

HIPSIR Research Series, No. 3 2020/01

CONFLICT MONITORING IN AFRICA FOR STRATEGIC INTERVENTION

HIPSIR Conflict Monitoring Tool (CMT)

Case Studies of
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
South Sudan and Kenya

Elias O. Opongo *(Editor)*

with Peter Maundu, Joyce Raichenah
Faith Ondeng, Linus Kawoundi *and* Allan Induswe



HEKIMA INSTITUTE OF PEACE STUDIES AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (HIPSIR)

Hekima University College

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HIPSIR CONFLICT MONITORING TOOL (CMT)
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ACRONYMS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
AU	African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
HSRP	Human Security Report Project
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
KST	Kivu Security Tracker
LRA	Lord Resistance Movement
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
RARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPLA	Southern People Liberation Movement
SPLM-FD	Sudan People's Liberation Movement Former Detainees
SPLM-IG	SPLM-In-Government
SPLM-IG	Sudan People's Liberation Movement In Government
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement In Opposition
SPLM-IO-Riek	SPLM-In-Opposition, led by Riek Machar
SPLM-IO-Taban	SPLM-In-Opposition, led by Taban Deng
SSR	Security Sector reforms
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

INTRODUCTION

The problem of conflict, especially between communities and nations has always been a dominant concern for societies and civilizations.¹ The Second World War (1939-1945) was a turning point to the tolerance of war. It was the largest armed conflict in human history ranging across the world and causing an estimated fifty million military and civilian deaths.² This stimulated an awareness on the need to develop preventive strategies to mitigate conflict and its devastating effects. During the Cold War, a bipolar system of world politics emerged along with new contenders of international leadership, the invention and subsequent proliferation of weapons. The post-cold war period in 1990s saw the emergence of intra-state conflicts in a number of nations and increases civil wars. In Africa, while intra-state conflicts have reduced tremendously since the early 2000s, there are still civil conflicts in Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Libya and South Sudan, while violent extremism has been experienced in Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, among others

In order to explore strategies of managing and possibly resolving conflicts, an in-depth analysis of causes, trends and manifestations of conflicts is important. Additionally, the psychological and behavioural elements as well as the systematic order of sectarian exclusion that generate conflict need to be understood. This means that the development and implementation of an appropriate conflict-monitoring tool as a model of conflict analysis is a requisite to the peacebuilding discourse. From the conflict monitoring exercise, preventive measures can be considered to ensure that the conflict is transformed and peace restored among the various parties involved. Hence, this project focused on the development of a conflict monitoring tool (CMT) with the selected sample countries as Kenya, South Sudan and DRC.

¹ J., Burton, & f., Dukes, eds, Conflict: Reading in Management and Resolution, p. 1.

² E., Roosevelt, World War II (1939-1945), Accessed June 8, 2019, url: <https://www2.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/world-war-2.cfm>.

South Sudan, Kenya, and DRC were selected for inclusion in the study because of the following reasons. Firstly, South Sudan represents other countries across the continent that have been engulfed with protracted conflict. The country has experienced intermittent conflicts since it gained its independence in 2011. At the centre of South Sudan's conflict are myriad of factors such as political arrangement for power sharing, agreement on the number of states, demobilization of the armed forces and formation of a government of national unity. There have been a number of peace agreements between President Salva Kiir faction and that of his former deputy Riek Machar. On 22 February 2020 the two protagonists signed an agreement to form a government of national unity, raising hopes for peace and sustainability in South Sudan, and subsequently ending violent conflicts and atrocities that have affected the country. Secondly, Kenya represents other countries across Africa that have been experiencing occasional conflicts and terror attacks. While the country is generally stable with a strong economic performance in the region, it has been experiencing numerous overlapping conflicts raging from ethnic clashes, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), election-related violence, and terrorism. Just like many other countries in Africa, the number of incidences of violent conflicts, their severity, and intensity has been increasing over the recent past. At the centre of Kenya's conflicts are issues concerning social fragmentation, ethnicity, political animosity, corruption, and impunity. Other issues include land disputes, discrimination, marginalisation, penetration of Al-Shabaab's ideologies into the country's local politics and proliferation of small arms. Finally, DRC represents African nations that have been experiencing protracted conflicts especially along competition for natural resources, inter-ethnic conflicts, national boundaries, poor governance and multiplication of militias. DRC does not only have fertile agricultural land and rich diversity of wildlife but also huge deposits of minerals like copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, uranium, platinum and palladium amongst others. However, unending state of violent conflicts has characterized the country for many years.³

The remaining part of the report is divided into three main sections. It starts with the conceptualization of conflict monitoring tool, followed by analysis for the existing tools for conflict monitoring. The next section provides

³ "Democratic Republic of Congo." Internal displacement monitoring Center, Last modified: June 7, 2019, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo>

historical and most recent background to the conflict and peace situation in the countries of study. This is followed by an analysis of the factors that tend to influence the status of peace or conflict. The following section outlines the methodology used in conducting the study. This includes research design, sampling and data collection strategies, as well as analysis of the data and systematic explanation of the development and application of the HIPSIR CMT. The final section outlines the diverse areas of concern in the study and some recommendations for action.

Conceptualization of Conflict Monitoring Tool

The development of the HIPSIR CMT was based on the theory of change, which “explains how a given intervention, or set of interventions, is expected to lead to specific development change, drawing on a causal analysis based on available evidence.”⁴ If key indicators that the tool is set to monitor are consistently observed, it would mean that the conflict will be escalating or deescalating. This can be explained by the fact that each indicator plays a certain role in the development of a conflict situation. Consequently, each actor reacts in a certain manner whenever a change in each of the indicators of measuring conflict level changes, which determines how the conflict situation unfolds. In response to such changes, peace practitioners are expected to intervene in order to deescalate the conflict. Theories of change are not only envisioned to be helpful but also practical.

The HIPSIR CMT seeks to generate information by monitoring conflicts with the intention of disseminating it to peace practitioners within each particular context. The consumers of the information are expected to help in restoring peace across the continent by improving economic, social, cultural, and political conditions of the people. In this case, the HIPSIR CMT seeks to promote peace by monitoring key indicators that point to concerns that would need attention. By doing so, measures can be taken based on the

⁴ <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=16&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiA2N6M-b7mAhVKAWMBS7zAb0QFjAPegQICAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.smallarmssurvey.org%2Ffileadmin%2Fdocs%2Ffiles%2FCCRVI%2FCCRVI-DFID-Practical-approaches-to-theories-of-change.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2nK5PRQAwkDJFkJbb4gvGk>

information provided to prevent escalation of conflict.⁵ Sound analysis, consideration of stakeholders' views, and lessons drawn from previous and existing peacebuilding efforts shall drive the theory of change in the context of HIPSIR CMT. From the understanding of the situation and context of conflict, an institutions or country can develop a theory of change that addresses the drivers of conflict and seeks sustainable solutions to the problem.

According to Babbitt, Chigas and Wilkinson. (2013):

A theory of change explains why we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context.” It is intended to make all of our implicit assumptions more explicit, in order to (1) clarify which drivers of violent conflict we are addressing; (2) state clearly what the intended outcome of programs will be; and (3) fully articulate how and why the program will address the drivers of conflict and achieve its intended outcomes.⁶

The theory of change is appropriate in understanding conflicts in Africa that are complex in nature due to the numerous drivers and actors involved. Such an approach helps in identification of actors-centred solutions to address the drivers of conflict effectively by leveraging on comparative advantages throughout the change process. In addition, the theory not only identifies the assumptions made, it also addresses the possible risks that may undermine peace efforts.

In this case, changing the highly dynamic conflict situation in Africa require constant spatial and temporal analysis of indicators and their relationship in order for actors to intervene effectively. This is the only way that actors can make positive contribution in deescalating conflicts across the continent.

⁵ <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=16&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiA2N6M-b7mAhVKAWMBHS7zAb0QFjAPegQICChAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.smallarmssurvey.org%2Ffileadmin%2Fdocs%2Ffiles%2FCCRVI%2FCCRVI-DFID-Practical-approaches-to-theories-of-change.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2nK5PRQAwkDJFkJbb4gvGk>

⁶ Babbitt, Eileen, Diana Chigas and Robert Wilkinson. (March 2013). Theories and indicators of change briefing paper concepts and primers for conflict management and mitigation. United States Agency for International Development.

The theory promotes learning within as well as between conflict cycles, which is one of the main objectives for monitoring conflict using the conflict curve. Each cause of conflict is well articulated using the theory of change before assumptions are made concerning any proposed peacebuilding strategies that is expected to promote peace. Over time, the assumptions shall be tested against all the evidence that shall be gathered using the CMT. This includes successes and failures of past peace interventions, which seeks to ensure that the logic for promoting peace is sound. If such interventions fail or performs dismally, the theory of change seeks to help actors make the necessary corrections on time. According to Babbitt, Chigas and Wilkinson (2013), “new learning and lessons from monitoring and evaluation help refine assumptions and inform decisions on how an approach should be adapted to deliver planned results.”⁷ This forms the basis for monitoring conflict and providing information to peace practitioners across Africa. The HIPSIR tool, as guided by the theory of change, can be adjusted to accommodate other indicators whenever circumstances change.⁸

Monitoring conflict is important because it acts as the basis for bringing the opinions of all actors together so as to develop peacebuilding strategies that are more likely to succeed. The theory of change explains how partnerships networks as well as partnership strategies can be managed. It supports consensus building through engagement of all actors. In this case, it encourages various actors to understand how the contributions of each other can be tailored towards achieving sustainable peace. The HIPSIR CMT shall seek to achieve this by helping all stakeholders in peacebuilding projects to understand as well as support each other’s’ contribution to the implementation of peacebuilding efforts. This is based on the premise that strengthening collaboration with the aim of achieving sustainable peace cannot be achieved without proper understanding of the conflict situation and collaborative efforts. The HIPSIR

⁷ <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&ved=2ahUKEwiA2N6M-b7mAhVKAWMBS7zAb0QFjAJegQIARAH&url=https%3A%2F%2Fundg.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2017%2F06%2FUNDG-UNDAF-Companion-Pieces-7-Theory-of-Change.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3NdTYITJ3ArVDUya7Fc7KF>

⁸ Babbitt, Eileen, Diana Chigas and Robert Wilkinson. (March 2013). Theories and indicators of change briefing paper concepts and primers for conflict management and mitigation. United States Agency for International Development.

