage. This shows that conflict in DRC have neither escalate nor de-escalate in the past one year, however, the attack by the rebel groups have intensified in the recent past

### **Countries that have joined DRC in the on-going conflict**

USA, Rwanda and Uganda were reported by the majority of the respondents as the foreign countries that have joined Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the on-going conflict. For example, in the past, it has been noted that the M23 has received significant and widely publicized support from the Rwandan government and to some extent Uganda as well. In 2012, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC found that Rwanda had provided supports such as recruitment, troop reinforcement, ammunition deliveries and fire support. Recently, the Congolese government has accused Rwanda of backing the M23. In return, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi said on June 5, 2022 that there was “no doubt” that “Rwanda supported the M23 to come and attack the DRC.”<sup>345</sup>

This also emphasizes the fact that neighboring countries such as Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda have been competing for economic control of Congo’s lucrative resources, military influence and geopolitical strongholds in the DRC. Nevertheless, this dynamic of instability could lead to escalation and wider regional conflict. The Great Lakes region, which includes Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the DRC, has experienced significant interstate conflicts, genocide and civil war, as well as refugee movements since the 1990s.<sup>346</sup> Similarly, during the validation workshop, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda were mentioned to have contributed to the ongoing conflict in DRC. One of the participants mentioned that ‘*there is a lack of mutual confidence between the DRC and neighboring countries. Even mothers who cross borders to look for food said that: We go there but we are afraid of people who are there*’.

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
344 DRC-Armed conflict in North Kivu, November, 2022 updates. <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-armed-conflict-north-kivu-dg-echo-un-ngos-echo-daily-flash-18-november-2022>

345 Levine-Spound, D. & Jafarnia, N. (2022). *New Armed Conflict in DR Congo: A Renewed Call for Civilian Protection*, <https://www.justsecurity.org/82155/new-armed-conflict-in-dr-congo-a-renewed-call-for-civilian-protection/>

346 Parens, R. (8 September, 2022). Conflict in Eastern Congo: A spark A way from a Regional Conflagration <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/09/conflict-in-eastern-congo-a-spark-away-from-a-regional-conflagration/>

## Peace Actors' Stakeholder group in DRC

Figure 26 results have revealed that, the country is well represented in the area of peace actors with the majority of the actors being community members at 29%, followed by youth group at 24%. This result shows that community members and youth play a vital role in the peacebuilding process. However, the contribution of other stakeholders like NGOs, women, and religious leaders has been low in DRC. Moreover, since the DRC is a new member of the East African community, it has an opportunity to get support from the other member countries who have agreed to join forces to create a regional force to fight rebels in eastern Congo.<sup>347</sup>




**Figure 26: Peace Actors' Stakeholder group**

Source: CRTP Research

## Effectiveness of institutions in conflict resolution

Understanding the role of different institutions in conflict management and peace building is key in formulating appropriate policies for effective conflict resolution. Results in Figure 27 show that, there are several institutions/ organizations that have been involved in peace building process with women organization at 41% rated as very effective by the respondents followed while religious organizations at 57%, youth organization/ groups at 55%, men's organization/ groups at 54% and traditional peace committee at 53% were rated as effective. This implies that gender, religious institution and traditional peace committee play key role in conflict management and peacebuilding.

<sup>347</sup> HRW. (2022). DR Congo: Resurgent M23 Rebels Target Civilians, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/25/dr-congo-resurgent-m23-rebels-target-civilians>



**Figure 27: Effectiveness of institutions on conflict resolution**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

Moreover, this shows the different groups involved with the peace building process having been able to gain a basic understanding of the complexities involved in conflicts. The institutions dealing with conflict management for peace building are engaging the communities from the local, regional, to national levels and seeking to help development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding organizations, to gain a better understanding of the context and their possible role in that context. However, government (court system) was rated not be effective in peace-building process. This could be attributed to reasons such as weak judiciary system, corruption, not being fair in judgment, influences from political parties in the country.

### Challenges to peace restoration in DRC

Furthermore, results in Table 9 show that most of the respondents highlighted lack of consensus between the peace actors at 72%, fragile government at 70%, on breakdown of peace talks at 68%, poor development in the region at 67%, international interference by external actors at 64%, and political goodwill at 60% as very challenging. Lack of consensus between the peace actors can be attributed to lack of peace agreement among the actors. Moreover, international interference by external countries like Rwanda and

Uganda have posed a great challenge to peace stability in the region. This could be attributed to accusation of countries such Rwanda for supporting the rebel group. This shows that conflict in the DRC is extremely fragmented making it more complex, with various armed groups violently contesting over different issues.

Foreign interventions, vast mineral resources, poverty, deeply rooted inter-communal and ethnical tensions, and the lack of a tough strong security apparatus to suppress those tensions, are also challenges that contribute to the intractable conflict in the DRC.

**Table 9: Challenges to resolving conflicts in Eastern DRC**

Effectiveness of peace restoration	Very Challenging	Moderately Challenging	Not a challenge	Not sure
Lack of consensus between the peace actors	72%	23%	1%	4%
Lack of reformed judicial system	52%	35%	8%	5%
Evidence of climate change	29%	27%	21%	23%
Weak social agreements between peace actors	56%	33%	4%	7%
Corruption	57%	31%	5%	7%
Lack of government policies on peacebuilding	38%	34%	11%	17%
Political incitements and hate speeches	45%	32%	8%	15%
Unresolved historical grievances	44%	35%	10%	11%
Failure of signed peace agreements	54%	38%	7%	1%
Availability and ease of access of SALW	56%	27%	10%	7%
Breakdown of peace talks	68%	26%	2%	4%
Political goodwill	60%	32%	4%	4%
Fragile government	70%	18%	5%	7%
COVID-19 pandemic challenges	45%	36%	9%	10%
International interference by external actors	64%	29%	3%	4%
Poor development in the region	67%	19%	4%	10%

Source: CRTP Research

## Recommendations on the best strategies to peace stability in Democratic Republic of Congo

### *Awareness creation*

Because peacebuilding involves different stakeholder from different sectors and levels, the respondents recommended awareness creation on peace from the grass root level. For instance, raising public awareness during elections to make the right choice and maintain

peace during election process. In addition, both community leaders as well as members need to be trained on peacebuilding and conflict management.

### *National Dialogue*

The respondents further argued that dialogue remains a better weapon to find peace in Eastern region of DRC, thus there is need to promote dialogue among the people instead of using weapons. This will facilitate signing of peace agreement between the government and the rebel groups.

### *Review of agreements and commitments signed*

Moreover, it is necessary to review the commitments and agreements signed with the neighboring countries, especially Rwanda, and to monitor its implementation. They recommend the repatriation of the Democratic Forces Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) to Rwanda, and suggest the sensitization of armed groups to surrender. Moreover, the government should stop signing agreements with rebel groups.

### *Job creation and economic development*

Investors should also put sustainable projects in the conflict zone so that young people in the field can work and not enlist in armed groups.


The study also assessed the effect of Covid-19 on security issues and economy of the country. This was necessitated by the fact that the pandemic caused a lot of domestic violence and security issues across the globe.

## **Impact of covid-19 on Security**

COVID-19 has created new dynamics that has affected social interaction and peace and development efforts. This included an increase in criminal activity, and stigmatization of those infected. With regard to the analysis, Figure 28 results indicated that majority of respondents strongly agreed and agreed that there is increased incidences of theft and looting of public and private properties (strongly agree-18%, agree-59%), followed by loss of life of security officers at (16% -strongly agree, 47%-agree), and increased robbery with violence as result of job loss among youth (29%-strongly agree, 46%-agree). While there is police brutality and extra-judicial killing at 41% for both strongly agreed and agreed. These findings were affirmed during the validation workshop where one of the participants stated that:

During Covid-19 period, police brutality was too much. They even asked for money. I was in town with my children. I was the only one using the mask. But the way the police treated us was unimaginable. We were brutalized and forced to give some amount of money.






**Figure 28: Impact of covid-19 on Security**

Source: CRTP Research

### Effect of Covid-19 on Economy

Further assessment of the impact of Covid-19 on the economy revealed that the effect of the pandemic on the economy has been varied with the loss of jobs and reduced business turnover being the highest at 63% (Figure 29). This was as a result of the lockdown and restriction in traveling. Majority of the respondents from the households were in agreement on the decline in the country GDP at 49% followed by 47% confirming the effect of the pandemic on distortion of international trade activities and food security at 49%. The respondents pointed out that there were reductions in non-labor income that resulted in a decline in income. Most of the respondents stated that the aftermath of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic had have been felt in job losses among different households. Due to Covid-19 restrictions, the market for products was restricted and this hindered many people from accessing food.



**Figure 29: Impact of covid-19 on Economy**

Source: CRTP Research

## KENYA

Kenya is the economic and commercial hub of East Africa, and one of the fastest growing economies in the region. The country is a multi-ethnic nation with over 40 different ethnic groups often characterized by overlapping conflicts mostly witnessed during the electioneering period. In the recent years, high levels of armed robbery and theft, domestic violence, inter-communal violence, political tensions and cattle rustling in pastoral communities have continuously been reported in Kenya.



Source: Creative Commons

## Data Collection

Data collection was done in five regions of Coast, Western/Nyanza, Eastern and North Eastern, Nairobi and Rift valley region representing 22 Counties between June and July, 2022. The total number of the questionnaire links shared out were 230 copies. The distribution per region were as follows; Coastal region were 35 copies, Western/Nyanza 60 copies, Eastern/North Eastern 45 copies, Nairobi 45 copies, while Rift valley were 45 copies. A total of 187 copies of questionnaires (Coastal region 22 copies, Western/Nyanza 60 copies, Eastern/North Eastern 38 copies, Nairobi 22 copies. Rift valley 45 copies) were filled online by the respondent. The response rate was not 100% as it was expected possibly because of issues of internet connectivity, data bundles and willingness of the respondents to participate in survey.

## Respondents' Profile

### Age, Gender, Profession and Years of experience

The study results revealed that 32% of the respondents were in the age bracket of 27-35 years, while 18-26 years and 36-50 years were represented by 30% while only 8% of

the total respondents interviewed were above 50 years. This confirms that those who participated in the survey cuts across all age brackets representing different views from different age groups. In addition, the statistics of gender which participated in the research showed that more male (66%) compared to female (34%) participated in the survey. This implies that there is need to mobilize more women to participate in conflict and peace related survey to share their opinions on peace building and conflict management issues. The survey findings further indicate that majority of the respondents were peace practitioners at 42%, private business at 22%, civil society at 16% and religious leaders at 7% .The highest number of peace practitioner who participated in the survey can be attributed to their role in advocating for peace as the country was gearing towards the August 2022 elections. Lack of peace also affects the smooth operations of the business, thus 22% of business owners also participated in the conflict monitoring survey to share their insights.