CMT is therefore meant to help organizations and individuals in defining what contribution they should make in peacebuilding besides seeking support from other stakeholders on implementation of peacebuilding strategies.⁹ Once developed, the HIPSIR's CMT shall be one among the numerous existing tools. Some of the existing conflict monitoring tools and data sources are discussed below.

Existing Tools for Conflict Monitoring

*Conflict Alert*¹⁰ is a system of monitoring conflict that tracks and reports violent incidences, their causes, as well as their human costs in Philippines. Its development was based on two databases in 2015. It makes regional comparison of conflict situation with an intention “to shape policymaking, development strategies, and peacebuilding approaches by providing relevant, robust, and reliable conflict data.”¹¹ Its data sources include incident reports from police offices, news reports, and members of multi-stakeholder validation groups (MSVGs). Once the data is collected, it is sorted, encoded, validated, and analysed. The information is disseminated in form of charts, graphs, tables, and mapped locational context.

The Kivu Security Tracker (KST), which is based in the US, was developed in 2017 “to map violence by state security forces and armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo to better understand trends, causes of insecurity and serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.”¹² Just like the Conflict Alert Tool, the KST reports violent incidences that armed groups and security forces perpetuate.¹³ Trained researchers collect the data on daily basis after which it is entered into a database. They also review media reports, exchange information with other organizations, and verify the

⁹ <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&ved=2ahUKEwiA2N6M-b7mAhVKAWMBS7zAb0QFjAJegQIARAH&url=https%3A%2F%2Fundg.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2017%2F06%2FUNDG-UNDAF-Companion-Pieces-7-Theory-of-Change.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3NdTYITJ3ArVDUya7Fc7KF>

¹⁰ “Conflict Alert,” Conflict Alert, <http://conflictalet.info/about/>

¹¹ “Conflict Alert,” Conflict Alert, <http://conflictalet.info/about/>

¹² “Kivu Security Tracker,” Kivu Security Tracker, <https://kivusecurity.org/about/project>

¹³ “Methodology,” Kivu Security Tracker, https://kivusecurity.org/static/KST_Methodology_Nov2017.pdf

information before publishing reports.¹⁴

The Global Peace Operations Review is a US-based tool that was created in 1966. It “covers more than one hundred multilateral active peace operations.”¹⁵ It is based on the assumption that while peace operations are of great need, there is need to adjust to the dynamics of conflicts. It also emphasizes the use of operations of peace enforcement that does not exclude deployment of military force when necessary.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been in existence since 1966. Its main aim is “to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament.”¹⁶ It constantly collects data from open sources, analyses it, and uses the results to make recommendations.

Just like SIPRI, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) is majorly involved in conducting “research on the conditions for peaceful relations between states, groups and people.”¹⁷ Its emphasis is on understanding issues that either unite societies or split them. Some of the issues that PRIO investigates include how conflicts emerge, their effects on people, how societies respond to them, and how to resolve them.

The Human Security Report Project (HSRP) is similar to SIPRI and PRIO in that it is a research centre that was developed in Canada to “track global and regional trends in organized violence, especially because of terrorism and warfare.”¹⁸ Through its researchers, HSRP prepare online publications documenting global trends of conflict and violence. Its data on security statistics is dated back to as early as 1946.

The Institute for Economics and Peace is not only known for developing metrics for peace analysis but also for its prowess in quantification of economic value

¹⁴ “Methodology,” Kivu Security Tracker, https://kivusecurity.org/static/KST_Methodology_Nov2017.pdf

¹⁵ “About,” Global Peace Operations Review, <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/>

¹⁶ “Home,” Sipri, <https://www.sipri.org/>

¹⁷ “About,” PRIO, <https://www.prio.org/About/>

¹⁸ “Human security report project,” Wikipedia, last modified May 24, 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Security_Report_Project

of the same.¹⁹ In other words, it focuses on four study areas: measuring peace, positive peace, economics of peace, and understanding risk. It releases the Global Peace Index annually that “measures national peacefulness, ranking 163 countries according to their levels of peace.”²⁰ It collects at least 5000 data sets concerning eight factors that it uses to measure positive peace besides acting as a guide for overcoming conflicts and promoting lasting peace. It relies on data on 13 types of costs incurred on issues related to conflict to do economic valuation of violence as well as fear. Furthermore, the institute measures violence risks using data that it has been collecting since 1996.

Based in the USA, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) “is a disaggregated conflict collection, analysis and crisis mapping project. ACLED collects the dates, actors, types of violence, locations, and fatalities of all reported political violence and protest events across the world.”²¹ .

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is a Swedish based conflict monitoring tool and data source.²² It has been providing event-based data on violence for over 40 years. It relies on information from news reports that it codes before entering into the system. It controls data quality by conducting a post-estimation validation exercise.

Table 1: Summary of Conflict Monitoring Tools and Data Sources

Date	Name	Country	Scope
1980s	Uppsala Conflict Data Program	Sweden	Global
2011	ACLED	USA	Global
2011	Conflict Alert	Philippines	Philippines
2017	The Kivu Security Tracker	USA	Eastern Congo

¹⁹ “About,” Institute of Economics and Peace, <http://economicsandpeace.org/about/>

²⁰ “About,” Institute of Economics and Peace, <http://economicsandpeace.org/about/>

²¹ “About,” ACLED, <https://www.acleddata.com/about-acled/>

²² “About,” UCDP, <https://ucdp.uu.se/>

Date	Name	Country	Scope
1959	Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)	Norway	Global
1966	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)	Sweden	Global
2005?	Human Security Index Project	Canada	Global
1990s	Global Peace Operations Review (under CIC)	USA	Global
2007	Institute of Economics and Peace (Global Peace Index)	Australia	Global

(Source: HIPSIR Research)

The review of the aforementioned tools and data sources indicates that most of the existing tools are well-funded projects able to sustain consistent and prolonged monitoring of peace and conflict. They mainly originate from the West. They are also content or data rich. In addition, their main sources of information are media, security organizations, and international organizations. In addition, their strategies and focus are closely related, and they often share information across their networks.

HIPSIR CMT comes as an additional tool that adds value to conflict monitoring, particularly in Africa. Additionally, HIPSIR combines both secondary gathering of data through with qualitative research, by relying on key informant interviews. This approach gives voice to people closely related with the conflict situations, while at the same time triangulates and validates the information collected from news print and other popular media sources.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICTS AND PEACE SITUATIONS

If a conflict is not resolved, it becomes detrimental to the wellbeing and development of the citizens and a country as a whole. The consistent cycles of conflict in the DRC, Kenya, and South Sudan are major concern not only for the citizens and the states but also for the socio-political stability of the region. In order to address these conflicts appropriately, there is need for a constant and reliable analysis of conflict situations in view of planning adequate responses or preventive measures where necessary. Regular analysis is vital for creating good strategies for local and regional responses to the conflict. This section provides a contextual analysis of literature on the three countries by giving historical and most recent background to the conflict and peace situation in the three countries

Democratic Republic of Congo

Violent conflicts within DRC have been recorded from the nineteenth century when King Leopold II acquired the vast territory along the Congo basin as his own personal property and exploited a lot natural resources. He named it the Congo Free State. However, his methods of subjugating the indigenous population were so cruel that the Belgian government (in response to an international outcry) took over the territory re-naming it Belgian Congo in 1908. Belgian colonization continued the exploitation of the people and the land. Eventually, a Congolese uprising led to independence in 1960. However, the country immediately fell into a crisis and conflict over competition for political leadership. As a result there were armed violence, coups and cessation attempts leading to estimated 100,000 deaths.²³ The crisis ended in 1965 with a coup d'état by Joseph-Desire Mobutu who became the president and created a highly centralized government.

²³ "Congo Crisis", Wikipedia, Last modified May 28, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis

Mobutu's reign has been described as a 'kleptocracy'²⁴ as it was characterized by a patronage system of buying loyalty with bribes and amassing of wealth from public funds and resources. As much as there was relative political stability during his regime, significant human rights abuses were reported and the country's economic situation was severely affected. With the end of the cold war the West, especially the United States, no longer supported him, and they called for democratic reforms within the country, as did the citizens who had become disillusioned with his rule. Subsequently, in 1996 Laurent Kabila, with support from the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, launched a military offensive from Eastern Congo and reached the capital by May of the same year. His march towards Kinshasa was not without reports of atrocities meted out on the civilian population. This conflict was known as the first Congo war. However, by 1998 when Kabila asked the Rwandans and Ugandans to leave the country, there was further conflict that triggered the second Congo war from 1998-2003. This conflict also referred to 'Africa's world war', is often regarded as the genesis of the DRC's ongoing conflicts to date. The war was fought between Kabila's government with support from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad against the RDC (Rally for Congolese Democracy), a fierce rebel group, RDC-Goma, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, among other parties. To a great extent the instability in the DRC plays out in the instability within the great lakes region. In 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son Joseph Kabila replaced him as president. In 2002, "the Sun City Agreement, the ensuing July 2002 Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and Congo, as well as the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and Congo, put an official end to the war as the transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo took power in July 2003".²⁵

However, as much as the Second Congo War ended in 2003, it had set up the stage for subsequent violent conflicts in the country which has continued to this day, especially in the Eastern parts of the country. There has been multiplication of rebel groups over the years, culminating into five main conflicts: the first is the 2012-2013 M23 attacks backed by Rwanda. The second is the Kivu

²⁴ Daron Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier and James A. Robinson. "Kleptocracy and Divide and rule: A mode of personal rule." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2, 2-3(2004):162-192.