Profession-wise 44% of the respondents have above 5 years of experience in their profession, 21% have 1-2 years while 19% have 3-4 years of experience. This confirms that the respondents that participated in the survey had vast knowledge on how the conflict have affected them in their profession.

### **Types of conflict in Kenya**


Results in Figure 30 shows that the highly prevalent type of conflict and human rights violation in Kenya are domestic violence (43%), Cattle rustling (44%), resource-based violence (41%). Moreover, political violence (40%), gender and sexual violence (50%), armed robbery and theft (41%), and police brutality (48%) were rated as moderately prevalent. The prevalence of political violence could be attributed to ethnic-based politics. These findings further showed that domestic violence is the most common conflict in Kenya with cases of killings and murder frequently being reported in media stations. Moreover, in the pastoral communities such Maasai, Samburu, and Turkana, cattle rustling has been reported as the highly prevalent type of conflict, causing many deaths and displacement of people.

Similarly, analysis of trends of armed conflict in Kenya from 1997 to 2021 showed *that* armed conflict related to politics is more likely to increase towards, during and after election years. Previously armed conflicts were in peak during 2007, 2013 and 2017 election periods.<sup>348</sup> The commonly noted form of conflict during the election period

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348 Kimani et al (2021): Trends of Armed Conflict in Kenya from 1997 to 2021: An Exploratory Data Analysis, *International Journal of Data Science and Analysis* 7(6):161-171 DOI:[10.11648/j.ijdsa.20210706.14](https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijdsa.20210706.14)

includes violence against civilians (VAC), riots and protests. Competition over natural resources such as water, pasture and land, poverty, illiteracy and Al-Shabaab infiltration are the main causes of conflict between the clans in Garissa County.<sup>349</sup>




**Figure 30: Types of Conflict and Human rights violation in Kenya**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

**Conflict Actors in Kenya**

The majority (68%) of the respondents identified political leaders as the most prominent conflict actor followed by armed militia groups (34%) and government security (35%) as indicate in Figure 31. This is attributed to the fact that various types of conflicts in Kenya is often exacerbated by elements of ethnic mobilization in line with political parties affiliations and political hate speeches and incitements that in most instances make certain conflicts to appear as ethnic conflict. According to National Cohesion and Integration commission report 2022 ranked Nakuru as one of the three hotspot in Kenya during the August 2022 General Elections with political leaders being accused of propagating political incitements and hate speeches during their campaign that could lead to outbreak

349 Rotich .S. K., Ahmed W. O.: Drivers of Clan Conflicts: A Perspective of the Role of Al-Shabaab in Garissa County, Kenya. <https://www.siasatjournal.com/index.php/siasat/article/view/65>

of conflict<sup>350</sup>.




**Figure 31: Conflict Actors in Kenya**

Source: CRTP Research

### Key drivers of conflict in Kenya

Majority respondents (85%) highlighted unemployment among the youths as one of the key drivers of conflict in Kenya (Figure 32). Indeed, unemployment has been identified as a factor that could contribute to instability and violence in many African countries and which needs intervention. Young people are potentially a tremendous force for change in conflict-affected countries, both positively and negatively. Thus, there is need for creation of employment to youths for economic development and reduction of conflicts such as armed robbery and theft.

350 Midrift Hurinet (2022): Promoting Peaceful and Secure Elections in Nakuru County. <https://midrifthurinet.org/promoting-peaceful-and-secure-elections-in-nakuru-county/>



**Figure 32: Drivers of conflict in Kenya**

Source: CRTP Research

Moreover, the study further revealed that political/economic marginalization (51%), climate change (48%), ethnicized politics (49%) and competition over resources (46%) are also main drivers of conflict in Kenya. For instance, the frequent conflicts between the Turkana and Pokot have been attributed to fighting over pasture and water (grazing field) and border disputes. Furthermore, as a result of drought due to climate change, coupled with poverty, conflict between communities in West Pokot and Marsabit has increased in the recent past.<sup>351</sup> The conflict in Marsabit County has been between the Borana and Gabra communities along the border of Saku and North Horr Constituency. The conflict is mainly as a result of competition over resource use, territorial claims and control over Marsabit politics.<sup>352</sup> According to Minority Right Group (MRG) partners report of 2021,

<sup>351</sup> Muigua, K. (2021). Towards Effective Peace-building and Conflict Management in Kenya. <http://kmco.co.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Towards-Peacebuilding-and-Conflict-Management-in-Kenya.docx-Kariuki-Muigua-MAY-2021x.pdf>

<sup>352</sup> Mokku J. and Prech D. (2020): Information Brief: Beyond Intractability Facilitating Inter-communal Cohesion and Reconciliation in Marsabitt County. <https://www.dlci-hoa.org/assets/upload/briefs-and-leaflets/20201102120834336.pdf>



several peace efforts have been put in place but little has been achieved.

Furthermore, the ethnic-based politics and possible fear, tension and conflict in relation to Kenya's Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project is projected to cause conflict in future.<sup>353</sup> This is attributed to conflict of interest of different politicians on the project for their own benefits. Moreover, the Isiolo-Meru County boundary violence has been identified as conflict driver between Meru farmers and Isiolo-based pastoralists (Borana and Turkana) as a result of land disputes. This calls for peace talks between the communities to improve peaceful coexistence and reduce border violence.

### **Conflict Level trends in Kenya**


The conflict level of 2.31 shows that Kenya is in the confrontational level of conflict. In comparison to 2021 conflict level of 2.45 the tension of conflict in Kenya have reduced and this is supported by lack of violence during and after the August 2022 general elections. The confrontation is much evidenced in pastoral communities where cattle rustling has been common in the recent past.

### **Effectiveness of institutions in conflict resolution**

Figure 33 results indicate that religious organizations (40%) and traditional peace committee (40%) are very effective in peace restoration process. Moreover, men organizations (55%), women groups (53%) and youth groups (50%) were reported to be effective in the peace restoration process. These findings highlight the importance of different institutions in peace building process. This implies that traditional peace committee such the use of clan elders as well as religious institutions to solve conflict should be fully embraced. Further, more support should be availed to religious institutions to fulfill their goals and missions of promoting peace. However, comparatively, men's, women's and youth organizations were found to be effective in conflict resolution. This shows that gender plays key role in peacebuilding process and there is need to support and promote their activities towards peacebuilding.

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353 Mktu Kennedy, Marie Müller-Koné & Evelyne Atieno Owino (2021) Future visions, present conflicts: the ethnicized politics of anticipation surrounding an infrastructure corridor in northern Kenya, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 15:4, 707-727, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2021.1987700. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2021.1987700>



**Figure 33: Effectiveness of institutions on conflict resolution in Kenya**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

### Challenges to effective peace restoration

Results on Table 10 indicates the challenges faced in peace restoration process in Kenya. The survey findings showed that 85% of the respondents perceived political incitement and the speeches, unresolved historical grievances at 75%, corruption at 72%, and availability and ease of access to small arms and light weapons at 68% as the most challenging factors to managing conflict in Kenya. This indicates that to effectively resolve conflict and maintains peace, political leaders and their followers should stop hate speeches as well incitement but speak words that brings people together. Moreover, there is need for tight rules and procedure for dealing with corruption cases. The government should also disarm all civilians that owns illegal fire arms mainly in pastoral communities where cattle rustling is very common and bandits are fully armed with guns and crude weapons. There is need to control as well the flow of illegal firearms along the borders, this will help in controlling the ease of access of guns and light weapons.

**Table 10: Challenges to peace restoration in Kenya**

Peace restoration challenges	Very challenging	Moderately challenging	Not challenging	Not sure
Lack of consensus between peace actors	56%	34%	8%	2%
Lack of reformed judicial system	44%	41%	12%	3%
Evidence of climate change	57%	37%	4%	2%
Weak social agreement between peace Actors	60%	33%	3%	4%
Corruption	72%	22%	3%	3%
Lack of government policies on peace-building	48%	43%	6%	3%
Political incitement and hate speeches	80%	15%	4%	1%
Unresolved historical grievances	75%	18%	5%	2%
Failure of signed peace agreements	45%	40%	7%	8%
Availability and ease of access to small arms and light weapons	68%	21%	5%	6%
Breakdown of peace talks	53%	37%	8%	2%
Political goodwill	55%	27%	16%	2%
Fragile government	48%	31%	13%	8%
Covid-19 pandemic	53%	36%	9%	2%
International interference by external Actors	34%	27%	27%	12%
Poor economic development	61%	32%	4%	3%

Source: CRTP Research

## Recommended strategies to promote peace stability

### *Peace initiatives*

There is need for total inclusion of all parties in the peace talk and conflict management process. In addition, the government through the Ministry of Education should include peace education in the school syllabus to teach the students on the importance of peace in the community from their early stages of growth and development. Further, the national and county governments to fund projects that focuses on peace restoration through educating youth, women and men on the importance of peace and peaceful coexistence. National dialogue between the fighting communities which involves different top government officers, community leaders and residence of the affected communities was

highly recommended.

### ***Government***

The government should create more job opportunities for youths to reduce the challenge of unemployment in the country by improving and expanding the *kazi mtaani* initiative. In addition, the government should consider establishing more security posts and camps in the affected areas to reduce crime rate level. To reduce armed robbery and livestock theft in the pastoral communities, national disarmament should be done to recover all firearms illegally owned by the civilians.

### ***Socio-Economic initiatives***

Compensation and provision of basic needs and services to displaced persons is highly recommended to improve the lives of people who have been affected by ethnic clashes and conflict. There is also need to improve positive relationship between the police and citizens. The study further analyzed the effect of Covid-19 on the livelihood of the citizens. This was deemed important because since the onset of the pandemic, a lot of domestic violence were reported. The study viewed the virus as conflict as it disrupted many activities across the globe.

The study also assessed the effect of Covid-19 on security issues and economy of the country. This was necessitated by the fact that the pandemic caused a lot of domestic violence and security issues across the globe.

### **Impact of covid-19 on the cost of living in Kenya**

Furthermore, the study assessed the perception of the respondents on the severity of Covid-19 on the cost of living among the people. The study findings revealed that majority of the respondent confirmed that the impact was more severe (73%), while 24% rated the impact as moderately severe. This shows that indeed covid-19 have severely impacted the lives of the Kenyan citizens. COVID-19 has also been reported to have contributed to domestic violence, increase in incidences of sexual and gender based violence as well as increased cost of living.<sup>354</sup>

### **Effect of Covid-19 on Kenyan economy**


According to Onsomu et al. (2021) the economic growth of Kenya was adversely affected in the first half of 2020 when the Covid-19 was first reported in the country. In the first

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354 International alert Report (2021) The Impact of Covid-19 on Peace and Conflict dynamics: A case study of Korogocho Informal settlement, Nairobi, Kenya. <https://www.international-alert.org/publications/impact-covid-19-peace-and-conflict-dynamics-korogocho-nairobi-kenya/>

quarter of 2020 the study found the economy registered reduced growth, at 4.9 percent compared to the 5.5 percent growth recorded in the same quarter of 2019<sup>355</sup>. Results in Figure 34 shows that Covid-19 have highly resulted into increased cost of living (91%), reduced household level of income (89%), loss of jobs( 88%), reduced business turnover (83%), food insecurity (78%), decline in country’s GDP (71%), and international trade distortion (62%). These findings confirm that indeed Covid-19 has affected Kenyan economy on both social and economic dimensions.

Moreover, Odhiambo and Okungu (2020) also found Covid-19 have affected the supply chain globally resulting into greater impact on the Kenyan import flows<sup>356</sup>. During the enforcement of Covid-19 containment measures, police brutality and extra-judicial killings were also experienced as the side effect of the pandemic. According to Pinchoff et al. (2021) Covid-19 has also put pressure on the health systems resulting in difficulty of accessing health services by poor households.



**Figure 34: Impact of Covid-19 on Kenyan Economy**

Source: CRTP Research

355 Onsomu, E., Munga, B., & Nyabaro, V. (2021). The impact of COVID-19 on industries without smokestacks in Kenya: The case of horticulture, ICT, and tourism sectors.

356 Odhiambo J. and Okungu J. (2020). Impact of Covid-19 on the Kenyan Economy.

## Conflict levels of selected regions in Kenya


### Nairobi

#### Data Collection

The total number of responses received were 22 from the total 45 links shared out representing approximately 50% response rate. This could be attributed to unwillingness of the respondents to fully participate in the survey possible due to lack of data bundles or time to answer the questions.

#### Types of conflict and Human Rights violations in Nairobi

The study results showed that the highly prevalent type of conflict and human rights violation in the region are gender and sexual violence (45%), armed robbery and Theft (45%), domestic violence (41%), and police brutality (32%). However, illegal settlement (50%), political violence (50%) and resource based violence (41%) were rated as moderately prevalent types of conflict and human rights violations in the region (Figure 35).



**Figure 35: Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Nairobi Region**

Source: CRTP Research


High prevalence of gender and sexual violence and armed robbery as well as theft can be attributed to the insecurity in some estates and slums in Nairobi as a result of so many unemployed people in the city. Moreover, political violence can be attributed to divergence in people’s opinion on party affiliations as well as preferred candidates on

## HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) Report 2023

the August 2022 general election. Due to high cost of living, domestic violence were reported in the region due loss of jobs due to COVID-19 and high rates of inflation in the economy among different people which resulted into reduced household income of the family. COVID-19 pandemic has had a socio-economic impact on Kenya which further complicates efforts to address political and developmental challenges. COVID-19 has also been reported to have contributed to domestic violence, increase in incidences of sexual and gender based violence.<sup>357</sup>

### Conflict drivers in Nairobi region

In evaluating the key drivers of conflict in Nairobi, the respondents pointed out that the most prominent drivers of conflict in the region were the high levels of youth unemployment rated at 85%, political and economic marginalization at 71%, and ethicized politics at 46% while proliferation of small arms and light weapons at 46% was rated as moderately prevalent as indicated in Figure 36.



**Figure 36: Conflict drivers in Nairobi**

Source: CRTP Research

Nairobi being the capital, high unemployment rate could be attributed many youths migrating to the after graduating from colleges and universities come to look for the city in search of employment. Moreover, Nairobi being cosmopolitan, ethicized politics was evident in the August general election due different party affiliation interests of the citizens. In the recent past incidences of robbery and theft have been reported in

357 The Impact of Covid-19 on Peace and Conflict dynamics: A case study of Korogocho Informal settlement, Nairobi, Kenya. <https://www.international-alert.org/publications/impact-covid-19-peace-and-conflict-dynamics-korogocho-nairobi-kenya/>



some parts of the city due to proliferation and holding of unlicensed firearms and light weapons by the criminals. This finding implies that in order to reduce the prevalence rate of criminal in some parts of Nairobi, there is need to create employment opportunities for youths and security officers to tighten security along the streets.

### Conflict Actors in Nairobi

The study findings revealed that in Nairobi region political leaders (68%) and government security (41%) were rated the most responsible conflict actors as shown in Table 11. This could be attributed to hate speeches by politicians during their campaign as well as on the social media. Moreover, County government security (*Kanjo*) has been accused of harassing small business owners and Boda Boda riders causing a lot of commotion in the region. Thus, there is need for political leaders and aspirants and their supporters to avoid hate speeches during and post-election period and practice unity and peace among the people. County government security should also be trained on how to carry out their duties properly without violating the rights and freedom of the citizens.

**Table 11: Actors of Conflict in Nairobi**

Actors	Most Responsible	Moderately Responsible	Less Responsible	Not Responsible	Unsure
Political leaders	68%	22%	5%	0%	5%
Government security	41%	27%	22%	5%	5%
Armed militia group	18%	37%	27%	18%	0%
Religious leaders	5%	5%	36%	36%	18%
social groups e.g. youth group	5%	41%	27%	18%	9%
Neighboring sand international states	18%	0%	23%	36%	23%
Multinational corporation	5%	5%	50%	18%	23%


Source: CRTP Research

### Effectiveness of institutions in conflict resolutions

The study further asked the respondents to rate the effectiveness of different institution in conflict resolution in Nairobi region. The study results in Figure 37 indicate that religious organizations (64%) and women organization (59%) have been rated as being effective

## HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) Report 2023

institutions in conflict resolutions. Most of the religious institutions have achieved this through supporting peace trainings and walks while women groups have also been in front in peace advocacy. To improve efficiency and effectiveness of these institutions in peace restoration process, more funding should provide and proper trainings on the subject of peace building and conflict management.



**Figure 37: Effectiveness of institutions on conflict resolution in Nairobi**

Source: CRTP Research


### Conflict Level trends in Nairobi

The conflict level of 2.59 shows that Nairobi is in confrontational level of conflict and the conflict is not escalating compared to conflict level of 2.5 reported by HIPSIR CMT 2021 report survey. Although the conflict has not escalated, incidences of political tensions and armed robbery and theft have been reported in some parts of Nairobi in the recent past.

### Impact of Covid-19 on economy of Nairobi

In evaluating and assessing the impact of Covid-19 on the economy of Nairobi, most of the respondents agreed that indeed Covid-19 have high impact on the cost of living (95%), loss of jobs (86%), reduced household level of income (86%), and food insecurity (86%) as shown in Figure 38. The increased cost of living could be attributed to cut-down wages for the employed households, lost jobs and restriction and lockdowns measures used to contain the pandemic in 2020 to 2021 period. According to Pinchoff et al. (2021) Covid-19 has also put pressure on the health systems resulting in difficulty of accessing health services by poor households. The pandemic has also affected labor and social

security since numerous employees in formal and informal employment lost their jobs and livelihood. Reduced earnings and job cuts have led to some Kenyans, especially those who rely on casual work, finding it difficult to cater to their basic needs – including rent. To contain the virus, the government instituted a curfew and lockdown measures with the police responsible for enforcement.<sup>358</sup>



**Figure 38: Impact of Covid-19 on Economy in Nairobi**


Source: CRTP Research

### Impact of Covid-19 on Security

Results in Figure 39 further showed that most of the respondent strongly Agree and Agree that Covid-19 has increased robbery with violence (Strongly agree-55%, Agree-40%), increased incidences of theft and looting (Strongly agree-53%, Agree-31%), loss of lives of the security officers (Strongly agree-14%, Agree-52%), and incidences of police brutality and extra-judicial killings (Strongly agree-45%, Agree-32%) have been witnessed. This is because most of the criminals took the advantage of lock-down and dawn to curfew to loot people’s properties and in the process of security officers in the maintaining law and order were also killed by these criminals. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) reported that police officers were responsible for 117 cases of inhuman

358 Kevin Okoth Ouko, Robert Ouko Gwada Gertrude Alworah and Zephaniah Ongaga Mayaka, “Effects of COVID-19 pandemic on Food Security and Household Livelihoods in Kenya,” *Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics* 23, 2(2020):72-80.

and degrading treatment and torture and 10 deaths between March 2020 and June 2020.<sup>359</sup>



**Figure 39: Impact of Covid-19 on security in Nairobi**

Source: CRTP Research

### Challenges to peace stability in Nairobi

In terms of challenges, the survey revealed that 86% of the respondents rated political incitement, hate speeches, and corruption and unresolved historical grievances at 85% as major challenges to resolving the conflicts in Nairobi. This implies that to restore peace in Nairobi region, corruption and unresolved grievances should be the main agendas of discussion and political leaders and their supporters to restrain from using hate speeches before, during and after election periods.

### Recommended strategies to peace stability

Strategies suggested by different respondents who participated in the online survey were that there is need to foster more participation of the members of the community in conflict resolution and peace building processes. Further, the government should create awareness program for peace e.g. peace education programs to be initiated in schools, while religious leaders to take lead in peace mediation process by involving all stakeholders in peace building efforts. Moreover, there is need to disarm all the citizens holding illegal or unlicensed guns and peacebuilding initiatives to consider involving all the vulnerable groups from initial stages since they are the most affected especially youth, and women. The politicians should stop the use of hate speeches that could ignite conflict among the people.

359 KNCHR (June 2020). Pain and Pandemic: Unmasking the State of Human Rights in Kenya in Containment of the COVID -19 Pandemic.


*Nakuru*

**Data Collection**

The data was collected using the online survey monkey platform and a total of 22 responses were received from the respondents. Out of the total number of links shared, this did not represent the 100% response rate.

**Types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Nakuru**

Nakuru recorded a conflict level of 2.15 indicating that the County is on confrontational level of conflict. Domestic violence (50%), Gender and Sexual based violence (50%), armed robbery and theft (46%) and resource based violence (41%) were highlighted by the respondents as highly prevalent type of conflict and human rights violation in Nakuru as indicated in Figure 40. The rise in domestic violence can be attributed to factors such as increased cost of living as well as marital problems experienced by different households. Cases of rape have been also reported in social media and media stations confirming the prevalence of gender and sexual violence as evidenced by the survey findings.



**Figure 40: Conflicts and Human Rights violation in Nakuru**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

Furthermore, one of the participants during the validation workshop emphasized that men have also become victims of domestic violence but they don't want to come out and

report. She said that:


We tend to advocate for women but men are also suffering daily. Domestic violence has always been there, it will always be there and it is a shame that it happens in our society as a daily activity. The most vulnerable are young mothers, and men. Most of the cases show that men are also victims of domestic violence. For instance, a man went to police station to report on domestic violence, but because of the mentality culture they start laughing at him instead of helping him. What I can add is that police officers need to help men who are victims of domestic violence since they fear reporting their cases due to embarrassment they receive from the police.

Armed robbery and theft was also confirmed by the participants during validation exercise as another type of conflict common in the region with a group by name 'CONFIRMED' mentioned to be the most terrible group in the recent past. Further a youth lady working with a women organization confirmed that a lot of problem through robbery with violence that has resulted into deaths and theft of properties within the region.