²⁵ "History of the conflict", Eastern Congo Initiative. <http://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict>

Conflict between the DRC army (FARDC) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The third is the Ituri ethnic conflict between the Lendu and Hema ethnic groups which have had historical differences over many years. In fact, the second Congo war brought in arms and increased grievances between the two communities. The fourth is the Kasai conflict between the army and customary chiefs in Kasai-Central Province in 2016-2017.²⁶ The fifth is characterized by multiple armed groups that remain active in the east. In conclusion, as a report by UNECA (2015) highlights, “today’s conflicts in the country are, to a large extent, a reincarnation of those of the past. This indicates that the structural causes of the conflicts have not been adequately addressed. Thus, even apparent episodes of peace, such as under the Mobutu regime in parts of the 1970s and in the 1980s, were achieved not by successful peacemaking, but through repression of popular discontent.”²⁷

South Sudan

For several decades, the South Sudanese people united to fight for their freedom. They had been exploited, subjected to slavery, abused and discriminated, not only on racial, but also on religious grounds.²⁸ Before cessation, South Sudan was ignored, and development indicators, whether of health, infant mortality, maternal mortality, drinking water, sanitation, or food security, were among the worst in the world.^{29,30} Hence, South Sudan’s clamour for change could not be suppressed or ignored. With different rebel groups engaged in guerrilla fights with the government based in Khartoum, South Sudan demanded for autonomy and self-determination. This justified rebellion as the only way to confront the oppressive and dictatorial leadership based in Khartoum. Consequently, Sudan suffered an intra-state protracted conflict that had diverse effects on the human population and the economy of the country. In between 1983 and 2005, about two million people lost their lives, over four

²⁶ “Conflict in the Kasai, DRC”, UNCEF West and Central Africa. <https://www.unicef.org/wca/conflict-kasai-drc>

²⁷ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Addis Ababa, United Nations, 2015), 9.

²⁸ F.H., Johnson, *South Sudan: The Untold Story From Independence to Civil War*, p. xiii

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

million were internally displaced (IDPs), and over eight hundred thousand displaced as refugees.³¹

The adverse effects of the civil war attracted the attention of the international community. As a result, there were different attempts to end the violence through dialogue and negotiation in a mediation process spearheaded by Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and funded by the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway (the Troika Nations). It is through such mediation that a peace agreement was reached with reforms of going to “the referendum on unity versus separation.”³² Nonetheless, the government of Khartoum was not committed to fully implementing the reforms upon which they were agreed. Due to the pressure from the United States and the international community, there was a referendum that saw over ninety percent of the southerners vote in favour of secession. Through struggles and persistence in the pursuit of independence, the South Sudanese remained firm and enshrined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Their dream was actualized on 9th July 2011 when South Sudan became the world’s newest country through its secession from the Sudan.³³

Basic changes were embodied in the terms of separation. Fundamental interest like border demarcation, oil and the tariffs for use in the Sudanese pipeline, transitional financial arrangements, citizenship, currency and other issues had to be addressed.³⁴ Additionally, the international community offered assistance and coordinated various programs of the CPA to help in building the state of South Sudan.

The people of South Sudan were relieved from a long period of oppression and denial of development. They were optimistic that their independence, the constitution and cooperation between their new leaders was to set a precedent for unity, peace and prosperity. This hope was short-lived when violence broke out in South Sudan in 2013. As a result, it is estimated that over fifty thousand people have been killed and possibly as many as 383,000, according to recent estimate, and nearly four million people have been internally displaced or

³¹ M., LeRiche, & M., Arnold, South Sudan, From Revolution to Independence, p. 2

³² F.H., Johnson, South Sudan: The Untold Story From Independence to Civil War, p. 13.

³³ Ibid., p. 1.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

fled to neighbouring countries.³⁵ There have been various peace initiatives and intervention by the local, regional and international community. A peace agreement signed in August 2015 failed to offer a resolution to the conflict. A 2018 revitalized peace deal signed seemed promising but did not bring peace to the country. On February 22 2020 President Salva Kiir and his former deputy turned foe, Riek Machar, signed an agreement to form a coalition government, raising hopes for peace in this troubled country.

Questions have been raised on which conflict resolution approach would be best applied to change the South Sudan situation. In fact, the strategy applied by the UN and Africa Union military interventions have influenced the methods of intervention of various regional countries present in South Sudan. From the onset of the South Sudan civil war in December 2013, IGAD chaired by Ethiopia took up the role of mediation in order to help strike a peace deal between the two main belligerent parties. These talks have however proved to be difficult because IGAD member states Sudan and Uganda were backing different sides in the war, Machar and President Salva Kirr, respectively.³⁶ In fact, the Ugandan forces were on the ground in Juba helping Salva Kirr's government fight Riek Machar. Hence, Kirr took a hardline position while negotiating since he was assured of protection by the Ugandan government.

Magnus Taylor notes that the South Sudan's 2011 independence directed its neighbors' rivalry toward competition for influence over the new state.³⁷ Sudan for a long time had been exporting oil that comes from the fields in South Sudan. Thus, they still wanted to control the new regime and continue benefitting from the oil. Uganda on the other hand have had a conflict with Sudan on the border issue even before the South Sudan independence.

³⁵ Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed June 7, 2019, url: <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>.

³⁶ Crisis Group, Salvaging South Sudan Fragile Peace, Accessed June 9, 2019, url: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/270-salvaging-south-sudans-fragile-peace-deal>.

³⁷ M., Taylor, From Conflict to Cooperation, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda, June 20, 2016, Accessed June 9, 2019, url: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/conflict-cooperation-sudan-south-sudan-and-uganda>.

During the 1990s, Uganda was suspicious of Islamist Sudan's apparent desire to expand Arab and Islamic influence southwards.³⁸ There were suppositions that the Sudan government financed the Ugandan rebel, the Lord Resistance Movement (LRA). The Ugandan government in turn decided to finance and support the Southern People Liberation Movement (SPLA). However, the Ugandan government in recent years has shifted from security interest to economic interest. Hence, the intervention by the regional block changed the dynamics of the conflict and the negotiation process leading to a prolonged civil war.

The United Nations on the other hand has defended its operations in South Sudan. In a statement by the U.N. Secretary General's Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng, the UN emphasized its main responsibility is to protect civilians and assist in the process of ending the war. He urged the South Sudan government to cooperate with UNMISS to allow the men and women in the blue helmets to discharge U.N. Security Council resolution 2327 (2016) that calls on the warring parties to return to the peace process and empowers UNMISS to use necessary tools to protect civilians.³⁹ Nonetheless, this cannot rule out the fact that the regional self-interest has led to the methods of intervention that in turn, has influenced the prolonged conflict. As such, the fatality rate has increased over the years and so many people displaced due to the civil war.

Factors that Tend to Influence the Status of Peace or Conflict

The drivers of the conflict in DRC, South Sudan, and Kenya are complex. There are those that are specific to the region as well those that are characteristic to respective countries. The horn of Africa is considered a conflict-prone zone. Roy Love notes that despite the changes of the regime and international efforts to broker peace agreements, the countries of the region experience consistently high levels of conflict, within and across the borders.⁴⁰ South Sudan serves as

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ UN Official, Peacekeepers in South Sudan not Intervention Force, December 14, 2017, Accessed June 9, 2019, url: <https://www.voanews.com/a/south-sudan-unmiss-mandate/4163740.html>.

⁴⁰ R., Love, Economic Drivers of Conflict and Regional Cooperation in the Horn of Africa: A Regional Perspective and Overview, 2, Accessed June 8, 2019, url: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bp1209horn.pdf>.

an example. Having fought the war of liberation and attained independence, the new nation was torn into violence just two years after celebrating their freedom of self-governance. Even though there was a change of regime and secession with efforts to create peace, still violence erupted in the new nation.

Economic Factors

Economic factors have also played a role in fuelling conflicts in DRC, South Sudan, and Kenya. Factors related to bad economic policies and the resulting weak development record,⁴¹ have prevented these governments from harnessing the huge economic potential that they hold. Economic deprivation has created a conducive environment for the disenfranchised to mobilize militarily. Using the utility theory, Collier and Hoeffler argue that rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits of conflict outweigh the cost of rebellion.⁴² The South Sudan war has been attributed to competition for power and natural resources. With the firing of Riek Machar and his allies based on corruption allegation from the government, the former vice president formed a rebel group. As Collier and Hoeffler point out, “their objective was to capture the state” and control the natural resources which is the economic base of the country.⁴³ Being a nation with various cultural disparities, the exclusion of some individuals from some communities seemed to appear as an injustice and inequality to the public. The fear of marginalization and unfair distribution of resources by a government that was dominated by one ethnic group, the Dinka, led to an eruption of violence.

⁴¹ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Addis Ababa, United Nations, 2015), 40.

⁴² P., Collier, and A., Hoeffler. “On Economic Causes of Civil War.” *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, no. 4 (1998): 563, Accessed June 7, 2019, url: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3488674>.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 564.

Presence of Armed Groups

The presence of armed groups in these countries has been fuelling conflicts in the region. In DRC for instance, groups like Mai Mai and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continue to perpetuate violence in the country. The Mai Mai militias operate as a self-defence network and a criminal rackets. In addition, the DRC harbours foreign-origin groups seeking safe haven and illicit revenues”.⁴⁴ For example, one of the most recent threats that come from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which is a Ugandan rebel group that is “based along the Rwenzori Mountains of eastern Congo. The group size currently numbers approximately 500 combatants. Most of its members are Islamists who want to establish Shari’a law in Uganda”⁴⁵.