### **Conflict Actors in Nakuru**

Most of the respondents mentioned political leaders (85%) as the most responsible actors of conflict in Nakuru region. Further, community leaders (23%), social groups (23%) and government security (23%) were also reported by the respondents as the most responsible actors of conflict as shown in Figure 41. These findings were further confirmed during the validation meeting where one of the participants testify that:

Personally, I agree with the research findings. For instance, I had an encounter with a friend whom have been paid by politicians during nomination period. Some political aspirants went to an extent of paying young people to guard their political rallies while some were paid to interfere with the opponent's campaigns.



**Figure 41: Conflict Actors in Nakuru**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

Another participant during the validation workshop further reiterated that the politicians are even funding youth groups to cause chaos and conflict. This is because youths are easily and readily available in social media where they spread propaganda and incitements.

She stated that:

Political leaders are the key actors, this is because the politicians use youths and government security officers to cause violence during campaigns. Youth are used mainly by the politicians because of lack of employment. When you give me some money and tell me to go and destroy another person campaign, obviously, I will do it, because at the end of the day I will be paid. But if you do not pay me to do the job, then there is no conflict.


This implies that to manage conflict in the region, there is need for sensitization and awareness creation on the negative effect of hate speeches and incitements by politicians before, during and post electioneering periods. According to National Cohesion and Integration commission report 2022 ranked Nakuru as one of the three hotspot in Kenya in the run-up to August 2022 general election with political leaders being accused of



propagating political incitements and hate speeches during their campaign<sup>360</sup>.

### Drivers of conflict in Nakuru

High level of youth unemployment (73%) in Nakuru region was ranked the most prominent conflict driver in the region as shown in Figure 42. Moreover, ethnicized politics (55%), political/economic marginalization (45%), and proliferation of small arms (50%) were also highlighted by the respondents as the most and moderately prominent drivers of conflict.



**Figure 42: Conflicts drivers in Nakuru**

**Source: CRTP Research**


Nakuru being a cosmopolitan city there are many youth in the town looking for formal employment against limited available opportunities, resulting in high levels of youth unemployment. On the other hand, one of the participants (peace practitioner) in the validation exercise confirmed that *‘It is true that youth unemployment is key driver of conflict in this region. Considering that, if you look at the issue of urban violence, the major drivers are unemployed youths.* Moreover, in the recent past, a lot of cases of robbery with violence and extra-judicial killings have been reported due to proliferation of small arms where civilians are found in possession of unlicensed arms.

### Conflict Level trend in Nakuru

Nakuru being a cosmopolitan region, it was marked as one of the hotspots of violence in the August 2022 general election. It recorded a conflict level of 2.15 indicating that the County is in confrontational level of conflict curve. This suggest that in future, the region need to be monitored very well more so during the electioneering period to avoid conflict escalating to crisis level. This can be done mainly through holding public forums on peace as well as awareness creation on peace issues.

### Effectiveness of institutions in conflict resolution

The study further asked the respondent to rate the effectiveness of different institutions and organizations in conflict resolution as to what they perceive. The results showed that religious organizations (46%), and NGOs both local and international (55%) have been very effective. In addition, women organization (59%), men organization (68%), and traditional peace committee (50%) were rated as effective in conflict resolution as indicated in Figure 43.



**Figure 43: Effectiveness of institutions on conflict resolution in Nakuru**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

However, one of the participants in the validation workshop said that religious leaders were only active during electioneering periods. He further echoed that:

I can say they have been playing vital role in peace-building but right now, I can say No, because I am also working with one of the religious institutions but in real sense, we can give very low percentage based on what they have done on the August 2022 election. Actually, in the just

## HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT) Report 2023

concluded election, church was one of the institution accused of dividing the county. An example, SUKE people and some churches like Evangelical church said we are supporting Kenya kwanza while Catholic Church came out very clear and telling people at the Election Day to “choose by your own choice but not Wajakoya”.

These findings illustrates that there is need to support different institutions to effectively achieve their mission of peace building more so the religious institutions, NGOs as well as social groups such as women and youth groups.

Another participant in the validation meeting further confirmed that both women organizations and men organizations play key role in conflict resolution, however, the voices of women are not heard when it comes to decision making especially during public meetings. For instance, *‘I recently attended a meeting where majority were just men and I thought I was the odd one out, even the few women who attended were forced to sit on the grass.’*

### **Challenges to peace restoration**

In analyzing the challenges experienced by residents of Nakuru in resolving the conflict, 82% of the respondents indicated corruption and political incitement/ hate speeches as the main challenges conflict resolution in the region. Other challenges reported are lack of reformed judicial system (68%), Covid-19 pandemic (82%), poor economic development (68%), weak social agreements between peace actors (64%) and lack of political goodwill (64%). During the validation process, one of the participants put more weight on corruption as key challenge to conflict resolution, he stated that:

There is a lot of corruption when it comes to selection of peace committee members in the constituency level for instance you find that it finds they those in authority only select their relatives. But when you look at the chairman and the committee, you find people who do not understand issues related to peace. Just because at county level we have those forums and they are given some tokens (paid some money). So corruption is too much instead of advertising these positions to recruit qualified people, they usually proposed names and they are doing nothing

To curb these challenges, the county government should come up with effective policies towards reducing the level of corruption for effective equitable distribution of resources among the citizens. Moreover, politicians should also avoid hate speeches and incitements that brings division among the people.

### **Strategies recommended for peace restoration**


To resolve conflicts in the region, most of the respondents suggested that all stakeholders from grassroots level should be involved in peace building initiatives. This will refrain youths from being used by politicians and given handouts to cause chaos. Religious

leaders should preach peace and desist from taking political side since it will eventually disenfranchise their congregation. Moreover, there is need to encourage more seminars and trainings on peace building and conflict management. For fair judicial process to prevail for all the citizens and political leaders should avoid hate speech, incitement, ethnicity, funding criminal gangs among others to prevent violence.

In the validation meeting in Nakuru, members also suggested that there is need for political tolerance among the people *‘recently, we are celebrating that there is peace. But deep inside, we don’t have peace? About 6 million people who voted baba are deep hurt inside, they are not at peace’*. In addition, there is a need for training local people e.g. Boda boda riders on peace and conflict management.

### Impact of Covid-19 on security

In assessing the impact of Covid-19 on security in Nakuru region, results in Figure 44 showed that Covid-19 has resulted into increased robbery with violence (Strongly agree-59%, Agree-27%), increased incidences of theft and looting (Strongly agree-59%, Agree-27%), loss of lives of the security officers (Strongly agree-23%, Agree-41%), and incidences of police brutality and extra-judicial killings (Strongly agree-41%, Agree-50%). This implies that during the implementation of the Covid-19 containment measures such as dusk to dawn curfews, most of the people took advantage of engaging into unlawful act such stealing. Moreover, in the process of enforcement, incidences of police brutality have been reported as well as some officers losing their lives in the course of duty.




**Figure 44: Impact of Covid-19 on security in Nakuru**

Source: CRTP Research

### Impact of Covid-19 on Economy

Nakuru is a business hub with many people running different types of businesses. However, the outbreak of the Covid-19 really affected the effective operation of businesses across the region. The study evaluated the impact of Covid-19 on the economy of Nakuru and the results are as shown in figure 41. The results indicated that Covid-19 had a high impact on the cost of living (95%), loss of jobs (91%), reduced household level of income (86%), food security (86%), business turnover (77%) and decline in GDP (73%). As a result of loss of jobs, many households experienced reduced level of income and this increased the cost of living among the citizens. Security officers were also reported to have taken the advantage of the Covid-19 pandemic and this resulted into extra-judicial killings due excessive use of power. During validation exercise, one of the participants said that:

For me, there is no justification in term of violence of human beings. Our police officers have the tendency of taking the advantage of the situation. For instance, during the Covid-19 press briefing, the President was giving the speech sometimes at 5 pm, then immediately the police officers start implementing the orders immediately just imagine the mess people were caught up in. It is high time for the police to start reforming and adopting the system of respecting the human rights.



**Figure 45: Impact of Covid-19 on Economy in Nakuru**  
 Source: CRTP Research


**Kisumu**

**Data Collected:** 20 questionnaire copies

The data was collected using the online survey monkey platform and a total of 20 responses were received from the respondents. The low response rate could be attributed to the unwillingness of most of the respondents to feel the questionnaire online.

**Types of conflict and human rights violations in Kisumu**

In Figure 46, the highly prevalent type of conflicts in the region is political violence (60%), armed robbery and theft (55%), domestic violence (55%) and border violence/incitement (45%). These findings are in line with the 2021 CMT results which found that the most prevalent conflicts were political violence, domestic violence and police brutality. The prevalence of political violence in Kisumu can be attributed to the fact that it has many supporters of the presidential candidate of the just concluded August 2022 general election.



**Figure 46: Conflicts and Human Rights violation in Kisumu**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

Moreover, a lot of tensions were also witnessed in the region just before the announcement of presidential election results of August 2022 election, however much conflict and unrest

were not experienced as anticipated. Armed robbery and theft coupled with domestic violence were also ranked the most prevalent conflicts in the region possibly due to hardships in the economy as well as loss of jobs due to the COVID-19 pandemic. One of the participants during the validation round table discussion echoed that domestic violence increased more during the electioneering period. A participant representing a women's activist group highlighted that *'A woman in Nyalenda was slapped by her husband due to her political party affiliation, when she told her husband that I told you, Ruto will defeat Raila'*. Another woman also reported that a husband divorced his Kalenjin wife after President Ruto was declared the president-elect by the Supreme Court. Further discussion revealed that many young women from Western/Nyanza region were so much involved in political rallies and campaigns during the electioneering period and this caused a lot of domestic violence in families.

Another participant mentioned that:

Nyanza people are just politically radical, it will reach a point where there will be silent resistance from particular groups. Even today Luos are grouping themselves and they are removing some tribes from their WhatsApp groups. Again historical injustice and those kinds of traumas people went through in 2007-2008 post-election violence made people to exercise peace.

Furthermore another participant during the validation meeting shared her sentiments that:

You know if people from Nyanza are calm then it does not mean that they are at peace with themselves. People still feel hurtled based on the court ruling and I agree with the findings that there the region is in the confrontation level. There are a lot of conflicts underground and this is evidenced by other people moving to other parties. But, I thank God that for the work that peace practitioners have done, despite the outcome of the election people are busy with their business and daily activities. However, if Baba would have said something on the court ruling day then things would have been different. Right now people are watching but my only fear is the future elections. Many people will say there is no need of voting not vote again.

Consistent with these study results is a study by Oyoo et al (2019) on the causes and types of conflict during the electioneering process in Kenya with reference to Kisumu County. The study found that the region experienced electoral and politically based ethnic conflicts common mainly during election periods with key actors being youths and political class<sup>361</sup>.

### **Conflict Actors in Kisumu**


Most of the respondents mentioned political leaders (80%) as the most responsible actors of conflict in Kisumu County while armed militia groups (50%) and government security

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<sup>361</sup> Oyoo, R. O., Okoth, P., & Matanga, F (2019). Causes and types of conflicts during electioneering process in Kenya with reference to Kisumu County. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, Volume 9, Issue 11, November 2019



(55%) were rated as moderately responsible actors as shown in Figure 47.



**Figure 47: Conflict Actors in Kisumu**

Source: CRTP Research

The rating of political leaders as the main actors of conflict in the region can be attributed to political incitements used by most of politicians and their supporters during campaign period.

During the validation meeting, one of the participants said that:


The armed militia groups were very common during the campaigns. They are young people who are idle due unemployment and are being misused by the politicians. This means that the government should disarmament operation to recover all unlicensed firearms and crude weapons owned by these groups.

In addition, another participant in the meeting confirmed that, these groups are more active at night along the streets and during political campaign period.

**Key drivers of conflict in Kisumu**

According to Figure 48 high level of youth unemployment (90%) was ranked the most prominent driver of conflict in Kisumu County. Moreover, ethicized politics (75%) and political/economic marginalization (80%) were also ranked as the most prominent drivers of conflict. Lack of employment in the region have made most of the youths to be idle and

engage themselves in unconstructive activities as well as being used by crude politicians.



**Figure 48: Conflicts drivers in Kisumu**

**Source: CRTP Research**

During the validation meeting, one of the participant working with youth organization mentioned that:

Youths are choosy when it comes to employment, they does not want to take what is available, and they need professional jobs which are not easily available with the present economy. Thus there is need for capacity building for youths on job creation and employment.

The study by Oyoo et al. (2019) indicated that the main cause of conflict in Kisumu County is dynamics in socio-economics such as unemployment coupled by historical injustices and electoral issues<sup>362</sup>. The ethicized politics have also cause conflicts resulting to border violence at Kisumu-Nandi and Kericho borders. On ethnic-based politics in the region, one of the participants during the validation meeting said that:

The issue of ethnized politics is a major challenge in Kisumu, for example, if you look at the proposed cabinet positions 50% are from Central of Kenya, only 30% from Rift Valley, and then 20% for the rest of Kenyans. The question is, are we part of this? Again I was in Nairobi recently, just before the president announce the cabinet nominees, and while chatting with the taxi driver he told me that you know we are going to demand more of cabinet posts because we are the ones who voted him, we give him 42% of the vote.

362 Oyoo, R. O., Okoth, P., & Matanga, F (2019). Causes and types of conflicts during electioneering process in Kenya with reference to Kisumu County. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, Volume 9, Issue 11, November 2019

This implies that need to create awareness on the ethnic-based politics which has remain one of the key drivers of conflict in the region.

### **Conflict Level trends in Kisumu**


The conflict level of 2.18 shows that Kisumu is in confrontational level of conflict curve. In comparative with conflict level of 2.4 in 2021 as per the HIPSIR CMT research, the conflict is not intensifying although some tensions were experienced in the region during the announcement of August 2022 presidential election results and after the court ruling on 5<sup>th</sup> September, 2022. During validation meeting, one of the participant said that:

Most of the people from Western /Nyanza region were so much traumatized after the reading of presidential court judgment and there is need for mental health therapy. For instance could Raila Odinga have uttered something bad after the judgment day, the country could have break into chaos, and we thank God he kept quiet.

This shows the level of political tension that was experienced in Kisumu region during the August 2022 general election. This has been trend in Kisumu more so during electioneering periods since the region has been marked hot spot for political violence.

### **Effectiveness of institutions on conflict resolution**

In evaluating the effectiveness of different institutions and organizations in conflict resolution, the survey findings revealed that youth organizations (75%), and NGOs both local and international (70%) have been very effective. In addition, women organization (70%), men organization (75%), traditional peace committee (60%) and religious organizations (60%) were rated as effective in conflict resolution as indicated in Figure 49. Although youth organizations play important role in peace building process, they have not received the needed support to fully realize their goal of peace keeping and advocacy.



**Figure 49: Effectiveness of institutions on conflict resolution in Kisumu**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

Moreover, a women empowerment activist in the validation meeting in Kisumu confirmed that *‘women organization in collaboration with men organizations (Bunge la wananchi) in promoting peace. Further boda boda riders mainly youths this time round during political campaigns really advocated for peace’*. She further reiterated that traditional peace committee members have also remained good custodian of peace at the community level.

Although the study rated religious institution to be effective in conflict resolution, the participants in the validation workshop have divergent opinions that this time round more so during the August 2022 election, religious leaders did not done well as it was expected. One of the participants said that *‘some pastors even used church to campaign for some political aspirants they were affiliated with while most of the religious leaders did not stand for truth and justice since they were manipulated, managed and politically inclined’*


### Challenges to peace restoration in Kisumu

In Kisumu County the survey revealed that political incitement and hate speeches (90%), Covid-19 pandemic (90%), corruption (75%), climate change (75%) and lack of consensus between peace actors (75%) are the main challenges to peace restoration

Kisumu County. Moreover, mental health problem was also mentioned by the participants during the validation exercise as major challenge to conflict resolution in the region. This suggests that to restore peace, political incitement and hate speeches, corruption and climate change should be well tackle through awareness creation and accountability on issues of corruption.

**Impact of Covid-19 on security in Kisumu**

In assessing the impact of Covid-19 on security in Nakuru region, results in Figure 50 showed that Covid-19 has resulted into increased robbery with violence (Strongly agree-60%, Agree-40%), increased incidences of theft and looting (Strongly agree-70%, Agree-25%), loss of lives of the security officers (Strongly agree-30%, Agree-60%), and incidences of police brutality and extra-judicial killings (Strongly agree-45%, Agree-50%). These challenges can attributed to increased high cost of living when the pandemic hit the country as well as forces applied by security officers in ensuring full implementation of the Covid-19 protocols and containment measures.



**Figure 50: Impact of Covid-19 on security in Kisumu**

Source: CRTP Research

**Impact of Covid-19 on Economy in Kisumu**

Results in Table 12 shows that Covid-19 has high impact on loss of jobs (90%), the cost of living (85%), decline in GDP (80%) and reduced household level of income (80%). Furthermore, the results revealed that Covid-19 also impacted business turnover (75%) and food security (75%). Many of people lost their jobs during the pandemic since

most of businesses recorded loss that cannot contain the operational costs of running the businesses as well as the organization. Moreover, the GDP declined as most of the businesses were affected by the Covid-19 containment measures initiated by county government which ultimately affected that household level of income and food baskets for different households. These findings were confirmed by the participants during the validation as the main effect of covid-19 on security as well as economy.

**Table 12: Impact of Covid-19 on Economy in Kisumu**

Impact of Covid-19 on economy	Highly impacted	Moderately impacted	Less impact	No impact	Unsure
Decline in Country GDP	80%	10%	10%	0%	0%
Loss of Jobs	90%		10%	0%	0%
Reduction in Household income	80%	0%	0%	0%	20%
Increased cost of living	85%	0%		5%	10
Reduced business turnover	75%	15%	0%	0%	10
Distortion of International trade	65%	10%	15%	10%	0%
Food security	75%	5%	20%	0%	0%

Source: CRTP Research


### *Turkana*

**Data Collected:** 18 questionnaire copies

The data was collected using the online survey monkey platform and a total of 18 responses were received from the respondents. Out of the total number of links shared, this did not represent the 100% response rate due reasons such as unwillingness of some of the respondents to participate in the research.

### **Types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Turkana**

Results in Figure 51 shows that the highly prevalent type of conflict and human rights violation in the region are cattle rustling (89%), resource-based violence (67%) and armed robbery and theft (50%). Moreover, police brutality (61%), gender based and sexual violence (61%) and domestic violence (50%) were reported to be moderately prevalent. Cattle rustling/border conflicts between Turkana and Pokot communities have frequently been reported as the main conflict in the region. This has been attributed to differences in political ideologies, discrimination and disputes over resources such as land, grazing fields and water points de prolonged drought due to climate change.




**Figure 51: Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Turkana**

Source: CRTP Research

**Drivers of conflict in Turkana**

The study results revealed that the most prominent drivers of conflict in the region are competition over natural resources, cattle rustling activities for economic gain and climate change at 89% respectively (Figure 52). Moreover, unresolved historical grievances and revenge killing as well as failure of judicial system are considered to be moderately prominent (50%).





**Figure 52: Conflict drivers in Turkana**

Source: CRTP Research

Turkana being a pastoral region where most of the residence keep livestock, competition over resources has resulted into the conflict of cattle raiding among the communities themselves and their neighbors. This has been on increase in the recent past due to climate change that has led to severe drought in the northern parts of Kenya. In consistent with this these findings, Mutinda in her study found that the main cause of conflict in Turkana is competition over natural resources coupled with marginalization and proliferation of small weapons. The study revealed that the conflict in the region is more rooted in ethnicity differences and this has proofed very difficult to resolve the conflict.<sup>363</sup>

### Conflict Actors in Turkana

In identifying the actors of the conflict in Turkana, results in Table 13 indicate that the key actors of conflict in the region are political leaders at 61%, community leaders at 50% and armed militia groups at 44%. These findings suggest that political and community leaders could be the key actors to conflicts in Turkana mainly because of political and economic gains. This has been common in the area as people raid cattle for economic gains. Most of the accusation has been on the community leaders which inspires youths to engage

363 Mutinda, Jackline K. “Assessing Dynamics Of Cross Border Ethnic Conflicts In the Horn Of Africa: A Case Of Turkana-Dassanech Conflict In Kenya-Ethiopia Border.” PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2019

themselves on such activities.

**Table 13: Actors responsible for conflict in Turkana**

Actors	Most responsible	Moderately responsible	Less responsible	Not responsible	Unsure
Political leaders	61%	28%	11%	0%	0%
Government security forces	39%	39%	17%	5%	0%
Armed militia groups	44%	28%	22%	0%	6%
Religious leaders	34%	22%	11%	33%	0%
Community leaders	50%	28%	5%	5%	6%
Social groups	28%	33%	22%	11%	6%
Neighboring states and International state actors	28%	33%	17%	22%	0%
Multinational corporation	28%	28%	11%	22%	11%


Source: CRTP Research

### Conflict Level trend in Turkana

The conflict level of 2.39 shows that Turkana is at confrontational level of conflict curve. This is much evidenced by recent conflict between the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu along the borders due completion over resources and cattle rustling.

### Effectiveness of institutions in conflict resolution

In Turkana region, results in Figure 53 show that religious organizations (65%) are very effective in conflict resolution followed by traditional peace committee (53%) and men organization/ groups at 38%. Moreover, both youth organization/ groups as well as local and international NGOs at 47% respectively, women organization and government/ court system at 41% were also rated as being effective in conflict resolution by the respondents.