Bad Governance and Systemic Institutional Failure

The state’s failure in delivering services, securing law and order, and defending the country’s interests at the regional and global levels has contributed to protracted conflict. Bad governance and high levels of insecurity from conflicts tend to lead to state fragility. Fragile states are vulnerable, and as a recovery strategy it is important to focus on state institutions in the development process, as well as external interventions and priorities based on deeply rooted knowledge of the local, political and economic context.⁴⁶ South Sudan at the onset of her independence had no proper state institutions where issues of corruption, abuse of power/office, inequitable distribution of resources and other grievances could be addressed. Lack of economic resources and qualified personnel were the major reasons that led to the lack of these institutions. Hence, people resorted to violence as a justification to address their grievance.

⁴⁴ Congressional Research Service. *Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations*(2019), p. 8

⁴⁵ “History of the conflict”, Eastern Congo Initiative. <http://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict>

⁴⁶ M., Ncube, and B., Jones, Drivers and Dynamics of Fragility in Africa. African Development Bank, Africa Economic Brief, 4(5), 2013, Accessed June 8, 2019. url: https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Economic_Brief_-_Drivers_and_Dynamics_of_Fragility_in_Africa.pdf.

Politicized Ethnic Identities

Roy observes that the incongruence between the legacies of colonial boundaries, ecological zones and cultural affinities peculiar to the region often mean that disputes in any one country have political and economic significance beyond their own local sphere.⁴⁷ There are various theories that explain the conflict drivers. Huntington explains the emergence of conflicts after the cold war as clash between cultures. He notes that in the new world, the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between people belonging to different cultural entities.⁴⁸ To support his argument, he gives examples of the bloody ethnic and tribal clashes that occurred in Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Uganda. Another example is the Yugoslavia conflicts where Russia provided diplomatic support to the Serbs, and Saudi Arabia while Turkey, Iran and Libya provided arms and funds to the Bosnians, not for reasons of ideology or power politics or economic interest but because of cultural kingship.⁴⁹ Hence, this theory holds that in the new world order, people isolate ideology and unite based on culture to work jointly in achieving their interest.

Elections and conflicts

David Carment argues that violent conflicts involves a crisis of legitimacy in which both state and society become arenas for open conflict and reformed-minded leaders lose ground to ethnic nationalists through the electoral process.⁵⁰ In Kenya for example, the unity between different regions of the country has failed mostly during election due to self-serving bases of power controlled by the elites. In the time of political and social upheaval, when insecurity prevails, corrupt ethnic leaders/elites have taken advantage of uncertainty to consolidate their power and promise benefits for their ethnic

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

⁴⁸ S., Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Accessed June 8, 2019, url: <https://www.stetson.edu/artsci/political-science/media/clash.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ D., CARMENT, "Exploiting Ethnicity: Political Elites and Domestic Conflict," *Harvard International Review* 28, no. 4 (2007): 62, Accessed June 8, 2019, url: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42763144>.

or political groups.⁵¹ Thus, the elites fuel ethnic violence in South Sudan, Kenya and DRC through social and political manipulations. On his address to the nation on the Independence Day, 9th July 2013, President Salva Kiir was criticized for not acknowledging or recognizing the presence of his Vice President.⁵² Thus, people asked questions if the president was already planning to work independently and segregate other ethnic communities. Issues of ethnic identity were already a concern when the country celebrated her independence. There were fears that exclusion of other ethnic groups would lead into violence. An African Argument Insider Newsletter reports that when violence erupted in Juba on December 2013, people were identified by their names. One was asked their name in Dinka and if he/she could not respond, he/she was shot on the spot. Thus, ethnic identity determined whether you are a victim or an aggressor.⁵³ The ethnic leaders united the communities together based on ethnic identity to organize and mobilise militarily. The Dinka formed the government military while the Nuer formed the anti-government military. As such, the South Sudan conflict is seen as both socially and politically driven.

Geopolitical Interests

Geopolitical interests at the regional and global levels fuel conflicts in the region leaving governments and the people at the mercy of external influences that they cannot always control. A good example is the role of Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda involvement in the South Sudan conflict. The interconnectedness between the various conflict drivers render the resolution of the conflict in the region challenging, since the origin of the civil war is multidimensional. One can therefore categorize the drivers of conflicts in DRC, South Sudan, and Kenya as complex because the various actors have different grievances that they give to justify their cause. An understanding thus, of different actors in conflict is important.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 62.

⁵² Johnson, F.H., South Sudan: The Untold Story From Independence to Civil War, p. 166.

⁵³ African arguments, Choosing to be a Dinka: Selecting Ethnicity Remains Elite's Privilege, AA Insiders Newsletter, February 28, 2018, Accessed June 8, 2019, url: <https://africanarguments.org/2014/02/28/choosing-to-be-a-dinka-selecting-ethnicity-remains-an-elite-privilege/>.

Categories of Key Actors of the Conflict

The key actors of the conflict in DRC, South Sudan, and Kenya can be broadly grouped into primary, secondary, and third party players. The primary parties are the direct actors in a conflict situation. They are those who are directly involved in the conflict. In most cases, they have the decision-making power to determine whether the conflict will be constructive or destructive. The primary parties often disagree with each other's views and oppose one another directly. Their goals are incompatible. For example, in the South Sudan conflict, Tethloach Ruey mentions four parties that were key actors of the conflict. These are the SPLM-In-Government (SPLM-IG), led by Salva Kiir, the SPLM-In-Opposition, led by Taban Deng (SPLM-IO-Taban), the SPLM-In-Opposition, led by Riek Machar (SPLM-IO-Riek) and the SPLM-Former Detainees (SPLM-FD), led by Pagan Amum.⁵⁴ The Salva Kirr, Taban Deng and Pgan Amum led groups interest is to ensure that Kirr's government remains in power by all means, making sure that its threats are completely wiped out. The Riek Machar led group aimed at overthrowing the government and capturing power. The South Sudan civil war outcome solely depends on their actions and decisions since they have a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict. In the DRC, some of the primary actors include the state, Congolese armed formed, political actors, individuals in government, and armed groups, and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, also referred to as MONUSCO.

The secondary parties are never directly involved in the conflict but are either allies or sympathizers. In the South Sudan conflict, China, Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, Uganda and Sudan have showed interest in the conflict. Ethiopia and Egypt who are rivalries due to water conflict over the issues of the renaissance dam build by Ethiopia along the Nile River. Secondary actors in DRC include the United States, which is the largest foreign aid donor to DRC and the largest financial contributor to MONUSCO; Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda that support militia groups in the Eastern Congo;⁵⁵ mining companies; and

⁵⁴ R., Tethloach, *The South Sudanese Conflict Analysis. Conflict Profile, Causes, Actors and Dynamics*, Munich, GRIN Verlag, 2017, Accessed June 7, 2019, url: <https://www.grin.com/document/411993>.

⁵⁵ KST, "After the elections, a shifting military landscape in the Kivus," Kivu Security Tracker, February 14, 2019, <https://blog.kivusecurity.org/after-the-elections-a-shifting-military->

trade partners like China, which is DRC's biggest trade partner and largest consumer of Congolese copper and cobalt.⁵⁶

The third parties are those that have taken the responsibility to engage in mediation, arbitration, dialogue and other intermediary roles. While from the onset of the conflict, the majority of the third parties may just act as observers, the magnitude of the conflict and its consequences may pull them to be involved. For example, the neighbouring countries that host refugees from South Sudan have been more involved in trying to ensure there is restoration of peace in the young nation. Tethloach Ruey mentions that the third party in the South Sudan civil war comprises the African Union (AU), IGAD, the Troika nations (United Kingdom, United States and Norway) and the UN.⁵⁷ From the onset of the war, these actors have actively been involved in mediation with efforts to unite Machar and Kiir. The IGAD and AU have however been challenged by the Machar led group for supporting Kirr and even in detaining Machar.⁵⁸ As such, we can see that the local and regional interventions have some impact on the South Sudan conflict. Examples of third-party actors in DRC include Humanitarian organizations, civil society and religious groups, and the African Union.

[landscape-in-the-kivus/](#)

⁵⁶ Congressional Research Service. *Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Relations* (2019), 12.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This study applied cross-sectional research design by comparing diverse perceptions and analysis from different contexts. The design was important in understanding the actual context of conflicts, their multi-level perspectives, as well as the cultural influences involved. The research also applied a mixed method approach, which accommodated quantitative as well as qualitative methods of data collection that helped in formulating the CMT using a holistic approach of interpretation.⁵⁹ The mixed method approach was also important in the rigorous use of quantitative research that helped in examining the magnitude of conflict and the frequency in which the conflict indicators were observed.

Target Population

The target population was mainly people with informed levels of knowledge from the general public, civil society organizations, NGOs and key informants from the DRC, Kenya and South Sudan. The population also included people involved in peace processes within the targeted three countries.

Sampling Procedure

Convenience and purposive methods of non-probability sampling were used. First, the countries were selected purposively to represent various conflict situations in the continent. Secondly, the participants were selected based on their availability and willingness to take part in the study. Inclusion criteria was used to ensure that only those people who had the desired attributes and experience took part in the study.

⁵⁹ <https://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/researchdesigns>

Data Collection Tool

A questionnaire was designed while guided by the objectives of the study as well as the findings of the literature review. The questionnaire included both open-ended and closed-ended questions designed around 64 indicators for measuring conflict levels. In order to test the validity and reliability of the tools, study included a wider consultation with experts in the field, as well as a test run of the questions with individuals in different countries. There was also a roundtable discussion on reliability of the tools with experts in peacebuilding. From the above consultations 34 indicators were validated as appropriate for measuring different stages of conflict in a country (see a copy of the questionnaire in the appendix A). A draft questionnaire was developed and translated from English to French, and later subjected to a pilot test. After making the necessary adjustments to address the issues that emerged during the pilot test, the tool was approved for official deployment.