**Figure 53: Effectiveness of institutions on conflict resolution**

Source: CRTP Research

### Challenges to peace restoration in Turkana

Moreover, the study also evaluated the challenges to achieving peace stability in Turkana region. The findings revealed that the main challenges are corruption (88%), unresolved historical grievances (76%), poor economic development (76%), lack of government policies on peacebuilding (65%), availability and ease of access to small arms and light weapons (65%).

### Recommendations on strategies to resolving conflict in Turkana

#### *Community Dialogue*


There is need for community dialogue between the fighting communities and call for peace talks. This calls for inclusion of all stakeholder in peace talks and dialoguing. This includes all people regardless of race, gender, sex or status in conflict resolution. Moreover, for the case of cattle rustling, ensure there is presence of enough security officers to protect the lives of citizens and their livelihoods alternatives.

#### *Awareness creation*

To improve peacebuilding in the region, there is need for awareness creation among the community on peacemaking, as well as sensitization by peace actors on conflict issues to the local communities.

### Impact of Covid-19 on Security in Turkana

Based on analysis of the respondents perception of Covid-19 impact on security , results in Figure 54 indicated that majority of respondents both strongly agree and agree that there is increased incidences of theft and looting of public and private properties at (56%-strongly agree/ 28% -agreed), followed by increased robbery with violence as result of job loss among youths at (50% strongly agree/ 28% agree) and police brutality and extra-judicial killing at (50%-strongly agree/ 33% agree).




**Figure 54: Impact of Covid-19 on Security in Turkana**

Source: CRTP Research

### Impact of the covid-19 on Economy in Turkana

The study further evaluated the impact of Covid-19 on the economy of the region based on the extent of the impact. The findings revealed that Covid-19 have highly impacted food insecurity at 89%, distortion of international trade activities, increased cost of living, reduced household level of income and loss of jobs at 78% per. Followed by decline in the country GDP and reduced business turnover both at 61% (Figure 55). The severe impact of covid-19 can be attributed to the containment measures and restriction measures that have affected the movement of people and the proper functioning of different institutions/ organizations within the region.



**Figure 55: Impact of Covid-19 on Economy in Turkana**

Source: CRTP Research


**Kilifi**

**Data Collected:** 16 questionnaire copies

The data was collected using the online survey monkey platform and a total of 16 responses were received from the respondents representing low response rate. This could be attributed to poor network connectivity in the region as the survey was done online.

**Types of Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Kilifi**


Results in Figure 56 shows that the highly prevalent type of conflict and human rights violation in the region of Kilifi are gender-based and sexual violence (56%), political violence (50%) and domestic violence (44%). Moreover, police brutality (63%), armed robbery and Theft (50% and resource based violence (38%) were reported to be moderately prevalent. Comparatively, cattle rustling (38%) and illegal settlement (31%) were not prevalent in the region. This could be attributed to the fact that Kilifi region is not a pastoral community.



**Figure 56: Conflict and Human Rights Violations in Kilifi**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

**Drivers of conflict in Kilifi**

From the analysis, the results indicated that the most prominent drivers of conflict in the region are high levels of unemployment (88%), climate change (56%), undressed historical grievances as well as competition over natural resources (50%) each, and political/economic marginalization (44%). Moreover, ethnicized politics leading to political power imbalance (56%), as failure of judicial system (50%) are considered to be moderately prominent as indicated in Figure 57. This suggests that to reduce the level of tension that can lead to conflict, unemployment and climate change should be dealt with in the region. Climate change currently is a global issues and if little or no action is taken then it will remain main driver of conflict not only in Kilifi region but also in the entire country.



**Figure 57: Conflict drivers in Kilifi**

Source: CRTP Research

### Conflict Actors in Kilifi

Table 14 results indicate that the perceived most prominent conflict actors in the region are political leaders at 63%, while government security forces were rated moderately responsible at 44%. However, religious leaders at 44% and social groups at 44% were reported as less responsible actors. This could be attributed to the role the faith based institutions as well as social groups such as women or youth groups play in peace building process. Moreover, political violence being the most common of conflict in Kenya during electioneering period, there is need for political leaders and aspirants to embrace peace during, and after election process.

**Table 14: Actors responsible for conflict in Kilifi**

Actors	Most responsible	Moderately responsible	Less responsible	Not responsible	Unsure
Political leaders	63%	25%	6%	6%	0%
Government security forces	31%	44%	25%	0%	0%
Armed militia groups	25%	31%	19%	12%	13%
Religious leaders	25%	12%	44%	19%	0%
Community leaders	25%	19%	44%	12%	0%
Social groups	25%	19%	44%	12%	0%



Neighboring states and International state actors	19%	19%	25%	37%	0%
Multinational corporation	13%	25%	31%	25%	6%


Source: CRTP Research

### **Conflict Level trend in Kilifi**

The conflict level of 1.9 shows that Kilifi is placed at the latent level of conflict curve. This stage is characterized by incompatible goals between one or more parties but their issues are hidden from the public. If these issues are not addressed or dealt with in the early stages, they can lead to tension that can mount up to confrontation.

### **Effectiveness of institutions in conflict resolution**

Results in Figure 58 show that religious organizations (44%) as well as local and international NGOs (44%) are very effective in conflict resolution. Moreover, women organization and government/ court system (69%) each, men organization/groups (62%), traditional peace committee (56%) and youth organization/ groups (50%) were rated by the respondent as effective in conflict resolution. This findings showed that different institutions or groups play a key role in conflict resolution in the region. Therefore, any support to these institutions will improve conflict management and peacebuilding in Kilifi.



**Figure 58: Effectiveness of institutions on conflict resolution**  
**Source: CRTP Research**

### Challenges to peace restoration in Kilifi

In assessing challenges to peace restoration in Kilifi region, the study findings showed that unresolved historical grievances (94%), political incitements and hate speeches (94%) corruption (88%), climate change (81%) and political goodwill (81%) are the main challenges to resolving conflict in Kilifi region.

### Recommended strategies to peace stability in Kilifi

#### *Awareness creation on peace*

Awareness creation and sensitization on peace should be given more consideration during electioneering periods. Moreover, the government and NGOs should support and fund peace talks and forums in the communities as well as including every stakeholder in all peacebuilding process.

#### *Gender and social group inclusion in peacebuilding*


There is need to include gender and social groups such as youths, men, women, faith-based organizations as well as community-based organizations in the decision making process on conflict and peace issues.

#### *Equitable distribution of resource*

Competition over the natural resources was evidenced as one of the drivers of conflict in the region. Therefore, the national and county governments should ensure equitable sharing of resources among the people. This will improve the living standards of the people and reduces possible tensions that can lead to conflict among the communities.

### Impact of the Covid-19 on security


With regard to the Covid-19 impact assessment on security, majority of respondents strongly agree and agree that there is increased incidences of theft and looting of public and private properties at (44% strongly agree/ 31% agree), followed by increased robbery with violence as result of job loss among youth at (31% strongly agree/ 50% agree) and loss of life of security officers at (13% strongly agree/ 62% agree) as indicated in Figure 59.



**Figure 59: Impact of Covid-19 on Security**  
 Source: CRTP Research

### Impact of the covid-19 on Economy

Further assessment of the effect Covid-19 on the economy in Kilifi region indicated that Covid-19 have highly impacted food insecurity, reduced business turnover and reduced household level of income at 100% respectively (Figure 60). This is followed by loss of jobs at 94%, increased cost of living at 87%, and distortion of international trade activities at 81% and decline in the country GDP at 69%.



**Figure 60: Impact of Covid-19 on Economy**

**Source: CRTP Research**

## **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

## Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The 2022 Conflict monitoring tool (CMT) key findings showed that DRC conflict level of 2.41 indicates a confrontational stage of conflict. This stage of conflict is characterized by incidences of open conflict, which has been evidenced by the intensification of attack by the M23 rebel group in the North Kivu, Goma Region in Eastern DRC. The findings revealed that the aggression of the M23 rebel group, border violence, armed robbery and theft, political violence were the highly prevalent types of conflict. Further, the proliferation and tenacity of other armed groups coupled with the M23 in the region is a serious issue that needs proper intervention for effective peace restoration in the Eastern region of DRC. The main challenge to peace stability in the Eastern DRC is the increase in frequency of attack of the citizens by the M23 rebel group. However, if the government forces can agreed and sign peace deal with the M23 rebel group then there is hope for peace stability in DRC. Moreover, with regional interest of countries like Kenya in joining DRC in fighting the rebel groups, there is hope that the Eastern part of DRC will be at peace in the near future.

The key conflict drivers/escalators revealed by the 2022 CMT analysis report were presence of armed and rebel groups (M23) as well as unemployment and economic hardships. While neighboring countries, M23 group and political actors were the key actors of the conflict. Interestingly, women organizations were found to lay vital role in peacebuilding in DRC. However, lack of consensus between the peacebuilding actors, poor economic development, interference by external actors as well as fragile government were the major challenges to peace restoration in the region. Moreover, Covid-19 was reported to have a severe impact on the economy as well as cost of living.

In conclusion, the study recommended that there is need for peaceful dialogue between the government and rebel groups (M23 and other armed groups). To the peace actors, there is need to include all stakeholders in peacebuilding from the grass root level and to the international organizations, sustainable projects should be implemented in partnership with the government to improve economic development and job creation.

## Ethiopia

In Ethiopia the study revealed that the conflict level was 3.02 (crisis level) before the signing of the peace agreement on 3<sup>rd</sup> November, 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa. This clearly indicates that although the conflict in Ethiopia was escalating, there is hope with the signing of the peace agreement which if fully implemented then peace will prevail in

Ethiopia. The highly prevalent types of conflict and human rights violation according to the study findings are Political violence and unrest, socio-economic imbalances, domestic, gender and sexual violence.

The key drivers/escalators of conflict in Ethiopia were high levels of youth unemployment, ethnic based politics, and undressed historical grievances. Despite the political instability in the country, religious institutions were found to be very effective in peacebuilding. Moreover, the role of clan elders in conflict management have been ignored despite their vital role in peacebuilding process. The literature review and the study results revealed that political leaders were the key actors of the conflict.

In conclusion, the major challenges to peace restoration in Ethiopia that requires immediate action were corruption, political goodwill and economic development. However, with the recent peace deal signed between the government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), there hope that the long battle between the government and Tigray people which have caused deaths and displacement of many people will come to an end upon the implementation of the peace deal. Therefore, the study recommends national dialogue and negotiation which involves all the peacebuilding stakeholders and political leaders as well as the oppositions in the government. There is also need to embrace the use of traditional peacebuilding mechanisms such as the use of clan elders. Moreover, permanent ceasefire and national disarmament of illegally owned guns is highly recommended.

## **Kenya**

According to 2022 CMT report, the study key findings showed that domestic violence, cattle rusting, political violence as well as resource based violence were the highly prevalent types of conflict and human rights violation in Kenya. The cattle rustling was found to be much prevalent in Turkana, Samburu, Baringo and West Pokot regions. Ethnic-based politics, unemployment, climate change and political/ economic marginalization were the key drivers of conflict in Kenya. The actors behind these conflicts reported were mainly political leaders, and armed militia groups. Furthermore, political incitement and hate speeches, corruption, and armed groups were the key challenges to peace restoration to the most affected regions in Kenya. In assessing the impact of Covid-19 on the economy, the key finding revealed that indeed the pandemic has negatively impacted the economy through job losses, increased cost of living and low business turnover.

In conclusion, comparatively, the study found that apart from cattle rustling among the pastoral communities in Turkana, Samburu, and Baringo counties which have resulted



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into killing of innocent people and which act as a threat to peace in 2023, there was no much open conflict in Kenya as witnessed in Ethiopia and DRC. The major challenge to these counties peace stability are the bandits which owns illegal firearms and frequently attack the people. However, the study recommended that there is need for economic growth and development to create more jobs for the citizens especially the youths. Moreover, disarmament process by the government forces, peace talks and dialogue among the pastoral communities and drought stricken regions was highly recommended to reduce the conflict of cattle rustling. The ministry of education through the government to consider including peace education curriculum in the school syllabus. National disarmament is highly recommended to recover illegally owned arms and crude weapons among the citizens.

### South Sudan

The findings of CMT 2022 report revealed that the conflict in South Sudan has not escalated in comparison of 2021 findings. However, cattle rustling, domestic violence, inter-communal clashes, armed robbery and theft were reported as the highly prevalent type of conflicts in the region. These conflicts were caused mainly by undressed historical grievances among the communities, high level of unemployment, delayed country elections, proliferation of small arms and crude weapons, as well as competition over natural resources.

The main actors of the conflict were found to be political leaders, and armed militia groups while religious organizations and women organizations were reported to play effective role in conflict management and peacebuilding. The study key findings further revealed that lack of a reformed judicial system, corruption and unemployment, as well as unresolved historical grievances, were the key challenges to peace restoration in South Sudan. On the assessment of the impact of Covid-19 on the economy as well as security, the study result revealed that the pandemic resulted into high cost of living, loss of jobs, and decrease in gross domestic product of the country and armed theft and robbery more so during the time of lockdowns and curfew.

In conclusion, the study findings revealed that there is progression in conflict management in South Sudan compared to the previous years as the political leaders have started working together. This shows an element of hope for the country that have been on consistent war since independence. However, tribal clashes between different communities remains main challenge to peace stability more so among the pastoral communities. Therefore, the study recommended that the government should prepare the country for general election

to reduce political tension in the country, and national disarmament operation should be carried out to reduce and control the access of illegal firearms among the communities.

Moreover, there is need for economic revival to create more jobs and opportunities to the citizens, thus policies that encourages more private investors were highly recommended. To the peace actors in the country, there is need for inclusion of all stakeholders from the grass root level into peacebuilding process. Finally, full implementation of the 2018 revitalized peace agreement was highly recommended.

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## **APPENDICES**



## Appendix 1: Research Tool

### A survey for Assessing Conflict Levels in Eastern Africa (DRC, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya)

The Centre for Research, Training and Publication (CRTP) of Hekima University College, based in Nairobi - Kenya, is conducting a multi-phase study to assess the conflict situation in various countries in Eastern Africa, 2022 marks the 4<sup>th</sup> year of the study. This survey seeks to gather information that shall be used to monitor conflict for strategic intervention across the region. Your participation in this survey will be greatly appreciated. For past research series please visit our website: <https://crtp.hekima.ac.ke/> and <https://www.hekima.ac.ke/>

#### Section A: Preliminary Questions

**Q1a.** Please indicate your age bracket?

18-26                                       27-35                                       36-50                                       Above 50

**Q1b.** Please indicate your gender?

Male                                       Female                                       others (specify)

**Q1c.** Please indicate which country you work in?

DRC                       Ethiopia                       Kenya                       South Sudan

**Q1d.** Please specify the geographical location you work (e.g. state, county, district, province or region) in the country that you will be giving information on?

**Q2.** Please indicate your main occupation and the years of experience you have in the field

Profession	Please Mark	Below 1 year	1-2 years	3-4 years	Above 5 years
Peace practitioner					
Business (Private)					
Religious leader					
Civil Society					
Journalist					
Others (Specify)					

**Q3a.** Please indicate in the group of stakeholder listed below which you represent as a

peace actor

Stakeholder Type	Please Tick
Religious Leader	
Women Group	
Youth Group	
Community Member	
Chief/Elder	
NGO Staff (Local)	
International Community	
Others (Specify)	

**Q3b.** Are you aware of any on-going conflict in your country?

Yes                       No            If Yes, which ones?

**Q3c.** In your opinion, what is your perception on the impact of ethnic social exclusion on the on-going conflict?

**Q3d.** Does exclusion of social groups (youths, women or religious leaders) in the peace building process affects the peace stability of your country? Explain.....

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**Q4 a.** Is there any country that have joined your country (s) on the on-going conflict?

Yes                                       No,            if Yes, which ones?

**Q4b.** How do they contribute to the on-going conflict? Please select (Multiple choice)

- Through sponsoring rebel groups
- Engagement in peace talks
- Through security reinforcement
- Through humanitarian support (provision of basic needs such as food, health care)
- Others (Specify)

**Q5a.** Please rate the effect of Covid-19 on the cost of living? Please Tick

Ratings	
More Severe	
Moderately Severe	
Less Severe	
No Effect	
Unsure	

**Q 5b.** To what extent have you agreed or disagree with the following statements on the impact of COVID-19 on security of your country? Please tick

Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided
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Increased robbery with violence as a result of job loss among youths					
There is increased incidences of theft and looting of public and private properties					
Loss of lives of security officers					
There is incidences of police brutality and extra-judicial killings during enforcement of Covid-19 containment measures					

**Q 5c.** In your opinion, please rate the impact of COVID-19 on the economy of your country using the following indicators? Please tick

Indicators	Highly impacted	Moderately impacted	Less impact	No impact	Unsure
Decline in country GDP					
Loss of jobs					
Reduction in household level of income					
Increased cost of living					
Reduced business turnover					
Distortion of international trade activities					
Food security					

**Section B: Conflict, Conflict drivers and Conflict resolution**

**Q6.** Which of the following conflicts or human rights violation are presented in your location. Kindly rate the following according to what you perceive as highly prevalent, moderately prevalent, less prevalent, not prevalent and unsure? (Please Tick)

Conflicts	Highly Prevalent	Moderately Prevalent	Less Prevalent	Not Prevalent	Unsure
Border violence/ incitement					
Illegal settlement (IDPs)					
Cattle rustling					
Resource based violence					

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Gender based and sexual violence					
Domestic violence					
Armed Robbery and Theft					
Political violence					
Police brutality					

**Q7.** Please select the key conflict drivers in your region according to what you perceive as the most prominent to the least prominent driver?

<b>Conflict drivers</b>	<b>Most Prominent</b>	<b>Moderately Prominent</b>	<b>Least Prominent</b>	<b>Not sure</b>
Political/economical marginalization				
Proliferation of small arms and light weapon				
Multiple armed groups and rebel groups				
Climate change impact e.g. droughts and floods				
Cattle rustling activities for economic gain				
Competition over natural resources (Land, water, grazing field & boundary disputes)				
Unaddressed historical grievances and Revenge killings				
Failure of judicial system				
Failure of peace agreement				
Ethnicized politics leading to political power imbalance				
High levels of unemployment (especially among the youth)				
Others (specify)				

**Q8.** Out of the actors listed below, please rate those you believe are responsible for the conflict situation in your region? Please rate according to who you perceive as most responsible, moderately responsible, less responsible, not responsible and unsure?

(Please tick)

<b>Actors</b>	<b>Most Responsible</b>	<b>Moderately Responsible</b>	<b>Less Responsible</b>	<b>Not Responsible</b>	<b>Unsure</b>
Political leaders					
Government security forces (Police and army)					
Armed militia groups					
Religious leaders					
Community leaders					
Social groups (men, women, youth, labour/workers association)					
Neighboring states and International state actors (such as neighboring countries, AU, UN, EU)					
Multinational corporation					

**Q9.**How effective have the following institution or organizations been effective in resolving conflicts in the past?

<b>Institution/ Organization</b>	<b>Very Effective</b>	<b>Effective</b>	<b>Not Effective</b>	<b>Not Sure</b>
Religious organization				
Traditional peace committee				
Women organization/groups				
Youth organization/groups				
Government (court system)				
NGOs (local and international)				
Men organization/groups				

**Q10.** Please indicate the extent to which you have observed the following situations as an indicator of peace stability in the past two years?

<b>Description Of The Conflict</b>	<b>Not Observed</b>	<b>Rarely Observed</b>	<b>Sometimes Observed</b>	<b>Consistently Observed</b>
There is reduced number of conflicts resolved through community elders/ court system				
There is increased inter-ethnic peaceful coexistence and marriage				
There is reduced revenge killings and crime activities( e.g. cattle raiding and theft)				
There is an observed increase in youth and women employment				
There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to prevail without interruption				
There is perceived equitable resource distribution and services by the government				
There is perceived low level of corruption				

**Q11.** Please indicate to what extent have you observed the following situation that show that your region is experiencing socio-political tension that can result into conflict?

<b>Pre-conflict</b>	<b>Not Observed</b>	<b>Rarely Observed</b>	<b>Sometimes Observed</b>	<b>Consistently Observed</b>
There is increase of access of light weapons by ordinary citizens				
There is increase in political based hate speeches				
There is rise in the level of criminal activities/gang groups e.g. cattle raiding				
There are cases of ethnic discrimination by government authorities				
Poor governance (regional and national)				

Lack of gender inclusion and social groups (women, youth, labour/workers association) ) in conflict management process				
Disappearance of men and young people in the community				
Unresolved historical grievances and failure of peace agreements				
There is an increased complaints of economic hardships e.g. High cost of living				

**Q12.** In your opinion, to what extent have you observed the following scenarios that show there is open conflict in your region (confrontation conflict level?)