Data Collection Procedure

A total of 508 copies of questionnaire were administered across the three countries. In those areas where internet access was not a big challenge, the questionnaire was administered online through the surveymonkey platform. However, the response rate was slow online resulting in the use of printed copies of questionnaire which were administered by the research assistants. Only respondents over the age of 18 years who gave informed consent participated in the study.

In South Sudan, data was collected in Juba, and 49 respondents working with various organizations completed the questionnaire. A research assistant who travelled from Nairobi to Juba was accompanied by a key informant to directly administer the questionnaire with respondents, while others were administered online via SurveyMonkey. This was vital because at the time of data collection, tensions were high as the former deputy president and one of the main protagonists in the conflict, Riek Machar, was expected to return to Juba for peace talks with President Salva Kiir Mayardit. However, the research still went on without any hindrance. In the DRC, 108 participants completed the questionnaire. Just like South Sudan, key informants filled in the questionnaire, both physically and online via SurveyMonkey. In Kenya,

research assistants went to Mombasa, Kisumu, Isiolo, and Eldoret where they directly administered the questionnaire to peace practitioners. In terms of distribution of respondents in Kenya across the counties, 85 of them (24.22%) were from Isiolo, 77 (21.94%) from Kisumu, 13 (3.70%) from Kwale, 75 (21.37%) from Mombasa, 12 (3.42%) from Siaya, and 89 (25.36%) from Uasin Gishu. In total, 351 peace practitioners in Kenya participated in the Study.

DATA ANALYSIS


Conflict Curve Assessment

In order to monitor the conflict levels, the HIPSIR CMT was designed for conflict curve assessment. A modified version of the Lund’s curve was adopted (See Lund’s curve in figure 1 below). The Lund’s curve is elaborate and gives different methods of intervention employed for conflict resolution. In addressing the ongoing conflicts, Lund’s curve of conflict is a useful tool.⁶⁰ According to Peace and Collaborative Development Network (PCDN), the conflict curve seeks to achieve seven goals. First, it indicates the stage of conflict. Second, it points to possible interventions that can be adopted by different actors. Third, it plays an important role in identifying the indicators for conflict early warning. Fourth, it shows five stages of conflict: “stable peace, unstable peace, open conflict, crisis, and war.”⁶¹ Fifth, it assesses how conflict escalates from one stage to another. Sixth, it is ideal in identifying patterns in the conflict. Finally, it shows increasing or decreasing intensity of a conflict situation.⁶²

⁶⁰ “Curve of Conflict,” United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/public-education/students/curve-conflict>

⁶¹ Swanström, Niklas L.P. & Mikael S. Weissmann. Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Beyond: a conceptual exploration. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=27&ved=2ahUKEwjnMa93cHmA2MBHW32Ao4QFjAae-gQIBBAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.files.ethz.ch%2Fisn%2F113660%2F2005_swans-trom-weissman_concept-paper_conflict-prevention-management-and-beyond.pdf&usg=AOv-Vaw3hQKnFtiI6PK9JM_iSCuNm

⁶² Marian Hassan, “Conflict Curve/Stages Of Conflict,” *The Peace and Collaborative Development Network (PCDN)*, June 27, 2010. <https://pcdnetwork.org/blogs/conflict-curvestages-of-conflict/>

Figure 1: Conflict Curve Representing Different

(Source: Conflict Curve Representing Different Levels⁶³)

The HIPSIR CMT conflict curve is an improved version of the Lund's curve because of two things. First, it merges the Lund's model with that of Mitchell linear conflict formation model.⁶⁴ Mitchell's model is based on the premise that the process of conflict formation involves the development or revival of some conscious and salient goals, by an individual or shared throughout a group, community, organization or state.⁶⁵ It includes the awareness that another group attitudes and belief is against the group desired goal or achievements. This develops from the incipient stage and can escalate to violent conflict and later the mitigation strategies. Some conflicts follow the path of mutual

⁶³ Conflict Curve Adopted from United States Institute of Peace, Accessed June 7, 2019, url: <https://www.usip.org/public-education/students/curve-conflict>.

⁶⁴ C., Mitchell, *The Nature of Intractable Conflict: Resolution in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 37-38.

⁶⁵ C., Mitchell, *The Nature of Intractable Conflict: Resolution in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 37-38.

threat, coercion and violence while others become involved in complex, institutionalized procedures in the search for solutions.⁶⁶ Hence, Mitchell developed a linear conflict formation model. The model flows from the onset of conflict where prevention strategies are employed to the stage of peacekeeping and containment in the violent stage, and finally to the peacebuilding process in post-violence. Figure 2 below shows the linear development of conflicts. However, Mitchell linear conflict formation model does not propose the best strategic responses that can be employed in transforming the conflict situation. In developing the HIPSIR CMT, this weakness was mitigated by fusing the Lund’s curve and the Mitchell linear model.

Figure 2: Mitchell Linear Conflict Formation Model on Development of a Conflict

Incipient	Latent	Overt	Violent	Post-Violence
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(Source: Mitchell, 2014, pp. 37-38)

The second improvement is that the HIPSIR CMT has a numerical scale of measuring conflict levels unlike the case of Lund’s and Mitchell models. The scale was developed through a rigorous process of selecting measurable indicators of conflict and statistical calculations that were tested over time to ascertain the accuracy in measuring conflict levels. Conflict level or the severity of conflict, according to the HIPSIR CMT, is measured on a scale ranging from negative 2 (-2) and positive 3 (+3). In this case, the CMT has six levels that are statistically calculated using 34 indicators of conflict. These levels and their respective numerical denotation (in brackets) are explained below.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 38.


Table 2: Levels of Conflict under HIPSIR CMT

Conflict Level	Description
Peace (0)	At this stage, there is no conflict whatsoever.
Latent (1)	This level is characterized by incompatible goals between one or more parties but hidden from the public. If not identified early and proper intervention not taken to address the causes of the tension, it may lead to confrontation. ⁶⁷
Confrontation (2)	At this stage, the conflict is more open. There could be intolerance that may lead to confrontational behaviour. If no interventions takes place, the situation may become polarized leading to crisis. ⁶⁸
Crisis (3)	At this level, there is war or open conflict.
Outcome (-2)	Either one party in the conflict is defeated. In addition, there may be intervention from a third party that leads to ceasefire. It may also occur when the conflict is ripe for intervention and all parties are tired and ready for dialogue. The force of the government could also lead to an outcome.
Post Conflict (-1)	When the issues are finally resolved and relationships normalize. If the cause of the incompatible goals among the parties is not addressed, the tension can occur and revert back to pre-conflict or confrontation stages.

Usually, many issues of a cycle of conflict are not fully addressed and this sets the stage for a subsequent conflict. A similar situation may also occur if state machinery is generally weak and not able to enforce enduring peace. The result is usually another outbreak of war. The HIPSIR CMT conflict curve is shown in figure below.

⁶⁷ Marian Hassan, "Conflict Curve/Stages Of Conflict," *The Peace and Collaborative Development Network (PCDN)*, June 27, 2010, <https://pcdnetwork.org/blogs/conflict-curvestages-of-conflict/>

⁶⁸ Marian Hassan, "Conflict Curve/Stages Of Conflict," *The Peace and Collaborative Development Network (PCDN)*, June 27, 2010, <https://pcdnetwork.org/blogs/conflict-curvestages-of-conflict/>

Figure 3: HIPSIR CMT conflict curve

(Source: HIPSIR Research)

Application of Conflict Monitoring Tool and Data Analysis

Data from South Sudan was used to demonstrate the analysis and application of the results in the development of HIPSIR CMT.

Step 1: Identification of Indicators of Conflict

Thirty-four (34) indicators were used to calculate the statistical rating of severity of the conflicts. Each level had a unique group of indicators. A full list of the indicators under each of the five levels of conflict are listed in Appendix B.

Step 2: Rating Participants' Responses

The indicators were presented to the participants of the study who rated them using a four-point Likert scale. The Likert scale measured whether these indicators were observed and if so, the frequency of their occurrence. In this case, the choices of the scale were 'Not observed', 'Rarely Observed', 'Sometimes Observed', and 'Consistently Observed'.

Step 3: Summarizing Participants Responses

The primary data from South Sudan was summarized using frequencies for each indicator under the four choices of the Likert scale (see appendix C for the data summary). The more such indicators for category one [levels zero (0), negative two (-2), and negative one (-1)] are observed, the higher the chances that the region or country is either enjoying relative peace or moving towards realization of peace. On the contrary, the more consistent indicators for category two [levels one (1), two (2), and three (3)] are observed, the higher the chance that the conflict situation is escalating.

Step 4: Weighting the Responses

Weights were introduced for the four categories of the Likert Scale because a 'Not observed' case of an indicator contributes differently in determining the conflict level compared to another case of 'Consistently observed' response of the same indicator. However, the weighting for the responses for indicators levels zero (0), negative two (-2), and negative one (-1) and those for levels one (1), two (2), and three (3) were rated in a reverse order. This was meant to maintain consistency in calculating the conflict levels. In other words, the weighting of the '**not observed**' indicators in category one was meant to mirror the '**Consistently observed**' category two indicators and vice versa.

Example:

The first indicator in conflict Level zero (L_0I_1) states:

[L_0I_1]: There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to proceed without interruption
(The consistent observation of this indicator means that the country is experiencing peace.)

The first indicator in conflict Level one (L_1I_1) states:

[L_1I_1]. There are complaints of economic hardships (drastic increase in inflation, high cost of living)
(The consistent observation of this indicator means that the conflict situation escalating.)

In this example, a '**Consistently Observed**' response for L_0I_1 implies a '**Not Observed**' response for L_1I_1 . Theory indicates that it is less likely that an

enabling environment envisioned in L_0I_1 will be accompanied by consistently observed complaints of economic hardships as stated in L_1I_1 . Therefore, the weighting of the responses for the two categories of indicators were based on the following interpretations.

- (i) An increase in the frequency in which category one indicators are observed means that the conflict is deescalating and vice versa.
- (ii) An increase in the frequency in which category two indicators are observed means that the conflict is escalating and vice versa.

Table 3 below shows the weights that were assigned for the responses for each conflict level.

Table 3: Weighting of Participants' Responses

Level	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
Level 0	3	2	1	0.01
Level 1	0.01	1	2	3
Level 2	0.01	1	2	3
Level 3	0.01	1	2	3
Level -2	3	2	1	0.01
Level -1	3	2	1	0.01

(Source: HIPSIR Research)

Table 4 below presents a summary of country-weighted means per each of the 34 indicators. In this case, the interpretation is that greater weighted mean depicts a case of higher conflict level. In order to build lasting peace, actors should seek to ensure that these weighted means are close to zero as much as possible. In this case, zero is the ideal weighted mean where the region or country enjoys absolute peace. For example, all indicators in level zero, negative two, and negative one should be consistently observed for the region to have absolute peace. On the contrary, none of the indicators in levels one, two, and three of the CMT should be observed in an ideal situation of absolute peace. Since the utopian situation of absolute peace cannot be practically achieved, the levels of conflict under the CMT are expected to oscillate between negative two and positive three.

Table 4: Country Weighted Means per Indicator


Conflict Level	Indicator	South Sudan	DRC	Kenya	Observation
Level 0	There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to proceed without interruption.	1.63	1.58	1.34	Poor distribution of resources and corruption had the highest weighted mean in all the three countries. This shows that most of the conflicts in these countries are attributed to disagreements on sharing of natural resources. While inequitable distribution of resources ranked highest in South Sudan at a weighted average of 2.53, Kenya and DRC had almost equal weighted mean of 2.05 and 2.04 respectively.
	There is peaceful coexistence between communities (different communities living alongside / interacting peacefully)	1.45	1.37	1.17	
	There is a well-functioning government (that upholds rule of law, provides adequate public services and offers political stability)	2.29	1.80	1.42	
	There are good relations with the international community	1.27	1.34	1.20	Among the three countries, Kenya was the most peaceful while South Sudan was at the highest risk of conflict
	There is a perceived equitable distribution of resources/low levels of corruption	2.53	2.04	2.05	
	There is a general perception that information is accessible	2.04	1.42	1.45	
	Level Totals	1.87	1.59	1.44	The fact that complaints of economic hardships had the highest weighted mean in all the three countries corroborate the assertion of unequal resource allocation and high level of graft. In this case, poverty thrives in environments with unequal distribution of resources and high levels of corruption. However, South Sudan is the worst affected with a weighted mean of 2.86 while DRC was the least affected with a weighted mean of 1.96.
Level 1	There are complaints of economic hardships (drastic increase in inflation, high cost of living)	2.86	1.96	2.45	
	There is an awakening of conflict memory by communities	2.47	1.68	1.90	
	There are some communities or sections of the community perceiving a sense of exclusion (marginalization)	2.55	1.72	1.98	
	There are reports of hate speech and/or inflammatory remarks	2.39	1.47	1.90	
	The functions of government deteriorate (inconsistency in provision of public services, rise in the level of perceived criminal activities in the region/country)	2.45	1.58	1.99	
	Level Totals	2.54	1.69	2.04	Based on pre-conflict data collected from the three countries, South Sudan is at the highest risk of conflict while DRC is at the lowest risk level

Conflict Level	Indicator	South Sudan	DRC	Kenya	Observation
Level 2	There is a disruption of economic activities (looting, theft of property, curfews)	2.31	1.72	1.89	In level two (2), most South Sudanese complained about weakened government functions as demonstrated by a weighted mean of 2.39. A similar finding was observed in Kenya but the weighted mean of 2.00 was far much lower than that of South Sudan. However, two major complaints were most dominant in DRC; demonstrations or riots and acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors that had weighted means of 1.85 each.
	There are demonstrations /riots	1.13	1.85	1.76	
	There is the acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors	2.27	1.85	1.34	
	The ability to cooperate or resolve conflict non-violently between the various political alliances has diminished and armed groups are being formed.	1.98	1.55	1.45	In terms of conflict escalation, the risk in South Sudan is highest while DRC has the lowest.
	Increase in fake news, negative propaganda	2.35	1.61	1.80	
	Weakened government function (increased reports of criminal activity- attacks, killings, sexual violence	2.39	1.57	2.00	
Level 3	Level Totals	2.07	1.69	1.71	In level three (3), displacements of citizens was the greatest pointer of conflict crises in South Sudan and DRC. This was indicated by weighted means of 2.52 and 1.95 in South Sudan and DRC respectively. However, the deployment of enforcement forces in some parts of the country was the greatest pointer of crisis with a weighted mean value of 1.52.
	There is open conflict/physical combat –combatant and non-combatant fatalities, damage of property, infrastructure	2.13	1.78	1.34	
	There is a media /information black out	1.90	1.28	1.07	
	Breakdown of government functions (no rule of law, government unable to provide security to citizens)	2.23	1.59	1.38	
	There is displacements of citizens (refugees and/or internally displaced people) which could lead to a humanitarian crisis	2.52	1.95	1.33	
	International/regional community imposes sanctions, calls to cease violence	2.04	1.26	1.14	
	Peace enforcement forces have been deployed to the conflict zone	2.21	1.91	1.52	
	Level Totals	2.17	1.63	1.29	

Conflict Level	Indicator	South Sudan	DRC	Kenya	Observation
Level -2	There is a reduction in the intensity of warfare/ceasefire (no. of fatalities, victims decreases, destruction of property/ infrastructure decreases)	1.25	1.45	1.27	As the results on level negative two (-2) indicators showed, the challenges that led to de-escalation of conflict after crisis differed across the three countries. In South Sudan, many people complained that the intensity of warfare had not reduced significantly (weighted mean = 1.25). In DRC, failure to implement and monitor peace agreements immensely slowed down the peace processes (weighted mean = 1.82). In Kenya, many people expressed their concerns that failure of some combatants to put down their arms has derailed peace processes in the country (weighted mean = 1.51).
	Some combatants put down their arms / surrender / parties to conflict tired of fighting	1.61	1.41	1.82	
	Key actors actively involved in the negotiation process, mediation activities are initiated and ongoing	0.90	1.47	1.34	
	Peace agreements are being implemented and monitored	1.42	1.51	1.24	
	Peacebuilding activities have been initiated or increased in intensity to address the conflict				
		0.76	1.16	1.08	
	Level Totals	1.19	1.40	1.35	
Level -1	Refugees and IDPs are returning back home /humanitarian crisis under control or resolved	1.69	1.23	1.83	In South Sudan and DRC, the situation has not normalized because the causes of the conflict have not been sufficiently resolved or addressed. This is demonstrated by weighted means of 2.02 and 1.81 for this indicator in South Sudan and DRC respectively. In Kenya, the greatest pointer that the situation is yet to normalize is failure for refugees and IDPs to return home as a sign that the humanitarian crisis has been fully resolved. This indicator ranked highest with a weighted mean of 1.83.
	Economic environment is stabilizing (regular economic activities have resumed)	1.82	1.41	1.31	
	Security Sector reforms (SSR) have been initiated to address conflict	1.78	1.40	1.21	
	The justice process has been initiated – includes initiatives to address conflict crimes legally	1.70	1.69	1.33	
	There is an absence of violence or fear of violence (negative peace)	1.74	1.63	1.38	
	The causes of the conflict have been sufficiently resolved/addressed (positive peace)	2.02	1.81	1.58	
	Level Totals	1.79	1.52	1.44	
					The situation is normalizing faster in Kenya as compared to DRC and South Sudan. The situation in South Sudan is still tense.

Figure 4 below presents a comparison of the total weighted means for all indicators in each level of conflict, that is, peace, latent, confrontation, crisis, outcome, and post-conflict levels.

Figure 4: Comparing Country Weighted Means per Conflict Level



Step 5: Introduction of Constants

Constants were introduced in each conflict level. The aim of introducing the constant was to uniquely identify the conflict levels on a scale between negative two (-2) and positive three (+3) as earlier stated. The constants for levels 0, 1, 2, 3, -2, and -1 were 0, 1, 2, 3, -2, and -1 respectively. In other words, all the values in the data summary were multiplied by constants respective of their conflict level. In addition, the total frequencies were also multiplied by the constants.

Step 6: computation of the Conflict Level

From the results from step 5 above, the level of conflict was calculated using the following formula.

Figure 5: Formula for Calculating the Conflict Level

$$CI = \frac{\sum c_{ij}[(f_{ij})w_{ij}]}{\sum (c_{ij}f_{ij})}$$

Where

CI = the conflict level

c_{ij} = the constant of the i^{th} row in the j^{th} column

f_{ij} = the frequency for the i^{th} row under the j^{th} column

w_{ij} = the weighting for the i^{th} row under the j^{th} column

i = the indicator number listed from level 0 to level -1 and appearing as rows.

j = Likert scale options that are listed in four columns as 'Not observed', 'Rarely observed', 'Sometimes observed', and 'Consistently observed.'