<b>Confrontation</b>	<b>Not Observed</b>	<b>Rarely Observed</b>	<b>Sometimes Observed</b>	<b>Consistently Observed</b>
There are occasional low key armed conflict in the country (between different armed groups/ government forces, etc)				
There is frequent acquisition of small arms and light weapons by residences.				
There are reported cases of police brutality in the process of enforcement of COVID 19 protocols				
There are community demonstrations/riots against insecurity in the country				
There is an increased movement of people displaced by conflict				
There were observed cases of criminal activities (theft and robbery) due to COVID 19 stress on economic situation of the citizens				



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There is an increased political incitement / negative propaganda that tend to generate violence				
There is existence of inter-ethnic/clan mobilization or groupings for violence				
There are cases of people being pushed out of their homes for political reasons (e.g. ‘ethnic cleansing’)				
There is increased reports on violation of human rights e.g. armed robbery, gender and sexual based violence, police brutality				
There is disruption of economic activities due to conflicts/violence ( such as trading, food supply, market activities etc)				

**Q13.** Based on the following active armed conflict indicators, please rate your observation on the presence of armed conflict in your region

<b>Active armed conflict</b>	<b>Not Observed</b>	<b>Rarely Observed</b>	<b>Sometimes Observed</b>	<b>Consistently Observed</b>
There is increased deployment of government armed security officers on the ground				
There are increased cases of armed conflicts in certain section of the country				
There is rise in violence and killing of innocent citizens				
There is increased inter-communal conflict (ethnic, religious or political)				
There is media information blackout				

There is displacement of communities and refugees influx into neighboring communities				
There is inter-border movement restriction in conflict affected areas				
There is presence of international peace keeping bodies such as UN, AU & EU in the affected regions				

**Q14.** Please rate the following statements based on your perception/ view on the decline of the armed conflict (outcome level)

<b>Conflict Intervention level</b>	<b>Not Observed</b>	<b>Rarely Observed</b>	<b>Sometimes Observed</b>	<b>Consistently Observed</b>
There are increased conflict intervention activities to end the conflict (mediation, negotiation, peace talks, sanctions)				
There is evidence of reduced conflict in the country due to conflict resolution efforts				
The active participants of the conflict have agreed to have peace talks				
People are seen as slowly taking on normal daily activities				
Reconciliation and peace building programs have been initiated				
There is ceasefire (the parties from both sides have agreed to suspend their aggressive actions)				
The protagonist have agreed to sign a peace agreement				
The key actors in the conflict are involved in the peace-building process				
The citizens holding arms illegally are surrendering their arms to the government in a demilitarization program				

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There is presence of international peace keeping bodies such as UN, AU & EU in the affected regions				
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**Q15.** Please rate the following post-conflict reconstruction indicators in your region based on your perception on the frequency of observation

<b>Post-Conflict Reconstruction</b>	<b>Not Observed</b>	<b>Rarely Observed</b>	<b>Sometimes Observed</b>	<b>Consistently Observed</b>
There is evidenced full resumption of daily activities by the residence				
The parties to the conflict have agreed to demobilize their forces				
There is a wider inclusion in the peace-building process/activities (includes women, youth, different ethnic groups, religious group)				
There is reduced tension and fear between different ethnic/religious/armed groups				
The refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are returning to their homes				
There is an improved security in the region with more police posts and security camps established				
There is reduced number of COVID-19 reported cases				

There is improved economic situation for citizens (resumption of economic activities, opening of markets/shops)				
The causes of conflict are currently being addressed				
Government justice processes have been initiated to address conflict crime				

**Q16 a.** Are there any peace restoration (like reconciliation) strategies that are currently being used by the government or other actors to restore peace in your region/country/location?

Yes

No

**Q16b.** If yes, please indicate the strategies undertaken locally (local actors), regionally (regional actors e.g. neighboring countries) and internationally (by international organization e.g UN or AU)

Communally(Peace interventions within & by the local community/ state/location/country)	
Nationally (Peace intervention at national level)	
Regionally (EAC, IGAD, Africa Union etc.)	
Internationally (UN, Other countries/organizations outside Africa)	

**Q17.** Please rate the effectiveness of the following challenges to peace restoration in your region

Challenges	Very Challenging	Moderately Challenging	Not a Challenge	Not sure whether it is a challenge
Lack of consensus between the peace actors				

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Lack of reformed judicial system that dispense fair justice				
Evidence of climate change leading to floods, drought and poor harvest				
Weak social agreements between the actors and failure to include all the stakeholders (youths, women and religious groups) in peace negotiation process likely to cause conflict				
Corruption evidenced by misappropriation and embezzlement of government resources				
Lack of government policies on peacebuilding				
Political incitements and hate speeches				
Unresolved historical grievances around land, compensation, and restoration				
Failure of signed peace agreements				
Availability and ease of access of small arms and light weapons by the locals				
Breakdown of peace talks				
Political goodwill				
Fragile government (under pressure from armed groups and political groups)				
COVID-19 pandemic challenges				
International interference by external actors (neighboring states, international bodies such as UN, EU, AU)				

Poor development in the region				
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**Q18.** Based on your experience and own opinion, please recommend on the best strategies to peace stability for government, peace actors, youth, religious leaders, NGOs etc?

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**Appendix 2: Description of the Indicators**

**Level 0: Peace**

L <sub>0</sub> I <sub>1</sub>	1. There is reduced number of conflicts resolved through community elders/ court system
L <sub>0</sub> I <sub>2</sub>	2. There is increased inter-ethnic peaceful coexistence and marriage
L <sub>0</sub> I <sub>3</sub>	3. There is reduced revenge killings and crime activities( e.g. cattle raiding and theft)
L <sub>0</sub> I <sub>4</sub>	4. There is an observed increase in youth and women employment
L <sub>0</sub> I <sub>5</sub>	5. There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to prevail without interruption
L <sub>0</sub> I <sub>6</sub>	6. There is perceived equitable resource distribution and services by the government
L <sub>0</sub> I <sub>7</sub>	7. There is perceived low level of corruption

**Level 1: Latent Conflict**

L <sub>1</sub> I <sub>1</sub>	1. There is increase of access of light weapons by ordinary citizens
L <sub>1</sub> I <sub>2</sub>	2. There is increase in political based hate speeches
L <sub>1</sub> I <sub>3</sub>	3. There is rise in the level of criminal activities/gang groups e.g. cattle raiding
L <sub>1</sub> I <sub>4</sub>	4. There are cases of ethnic discrimination by government authorities
L <sub>1</sub> I <sub>5</sub>	5. Poor governance (regional and national)
L <sub>1</sub> I <sub>6</sub>	6. Lack of gender inclusion and social groups (women, youth, labor/workers association) ) in conflict management process
L <sub>1</sub> I <sub>7</sub>	7. Disappearance of men and young people in the community
L <sub>1</sub> I <sub>8</sub>	8. Unresolved historical grievances and failure of peace agreements
L <sub>1</sub> I <sub>9</sub>	9. There is an increased complaints of economic hardships e.g. High cost of living

**Level 2: Confrontation Stage**

L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>1</sub>	1. There are occasional low key armed conflict in the country (between different armed groups/government forces, etc.)
L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>2</sub>	2. There is frequent acquisition of small arms and light weapons by residences.
L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>3</sub>	3. There are reported cases of police brutality in the process of enforcement of COVID 19 protocols
L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>4</sub>	4. There are community demonstrations/riots against insecurity in the country

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L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>5</sub>	5. There is an increased movement of people displaced by conflict
L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>6</sub>	6. There were observed cases of criminal activities (theft and robbery) due to COVID 19 stress on economic situation of the citizens
L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>7</sub>	7. There is an increased political incitement /negative propaganda that tend to generate violence
L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>8</sub>	8. There is existence of inter-ethnic/clan mobilization or groupings for violence
L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>9</sub>	9. There are cases of people being pushed out of their homes for political reasons (e.g. ‘ethnic cleansing’)
L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>10</sub>	10. There is increased reports on violation of human rights e.g. armed robbery, gender and sexual based violence, police brutality
L <sub>2</sub> I <sub>11</sub>	11. There is disruption of economic activities due to conflicts/violence (such as trading, food supply, market activities etc.)

### Level 3: Crisis Stage

L <sub>3</sub> I <sub>1</sub>	1. There is increased deployment of government armed security officers on the ground
L <sub>3</sub> I <sub>2</sub>	2. There are increased cases of armed conflicts in certain section of the country
L <sub>3</sub> I <sub>3</sub>	3. There is rise in violence and killing of innocent citizens
L <sub>3</sub> I <sub>4</sub>	4. There is increased inter-communal conflict (ethnic, religious or political)
L <sub>3</sub> I <sub>5</sub>	5. There is media information blackout
L <sub>3</sub> I <sub>6</sub>	6. There is displacement of communities and refugees influx into neighboring communities
L <sub>3</sub> I <sub>7</sub>	7. There is inter-border movement restriction in conflict affected areas
L <sub>3</sub> I <sub>8</sub>	8. There is presence of international peace keeping bodies such as UN, AU & EU in the affected regions

### Level -2: Outcome Stage

L <sub>-2</sub> I <sub>1</sub>	1. There are increased conflict intervention activities to end the conflict (mediation, negotiation, peace talks, sanctions)
L <sub>-2</sub> I <sub>2</sub>	2. There is evidence of reduced conflict in the country due to conflict resolution efforts.
L <sub>-2</sub> I <sub>3</sub>	3. The active participants of the conflict have agreed to have peace talks
L <sub>-2</sub> I <sub>4</sub>	4. People are seen as slowly taking on normal daily activities.
L <sub>-2</sub> I <sub>5</sub>	5. Reconciliation and peace building programs have been initiated
L <sub>-2</sub> I <sub>6</sub>	6. There is ceasefire (the parties from both sides have agreed to suspend their aggressive actions)
L <sub>-2</sub> I <sub>7</sub>	7. The protagonist have agreed to sign a peace agreement
L <sub>-2</sub> I <sub>8</sub>	8. The key actors in the conflict are involved in the peace-building process.
L <sub>-2</sub> I <sub>9</sub>	9. The citizens holding arms illegally are surrendering their arms to the government in a demilitarization program
L <sub>-2</sub> I <sub>10</sub>	10. There is presence of international peace keeping bodies such as UN, AU & EU in the affected regions

### Level -1: Post-Conflict Level

L <sub>-1</sub> I <sub>1</sub>	1. There is evidenced full resumption of daily activities by the residence
L <sub>-1</sub> I <sub>2</sub>	2. The parties to the conflict have agreed to demobilize their forces
L <sub>-1</sub> I <sub>3</sub>	3. There is a wider inclusion in the peace-building process/activities (includes women, youth, different ethnic groups, religious group)



L <sub>-1</sub> I <sub>4</sub>	4. There is reduced tension and fear between different ethnic/religious/armed groups
L <sub>-1</sub> I <sub>5</sub>	5. The refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are returning to their homes
L <sub>-1</sub> I <sub>6</sub>	6. There is an improved security in the region with more police posts and security camps established
L <sub>-1</sub> I <sub>7</sub>	7. There is reduced number of COVID-19 reported cases
L <sub>-1</sub> I <sub>8</sub>	8. There is improved economic situation for citizens (resumption of economic activities, opening of markets/shops)
L <sub>-1</sub> I <sub>9</sub>	9. The causes of conflict are currently being addressed
L <sub>-1</sub> I <sub>10</sub>	10. Government justice processes have been initiated to address conflict crime

Source: CRTP Research



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