(Source: HIPSIR Research)

Substituting the numerical values in the formula above yields the following

$$\sum c_{ij}[(f_{ij}x_{ij})w_{ij}] = 2597.84$$

$$\sum (c_{ij}f_{ij}) = 912.00$$

$$CI = \frac{2597.84}{912.00} = 2.848508772$$

As indicated above, the result of the calculation was 2.85, which is close to the highest level of conflict as per the HIPSIR's scale of -2 to +3.

Step 7: Display of the Results


Using Ms-Excel, a heat map was generated using a conflict level of 2.851, which marked South Sudan in red as indicated in figure 4 below. Figure 6 shows the starting points for the conflict curves as at December 2019. After collecting, analysing, and updating the data in the next phases, the conflict curves shall continue to take shape. Using the same procedure, the values for the calculated conflict levels for Kenya and DRC were 1.677 and 1.834 respectively.

Figure 6: Heat Map



(Source: HIPSIR Research)

Figure 7: The Starting Points of the Conflict Curves for the Three Countries



(Source: HIPSIR Research)

Limitation of the Developed Tool

While the development of the tool has been a major milestone so far, various issues need to be improved. Some of the immediate limitations that need to be addressed include the following. First, the process of data collection needs to be automated in order to enhance accuracy level by minimizing errors that may be made during data entry. Furthermore, there is need to train more data collectors on the modern methods of gathering information. Second, there is need to focus on specific areas in each country since different regions experience different conflicts. For instance, conflict level of the eastern region of DRC is less likely to be equal to that of the western part of the country. This will require deployment of GIS in collection of data and presentation of the results. Fourth, there is need to create a platform that shall enhance dissemination of the results to consumers who are also expected to provide their feedback about the tool and its relevance in their regions and work areas. Such a platform may include development of a dashboard, or a website with the view of upgrading it to a mobile app for easier and wide use across the continent. Fifthly, the conflict indicators need to be tested continuously with the view of improving on the weighting through a process of regression


analysis. In addition, there is need to develop models of predicting conflict as more data is collected in the subsequent phases of the project.

Areas of Concern

South Sudan

The study examined different areas of concern in the contextual analysis of each country. For South Sudan it emerged that the three biggest challenges to peace intervention efforts were mistrust among conflict parties, lack of political goodwill, and unresolved grievances from past conflicts. Even though participants rated breakdown of peace talks as the least challenge to peace interventions in the country, one should remember that such peace talks are usually successful in an environment characterized by trust and political goodwill. The study took place before the February 22 2020 peace deal between Riek Machar and President Salvar Kiir that raised hopes for peace and stability in the country.

Figure 8: Challenges to Peace Intervention Efforts in South Sudan



(Source: HIPSIR Research)

Besides the listed challenges, participants identified others including complex traumas, international community unwillingness to support the Revitalized


Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (RARCSS), presence of violent extremist groups, the legacy of violence, ethnicism and sectarianism, and easy access to small arms.

The figure below presents some of the challenges in peace intervention in Kenya and DRC.

Figure 9: Challenges to Peace Intervention Efforts in Kenya



Figure 10: Challenges to Peace Intervention Efforts in DRC



Recommendations

Despite the gains that the three countries have made in improving peace processes, participants believe that all stakeholders need to do more. Based on the participants' views, some of the recommendation in terms of actions that need to be taken in South Sudan include the following.

Reorganization of the Government

South Sudan, according to the participants, need regime change in the politics and government. In addition, some participants proposed the change of the current system of government to a federal system. However, some people called for the establishment of rotational presidency among three regions of Ge, Gun, and Gbg. Some of the respondents called for retiring of the active army generals. This, according to some of the respondents require high level of political will. Other people called for formation of a technocrat government. Besides encouraging the opposition parties to make realistic demands, a number of respondents believed that the states should be reduced to ten. However, other respondents preferred that the government retains the 36 states. The February 22 2020 agreement between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar Judicial, resolved to have 10 states. Respondents also proposed reforms in order to allow the rule of law to reign in the country. Calls were made for electoral reforms to promote free and fair elections.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

It would be important to impose a complete embargo on aid and arms to warring factions alongside conducting a disarmament exercise. Ex-combatants should also be re-integrated back into the society. In other words, there should be a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process. The international community in collaboration with the warring parties and other non-state actors should undertake the DDR exercise that should involve former combatants. Unification of security forces was also cited as an important measure to ending the country's conflicts. In addition, many people proposed the idea of cantonment of armed forces before reintegration exercise.

Signing and Honouring a Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The signing and honouring of a comprehensive peace agreement by all conflict parties was identified as an important factor to peace sustainability. While some people called for minimum mediation in the negotiation process, others argued that the issue of inclusivity in all levels from the grassroots should be considered. This would also include the formation of region-specific peace forums. Furthermore, there is need to engage the church to mediate between warring parties.

Investment in Economic and Social Sectors

Some participants called for huge investment in economic and social sectors especially in conflict zones. In addition, most participants proposed the need to promote equitable distribution of resources. People's lives should be prioritized over resources. As a result, many people called for the development of physical infrastructure; roads, health facilities, schools, and so on. Provision of basic needs to the citizens should be emphasized. Other people called for promotion of job creation especially for marginalized communities and groups such as women and youth. There is also the need to address corruption to ensure that people, especially the youth, are employed on merit. In addition, there is need to equip the youth with life skills. Trust, transparency and understanding amongst the political parties should be improved in administration of resources. In this case, there is need for the creation of a financial monitoring system of oil income and expenditures. There is need to appeal for aid to support development and rehabilitation initiatives that improve the overall wellbeing of the people in war-torn areas. This would encourage the active combatants to lay down arms and work towards re-building the country.

Reconciliation

Promoting education on peace and reconciliation initiatives was suggested by respondents. This should be accompanied by increased awareness about the peace agreement and the active involvement of the non-state actors in the peace process to ensure that citizens own the process. Many people called for encouragement of forgiveness, love and tolerance where South Sudanese respect the opinion of others even if they do not agree. Some people called

for enhanced freedom of expression and political space. Trauma healing was also proposed where all traumatised actors to the conflict would be involved. However, some participants called for punishment of the perpetrators of violent crimes. In their argument, there is need to call for support from local and international justice mechanisms to bring to book the perpetrators of war in order to serve as an example that deters escalation of the conflict. This would also be part of the efforts to address the root causes of the conflict including historical grievances. In addition, it would also involve promotion of peaceful coexistence among members of different ethnic communities.

More Involvement of External Actors in Peacebuilding

Another recommendation was the involvement of external actors in the signing of the peace deal. This should be accompanied by putting pressure on the main actors to the conflict and continuously holding them accountable to the terms of the peace agreements. Some participants called for adoption of a regional approach to peacebuilding through Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and African Union, as well as other foreign actors. The aim would be to resolve the conflict on regional level in order to find a sustainable solution to the conflict.

CONCLUSION

Conflicts have ravaged many countries in Africa, and South Sudan, Kenya, and DRC are not an exception. Many lives have been lost and millions of people displaced in these countries, as well as property destroyed. Many efforts have been put in place to resolve the conflicts with varying level of success. As more efforts continue to be pursued, understanding the dynamics of the conflicts from the perspective of the people at the grassroots is very important. In addition, the conflicts are less likely to be resolved successfully if all actors are not involved. Exclusion of various groups of people in peace processes especially the young women, and ex-rebels is a major drawback to attaining peace in these countries. On realizing the need to bring all actors together through creation of a platform for gathering and sharing of information, the Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations (HIPSIR) embarked on the journey to create a conflict monitoring tool (CMT) also known as the HIPSIR CMT. Though its development is still in its initial stages, it hopes to make a major contribution to the practice of conflict monitoring in Africa by fostering cooperation in generating information from Africa and by Africa at all levels of the society. The use of the HIPSIR CMT would allow for a broader identification of the causes of conflict and propositions on possible ways of resolving conflicts. The preliminary results of the HIPSIR CMT rank South Sudan at highest risk of escalating conflict with a value of 2.849 out of the maximum of 3 at which a country is said to be at crisis stage. The DRC and Kenya come second and third with conflict levels at 1.834 and 1.677 respectively. The HIPSIR CMT shall continue to track how the situation unfolds and propose feasible and grassroots-centred ways of resolving the conflicts. The tracking of the changes shall be displayed through real-time conflict curves and a heat map. In addition, detailed downloadable reports shall be released on quarterly basis.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: The Data Collection Tool

A Survey for Assessing Conflict Levels

The Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations (HIPSIR) of Hekima University College, based in Nairobi - Kenya, is conducting a study to assess the conflict situation in various countries in Africa. This survey seeks to gather information that shall be used to develop an early warning system, which will help in conflict monitoring across the region. Your participation in this survey would be greatly appreciated.

1. What is the name of your **organization**?

2. Which **country** do you work in?

3. How many **years of experience** have you had in Conflict and peace activities?

4. How would you describe the **nature of the conflict** in your country?

- ☐ Ethnic driven
- ☐ Economic driven
- ☐ Sociopolitical driven
- ☐ Other (please specify)

5. What *factors have sustained the conflict* in your country? (Tick as many as apply to this conflict situation)

- ☐ Proliferation Armed groups
- ☐ Proliferation of small arms
- ☐ Dishonoring of peace agreement
- ☐ Ethnic differences
- ☐ Competition for natural resources
- ☐ International interferences
- ☐ Historical unaddressed grievances
- ☐ Government failure (providing basic needs, security)
- ☐ Other (please specify)

6. Out of the *actors* listed below, please indicate those you believe are *involved* in this specific conflict situation, and categorize them as primary (P), secondary(S) or third party (T) actors.

		Primary (P)	Secondary (S)	Third part (T)
a.	Government (police, army)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b.	Armed groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c.	Prominent individuals (opposition leaders, rebel leaders, government leaders, community leaders etc)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d.	Regional actors (neighboring states)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e.	International state actors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f.	Regional intergovernmental organizations (e.g. IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g.	International intergovern- mental organizations (UN, EU, AU)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h.	Multinational Corporations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Other (please specify)			

7. Which **actor(s)** in your opinion **initiated this conflict**? Please be specific.

8. In your opinion, to what extent have you observed the following scenarios that show that there is **NO CONFLICT** (positive peace or negative peace) in your country?

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to proceed without interruption.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There is peaceful co-existence between communities (different communities living alongside / interacting peacefully)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There is a well- functioning government (that upholds rule of law, provides adequate public services and offers political stability)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There are good relations with the international community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There is a perceived equitable distribution of resources/low levels of corruption	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There is a general perception that information is accessible	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

9. In order to find out whether your country is in **PRE-CONFLICT LEVEL** (realization or voicing of incompatible interests/goals), rate the following statements on the basis of observation levels (from not observed to consistently observe)?

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
There are complaints of economic hardships (drastic increase in inflation, high cost of living)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There is an awakening of conflict memory by communities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There are some communities or sections of the community perceiving a sense of exclusion (marginalization)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There are reports of hate speech and/or inflammatory remarks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The functions of government deteriorate (inconsistency in provision of public services, rise in the level of perceived criminal activities in the region/country)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10. How would you rate the following statements in establishing whether your country is in the **CONFRONTATION CONFLICT LEVEL** (conflict is more open, if there is no intervention will lead to crisis level)?

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
There is a disruption of economic activities (looting, theft of property, curfews)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There are demonstrations /riots	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There is the acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
The ability to cooperate or resolve conflict non- violently between the various political alliances has diminished and armed groups are being formed.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Increase in fake news, negative propaganda	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Weakened government function (increased reports of criminal activity- attacks, killings, sexual violence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. In determining whether your country is in **ACTIVE ARMED CONFLICT** (open conflict, armed conflict, violent conflict, war-crisis), please indicate your rating of the following statements.

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
There is open conflict/physical combat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
–combatant and non- combatant fatalities, damage of property, infrastructure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There is a media / information black out	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Breakdown of government functions (no rule of law, government unable to provide security to citizens)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There is displacements of citizens (refugees and/or internally displaced people), which could lead to a humanitarian crisis	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
International/regional community imposes sanctions, calls to cease violence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Peace enforcement forces have been deployed to the conflict zone	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

12. Please indicate how frequent the following scenarios are observed in order to establish whether your country is **EXPERIENCING A DECLINE IN OPEN-ARMED CONFLICT** (outcome level - decrease in intensity of conflict).

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
There is a reduction in the intensity of warfare/ceasefire (no. of fatalities, victims decreases, destruction of property / infrastructure decreases)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Some combatants put down their arms / surrender / parties to conflict tired of fighting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Key actors actively involved in the negotiation process, mediation activities are initiated and ongoing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Peace agreements are being implemented and monitored	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Peacebuilding activities have been initiated or increased in intensity to address the conflict	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please indicate how noticeable the following characteristics of **POST CONFLICT LEVEL** are in your country.

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
Refugees and IDPs are returning back home / Humanitarian crisis under control or resolved	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic environment is stabilizing (regular economic activities have resumed)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Security Sector reforms (SSR) have been initiated to address conflict	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed
The justice process has been initiated – includes initiatives to address conflict crimes legally	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There is an absence of violence or fear of violence (negative peace)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The causes of the conflict have been sufficiently resolved / addressed (positive peace)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

13. In your opinion what are the **top three peace interventions** that have been undertaken to resolve this conflict? (Begin with the most successful peace intervention)

Intervention 1:	
Intervention 2:	
Intervention 3:	

14. Please rate the following **challenges to peace intervention efforts** in bringing about a resolution to the conflict

	Not a challenge	Not sure if it is a challenge	Moderately Challenging	Very Challenging
Lack of political goodwill	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Authoritative /fragile government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mistrust amongst conflict parties	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Negotiations not involving all parties	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Breakdown of peace talks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Peace agreements not fully implemented	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unrealistic demands from conflict parties	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Illegal exploitation of natural resources in conflict zone	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Not a challenge	Not sure if it is a challenge	Moderately Challenging	Very Challenging
Availability of small arms and light weapons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Poor development in the country	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unresolved grievances from past conflicts in the same country or among the same people	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
External interference (from other states, business organization etc)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (please specify)				

15. Please list **the current peace interventions** being carried out to resolve this conflict situation. Please rate them (1, 2, 3....) according to which you perceive as most effective in resolving this conflict. (1=most effective).

1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	

16. Based on your opinion and experience, please list three **ways in which this conflict can be successfully resolved?**

a.	
b.	
c.	

Appendix B: Indicators of Conflict

Abbreviation	Description of the Indicator
Level 0: Peace	
L ₀ I ₁	There is an enabling environment that allows economic activities to proceed without interruption.
L ₀ I ₂	There is peaceful coexistence between communities (different communities living alongside / interacting peacefully)
L ₀ I ₃	There is a well-functioning government (that upholds rule of law, provides adequate public services and offers political stability)
L ₀ I ₄	There are good relations with the international community
L ₀ I ₅	There is a perceived equitable distribution of resources/low levels of corruption
L ₀ I ₆	There is a general perception that information is accessible
LEVEL 1: LATENT CONFLICT	
L ₁ I ₁	There are complaints of economic hardships (drastic increase in inflation, high cost of living)
L ₁ I ₂	There is an awakening of conflict memory by communities
L ₁ I ₃	There are some communities or sections of the community perceiving a sense of exclusion (marginalization)
L ₁ I ₄	There are reports of hate speech and/or inflammatory remarks
L ₁ I ₅	The functions of government deteriorate (inconsistency in provision of public services, rise in the level of perceived criminal activities in the region/country)
LEVEL 2: CONFRONTATION STAGE	
L ₂ I ₁	There is a disruption of economic activities (looting, theft of property, curfews)
L ₂ I ₂	There are demonstrations /riots
L ₂ I ₃	There is the acquisition of small arms and light weapons by non-state actors
L ₂ I ₄	The ability to cooperate or resolve conflict non-violently between the various political alliances has diminished and armed groups are being formed.
L ₂ I ₅	Increase in fake news, negative propaganda
L ₂ I ₆	Weakened government function (increased reports of criminal activity- attacks, killings, sexual violence)

Abbreviation	Description of the Indicator
LEVEL 3: CRISIS STAGE	
L ₃ I ₁	There is open conflict/physical combat –combatant and noncombatant fatalities, damage of property, infrastructure
L ₃ I ₂	There is a media /information black out
L ₃ I ₃	Breakdown of government functions (no rule of law, government unable to provide security to citizens)
L ₃ I ₄	There is displacements of citizens (refugees and/or internally displaced people),which could lead to a humanitarian crisis
L ₃ I ₅	International/regional community imposes sanctions, calls to cease violence
L ₃ I ₆	Peace enforcement forces have been deployed to the conflict zone
LEVEL -2: OUTCOME STAGE	
L ₋₂ I ₁	There is a reduction in the intensity of warfare/ceasefire (no. of fatalities, victims decreases, destruction of property/infrastructure decreases)
L ₋₂ I ₂	Some combatants put down their arms / surrender / parties to conflict tired of fighting
L ₋₂ I ₃	Key actors actively involved in the negotiation process, mediation activities are initiated and ongoing
L ₋₂ I ₄	Peace agreements are being implemented and monitored
L ₋₂ I ₅	Peace building activities have been initiated or increased in intensity to address the conflict
LEVEL -1: POST-CONFLICT LEVEL	
L ₋₁ I ₁	Refugees and IDPs are returning back home /humanitarian crisis under control or resolved
L ₋₁ I ₂	Economic environment is stabilizing (regular economic activities have resumed)
L ₋₁ I ₃	Security Sector reforms (SSR) have been initiated to address conflict
L ₋₁ I ₄	The justice process has been initiated – includes initiatives to address conflict crimes legally
L ₋₁ I ₅	There is an absence of violence or fear of violence (negative peace)
L ₋₁ I ₆	The causes of the conflict have been sufficiently resolved/addressed (positive peace)

(Source: HIPSIR Research)

Appendix C: South Sudan Data Summary

Indicator	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed	Total counts
L0i1	12	14	16	7	49
L0i2	7	15	20	7	49
L0i3	24	18	4	3	49
L0i4	4	11	28	6	49
L0i5	32	13	2	2	49
L0i6	17	20	9	3	49
L1i1	1	1	2	45	49
L1i2	2	1	18	28	49
L1i3	2	3	10	34	49
L1i4	2	2	20	25	49
L1i5	2	3	15	29	49
L2i1	2	6	16	25	49
L2i2	13	22	9	5	49
L2i3	5	3	14	26	48
L2i4	6	9	13	20	48
L2i5		7	17	24	48
L2i6	4	2	14	29	49
L3i1	5	4	19	20	48
L3i2	3	9	26	10	48
L3i3	4	3	19	22	48
L3i4	4	3	5	36	48
L3i5	6	8	11	22	47
L3i6	4	4	18	22	48

Indicator	Not observed	Rarely observed	Sometimes observed	Consistently observed	Total counts
L-2i1	8	4	29	8	49
L-2i2	10	14	21	4	49
L-2i3	4	4	21	17	46
L-2i4	9	13	15	11	48
L-2i5	2	6	19	22	49
L-1i1	10	18	17	4	49
L-1i2	13	21	8	7	49
L-1i3	13	18	12	6	49
L-1i4	15	14	10	10	49
L-1i5	14	17	9	9	49
L-1i6	20	13	13	3	49
This table presents the data summary for each of the 34 indicators. Abbreviations LxI_j for the indicators denote conflict level x indicators number j , where x and j are integers ranging from negative two (-2) to positive six (6).					

(Source: HIPSIR Research)



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